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SUMMARY 
This work is a study of power and control in industry, and focusses 
upon the possibility of radical democratic innovations in control. In 
particular the problems of producer co-operatives in market systems are 
examined. 
Volume I presents a detailed analysis of the Scottish Daily News 
workers' Co-operative, and seeks to isolate the reasons for the 
abrupt failure of the enterprise. 
Volume II examines the political economy Ofi the press, and the 
difficulties to be encountered by any attempt to launch a non-
commercial newspaper committed to radical politics. 
Volume III presents a review of the historical development of 
producer co-operatives, case studies of the two other co-operatives 
launched with the assistance of Department of Industry funds in 1975, 
KME and Triumph Meriden, discusses contemporary co-operative theory, 
and considers the extent of current co-operative development. 
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PREFACE 
Research Aims 
, 
This research began as a study of power and control in industry. 
I was particularly interested in the possibility of radical democratic 
innovations in control. At the time, in early 1974, it seemed quite 
likely that the growing academic and political interest in industrial 
democracy might be soon translated into practical efforts in this country. 
Sooner than I had anticipated, the opportunity arose to examine a 
spontaneous attempt at workers' control when the. Fisher Bendix (IPD) 
factory at Kirkby, Liverpool, was occupied in resistance to closure. 
I 
I had been brought up in Kirkby and had many friends and relatives 
working at the plant who were keen to assist in a detailed study of 
1 the work-in during July 1974. 
Negotiations at the Department of Industry between the Secretary 
of State, Tony Benn and the senior stewards of IPD, led to the creation 
of a workers' co-operative, Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering~ 
Although full of idealism and curiousity about the concept of a 
co-operative, many of the workers and stewards harboured serious 
misgivings about the problems they would encounter in the attempt to 
make the co-operative succesful in both commercial and democratic 
terms. I shared their apprehensions, and felt it important that the 
development of the co-operative should be closely examined. 
It then seemed· logical to extend the study to the two other 
co-operatives that workers were attempting to launch at this time 
15it-In at Fisher Bendix, rwc Pamphlet 42, Nottingham,1914. 
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with assistance from Bennis Department of Industry: Triumph Heriden 
Motorcycle Co-operative, and the Scottish Daily News. A cOMparative 
study would reveal more about the difficulties involved in establishing 
workers l co-operatives, and in their organization and functioning. 2 
Upon arrival at the Scottish Daily News in June 1975, and later at 
Triumph Meriden in March 1976, I was fascinated to find that although 
these two co-operatives were operating in different industries to 
KME, in different parts of the country with differ.ent labour traditions, 
that they shared many similar experiences, and were immersed in very 
similar problems. 
The workers at these three co-operatives were bravely embarking 
on a hazardous venture, somewhat clinically termed by the Department 
of Industry II a social experiment". Alrrost everyone was prepared to 
wish them wel11 they enjoyed a great deal of public sympathy, particularly 
in the communities in which they were situated, and were the subject 
of intense scrutiny from both academics and the media. However they 
could count on very little practical assistance, either from industry 
or financial institutions (who regarded thenl as little more than 
renegade outfits) 1 from the Department of Industry after Benn's 
departure in June 1975; or from the wider labour movement from which 
they became increasingly isolated. 
Considering that the £10 million paid to the co-operatives was 
only a tiny fraction of the assistance paid by government ,to private 
industry each year,.Benn has commented on the suprising force of the 
opposition this aroused: 
2 
"A Comparative Study of Three Major Workers' Co-operatives", 
SSRC Final Report, September 1978. 
"Men at Meriden or the Scottish Daily News or Kirkby 
were transformed not by anything that was done by 
government, but· by their readiness to take responsibility. 
There was the most bitter official hostility to what 
they were trying to do. I have never in the whole of my 
political life known the establishment devote so much 
time and effort to trying to frustrate an industrial 
initiative as they did with the co-operatives. At first 
I couldn't understand it. The reas.ons given were so 
unconvincing. They said this could 'damage the interests 
of co-operation'. 'Wouldn't it be better to get 
co-operatives going where they could be successful?' 
Those who said this didn't believe in co-operation 
anywhere, successful or unsuccessful. Then they said this 
would be unfair to the people concerned as they were 
bound to fail. But the real reason was that if you open 
up an escape from the mechanisms of market discipline 
which gives the owners the ultimate power to sack, 
you have undjrmined the who~e basis of capitalist 
discipline." 
Leaving aside for the moment whether the co-operatives were "an 
escape from the ordinary mechanisms of market discipline", (and it 
iii 
is a central theme of this study that they were not), Benn's comment 
does reveal the deep reluctance among those in power in industry 
and government to contemplate any reform that apparantly challenges 
conventional hierarchies and practices, and helps explain the 
precariousness of the co-operatives'existences. 
It quickly became clear to me that although the focus of my 
study might be the organisation and functioning of the co-operatives, 
with a particular interest in any innovations in industrial relations, 
that any explanation would be inadequate without a parallel investigation 
of .the commercial ~roblems confronted by the co-operatives, and the 
impact of the market environment in which the co-operatives were 
situated. The. Scottish Daily News was the first co-operative to fail 
in November 1975 (though hope of a relaunch survived until November 
1976). Since I had gathered a considerable amount of material on 
3 Arguments for Socialrsm~ London, Penguin, 1980, p159. 
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the ~ , I began writing up this case study first. '!be depth of 
analysis I felt appropriate to explain the SON experience ( and 
necessary for a PhD thesis) transformed what was intended to be 
a lengthy chapter into a lengthy volume. Unofficially I had assumed 
the brief assigned by Robert Maxwell: 
lilt would be the first job of the editorial department 
to appoint an historian to record the struggle and 
the success of establishing a workers' co-operative 
for posterity and to assist other groups of workers 
attempting to uchieve a similar goal." (SON Mass 
Meeting Minutes, 16 January 1975) 
Having completed· the SON studY,early in 1980 I felt that although 
it was a detailed and rigorous analysis of why the SON failed, it 
did not explain sufficiently the difficulties that would be 
encountered by any co-operative newspaper in the competitive market. 
Therefore it seemed helpful to provide a brief critique of the 
concentration, contraction, and centralisation of the newspaper industry, 
together with a consideration of industrial relations and the implications 
of new technology, to provide a more general appreciation of the 
possibilities for alternative newspaper co-operatives. 
Again this political economy of the press proved more exhausting 
than anticipated due to the vast media literature that was relevant 
to the critique. To commence writing up studies of R}m and Triumph 
Meriden in similar depth to the SON, and to provide similar political 
economies of the development of the light engineering and motorcycle 
industries in the UK seemed more than a little daunting. Therefore 
I decided to return "to roy original conception of a comparative study 
of co-operative experience by relating more concise chapters on KME 
and Triumph Meriden to the theoretical debate concerning co-operatives 
and the problems of wider co-operative development. 
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The end result is that Volume I consists of a full analysis 
of the SDN: Volume II is a consideration of the context in which 
the SDN failed, the political economy of the press; finally 
Volume III presents a review of the historical development of 
co-operatives, contemporary co-operative theory, and the extent 
of current co-operative development. 
Although the examiners will undoubtedly find this an 
unusually circuitous route to adopt, I hope that I can be forgiven 
the expansion and proliferation of my research interests, since 
I think that they have helped to provide a more sober appreciation 
of the . possibilities for the radical reform of power and control 
in industry, and have resulted in an informed assessment of the 
problems of co-operative development. 
Research Methods 
In one sense the research'methodology employed in the study of 
the three co-operatives was entirely conventional. In early visits to 
the co-operatives every available method was utili sed to gather as 
much information as possible on the organization and functioning of 
the co-ope~atives, including observation; examination of documents: 
extensive semi-structured interviewsJ and collation and analysis of 
the considerable media coverage of the organizations. As many 
representatives of management, works councils, shop stewards, and 
shop floor workers were interviewed as was possible during ~ stays 
which ranged from two weeks to a few days, during the period 1974-
. . 
1979. I made repeated visits to each bo-operative, but was also 
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able to remain in touch by telephone. In later visits substantive 
and procedural problems were studied as they emerged over sllch issues 
as control, wages, conditions and disputes. At this stage more 
intensive interviews proved helpful, particularly with key informants. 
In Volume II the consideration of the political economy of the 
press is based largely on secondary sources, supplemented by attention 
to the editorial of the daily press. Finally the comparative analysis 
of co-operative development has been greatly assisted, by the considerable 
growth of interest in the area and the pUblications of such bodies as 
ICOM,IWC,CDA, and the Co-operative Party. A series of international 
conferences proved an invaluable source of information on the 
latest developments in international experience of co-operatives, 
and co-operative theory. 
In another sense the methodology employed has been highly 
unconventional. The enterprises studied were organizations in crisis. 
From their formation they were highly vulnerable to imminent collapse, 
divided, torn by conflict, and frequently subject to ill-informed 
criticism. The leaders of the co-operatives therefore were extremely 
sensitive to information being released about the commercial 
difficulties encountered or internal disputes which occurred. They 
preferred the constant stream of academics, TV interviewers, and 
journalists to leave with the well rehearsed rhetoric of co-operative 
idealism which they themselves and carefully selected workers 
would issue. 
Though I avoided this trap, ~ wds faced with a series of moral 
dilemmas which the text books on research methodology had scarcely 
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prepared me for. Firstly in a general sense there \"/as the problem 
of involvement and detachment. When studying workers who were 
struggling to maintain their livelihoods and towards ideals, which, 
however incoherent, were firmly held, how could I remain detached ? 
Not being a co-operative advocate I approached the study with a 
critical scepticism, but found that to retain some integrity I had 
to view the problems of the co-operatives as the workers themselves 
viewed them, and therefore, to a limited extent at least, to 
become involved in their struggle. To remain detached would have 
been· irresponsible, and in the worst instance parasitic. (Those 
academics who managed this approach when studying the co-operatives 
filled me with shame for my profession). On the occasions I retreated 
back into a distant academic scepticism, I fOllnd this a more 
comfortable, but morally indefensible postion. Fortunately, Paul 
Blumberg, whose book Industrial Democracy (Constable, 1968) first 
aroused my interest in the subject has defended the position of 
moral involvement thus: 
"When a man becomes a sociologist, he too often subtracts 
the moral component from himself and, as sociologist, he 
then becomes something less then he was. Preferably, when 
a man becomes a sociologist, he should not subtract from 
himself, but supplement what he is with scientific methods 
of enquiry, which are not as incompatible with the frank 
and honest expression of widely held values of democracy, 
freedom, equality and community,as is customarily 
believed". (pvii) 
But the dilemmas did not end there. Secondly there were the 
unintended consequences of social action. If the most obvious 
problem at each co-operative was acute commercial insecurity due 
to serious underfunding, the most serious organizational failure 
was the lack of democratic participation. Together these problems 
reinforced each other. Any attempt on my part, or by other academics, 
to publicise the democratic shortcomings of the co-operatives 
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would have led to the Department of Industry'civii servants 
using this information to adopt an even 'more unhelpful approach 
to the co-operatives, and would have damaged the interests of 
the people I wished to help. 
, Thirdly within the co-operatives there were hostile camps. 
Though in my initial visits I attempted to speak to representatives 
of all interests it was difficult not to become identified with 
one faction or another. The conduct of the research therefore 
required a degree of subversiveness I had not anticipated in 
academic work. If one group of people knew I was in close touch 
with another,I would not have received the degree of co-operation 
and information that was necessary for a full account to be given. 
The intricacies of action research are more complex than might 
f ' b' . d 4 at lr st e lmaglne • 
The commitments which emerged in the course of the research 
are clearly indicated in the analysis presented. n~~ere the attempt 
of men consciouslY to control their own destinies clashes with 
social arrangements rooted in ignorance or manaipulation, I cannot 
profess neutrality".5 However I realise that the commitment to 
democratic ideals is not served by neglect of the laws of scientific 
evidence and inquiry. 
FUrthermore I hope that I can be forgiven the polemic on the 
political economy o~ the press in Volume II, firstly because the 
BTitish national press has escaped anyatte~t at reform throughout 
, 
4 J.E.T. Eldridge and A.D. Crombie, A SociologY of Organizations, 
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1974, pp 197-204. 
5 R.Hyman, Strikes, London, Fontana, 1977, p8. 
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the 20th century due to the force of the legitimatory ffi¥ths it 
propagates 1 and secondly because established academics seem happy 
to commence their studies in full acceptance of the existing 
press: 
"To enable the reader to judge ffi¥ own preconceptions, 
they are the hardly unconventional ones that the 
British national newspapers are amongst the best 
in the world, that in order to maintain their 
position politically, culturally and economically, 
major changes in "their methods of production will 
required in the near future ••• " 6 
Finally, if again I clearly have a position to defend, I 
hope that in the third volume I have presented the many-sided 
debate presently taking place on the direction of co-operative 
development as accurately as possible. 
6R.Martin, New Technology and Industr-ial Relations in Fleet Street, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,pvi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the post-war period the national newspaper industry has experienced 
a steady decline, punctuated by frequent crises and the collapse of major 
-titles. There has been only one large-scale idealistic attempt to break 
out of this cycle of decline and launch an alternative newspaper. At the 
Scottish Daily News three significant idea~s coalesced .in a dramatic fusion: 
the struggle to resist a newspaper closure and mass redundancy; the struggle 
for workers control of industry; and the struggle to create a democratic 
press responsive to the readership it served. After over a year of 
determined effort to gather the necessary resources, and with a minimum of 
government assistance, the printers and journalists of the Scottish Daily News 
bravely attempted to pioneer a new concept for the national press: a workers' 
newspaper. They were made immediately aware of the enormous obstacles that 
any large circulation newspaper published by workers for ~~rkers must 
overcome. 
some might simply say that this was a hopeless attempt to reverse 
the historical development of the media: that with the invention of new 
electronic information technology, inevitably newspapers as a primary means 
of communicat.ion are nearing obsolescence. This is an age when the atmosphere 
is dense with telecommunications; the next consumer durable capitalism has 
to offer for every home is the video-tape machine; the arrival of breakfast 
television means almost a 24 hour television news service, and the 
prospect of every household being linked to three central computer data 
banks in the Ceefax, Oracle, and Prestel systems is not remote. Yet even 
, 
with. all these advanced technological accoutrements available, it could be 
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argued that printing technology developed by Caxton in the late 15th century, 
and the popular newspaper created in the late 18th century, will still 
survive as integral and vital parts of our political culture. 
Sixteen million daily newspapers ,are circulated in Britain, 
twenty-three million if evening newspaper are included, most are read by 
several people, almost the whole population see a newspaper each day, a 
_much higher proportion than regularly read books. ' (Royal Commission on 
the Press, (ReP), 1977, p270) (In contrast in the first months of operation 
the BBC TV breakfast news programme averaged 1.5 million viewers, and the 
TV AM viewers remained as low as 300,000. The newspaper remains a remarkably 
cheap, efficient and extremely accessible means of conveying information. 
For example a newspaper can be read, considered, and re-read by people on 
the factory floor or in the office, as well as at horne or in the pub. The 
information and ideas put forward in newspaper articles can be readily and 
precisely quoted, debated, accepted or rejected by readers. In contrast 
the 'higher' forms of information technology, such as television and radio 
remain relatively expensive and inaccessible. 
In one' sense all television and radio news is subliminal, in that it 
is difficult for the viewer or listener to capture the text for further 
consideration and analysis. Therefore TV and radio news tends to be 
one-directional, encouraging the passive receipt of information as if it 
were a communication of 'reality'. Newspaper editorial is, at least 
briefly, retained by readers, and whatever the reverence for the printed 
word is frequently subjected to a conscious process of questioning and 
rejection, so that fortunately the profound editorial biases of the press 
are well known., But the television authorities capacity to au~oy,itatively 
define the news endured relatively unscathed until the recent studies by 
the Glasgow University Media Group ~.simi1ar research bodies revealed 
the extent of systematic distortion. (GOMG, 1976, 1980). It took them 
-years of hard work, employing multiple video tape machines, to reveal 
instances of TV bias, which any worker on the shop floor, pulling out a 
copy of the Daily Express or Sun from his or her back pocket, could show 
in a few minutes in their newspaper's editorial! The newspaper is more 
susceptible to criticism and awareness of bias, and the written word still 
does have an essential part to play in political education. 
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If newspapers are still central to the process of communicating 
infor~ation - the currency of democracy, and if they have not been 
completely superceded by more technologically sophisticated means of 
communication, then the question has to be asked - why have they experienced 
such a protracted decline? (The aggregate circulation of the national 
press fell by 10.8% between 1961 - 1975). (ReP 1976~,p5). The national 
newspaper industry is enduring a secular decline, losing circulation and 
advertising revenue not only 'to commercial TV and Radio, but also to 
the profusion of specialist magazines and weeklies. However it is in 
newspaper proprietors interests to conceal the true scale and the causes of 
this decline. Newspaper closure is often part of corporate restructuring 
in order to en hance profitability, when company executes deliberately use 
inflated arguments of 'decline' to force through extensive redundancies, 
even when sales are steady and profits being earned. Corporate reorganisation 
is often induced by the desire to introduce new technology or pursue market 
segmentation strategies rather than simply to combat circulation losses. 
Usually the performance of the national newspaper industry is judged by its 
well publicised most vulnerable sectors, rather than the titles which 
continue to earn substantial profits. 
It could be contended that the decline in popularity of the press is 
primarily evidence not of a growing irrelevance of the press, nor simply 
the effect of increasing-competition from other media, but rather is 
indicative of major inadequacies in the present structure and content'of 
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the press. The most critical weakness of the contemporary press is the 
systematic failure to represent the ideas and interests of the working class 
and the organised labour movement. This chronic bias is now so clearly apparen~ 
that the Royal Commission on the Press in its Final Report published in 
1977, amid studied complacency and atavistic genuflections to free market 
values, approvingly quoted Sir Dennis Hamilton, then Chairman of Times 
Newspapers, who said in 1976 that "there is a gap at the point where there 
ought to be serious coverage of the news from a left wing standpoint". 
(ReP, 1977 p2). The Royal Commission therefore supported the suggestion 
that the TOe should organise and fund a labour newspaper to the left of the 
Daily Mirror and to the right of the Morning Star •. 
The problem, to which the Royal Commission remained carefully 
oblivious, is nqt a 'gap in the market' which can be conveniently filled: 
in fact the free market has destroyed the independence and diversity of 
the whole of the press. There is a systematic, structural, weakness in 
the character of the contemporary British press. There is a great divide, 
which is becoming wider, between the intellectual excellence of some of 
the quality newspapers that cater for the middle class at one pole, ~d 
the shallow vacuity and social irresponsibility of some popular newspapers 
at the other pole. Popular newspapers are degenerating into entertainment 
sheets that deny their working class readers the fundamental democratic 
right to a newspaper that views the world from their position, a situation 
that Basnett and Goodman in a Minority Report to the Royal Commission 
recognised amounted to the political and cultural disenfranchisement of 
the great mass of popular newspaper readers. As Tony Benn in a recent 
broadside aimed at the press has maintained: 
"For the vast majority of adults in Britain their 
• 
. 
newspaper is the only written account of what is 
happening in the world that they are likely to see. 
These people have been betrayed by the insistence of 
the popular press on remorselessly trivialising and 
personal ising all the great and complex issues of our 
day to a level when they almost defy comprehension •••• 
All national newspapers and most local papers are 
controlled by men who seem'uniquely unsuitable to 
comment upon or comprehend the events which shape the 
lives of ordinary people". (1982, ppl15, 117) 
How this betrayal originated has been illuminated by the excellent 
historical research ~f James Curran. (1977: 1981). 
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In the early decades of the 19th century a radical working class 
press flourished, with a circulation of 200,000 and a readership of about 
four million. In the words of Feargus O'Connor, the editor of the 
Northern Star, the radical press was "the link which binds the industrious 
classes together". (16 January 1841). The radical press evaded starr~ 
tax, was sustained by a high re~ai1 price, and without a dependence on 
advertising revenue was free to attack the system of industrial capitalism. 
But in the second half of the century with the abolition of stamp duty, 
the radical press came into competition with the cheap mass newspapers 
which received substantial revenue from commercial advertising denied to 
the radical press. Previously the low launch costs of newspapers, and 
the.limited capital costs of printing machinery, made it possible for 
working class groups to own and control newspapers. With the development 
of linotype co~sing and mechanised printing presses, there was a seriou$ 
rise in fixed capital costs. Economies of scale benefitted the major 
pub~ishers and printing companies, as production and newsprint costs 
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increased. Pagination increased also, along with editorial, publicity, and 
distribution charges. The rise in costs necessitated a rise in circulation 
levels, and the break-even point was raised further as newspaper prices 
were successively reduced. 
Newspapers came to cost a lot more to produce than the price at 
which they were sold, therefore increased circulation meant losses unless 
there was increased advertising, which came to contribute more than half 
total revenue. This competitive process involved ownership and control 
of the national press slipping solely into'the hands of the capitalist 
class. The radical press was effectively eliminated or absorbed, and all 
of the new generation of commercial national new~papers commencing with 
Northcliffe's Daily Mail in 1896, were on the right or extreme right of 
the political spectrum. Not only did wealthy proprietors now dominate the 
press, but advertisers assumed a role which Curran defines as that of a 
,de facto licencing authority: no mass circulation newspaper could survive 
for any length of time without the active approval of the advertisers. (1977). 
The founding by the labour movement of the Daily Herald and the Daily Citiz~n 
was part of a determined attempt to resist the proprietorial and adve~tiser 
domination of the press, though ultimately the commercial failure of the 
labour papers only confirmed this trend. Newspapers produced by the press 
lords aimed at the working class market attempted to impose the alien 
ideas and values of the employers, to undermine and fragment working class 
consciousness and culture, and even to suppress the right to question. As 
Lord Beaverbrook demanded in a glowing manifesto in support of Ramsay 
MacDonald's desertion of the Labour Party in favour of a National Government: 
WI ask you to give ••• your confidence to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his 
colleagues ••• Ask no questions... Seek no pledges ••• Trust in 
f 
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Mr. MacDonald's leadership. Rely on Mr. Neville Chamberlain ••• " 
(Daily Express, 28 September 1931). This was the typical sta~p of 
Beaverbrook upon the Express, his fl~;ship, which was emulated by the 
other baronial proprietors: 
nA paper for which the word 'freedom' was the 
soberest of all its expressed values constantly 
trespassed on its readers' freedom to know, to 
judge and to act. Instead of the 'free use of 
ideas' in Mathew Arnold's phrase, it took a 
politician's decision that the readers' votes 
were all that mattered, not their understanding. 
It did not suppose its readers competent to 
judge the issue but supplied their opinions for 
them". (A. Smith, 1975, p60). 
The concentration of the press into the hands of fewer individuals and 
companies accelerated in the middle decades of the 20th century until 
Britain had the most centralised nation~l press in the world, written, 
printed and published in the immediate vicinity of Fleet Street. As control 
of the press became more remote, rival newspapers were closed, and the. 
surviving papers became more powerful in determining the flow of information 
to the reading public. Furthermore the influence of advertising revenue was 
critical to the uneven development of the national press. As advertising 
revenue expanded to contribute half of total newspaper revenue, there was 
a constant pressure upon newspapers to provide the kind of editorial which 
fitted the requirements of the advertisers. Advertisers discriminated in favour 
of quality papers read by a small but very affluent readership, and insisted 
upo~ mass circulations for the popular newspapers, the pursuit of which 
imposed a homogenous superficiality upon editorial content. The most recent 
• 
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development in the ownership structure of newspapers, in direct contradiction 
to the celebrated I independence I of the press, is the diversification of 
newspaper companies into other profitable industries, including oil, 
property, and bankin9. Alternatively major national newspapers have been 
acquired by multi-national conglomerates, which thereby have secured 
important ideological subsidiaries to their vast economic power. The 
~wspaper industry therefore has followed the classical tendencies of 
capitalism towards concentration, centralisation and contraction. But 
newspapers are not like other commodities such as motor cars or soap powder, 
they are vital sources of information, and the threat posed by a monopoly of 
supply is infinitely more dangerous: 
"The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, 
so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas 
of those who lack the means of mental production 
are subject to it". (Marx and Engels, 1970, p64). 
Throu9hout this process of monopolisation, newspaper proprietors have 
continued successfully to purvey the quaint notion that "press freedom"· 
depended upon the press remaining their private property. Karl Marx, who 
was an active journalist for most of his life, appreciated the absurdity 
of this view. As an editor of radical newspapers he had fought a9ainst 
proprietorial interference, and ferociously resisted the state censorship 
to which the establishment press easily accomodated. (McLellan, 1973). 
Acknow1ed9Edas one of the most hi9hly re9arded forei9n correspondents of 
the New York Daily Tribune, he experienced the indi9nity of bein9 sacked 
because the proprietor did not like his views. (Murdock, 1982, p13l). 
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Marx insisted: 
• With the lack of freedom of the press, all 
other freedoms become illusory. Every form of 
freedom conditions the others, just as every 
bodily member affects every other. Every time one 
form of freedom is rejected, it is freedom 
that is rejected but, to put freedom of the 
press in a class under freedom of business is to 
defend it while killing it in the course of the 
defence ••• • (Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press, 
1842, quoted in Draper, 1977, pp38, 42). 
Many modern proprietors might claim they would never dream of exerting 
their ownership rights to impose editorial control. In no industry does 
the thesis of the separation of ownership and control carry as little 
conviction as in the newspaper industry: 
"The national press, as one of the oldest 
media sectors is still largely dominated by 
companies controlled by the descendants of 
the original founding families and their 
associates. In fact, five out of the top 
seven concerns are of this type (they are: 
Associated Newspapers, The Daily Telegraph Limited, 
The Thomson Organisation, News International, and 
s. Pearson and Son) ••• The resilience of individual 
ownership fits easily into the long-standing 
debate about the nature and scope of proprietorial 
f 
. 
intervention in media production, while the 
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intermeshing of communications companies and 
general capital re-emphasises the question of how 
far media corporations operate in the interests of 
the capitalist class as a whole n • (Murdock, 1982, 
pp136, 137). 
There are two strands to this argument. Firstly, despite any public 
relations efforts to the contrary, newspapers are an example of an industry 
• 
in which traditional family proprietorship has survived with a vengenance. 
It must be difficult for those who feel that there is a residue of truth in 
the idea of the managerial revolution, to imagine companies in which titled 
lords still hold an almost feudal sway. Such personal fiefdoms can exist 
long after the family shareholding has been repeatedly diluted in the 
search for injections of fresh cash: effective ownersh~p depends not simply 
on the absolute size of the shareholding but on the relative dispersal of 
other voting shares. (Murdock, 1982, p133). "One of the keys to an 
understanding of Fleet Street is to recognise that it still acts as if 
newspapers were the personal property of press lords". (Cleverley, 1976, 
p7l). As long suffering editors and executives know, in many cases 
proprietorial intervention is persistent and pervasive, and often proves 
highly damaging in both editorial and commercial terms. Secondly, newspaper 
editors and executive management are constrained further by the wider 
commercial interests of the company they are part of, and ultimately are 
confined by the interests of private property and the free market upon which 
the newspaper industry is based. 
Examples of deliberate censorship or vindictive editorial sackings 
are infrequent (although bloody episodes have occurred). Control is 
exercised more through selection and recruitment, promotions and perks, 
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through tacit understandings, and through the well-trodden parameters of 
what is the acceptable way to approach a story which has become confused 
with 'professionalism'. The effectiveness of the pressures that are 
brought to bear in newspapers mean that efforts at editorial resistance 
and independence are less frequent and less successful than in other media. 
The result is that the working class has been deprived of voices in the 
national press that identify with the interests and express the views of 
working people. The editorial coverage presented by capitalist newspapers 
directed at the popular market present a distorted and manipulative conception 
of working class ideas and values. Th~ only resonance the commercial press 
finds in the working class is due to the alien and divisive influence itself, 
and the mode of production it represents, has implanted and daily restores. 
It is not altogether a paradox that the press which projects anti-
unionism so fiercely, is the most tightly organised industry in the country 
in strictly economistic trade union terms. The print unions often seem too 
buried in wage and manning bargaining to be concerned with what is actually 
said in the newspapers they produce. Newspaper management will make almost 
any'financial concession to prevent the intrusion of shop floor trade 
unionists in the editorial decision making process. This neglect by the 
print and media unions prompted the following outburst from Benn at the 
Labour Party Conference in 1972: 
·I-sometimes wish the trade unionists who work in 
the mass media, those who are writers, and broadcasters, 
and secretaries, and printers, and the lift operators of 
Thompson House, would remember that they too are 
members of our working class movement and have a 
responsibility to see that what is said about us is 
true· ••• 
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The incensed reaction of the media to this speech indicated that 
proprietors and editors would continue to jealously quard their monopoly of 
editorial control against any incursion. 
A far more serious threat to the maintenance of the domination of the 
capitalist press arrived with tbe unprecedented economic and political crisis 
that overwhelmed the newspaper industry in the mid 1970's that has left 
Targe parts of it permanently vulnerable. Greatly increased costs of 
newsprint and other materials together with increased labour costs combined 
with a serious reduction in advertising reve~ue to heavily erode the 
profitability of the national press. Some national newspapers have made 
substantial losses, and have only survived because of profitable sister 
papers or cross-subsidisation by conglomerate parent companies from their other 
concerns. In this context the detached, but often intense,. hostility" that 
has typified the relations between management and unions in the newspaper 
industry has assumed a new significance. Faced with the prospect of ODunting 
losses the proprietors of national newspapers decided that they could no 
longer accept the recurring unofficial action by print union chapels that 
punctuates industrial relations in the industry. The conventional solutions 
to industrial conflict such as joint consultation and the reform of the 
institutions of collective bargaining failed to even get off the ground in 
Fleet Street. However, the new technology of computer typesetting offered 
a classical technical solution to the political and economic problems of the 
employers. 
The introduction of the new technology with the accompanying mass 
redundancies management desired would both restore the profitability of the 
national press and considerably weaken trade union organisation, as 
Rex·Winsbury suggested, with computer technology, -A bonus in the eyes of 
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many ••• managements, is that ••• they will be rid of the constraints of the 
printing craft unions, which will have vanished along with the technology that 
created and defined them".· (1975, pI9). The existing hot metal technology 
is complicated and labour intensive, in contrast the new technology in\~lves 
"word-processing, type-setting and plate-making processes which centre on 
the use of the computer to do the main time consuming jobs of storage and 
arrangement of text and advertisements, ready for high-speed photographic 
~ 
creation of the actual columns of text for the newspaper". (Winsbury, 
1976, plO). The journalists' craft also would not be spared: computer type-
setting, facsimile transmission, and computer-to-computer linkups with the 
facility for direct input of agency co~y bypassing both editorial and 
production could dispense with need for anything more than a skeleton 
editorial staff in most newspapers. (NUJ, 1980). The introduction of new 
technology finally would provide a catalyst to examine and restructure the 
finances, management, editorial and industrial relations of newspapers. 
Print workers are aware of the implications of the new printing 
technology and revealed the full extent of their determination to resist 
the introduction of these methods, except on their own terms, in the 
protracted struggle at Times Newspapers. "In Fleet Street terms, Times 
management was asking for the moon, in seven monchs: the introduction of 
new technology, new manning levels,· wage restructuring, the abolition of 
restrictions on production, the ending of unofficial action, and the 
negotiation of a new disputes procedure constituted a programme no print 
union could accept". (Martin, 1981, pp279-80). The suspension of The Times 
and the Sunday Times for 12 months in 1978/1979, the failure of the Times 
management to impose direct input with computer, and the continuing failure 
of other Fleet Street newspaper managements to utilise fully the. new 
technology to restore their companies' finances, bighlights the fact that 
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the national press now stands at a watershed of profound importance. Either 
the new technology can be used to impose a more remote, highly profitable, 
and irresponsible press under the exclusive control of corporate executives, 
or the political crisis provoked by the new technology can help to stimulate 
the democratic social chapge of the ownership and control of the press. 
Management consultants clearly see the solution to the survival of the 
national press in terms of capital reasserting firm control ,over an 
industry which can no longer afford the recklessness of the past, with a 
regime of strict financial stringency, the subjection of editorial principles 
to marketing requirements, and the recppture and rationalisation of 
production processes ~ith automated technology. This would create the 
conditions for a more highly centralised and remote press, in which there 
would be little opportunity for labour to take effective industrial action. 
The revitalised profitability of automated newspapers would compound their 
lack of responsiveness to working class readers. New technology on these 
terms would mean the perpetuation and intensification of the passive receipt 
of centrally generated material - a form of technocratic barbarism. 
An alternative possibility is that as the capitalist press collapses 
through the enormity of its own contradictions, it may be replaced by a 
radically different socialised press. The success of this attempt will 
depend upon the degree of commitment of journalists and print workers to 
achieving change. Journalists have always resented proprietorial 
interference in editorial construction, though they have often learned to 
live with it in return for material rewardsJ now there are signs that 
journalists are beginning to recognise once again the ~portance of 
fundamental change in the press if editorial freedom is to mean something 
more than proprietorial rhetoric. Con~lict has repeatedly erupted between 
journalists and proprietors over the closed shop, which remains a potentially 
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explosive issue. In Nottingham 28 journalists were sacked by the Evening 
Post when they joined the NUJ provincial press strike in December 1978, andin 
retaliation launched the weekly Nottingham News workers co-operative which 
survived for more than three years with the help of NUJ funds. (Prospectus, 
1979). During the Times dispute a group of journalists commissioned a 
co-operative feasibility study as a possible way out of the impasse. 
~JOL, 1979). A dispute at Time Out in 1981, caused"by an attempt by the 
owner to break a long-standing agreement that all staff should receive equal 
pay, involved a lengthy occupation of the offices, and then led to the 
successful launch by forty of the sacked journalists and print workers of 
City Limits with a circulation of 60,000 as a punchyriva1 London weekly 
listings magazine. (Guardian, 20 August, 1981). 
Print workers in the past have expressed their hostility towards 
employers almost purely by militant sectional act"ion to further improve pay 
and maintain employment~ however, the fact massive technological change 
cannot be held off indefinitely has focused print workers minds on what kind 
of press they would like to see emerge, and what their role in it would be. 
Already print workers have joined"journalists in the demand for a right 
of reply launched by the Campaign for Press Freedom, so that those who feel 
they have been the victims of pres~ distortion may be allowed an equal space 
to present their case. (CPF, Bulletin, 1981/82). Political re-awakening 
has been accompanied by growing calls for public intervention in the press 
from the NUJ and print unions. 
At this point in" the argument, the quest for democratic control of 
the press always collides with a paralysing fear, which the capitalist 
press consciously nurtures at every opportunity: that any attempt at public 
intervention in the press will inevitably lead to a state controlled press. 
-It is one of the parodoxes of the issu~of press reform that any government 
action to introduce genuine freedom of the press is seen by some as a 
threat to the so-called freedom that currently exists". (Labour Party, 
1974, p24). It is not helpful to casually dismiss this fear or to 
underestimate what the remaining independence and critical facility of 
the capitalist press, constrained and enfeebled as it is, does represent. 
Raymond Williams has conceived the dangers involved: 
-
"Neither the growth of a public bureaucracy, as in the 
Fabian model, nor the achievement of a workers' 
state, as in most Marxist models as hitherto defined, 
diminishes in any degree the historical challenge of 
a free press. The problems of its attainment, in 
radically altered social conditions, can not be left to 
yerbal solutions, in which public representatives 
masquerade as the public interest, or in which the party 
equals the truth','. (1978, pI8). 
-:;, , 
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Indeed state intervention in the press has largely proved repressive 
in practice: 
"There are few countries in which both printing and the 
press have not at some time been kept under strict scrutiny 
or control by government. The list of printers and 
journalists killed or imprisoned for their belief in a 
'free press' is seemingly endless. Indeed there are still 
'many countries (in the developed East and West as well as 
in the Third World) where the industry is to greater or 
lesser extent overseen by government - print being a 
powerful weapon of religious or political dissent". 
(Marsh~ll, 1983, p141). 
The press cannot function properly as a tool of deJOOCracy if newspapers 
themselves do not practice democracy. -l~ public intervention is to be 
encouraged, yet the dangers of state control of the press avoided, there 
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must be detailed exploration of alternative structures for democratic 
control of newspapers. TO discover how to attain a diversified, 
decentralised and socialised press. 
Among the central problems to be considered include what measures 
are necessary to overcome market controls of the press, particularly the 
economies of scale and advertising subsidies that sustain capitalist 
~omination of the press? How to ensure opportunities for participation and 
control of print workers and journalists in newspapers, including acc~ss 
to editorial decision making? Equally, how to develop the access and 
contribution of readers to editorial construction in order to ensure that 
newspapers properly reflect their concerns? There are many ways in which 
these problems may be tackled, however the co-operative form is one of the more 
attractive and spontaneous alternatives, and whenever a newspaper encounte~s 
. 
serious difficulties the possibility of conversion to a co-operative is 
usually suggested. The great restraining influence upon enthusiastic 
pursuit of the co-operative alternative, is the belief that however 
impressive in principle newspaper co-operatives may be, they are inherently 
both organisationally and commercially unsound. This lack of confidence is 
primarily due to a misund~rstanding of the precise reasons for the failure 
of co-operative experiments, and a lack of awareness of the structures and 
resources necessary in order to allow newspaper co-operatives to succeed. 
The Scottish Daily News remains the most important attempt to found 
a large-scale co-operative daily newspaper. Yet the Scottish Daily News 
was a disaster in almost every sense - editorially, commercially and 
politically. But the sacrifices, endeavours and idealism of the SON workers 
will have been wasted if people interested in the reform of the media do 
not l~arn from the tragic experiences of this co-operative how to prevent 
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a similar recurrence in the future. The simplistic autopsies of orthodox 
analysis have concealed more than they have explained: "The real problem 
was that there were never enough people who loved them enough to buy the 
paper." (The Economist, 15 November 1975) Rather the SDN experience 
reveals in high relief the dilemmas of reformism: the limitations and 
ineffectiveness of state interventionJ the unpreparedness of the trade 
_nion movement for radical social change, the powerful contradiction 
between market systems and democratic practicesJ the unsuitability of 
existing management, totally absorbed by ancient conceptions of property 
rights and hierarchical control to coordinate the operation of a 
democratic enterprise1 the lingering intensity of the separation of 
intellectual and man ual labour, and the incapacity of traditionally 
trained journalists and the aristocracy of print labour to forge a 
radical democratic newspaper. 
When it assumed power in 1974 the Labour Government had a sophisticated 
analysis of the failings of the British press and a carefully thought 
out set of remedies in its possession. A Labour Party study group on the 
relationship of the people,.the press and broadcasting, put forward a 
range of Objectives to improve the diversity of the press, to remove 
monopoly control, ,to assist the lau~ch of new publications: and to improve 
the accountability of newpspapers to both their workers and the public. 
~ counteract the economic forces making for concentration and contraction 
in the newspaper industry they proposed a differential newsprint subsidy 
to make it possible f.or small specialist newspapers to survive; a subsidy 
on initial launch and establishment costs; and finally, to eliminate 
advertising discrimination bya redistribution of advertising revenue on 
an equitable basis. They concluded: 
-Economic pressures are gradually reducing the number 
of newspapers, and even more rapidly the number of 
newspaper owners, and they are raising barriers against 
the entry of new publications into the market. Only 
a radical restructuring of· the economics of the 
newspaper industry can reverse these trends, open 
up the market, and enable new publications to establish 
themselves on a viable basis once again." (Labour Party, 
1974, pp 24-25) 
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These proposals were eagerly endorsed at the party conference in 1975, when 
it was demanded that: 
"We must use the crisis in the newspaper industry 
as the opportunity for a radical reform, to reestablish 
the finances of newspapers on a sound public service 
basis, and to open up the market for new newspapers." 
Public money should not be used to "bailout the 
existing TOry news papers by helping divest them 
of men they hired and no longer want." ( Labour 
Party, 1975, p33l) 
Within days of being elected in February 1974 the Wilson government 
was confronted by an ideal opportunity to test some of these ideas in 
practice with the closure of the Scottish Daily Express in Glasgow with 
1,800 redundancies. It reacted to the Express workers plans to launch the 
Scottish Daily News with reluctance and prevarication bordering on 
downright hostility. The announcement by Wilson of yet another Royal 
Commission on the Press was seen as an attempt to shunt any likelihood 
of action into an obscure siding: the terms of reference of the inquiry 
were designed to appeal to both proprietors concerned with financial 
problems and labour practices, and party critics concerned about the 
diversity and editorial standards of the press. The selection of the 
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commissioners was carefully balanced to ensure that whatever proposals 
did emerge, they would be as conformist as possible. The national 
newspaper publishers nevertheless dismissed the commission as at worst 
dangerous and at best irrelevant, until under the combined impact of 
soaring newsprint costs and collapsing advertisement revenue they suddenly 
~ame to see the value of the commission's existence and asked for its 
help in dealing with "a crisis of unprecedented dimensions and dangers.-
The commission obliged by proposing a programme of major capital e~~nditure 
on new "technology, with large scale redundancies, and a restructuring of 
debts. They insisted,"With the object of maintaining a healthy, independent 
and diverse industry", to deal with immediate problems,"drastic remedies 
are needed •• there is no prospect of improving revenue sufficiently. 
Productivity must be increased and costs reduced; this" can be done on.an 
adequate scale only by lowering manning levels and introducing new technology.-
(RCP,1976b,ppl,9,12) 
The complacency and consistent implicit ~thy for the commercial 
priorities of the proprietors contained in the Commission's Final Report 
helped neutralise the movement for reform of the press. But this could 
not have been achieved if there had been any sustained effort on the part 
of the organized labour movement to seize the opportunity for a radical 
transformation of the most dangerously unaccountable institution in 
modern society.It is a great enigma in socialist politics that the 
determination of conservative forces to retain domination of the 
national press in the post war period was opposed by little more than 
a vapid intention on the left to achieve radical change, a situation that 
Raymond Williams has described as "the extraordinary indifference of the 
organized left." 
... 
"Every attempt to redress or even maintain some sort 
of political balance has been ignored or rejected by 
Labour Governments. It is a mark of the capitulation 
of the Labour leadership to the terms of a capitalist 
economy that the only significant effort it has ever 
been persuaded to make is in terms of the maintenance 
of capitalist employment, and even this has been 
negotiated, except by unions with special interests, 
in terms of an inevitable reorganization for corporate 
profitability. It is then difficult to pverestimate 
the extent, in this area,-of the social and political 
victory which has been gained by the organized Right 
in this country.That !tis a victory for which both the 
Labour Party and the trade union movement are likely 
to pay very heavily is no comfort, even when they 
have most clearly brought it upon themselves." 
(Williams, 1978,p22) 
Workers in the newspaper industry have too often proved trapped 
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by traditional conceptions and practices to lead the struggle for change 
in the industry. In particular the divisions between journalists and 
print workers, between head and hand, have persisted. The urgency of 
the need to fundamentally tackle the ownership and control structure of the 
press has been lost amid competing claims for job protection and wage 
improvements on existing newspapers. Journalists have remained too absorbed 
by the comfortable certainties of conventional editorial practices and 
convictions to think about new possibilities. 
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In exploring the potential for a socialised press the bitter 
lessons of the Scottish Daily News illuminates not only these problems, 
but direct attention to the question of whether any democratic enterprise 
can survive in a market system geared to production for profit and 
dominated by huge concentrations ofpower and.wealth. Trained to operate 
-in this environment of hierarchical and arbitrary control, it is doubtful 
whether conventional management could respond well to participative 
decision making even if they wanted to embrace it. Yet the message 
of hope that emerges from the gloom of the mm disaster is that workers 
themselves do possess tremendous organizing abilities that can be released 
by the challenges posed by .'co-operatives. Though market controls and 
orthodox managerial practices present enormous obstacles to the success 
of co-operative ventures in the newspaper industry, the. SDN saga 
does reveal important insights into what could be possible in a 
co-operative organization extracted from the hazards of the market and 
relieved of the burden of management hierarchies. 
-CHAPTER TWO 23 
THE CLOSURE OF THE EXPRESS IN GLASGOW 
Introduction 
The sudden closure of Beaverbrook's newspaper office at 
Albion Street in Glasgow in March 1974, was met by a protracted 
struggle on the part of the Beaverbrook workers to resist redundancy 
and establish a rival newspaper. The·Scottish Daily News was 
published from 5 May 1975 to November 7 1975, and during its brief 
six month life and 168 editions it staggered desperately from crisis 
to crisis. It was Britain's first worker-controlled mass circulation 
newspaper, and its co-operative structure was regarded as having 
important implications for the doubtful future of the national 
newspaper industry in Fleet street. Tony Benn, the minister responsible 
for providing government assistance to the enterprise, declared on 
the eve of the first edition: 
"I think there's all the difference between having the 
policy of the paper determined by the people who work on it 
and having it determined by the people who own it. For 
journalists, for printers, and for all newspaper workers 
industrial democracy is the chance they've been waiting for. 
I think what happens in the Daily News this May will spread 
quite rapidly throughout Fleet Street this year, and in the 
years to come." 
(Granada T.V, World in Action,S May, 1975). 
However, despite the bravura and optimism of Benn, for the workers 
involved the Scottish Daily News was born, primarily, not out of 
idealism, but out of despair, and was regarded by many of the active 
1. 
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participants as a political protest against unemployment; for example 
Allister Mackie, the ex-chairman of the co-operative maintained, 
"The entire history of the Scottish Daily News is founded 
on the determination of a group of trade union activists 
to fight against unemployment. Any other consideration 
was incidental •••• Some of the members of the Action 
Committee saw in the proposal a vehicle of protest against 
a society that found nothing obscene in unemployment; 
they were the more politically conscious members and 
motivated perhaps by more fundamentaL principles. They 
assessed, with good reason, that the successful outcome 
of the proposals was so remote that it appeared almost 
an impossibility, but not quite. 
protest would have to be made." 
(Mackie, 1976 , pp 109,112). 
The effort and the 
First impressions of contemporary Glasgow are of a city which 
has just survived a blitz: derelict factory sites, boarded-up bars, 
dark tenement slums and a battered but defiant people. In the 
Spring of 1974 Glasgow had scarcely recovered from the potential 
employment catastrophe threatened by the Conservative Government's 
attempt to axe the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders yards in 1971 which was 
narrowly averted by the lengthy workers' occupation of the yards. 
The full dimensions of this threat of unemployment for the working class 
of Glasgow is difficult to over-estimate, although 6,000 of the 8,500 
jobs in the yards were threatened, as Willie Ross, the Secretary for 
State for Scotland maintained, "For every job in the yards there were 
-about four outside. It was not just an industrial disaster -
it was an industrial holocaust." With unemployment twice the 
national average in Glasgow at 5.7% in April 1974, a total of 
31,000 unemployed, the city was designated a special development 
area. (Department of Employment,Gazette, May 1974). There was 
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particular resentment and anger at the drift of industry to the 
South: "There is an especially acute sense of outrage when Scottish 
jobs are declared expendable by controlling bodies in London." 
(Observer, 5 May 1974). The serious decline of the Scottish economy 
and the severe conditions of poverty and unemployment which resulted 
in the traditional industrial areas of the West of Scotland had promoted 
a widespread political consciousness which was a volatile combination 
of socialist opposition to the exploitation of Scottish workers 
by remote and irresponsible British capital centred in London, and 
the primeval yearnings of Scottish nationalism, as Allister Mackie 
asserted, "The whole country is nationalist in the face of London -
especially the press dictated from London." 
The Express Empire 
The Express newspaper empire, of which the Scottish Daily Express 
was the northern outpost, was founded by Lord Beaverbrook in the 
1920s as an adjunct to his political ambition to make or break prime 
ministers, if not governments; he was perfectly frank about this, 
exuding an amused proprietorial disdain for the niceties of the liberal 
theory of press freedom, and once startled a Royal Commission on the 
~ress, by insisting: 
WI ran the paper purely for propaganda, and with no other 
purpose ••••• But in order to make propaganda effective the 
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paper had to be successful. No paper is any good at 
all for propaganda unless it has a thoroughly good 
financial position." 
(RCP, 1949,Q8656,8660) 
Max Aitken was a self-made millionaire who had won his fortune 
by setting up monopolies in the basic Canadian industries between 1906-
-1910. "When he is on one of his impish moods, this arch-propagandist of 
free competitive enterprise will refer to them, with a nasal cackle of 
mirth as 'monuments to the iniquity of trustification." . (Driberg, 1956, 
p44) As Canadians suffered from the rapidly inflated prices of the new 
trusts Beaverbrook had established he became subject to a barrage of 
public criticism: "The newspapers attacked Aitken violently as a young 
upstart who had been guilty of deals very near to the edge of illegality. 
He learned then - as so many controversial figures in public life have 
learned since then, in their turn, from his newspapers - what it feels 
like to be pilloried day after day in front page news stories and in 
editorials." (Driberg, 1956,p45) 
Aitken arrived in Britain intent on gaining the highest political 
honour to match his astonishing wealth, however his erratic. brilliance 
and unlimited ambition quickly sidetracked him as be first became a 
major newspaper proprietor and then accepted a peerage. Disqualified 
from the premi·ership himself, Lord Beaverbrook assumed the right of 
kingmaker, which he exercised with a wicked vanity as he openly 
revealed in his Politicians and the Press (1925), as one reviewer 
put it, "This trivial little book ••• displays the working ·at the 
heart of our national life of a dangerous, irresponsible, and corrupting 
power." (Driberg,l956,pl96) 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere, together with the other press magnates, 
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at each election attempted to select the next prime minister and 
then dictate to him both his cabinet and policies. Several potential 
PMs subjected themselves to this indignity rather than risk the pique 
of the controllers of the most powerful weapons of propaganda then in 
existence. However sustained attacks by Rothermerein the Daily ~ 
and Beaverbrook in the Express upon Baldwin the Conservative leader 
-who supported Labour Party policy on India prompted the following 
celebrated retort that has resounded against the arbitrary power of 
the press barons throughout the decades. Baldwin insisted that the 
papers that were attacking him were not newspapers in the ordinary 
sense but: 
" ••• Engines of propaganda for the constantly changing 
policies, desires personal wishes, personal likes and 
dislikes of two men ••• What are their methods? Their 
methods are direct falsehood, misrepresentation, half-
.c,: truths, the alteration of a speakers's meaning by 
publishing a sentence apart from the context ••• 
suppression and editorial criticism of speeches 
which are not reported in the paper. These are the 
methods hated alike by' the public and by the whole 
of the rest of the Press •• I have used an expression 
about an 'insolent plutocracy' •• What the proprietorship 
of these papers is aiming as is power, and power 
without responsibility - the prerogative of the 
harlot throughout the ages." (Driberg, 1956, p2l4) 
In the 1930s Beaverbrrok's career as power broker began to wane as 
he increasingly lost touch with political reality and pursued his own 
fanta'sies about Empire Free Trade, refusing to be concerned with the 
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·rise of fascism in Europe. In 1938 the Daily Express began to 
print the slogan 'There will Be No War 'Ibis Year Or Next·Year Either,' 
which appeared frequently until 7 August 1939. During 1938/1939 the 
Express espoused optimism and appeasement, and for example in a 
·leading article on 10 March 1938 gushed "Welcome Herr von Ribbentrop, 
Hitler's Foreign Minister. You have the right to believe he comes 
-here as an Ambassador of peace, sincerely seeking it." Editorials 
such as this helped convince Hitler that there would be little 
response from Britain if he invaded Poland. '(When canvassed about 
whether they agreed with their proprietors editorial policies the 
Express staff responded "almost unanimously NO !" (Driberg,1956,p245) ) 
After the war Beaverbrook seized upon a chance remark of Harold 
Laski concerning the determination to use force if necessary to 
ensure their socialist programme was not obstructed should Labour 
win the 1945 General Election, to insist repeatedly in leading stories 
that "socialist dictatorship and repression" would be imposed on 
Britain if Churchill was not elected. The sweeping Labour victory by 
295 seats rocked Beaverbrook and the editor of the Express, Arthur 
Chr is Hanson: 
"From his penthouse Lord Beaverbrook telephoned me 
for the latest news. As I told him I broke down. 
I was suffering from acute shock. I had believed 
that the Daily Express would swing the election 
for the Conservatives. I had thought that my press 
propaganda machine was invincible. I had been 
proved wrong and hurt where it hurt most - in my 
professional pride ••• " (Smith,l975,p27) 
• 
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Unrepentant, the Daily Express became renowned for the stridency, 
if consistent eccentricity, of its political views, which were a 
direct reflection of the radical and paternalistic, but deeply 
bigoted conservatism of Beaverbrook himself. The paper bore the 
masthead 'The World's Greatest Newspaper,' and for a while it was 
the best selling newspaper in the world. However, the editorial 
-
stance of the Express became increasingly anachronist·ic in the post-
war period, and in particular it was burdened with Beaverbrook's obsession 
with the British Empire, long after it had been lost. Locked in ancestral 
combat with Rothermere's Daily Mail, like two aging dinosaurs, neither 
newspaper noticed the dramatic political and economic changes that 
were occuring in the environment around them. Described by A.J.P. 
Taylor in his biography of Beaverbrook as "the· only classless and 
ageless newspaper in the world," (1974,p9) the Daily Express editorial 
appeal in the 1960s congealed around a limited section of the middle-
aged, deferential working class and the lower middle class. Displaced 
by the brasher and IOOre sympathetic appeal of the populist Daily 
Mirror, the Daily Express circulation fell from a peak of 4.3 million 
in 1961 to 3.3. million in 1973, and continued on a rapid downward 
spiral through the 1970s despite repeated changes of editor and 
marketing formula. (Hirsch and Gordon, 1975, p70) 
In the first two decades after the war the Express newspapers 
were the largest employers in the national.newspaper industry, and 
Beaverbrook actually believed in paying good wages to those journalists 
prepared to stand his overbearing intrusions. However the proprietorial 
idiosyncracies comfortably afforded.with the easy newspaper profits of 
the middle decades of the century, were replaced by sharper managerial 
practices by the time Beaverbrook die in 1964, and his son, 
Sir Max Aitken, took over as chairman. The new 
managerial style was confirmed with the appointment, as deputy 
chairman and managing director, of Jocelyn Stevens, a wealthy 
young heir, with a determination to strip away what he assumed to 
be the unnecessary accretions of the Eeeress empire,to be replaced 
by more profitable pursuits. (McKay and Barr, 1976, pp.18-2l). 
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For Beaverbrook's conservatism had extended into his business policy: 
while other newspaper groups had been diversifying into other, more 
~ lucrative activities, particularly commercial television, which 
rather quaintly Beaverbrook dismissed as a "passing phase", 
(The Editors, BBC TV,14 August 1977},the Express group had remained 
isolated in newspaper publishing which was experiencing declining 
profitability. Early attempts at economies were not convincing: 
the most celebrated was a redundancy scheme operating during 1972 and 
1973 by which any staff member, irrespective of length of service, 
could give notice and leave with six months pay tax free: forty one 
young journalists, confident of securing other employment, took their 
redundancy money, and were thereupon replaced by forty three new 
recruits. (McKay and Barr, 1976,p.2l·.) The accelerating fall in 
the Daily Express circulation, the doubling of the cost of newsprint 
in the early 1970s, and a corresponding fall in advertising revenue,' 
brought the Beaverbrook Newspaper group's first loss, of £264,413 
before tax in the six months to 31 December 1973, compared with a profit 
of nearly £~oo,OOO in the previous six months. In fact, 1973-4 was 
a disastrous period for Beaverbrook's fortunes: it was estimated that 
the bill for newsprint, would increase by £9 million in 1974; £2 million 
of advertising revenue had to be turned away due to a shortage of 
newsprint; a December go-slow on the railways damaged Circulation, 
and an application to the Price Commission f9r a lp increase was delayed 
• 
until February. 
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The increase from 3p to 4p, worth about £6 million 
a year had come too late to prevent the prospect of continued losses. 
"Drastic economies" were announced by the Beaverbrook board of 
directors, namely the closure of the Albion Street office and print 
works in Glasgow, and the redevelopment of thegroup's undervalued 
property assets. (Guardian 19 March 1974). 
-The Suddenness of the 'Closure 
Speculation about the closure of the Scottish Daily Express 
office began early in 1974, but senior Beaverbrook management in 
London denied that closure was being contemplated. At a press 
conference in Glasgow early in March Jocelyn Stevens said that 
there would be no redundancies in Scotland. Workers at Albion Street 
assumed that management was indulging in the brinkma~ship common in 
the newspaper industry, and were convinced that their operation was 
viable, both by the profit figures of the past, and managements 
lavish waste of money at the present. The decision, made public on 
18 March, was intended to hit the Glasgow workers completely by 
surprise, even the Albion Street management had not been consulted; 
Ronnie Gibson the Father of the APEX clerical Chapel explained 
"There were rumours of a closure. We kept asking the 
management were they true, and they kept insisting that 
we were not going to close down. We asked if we would 
participate on the board but they refused. Then 
Jocelyn Stevens came up and announced the closure two 
weeks before it was to happen. One of our management 
said to me, "I admire the man for having the nerve to 
come up here and tell you'. What a statement! To say you 
-admire a man who can sack l, 800 people just like that". 
Stevens hoped that there would be too little time available 
for the workers to mount act.ive resistance, and he was proud of 
the efficiency of the managerial operation: 
"Although it was a bloodstained issue, the only satisfying 
aspect of the closure of our Glasgow office was that it 
was executed enormously efficiently. We worked on it, 
very few of us, in this room at night after we had done 
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our day's work and every single detail was foreseen and 
planned. Nothing happened in the fortnight between the 
announcement and the moment it closed that we hadn't foreseen, 
despite the fact that we were dealing with a very wild 
political situation." (McKay and Barr, 1976, pp 22-23). 
But the transmission of closure was not as smooth as Stevens 
might assert, the anger of the men was, in fact, more difficult to 
contain: 
"We had a meeting with Stevens, all the FCC's and Supervisors, 
and he made a few bald statements about the reasons for 
closure. We heckled him all the way through. He said, 
'You've got no right to do this! But we said, 'We've 
got every right - they're our jobs man!'. He started to 
get ruffled, he'd never met resistance like this before, 
he was used to workers being polite to him, but we didn't 
care anymore - he'd made us redundant." 
The workers at Albion Street were shattered by the unexpected 
force of the blow: all three newspapers were to be stopped, the 
Scottish Daily Express, the'Sunday Express, and the Evening Citizen, 
..,. 
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with 1,850 staff made redundant out of 1,942. Particular bitterness 
was felt that, although so man y workers were redundant, two of the 
papers would continue to be published from Manchester, whilst the 
'Eveninq Citizen was sold to OUtrams,publisher of the Glasqow 
competitor, the Evening Times. Unlike most closures therefore, 
the product still continued, which compounded the workers sense of 
uselessness and ignited their determination to prove that they 
could still work productively at their printing trades. The 
irresponsibility of the Beaverbrook management in their conscious 
attempt to foreclose any alternative which might affect their interests 
was recognised in the parliamentary debate on th~ closure, opened by 
Jim Sillars: 
"The Aitken family has spent two generations lecturing this 
country on how it should run its business. They have done 
so from the secure position of Press power without responsibility. 
The first time they have come face to face with responsibility 
in a very difficult situation, in which they have had to take 
decisions with consequences, as opposed to commenting on the 
decisions of others, their performance has come nowhere near 
the high standard that they have always demanded of others, 
especially of Labour Ministers •••• It is clear to me that 
the Express group management has no intention of saving the 
Scottish papers and the Scottish jobs that go with them. 
The lack of consultation with the unions,the extremely short 
notice given to employees, and the closure announcement 
leaving limited time for counter-action, all point to a 
management strategy designed to deny the precious time needed 
-in which a saving operatIon could become successful. 
(Hansard, 26 March 1974, pp 383-4). 
Yet, just two years later, in its report on industrial 
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relations in the national newspaper industry, ACAS made the following 
astounding observation: 
"Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd has one of the most developed 
formal arrangements for consultation and disclosure. 
The impetus for more disclosure of information and 
consultation on future plans seems to have been the general 
~ompany policy of cost reduction since 1971 and, in particular, 
the closure of the Scottish Daily Express. 'In 1973-4, 
the company set up three consultative committees covering the 
Daily and Sunday Express in London, the Daily and Sunday 
E;eress in Manchester, and the Evening standard~ The main 
functions of these committees are to receive regular 
information on the company's trading position and finances 
and on future plans and prospects; to discuss any matters 
affecting the operating efficiency of the company or the 
interests of the employees; to enable each side to have 
the opportunity to understand the other's views and objects, 
and to discuss future plans and new ideas." 
(RCP, 1976 i'1,pp 135-6). 
It may be reasonably concluded from this that the development of 
consultation and the willingness to impart financial information at 
Beaverbrook was related to the commercial difficulties of the group: 
the one situation in which a company may freely impart financial 
information to its workforce.is when it faces imminent bankruptcy. 
Thu~ ACAS concluded, "The seriousness of the financial poSitions of the 
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The organi zational strength of the chapels is based upon the 
highly perishable nature of the newspaper product, the frequent 
changes necessary in editions and print runs, and the competition 
with other similar newspaper~, which renders the newspaper industry 
acutely vulnerable to any form of industrial action. The assessment 
of ACAS of the position, endorsed by the Royal Commission on the 
Press was that 
"The daily production cycle, the intense competition among 
newspapers, and the disproportionately heavy losses that 
can be incurred as the result of relatively minor disputes 
encourage fragmented bargaining, encourage short-term 
attitudes on the part of employers to dispute settlement, 
and impose strains on co-operation between employers." 
(Rep, Final Report, 1977, p.218). 
Industrial relations in the national newspaper industry based in 
Fleet Street ~e inherently conflictual: prolonged periods of cease 
fire are abruptly interspersed with brief, but intense, outbreaks of 
guerilla war in a continuous struggle along the frontier of control. 
(See Chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis of industrial relations 
in the newspaper industry). However, the provincial newspaper 
industry, including the national offices in Manchester, is normally 
more peaceful, a situation partly induced by the constant threat upon 
unions and management of closure and withdrawal to London. At 
Albion Street though, perhaps influenced by the tradition of industrial 
militancy on Clydeside, and the statk contrast between the grander 
illusions of the Beaverbrook proprietors and the conditions of economic 
and social depression surrounding them, industrial conflict resembled 
that experienced in Fleet Street. . Militancy extended beyond the manual 
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chapels into the NUJ, and the Albion Street NUJ chapel was 
responsible for the first stoppage by journalists over editorial 
content in the country, when the night shift prevented an edition 
of the Daily Express because of an inflammatory and irresponsible 
Cummings cartoon on the conflict in Northern Ireland "'hich might 
have incited retaliation against the office itself. (McKay and Barr, 1976, 
pp 23-25). In the final year of the paper, editorial and chapel 
.... 
conflict came to a head, John Hodgeman, a sub-editor explained: 
"There were a lot of people who hated Beaverbrook. They 
hated the set-up whereby Sir Ma~ Aitken could spend £30-40,000 
on a power boa~ show every year. They hated the fact 
that his mother could go and buy a string of racehorses; 
and that nobody seemed to be paying much attention to the 
fact that the place was slowly strangling itself. We did 
have in the year I was deputy FOe to Denny Magee, we did have 
56 strikes in this building. Even the activists, and the 
militant trade unionists have said that half of these stoppages, 
some of them were only temporary stoppages, were completely 
unnecessary, and seemed to have come about not from any 
premeditated reasons of sabOtage, but just through sheer 
bloody mindedness, and frustration, and boredom ••••• There 
was no acceptance of any editor in the time I was working for 
Beaverbrook, and whoever the editor was, he was fair game to 
be hatcheted by the journalists at any opportunity ••••• There 
was a turnover of editors, the last but one editor, Clive 
San,dground took ov:er, and was editor for about eighteen months, 
half way through which the journalists passed a vote of no confidence 
. 
. in him. There was a great feeling throughout the whole of the 
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building that he was ready for the chop anyway, but the 
vote of no confidence from the j.ournalists sa~ed him - it 
stayed the execution, because the management couldn't 
give in to that kind of demand! " 
Towards the end the Beaverbrook London management were not 
entirely unhappy about the continual conflict in Albion Street: a 
dispute during the New Year of 1974 had shown that the Scottish Daily 
-Express could be published from the Manchester Beaverbrook office, and 
the record of stoppages in Glasgow provided a ready-made excuse for 
the closure which was demanded by Jocelyn 'Stevens' strategy of 
rationalization. So when Stevens announced the closure of Albion Street 
he attributed the blame primarily to the unions who were responsible for 
the fifty-six interruptions of work, forty of which had involved the 
loss of sales in the past year. But the intensity of conflict which 
Stevens and other commentators implied was unique to Albion Street, 
is, in fact, endemic in the national newspaper industry. Larry Lamb, 
past editorial director of the Sun, admitted, "We regard it 
as a big success when we get through a week of production without a 
stoppage", and Harold Evans, formerly of the Sunday Times, 
maintained that, "Every single week, unpublicised,there is a dispute, 
and a disruption of production". The reason why such perpetual conflict 
rarely receives editorial coverage in the newspapers concerned, which 
devote such unstinting attention to strikes in other industries, is 
not simply the natural reluctance of newspaper management to wash their 
own dirty laundry in public but because critical editorial comment 
would probably inflame internal disputes, as Harold Evans indicated 
~th rather poignant disingenuousness, nIt's difficult for a newspaper 
to report its own difficulties - the workers think we represent some 
• 
. 
vested interest." (BBC TV, The Editors, July 31, 1977). 
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The Royal Commission maintained that the industry "has been plagued 
by recurring unofficial actions", and despaired that, despite 
stern action by management and union officials, "unofficial stoppages, 
often unpub1icised by the papers affected, have continued up to 
the time of our going to press." (RCPi Final Report, 1977,p226) 
"Ccromercia1 Reascns for C1csure 
Since the frequency of industrial action at Albion Street was 
comparable to that experienced normally in Fleet Street, more commercial 
reasons for the closure are indicated. In fact the withdrawalof 
Beaverbrook Glasgow office was part of a process of contraction and 
concentration of the national and provincial press which has continued 
since the 1920s. For the continuing liberal belief that private 
ownership and market competition are the key to a free and flourishing 
press rests upon a profound contradiction: the cost reductions derived from 
economies of scale, together with unequal access to advertising revenue, 
promoted unequal competition. This competition actively reduced" 
diversity and developed ~nopolytherebyrestricting press freedom. The 
result is that Britain has developed a press unique among capitalist 
industrial countries in the degree of centralization of both editorial 
control and production in one city, -In no other capitalist country 
was there so rapid and apparently so complete a movement towards a 
centralized metropolitan press." (R.Wi1liams, 1978,p.25). This 
centralization, dictated by the competitive process and economies of scale, 
has sacrificed regional autonomy and cultural heterogeneity in the 
course of cost-cutting exercises. Beaverbrook's original venture north 
of the border was against the trend, and the departure of Beaverbrook 
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in 1974 meant that none of the national newspapers were produced 
in Scotland, though they all circulate there. (RCP, Interim Report, 
1976b,p.2). In view of 'the precarious state of the finances of 
Beaverbrook it was commercially compelling to secure the large cost 
reductions available by shifting production of the Scottish Daily 
Express to its office in Carmelite Street in Manchester. (RCP, Interim 
Report, 1976b,p.82). 
It has been argued that the Albion Street operation was never 
profitable, even at the peak of sales of the Scottish Daily Express 
in the late 1950s. (McKay and Barr, 1976,p.18). It would be impossible 
to verify this without a thorough examination of the Beaverbrook books, 
however the workers believed that in the final year, at least, the 
losses incurred at Albion Street, relative to the rest of the group had 
been accentuated by calculated manipulation of the advertising accounts 
by the London management to,help justify closure. (Guardian, 5 May 1975). 
Certainly the circulation of the 'Scottish Daily Express had been 
maintained at 570,000, while the circulation of the Daily Express 
itself was rapidly declining, an imposing achievement in a country with 
a population of 5 million people. It was estimated that the closure 
would cost Beaverbrook £5 million in redundancy payments which would 
be offset by government contributions, the sale of the title of the 
'Evening Citizen for £2.75 million, thesale of the Albion Street building; 
and the annual saving of approximately £1 million on labour and other 
1 
costs by utilizing the spare capacity in Manchester. The Evening 
Citizen was sold to George Outram, a subsidiary of Sir Hugh Fraser's 
scottish and Universal Investments, and the publisher of the rival 
1.. George Reid, quoting the Investors Chronicle of 11th January, 1974 
and the Guardian, of March 17th 1974, argued that the Beaverbrook property 
assets, since they had not been reval~d for six years were worth some 
E50 million,rather than the £8.4 mi~lion book value, and that the Albion 
Street closure was part of a management forward planning strategy of 
asset-stripping. (Hansard, 26 March, 1974, p.397). 
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evening paper. The Economist gloated, "Sir Hugh is expected 
to combine it with Glasgow's other evening paper, the Evening Times, 
which must then become as nicely profitable as most of the monopoly 
evenings in the country." (23 March 1974). Consent to the 
acquisition of th~ Evening Citizen by Outrams was given by the 
Secretary of State, Shirley Williams, without reference to the Monopolies 
Commission because the Citizen was "not economic as a going concern, 
_ and as a separate newspaper." (Hansard, 27 March 1974,p.467). HencE: 
the last remaining city in Great Britain excluding London, with two 
evening papers, saw its choice quietly extinguished. Table I 
shows that in 1921 there were 27 urban centres with a choice of evening 
paper, and by 1974 London alone had 2 evening papers before they were 
merged in 1980. Little, if any, official effort has been made to 
1 
arrest this development of almost complete local press monopoly. 
Resorting to the basest of rationalizations Eric Deakins, the Uncer-
Secretary of State for Trade, replying for the government in the debate 
on Albion Street, justified the Glasgow merger, "It is a fact that, 
apart from Glasgow, only London supports two evening newspapers. There 
have been many mergers since the war. The-trend everywhere has been 
towards a single evening paper. This need not create a real monopoly 
situation if there is continued competition from weekly newspapers, 
morning papers and local radio. Some people may even feel that it is 
better that there should be one strong newspaper, given editorial freedom 
than two ailing local newspapers."· (Hansard, 26 March, 1974,p.4lS). 
1. A "proposal/:a~pted in 1965 requiring all acquisitions of newspapers 
by large press groups, already having an average daily circulation in 
the United Kingdom of 500,000 copies or more, to obtain the assent of 
the Secretary of State. Between 1965 and 1975, 50 applications were 
made to the Secretary of State of which seven were referred to the 
Monopolies COmmission. Not one of these S~ applications was refused." 
(CUrran, 1979,p.73). 
-Table 1. 
Year 
19213 
19373 
1948 
1961 
1974 
1980 
The Number of Urban Centres Wi£h a Choice of 
, :Loca1 Daily Paper, 1921"':'19~4. 
Urban centres with a choice of 
. Local Morning . Paper 2 Local ·Evening paper Local 
16 27 
7 10 
5 11 
2 9 
2 1 
0 
................ 
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Daily 
34 
21 
21 
20 
16 
1. Derived from RCP 1947-49, Appendix II, Table II Rep 1961-62, 
Appendix III, Table 4, Hartley et ali Concentration of 
. ·ownership in the Provincial Press, RCP, 1977, Table 6.1. 
2. Excluding London 
3. Excluding Ulster 
(Source: Curran, 1979, p.70, Table 6.> 
Paper 
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Labour Government Contradictions 
The newly-elected Labour Government felt that it could only 
acquiesce to Beaverbrook's demands in March 1974. Peter Shore, 
the Secretary of State for Trade, maintained that after discussions 
with Sir Hugh Fraser and Beaverbrooks itemerged that it was not 
possible for Fraser to continue to print the Scottish Express 
papers at Albion Street as well as his own papers the Evening Times 
- and the Glasgow Herald. Fraser had offered to buy the Scottish Express 
newspapers, but Beaverbrook had refused, insisting to the government 
that the loss of the Scottish sales and advertising revenue would have 
serious consequences for. the group as a whole. Having exhausted 
the alternatives deemed appropriate by the newspaper proprietors 
concerned, Shore could only comment, "we have been concerned with two 
objectives: first, to explore all possibilities of avoiding the 
grievous loss of jobs in hard-pressed Glasgow, and, second, to try to 
find an alternative solution based upon a Scottish newspaper group. 
It is with profound regret that we have been forced to the conclusion that 
no solution could be found." (Hansard, 27 March 1974. My emphasis). 
In the debate on the Scottish Daily Express in parliament, LabolJI M1?s 
were confronted with a painful dilemma: how could they assist a 
newspaper which throughout its life had sought only to vilify and abuse 
socialism? Normally the contradiction of a Labour Government assisting 
capitalist industry in order to preserve workers jobs remains concealed. 
But in the case of the Express the irony was too heavy to ignore, 
Hugh Brown indignantly claimed, 
"Running through the mess.age of the newspaper concerned 
has been a contempt for labour and the trade union movement. 
It has been lI;1ade clear that unless one is on the other side 
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of the fence, one cannot even run a local council - quite 
apart from running a Government or business venture. 
This evening we are discussing one of the most inefficient, 
and inco~petent managements in the newspaper industry." 
(Hansard, 26 March 1974, p.390). 
Harry Ewing added, 
"One can well imagine what. tomorrow's Scottish Daily Express 
.headlines will be about the new Government, and it is ironic 
that on Budget night, of all nights, we are·pressing for 
something to be done to save the paper. Listening to the 
debate, I recall what my father said when I was a small boy. 
He was an ardent Socialist and used to say tha~ the best 
thing ever in the Scottish Daily Express was the fish supper. 
I do not disagree with that view, but it hurts me deeply 
that 1,800 specialised jobs in G.asgow are to be lost." (p.407). 
There was some division among the Labour members between those 
who were prepared to treat the Express like any other industry in the 
offer of assistance, and those who baulked at propping up such a 
reactionary proprietorial newspaper. Those Labour members in favour 
of some form of assistance were made uncomfortable by the support of 
Teddy Taylor, the strident and unpredictable Conservative MP 
for Glasgow Cathcart, who likened Albion Street to Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders, stressed the need for special action to restore profitability, 
and later suggested the possibility of a newsprint subsidy, though 
as Hugh Brown unkindly pointed out this support for Scottish Express 
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newspapers by Taylor was largely "because they churn out rubbish 
with which he agrees." (p.393). Probably John Robertson, MP for 
Paisley, expressed the view of many Labour members in insisting, 
"I should be against subsidising privately-owned 
newspapers •••••• The idea that newspapers owned by 
private individuals are better than vehicles for the opinions 
and ideas of those individuals is nonsense. The great 
weakness of the newspaper industry is that it is the producer 
of private pamphlets of individuals seeking to bend 
.people's minds to their way of thinking •••••• If we can 
run the BBC, which is also a vehicle for information and 
news, there is no reason why newspapers cannot be controlled 
in a similar way. Therefore, while it is important that 
we carry out an immediate rescue operation, if that is 
possible, we should not do it at any price. I should 
like to see the Government take over all theassets without 
compensation and produce a newspaper which is genuinely 
free and which reflects the point of view of not only the 
people it serves but those who work on it." (p.40l). 
... 
The prospect of nationalization without compensation remained 
firmly part of Labour Party mythology, but two other, more limited, 
proposals emerged from the parliamentary debates on the Scottish Daily 
Express: firstly the idea was endorsed that there should be a 
Royal COmmission on the Press, and secondly that some form of trust 
or 'employees' enterprise'should take over Albion Street and continue 
to publish newspapers from there. The demand for a Royal Commission 
into the ownerShip of the press was made during the first prime minister's 
question time of the new government on 21st March, when loan Evans 
-linked the events in Glasgow with the fact that in the February 
1974 election all of the national daily newspapers, with the 
exception of the Daily Mirror, had supported theConservatives or 
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a coalition government. The demand for a Commissmn was repeated 
in a number of debates, and a month later, announcing his intention 
to appoint a Royal Commission, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
referred to the anxiety about the closure of the Scottish Daily Express 
with the loss of nearly 2,000 jobs and the grave dangers of a further 
restriction on the newspaper reading public's choice. The terms of 
reference of the Royal Commission were deceptively wide ranging concerning the 
economics, industrial relations and concentration of ownership of 
the press; but it was earlier acknowledged by Wilson that the Commission 
had come too late to assist. the Albion Street workers in any way. 
(Hansard 2 May 1974, pp 1322-1326; RCP, Final Report, 1977,p2) 
The more immediate suggestion of a workers takeover of Albion Street 
was supported by most of the Labour speakers as an attractive solution 
to the problem, however, th~ suddenness of the arrival of the idea 
was indicated by Tam Dalye11's contribution: 
"I have just received a phone call from my friend and 
constituent, Allister Mackie, who is the father of the 
federated chapels in Albion Street, Glasgow. Be 
told me that the employees have tonight decided to try 
to set up an employee's enterprise involving Scottish 
industrialists and any Scottish capital that is prepared 
to help. According to Allister Mackie, the idea is 
to float a new newspaper. A feasibility study has been 
done, and at first Sight, at any rate, the accountants 
are optimistic. I have been asked to inquire from the 
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-Government whether any help and advice can be provided on a 
management consultancy basis. The crunch question is whether 
they will have access to the Beaverbrook accounts and the internal 
operations of the Beaverbrook set-up. I hope, therefore, that 
in discussions with the Beaverbrook Press my right hone Friends will 
impress upon those concerned that if they are not prepared to run 
- a Scottish newspaper themselves they should at least not be difficult, 
and should allow others to have a go at trying to do so • 
. (Hansard, 26 March, 1974, pp.393-4). 
A similar idea was proposed by Jim Sillars who suggested that 
in the event of Beaverbrook refusIng to remain in Scotland, the 
government should take the Scottish op~ration into the ownership of 
a newspaper trust, with control of the trust vested in a policy 
board drawn from the workers employed by the three newspapers, with 
a second-tier executive board responsible for implementing policy 
decisions. The government would be" responsible for ensuring that 
the trust received adequate launching aid, and that policy-making 
lay in the hands of the trust's policy board, without interference 
from the Government. To those whoopposed state aid to newspapers 
because "they fear that where Government money goes, so does Government 
control", S~llars offered the following amazing reassurance, 
"This year in Scotland alone, thanks to the wisdom of 
a Labour Government, we shall pump £40 million into firms 
through the regional employment premium ••••• As well as 
the money from REP, many more millions of pounds will be 
pumped into industry in Scotland througn the Industry Act. 
f 
• The REP payments will carry no Government control, and I 
suggest that very little control will follow money granted 
under the Industry Act. That proves that Government 
money need not necessarily march hand in hand with 
Government control. (p.385-6). 
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Sillars therefore maintained. that there was a possibility of 
providing state assistance, without accompanying controls, to a 
~ 
newspaper trust, by reference to the lack of control exercised by 
government in its general assistance to capitalist industry! 
An appreciation of the scale of the problems which faced 
the Albion Street workers in embarking upon their "employees 
consortium" was revealed by Harry Ewing, who also stressed the 
importance of Beaverbrook releasing the titles of the Scottish 
Express papers: 
"The men are taking on a monumental task. No-one should 
should be under any misapprehension about that. The 
task which they have set themselves is not easy, and it 
will not be made any easier if the titles of the papers 
are withheld and the men have to start publishing new 
papers with new titles. They require not only 
management consultancy but a massive public relations 
exercise to sell the title of a new paper. That is 
costly in itself. We must begin to think in terms of 
ES million before the paper gets off the ground." (p.406). 
As experience was to show, Ewing had hit upon the real 
dimensions of the problems confrontin~ the new paper; however the 
outline proposals for a 50\ bridging loan from the government at 10' 
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interest which emerged from Albion Street by the next day did not 
sufficiently r.ecognise these problems. In fact the flrst 
feasibility study of the Scottish'Daily News was completed by Willi~~ 
Wolfe, an accountant and chairman of the Scottish National Party, 
within 48 hours of him approaching the Albion Street Action Committee. 
A newspaper was projected with a circulation of 200,000, an 
advertising content of 40\, and a workforce of 600. (McKay and 
Barr, 1976, p.39). Though so hurriedly prepared, later proposals and 
reports were to revolve around these original figures. Moreover, 
rather than receiving the official assistance which they had requested 
in correcting their estimates, the Qlasgow workers were to encounter 
a sustained antipat~y from official quarters, particularly the 
Department of Industry civil service. 
The Co-operative Decision and the Diversion of Resistance. 
The decision to press for a co-operative was taken at Albion 
Street with remarkable speed: an Action Committee Was formed the 
day after the closure Was announced, and within a week a feasibility 
study had been completed and acceptance gained for the idea, at a 
mass meeting. This is the first major enigma surrounding the 
Scottish Daily News: why did the Glasgow workers immediately opt 
for a co-operative rather than attempt alternative forms of resistance? 
Why did they not fight to prevent the Beaverbrook closure, or demand 
nationalization of the Scottish Daily Express, or try some other 
strategy? Whatever the reasons for the decision, the resolve to 
launch a co-operative did serve to de-escalate a situation of mounting 
tension: 
-"As the moment of shut-down approached at the end of 
March ••• there was a live possibility of confrontation at 
the Albien Street plant in Glasgow. There were tentative 
murmerings about occupying the building and making sure 
that Beaverbrook would not have the use of it if the staff 
were to lose their jobs. But before such a clash 
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materialised, an Action Committee led by an Express compositer, 
Mr. Allister Mackie, came up with the idea of forming a 
workers co-operative to buy the plant and publish a new 
daily paper." . (The Guardian, 5 May 1975). 
The co-operative idea, once accepted, precluded alternative means 
of resistance and diverted energy in this particular direction. The 
possibility of more outright opposition was pre-empted: 
was to be fought not politically, but commercially. 
Beaverbrook 
TO understand the readiness with which the co-operative idea 
was adopted, the. constraints within which the Action Committee operated, 
must be appreciated. In arranging the closure,besides giving no 
warning, Beaverbrook had adopted two other devices in order to minimize 
opposition. The first was the insidious nature of the redundancy 
terms: two weeks wages were to be paid for every year of service, but 
in addition the management announced, 
"It is our aim that a further cashpayment of one 
week's earnings for each year of service will become 
payable on the 1st January 1975 to everyone who is under 
65 at that date. This payment \lill be dependent upon 
• normal production and distribution continuinq in London, 
Manchester and Glasgow until the end of the month and 
thereafter in Manchester and London." 
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The Albion Street workers rightly interpreted this provision 
as a crude attempt to blackmail them into passive submission. 
Furthermore, it placed them in the impossible position of relying 
upon the co-operation of the London and Manchester workers with 
Beaverbrook's plans, over whom they could exert little influence 
once dismissed from employment with the Express. (Hansard, 26 March 
1974, pp. 382-3). The other management· device was the more 
conventional one, frequently utilized during redundancy and other industrial 
relations issues, of divide and conquer. Beaverbrook management 
assured their workforce that the only way of saving the jobs of the 
London and Manchester offices, was to sacrifice the Glasgow office, 
and that any effort to maintain Albion Street would place in jeopardy 
the group as a whole. The stark calculation presented by management 
was: accept the 1,800 redundancies in Glasgow, or risk 10,000 
redundancies with the complete collapse of Beaverbrook. 
Rather than contest this logic and produce alternative demands 
for the Beaverbrook group to maintain employment, the trade unions in 
London, Manchester and most critically, in Glasgow itself, conceded 
that the management proposition was inescapable. "As a trade 
unionist", Allister Mackie asserted later,"I have always accepted 
that you sacrifice one thousand to savefive thousand." (Sunday Times, 
21 September, 1975). He elaborated further, "Their argument was that 
it was necessary to cease their Glasgow printing operations to 
~eep their Manchester and London offices open. The attitude of the 
national print unions was understandtbly conditioned by this argument. 
They accepted that it was a lesser evil to lose 2,000 jobs than 10,000. 
The shop stewards then had to make a quick and decisive re-appraisal 
of their own attitudes. Could they continue to press for the 
reversal of the Beaverbrook decision to close, knowing that if 
their efforts proved successful, they would throw perhaps another 
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8,000 Manchester and London colleagues out of work? The offi d..al 
union attitude held the day; another means of maintaining employment 
would have to be found." (Mackie, 1976 pp. 110-111). Thus under 
_ the influence of official print union attitudes, the orientations 
of the Albion Street union leaders were a combination of the 
acceptance of the prevailing market rationality, the continued private 
ownership and control of the Beaverbrook empire, the impossibility of 
any immediate alternative structure for the national press, and 
therefore the acceptance of the need for the self-sacrifice of the 
Glasgow workers. A more accurate assessment of the political 
realities involved in the closure was offered at the" time by Harry Ewing, 
"I believe that Glasgow is ••• the first stage and that for Jocelyn 
Stevens to say to Manchester and London, 'Ditch Glasgow to save 
Manchester' is a deception of the lowest kind. That is because cf the 
guarantee that in a year's time people will be saying to London, 
'Ditch Manchester to save yourselves'. (Hansard, 26 March 1974, p.406). 
(In 1974 Manchester received an influx of 100 workers from Scotland, 
but by 1976 this increase was eliminated by enforced labour reductions 
dqe to the pagination and circulation decline of the Express. (RCP, 
1976a,p.148). Despite many recent developments, the future of 
both the Manchester and London offices has remained uncertain, and rivalry 
has perSisted. 
The tame response of the print unions concerned to the Beaverbrook 
offensive prompted more strident calls for united action from other 
quarters: 
The time is long overdue for a real fight against the 
press barons ••• and that can only mean an industrial 
fight using Albion Street and solidarity strike action 
to bring them to heel. No other force is strong enough 
to make them go back on their objectives. If Beaverbrook 
still refuse to honour their obligations to the workers 
then the struggle must be stepped up and extended to the 
_ whole newspaper and media industry so that the Labour 
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Government is forced to nationalize the building and machinery 
and subsidize the production of newspapers under workers control." 
(I.S.Pamphlet,The Beaverbrook File, n.d.) 
That no such militant call for union mobilisation in pursuit of 
nationalization and workers control was either seriously raised by 
the Albion Street chapels, or attended to by the print unions, can only 
be explained by an examination of the level of organization and 
consciousness which existed in both at the time. Widely contrasting 
opinions exist on the strength of unien organization at Albion Street, 
Allister Mackie has argued, 
nFor a period of years there had built up in the office 
an organization among the various chapels that was difficult 
to match in any other national newspaper in Britain. In 
the newspaper industry the mistrust and, at times, hostility 
among the various chapels is difficult to imagine. There 
is a long history of inter-chapel mistrust: either craft 
against non-craft; or craft against another craft, and 
invariably the Journalists against all the others. But in 
Beaverbrook's Glasgow office the problem has almost disappeared 
-Under the organization of the Federated House Chapel the 
various chapels had learn~d to live together; had 
developed the habit of discussing each other's problems, 
and had forged a relationship to each other that gave 
them a unity, and the Federated Chapel a respect, that 
the entire workforce recognized. And had it been 
otherwise there would have been no concerted effort to 
fight the closures of the three newspapers ••• It is 
possible that the unity of the workforce that hallmarked 
the entire struggle could not have materialized ~ any 
other newspaper office in Britain. (197Gb, pp.109-l0). 
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A markedly different interpretation provided by Buckingham was that, 
"Proper trade union organization inside the Scottish Daily 
Express could have averted the closure in the first place. 
In other sections of the newspaper industry - Thomson Group 
houses are an example - the unions have bench-marked jobs 
and got this written into water-tight annual agreements with 
the management ••• The trouble at the Express was that while 
the going was good, no real attempt was made to sew up the loose 
ends that would put the chapels in a strong position. 
Trade unionists made the false assumption that Beaverbrook 
would 'See them all right', and that good pay and conditions 
would automatically continue, as if by some magical process 
The rigid defence. of a trade union position leading up to 
a militant occupation would have saved theE!press jobs, 
as Beaverbrook themselves knew full well. And this would 
have made the whole brave, sad, SAgA of "the Scottish Daily 
... 
" .. ~ unnecessary." (M.Buckihghami International Socialism,81P.9). 
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The weakness at Albion Street was, that however cohesively 
the Federated Chapel functioned, and however militant about particular 
grievances individual chapels were, this organisation and activity 
was contained within union orientations steeped in conservatism: 
the generous material rewards of working at traditional skills for 
years in one of the most reactionary newspaper publishers in Britain 
had left its mark. Though their confidence in the existing economic 
system had been shattered by the cruelty of Beaverbrook's treatment 
of them, as far as most of the workers were concerned, they wanted 
merely to prove that with their own enterprise they could carryon in 
the newspaper industry more. or less as before. Alternative employment 
in a declining industry was difficult to find, and the workers 
at the Express wanted to retain their skills and continue in the jobs 
they were used to, "A stubborn and strong loyalty to print", 
John Hodgeman maintained, "contributed to the redundant workers' 
determination to stick together. Those who have these skills do 
not lightly cast them aside to settle for alternative manual jobs." 
Allister Mackie elaborated more expansively, 
"An engineer, electrician, painter or accountant has a 
chance of finding a job. outside the newspaper industry. So 
has a typist. But the great majority of people who worked 
in Albion Street are the possessors of rare and special skills 
valuable only in the production of newspapers. It would be 
a reckless waste to throw these skills away. They are a 
human investment. Scotland cannot afford to lose. That 
is why the Scottish people owe this enterprise their warm 
support." (Campaign, April 26, 1974). 
, 
.... 
The failure to mount an effective campaign against Beaverbrook 
in the short time available, meant that when Andrew McCallum, the 
father of the journalists' chapel, suggested that they all pool 
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their redundancy money to buy the plant and premises and launch their 
own paper, it was seized upon as the last chance of saving jobs: 
"charged with desperation from the certain knowledge that the 
alternative was unemployment, the Action Committee took the decision 
to fight for the setting up of a co-operative. Like so many co-
operatives in the past, the idea was conceived in a womb of expectancy 
and despair, and in an economic climate that had already forced the 
closure of a newspaper." (Mackie, 1976b, p.112). But the envisaged 
co-operative according to Wolfe's feasibility study which was not 
contested, could only employ 600 workers, which was later scaled down 
to 500, therefore from the start it was accepted ~~at 1,300 redundancies 
were inevitable. Though widely interpreted as a political gesture, 
the idea of running their own newspaper appealed primarily to the 
business inclinations of most of the journalists, the staff, and 
large sections of the print workers. 'The Scottish Daily News 
therefore was inspired originally, not by the strength of union 
orientations and organization at Albion Street, but by their weakness. 
'The Fight for the Right to Work 
Yet some of the Glasgow workers possessed more political awareness, 
and saw the struggle to establish the 'Scottish Daily News as part of 
the general fight for 'the right to work'. This group consisted 
of the engineers and electricians, the clerical workers in APEX, and 
some journalists and print workers, and included several of the most 
active Fathers of the Chapels (FOCs) and IIIiI!Blers of the Action Committee 
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They were largely responsible for whatever links the campaign for the 
Scottish Daily News managed to create with the rank and file trade 
union movement, and for the socialist element in the direction of 
the proposed newspaper. Jimmy McNamara, the FCC of the engineers 
and a member of the Action Committee, was one of the leading spokesmen 
acknowledged by the left: 
"We see our struggle, some of us see our struggle, as an 
extension of the right to work ••• as an extension of the 
UCS struggle. Certainly not an alternative: not 
an alternative to socialism, not an alternative to 
nationalization •••• Now we didnae choose a co-operative, 
we were forced into the position, and speaking personally, 
its not an alternative to socialism. It's certainly not 
an alternative, it can't possibly be, for us to exist as an 
island of socialism.in a capitalist society ••• But what I 
do see, is that Robert OWen couldn't have possibly 
succeeded on his own in his society, when he built the 
mills in New Lanark, but Robert OWen went ahead, and our lives 
have been enriched because Robert OWenwent ahead, that's 
what's important - Robert OWen contributed •••• I don't know 
of any other industry that's had three Royal Commissions 
since the war. So there's changes coming, there ~ be 
chanqes. The whole of the western world is suffering these 
problems in the press, there's got to be changes in the press. 
If we can contribute to that change, if we can show something, 
if we can show some direction and participate in that change, 
and at the same time encourage workers to participate, then we 
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will have contributed And they were our three planks: 
the 500 jobs were the most important thing, democratization 
of the press was very important, and thirdly the development 
of workers control. They were the three issues we 
continually hammered home, and workers responded. Unfortunately 
for workers in the print industry to respond we had to go 
to England. There was some response in Scotland, but fear 
- of unemployment, us being a threat to their jobs kinda 
spoiled that ••• But over the piece: - alternative to 
socialism? No! The best form of struggle? No! 
Ideal? No! Not by a long shot! n 
This assessment of priorities was emphatically supported by 
Ronnie Gibson, FOC of the clerical workers' APEX, 
"When we thought up this concept, it wasn't a concept of a 
workers co-operative, it was a concept of the right to 
work. Basically it was as simple as that, it was a concept 
of the right to work. Nobody should have the right in 
Fleet Street, or anywhere else, to put 1,800 workers out 
of a job. We're not really talking about 1,800 workers 
we're talking about maybe three or four thousand people 
who were affected. By the stroke of a pen. Jocelyn 
Stevens said to us - 'You've no right to work'. And we 
were fighting basically for the. prinCiple of that. Not 
the principle of a workers co-operative, but the principle 
of the right to work. And ~t should always be recognized 
as that and nothing else. What we d1d L we created 500 jobs, 
not created a workers co-operati~e but created 500 jobs that 
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were not there. We fo.ught, and we won, for the right to 
work. It was based on that." 
Something which all sections of opinion within Albion Street 
had in common though, was the feeling that they had been abandoned 
by the print unions in Beaverbrook, in Scotland, and in much of 
the national newspaper industry, to fight alone. When the Glasgow 
workers faced Beaverbrook, and later in negotiations with the government, 
it was not with the authority of the national printing unions behind 
them, but as an isolated group of redundant print workers searching 
despe.rately for any feasible solution, and living on their wits. 
For an important reason why the Scottish Daily Express went down, as 
other national newspapers had gone before, was the sectionalism and 
competitiveness of the different chapels, unions and newspaper offices, 
which replicated the rivalry of the relationships between their 
. employers under the constant pressure of the restricted, but intensely 
competitive market for national newspapers. Jimmy McNamara, a life-long 
ardent trade unionist was dismayed, 
"The unions in the print industry are a shambles. At the moment 
we have a 'non-political' print union, how the hell any trade union 
can be 'non-political' I'd love them to tell me. But this is a fact, 
we have a 'non-political' trade union. There is animosity, there are 
frictions, there are attitudes inside the print industry that are 
foreign to any other industry. As engineers we can be a bit more 
objective, and I hope its constructive criticism, I'll no purely be 
destructive, but I've got to say it. When I worked in a ship-yard, 
there were frictions, there were animosities, between boilermakers and 
coppersmiths, engineers and plumbersi and electriCians, you name it. 
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But when they met the employer - they were a solid body, 
I canna remember any instance where the unions sided with 
the employer. In the print industry it's entirely different, 
and I'm talkin about something I know here, when I talk about 
the Beaverbrook closure - there was connivance inside the 
print industry unions in the Beaverbrook closure and make no 
bones about it. In fact their whole attitude towards us was 
wrong when we attempted to do something - and this was the 
difference between us and ues, the trade union movement responded 
·to ues because the trade unions involved in ues responded to 
the workers - but the trade unions in the print industry, it 
embarrassed them that we should have the audacity to fight 
for the right to work. 1"m not saying that at the end of the 
day a workers co-operative was th~ answer, or that it was what 
we were looking for. We were looking for to keep Beaverbrook 
open, lets be honest, we were fighting to prevent a closure, 
500 jobs that was what we fought for in the first instance, -
not 500 jobs, 2,000 jobs - but it became painfully obvious 
to us, that the print unions are so fragmented, and so selfish, 
particularly in the newspaper industry. High wages in the 
newspaper industry has created a licence to print lies. That's 
a reflection of the wages in the printing industry - its a 
licence to print lies. And that reacts on us." 
The complicity of the union chapels at the Beaverbrook London and 
Manchester offices in the Albion Street closure arrangements, was 
certainly of critical importance in restraining the effort to arouse 
the rest of the national newspaper industry unions in the struggle to 
kee~ the Glasgow office open. Jimmy McNamara explained further, 
61 
"Its an old socialist argument 'the, greatest good for the 
greatest number', and we recognize that. I can recognize 
print union leaders saying, 'To save 8,000 Beaverbrook 
jobs in the South, its quite in order to sacrifice 2,000 
Beaverbrook jobs in Glasgow.' And I can accept the 
Manchester workers attitude of fear. But for no one to co 
anything! In fact when we went to l-tanchester to ask 
them not to do the Scottish edition, to fight for the right 
to work, the answer we got was,'You're asking Manchester to 
cut its throat to give you a blood transfusion!' We dimi't 
see it as that, we reckon the blood was taken off us in the 
first instance! It was our work! And we said, 'We're 
trying to escalate the struggle! We say to the Beaverbrook 
Empire workers: Stand Up! Be counted! Fight for 
the right to work! Escalate the Struggle into the Print 
Industry! It didnae happen, it didnae happen. It didnae 
get off the ground. And there's no doubt in my mind, that it 
didnae get off the ground because arrangements had been made 
prior to the closure, and there's evidence that jobs were frozen 
in Mandhester for certain sections. These are facts, jobs were 
frozen to accommodate some Scottish workers, jobs that were 
available for permanent employment, were not made available 
for the 'Manchester casuals to take, in preparation for the 
closure in Glasgow. Och, its not a practice you can critize, 
it had happened every time before. It wasnae any different. 
But we maintain, that after the UCS situation - it'is different. 
Now Honeywells, McClaron Controls, the factory in Eastleigh, 
Meriden, - there have been a variety of interpretations 
. of the UCS struggle. Certainly not the same - Bryant Colour -
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they're endless, they're no the same. But at least 
there's been something, and the common thread is - that no 
longer do workers accept the boot! They react in some 
form or another. There is a reaction regardless of 
redundancy money etc.... But nowhere yet has a newspaper 
closure been fought. Been critized and argued about -
but never been fought! .. 
National print union officials were unsympathetic to the idea 
of attempting to save Albion Street, and the Glasgow workers failed to 
either reach or convince the rank aqd file in the industry; many of 
the most militant c?apels in the country only heard of the struggle 
in Glasgow when the appeal went out for money for the co-operative 
and the fight against closure had already been lost. (M.Buckingham, 
'International Socialism 87, p.9). A final appeal from the Action 
Committee on the day of closure for a national 24 hour print strike fell 
upon deaf ears. 
The Dilemmas of Reformism 
To some extent the trade unions faced the same dilemmas as 
the Labour Government; how could they support a campaign to keep open 
the office of a newspaper which had unstintingly condemned them since 
its origin? The embarrassment was clear at a mass demonstration 
in Glasgow on the Friday before closure, the many militant trade 
unionists present were acutely aware of the ironic contradiction that 
they were supporting the maintenance of the reactionary Scottish Daily 
E!press. But given the effectiveness with which the capitalist 
press had succeeded in conveying the idea that private ownership was a 
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vital prerequisite of press freedom, there was also no chance of the 
Labour Government agreeing to nationalize Albion Street. Any 
selective individual assistance would be guaranteed to raise the 
hackles of the proprietorial press. There were profound problems 
too, with proposals for a general press subsidy, as Jimmy McNamara 
argued, 
"There must be some change, but I don't see any right 
thinking Labour Government subsidizing a press that is 80\ 
in the hands of three groups. The national press is 
in the hands of three groups, and you can bring it right 
down to three men. I don't see a policy coming from any 
socialist government, on subsidizing the press in these 
circumstances. But what I do expect is that a socialist 
government would say - the more ideas, the more points of 
view, the more opinions, that are made available for people, 
the better. And I would expect them eventually to put 
printing presses at the disposal of the bodies in 
society that are representative of society. I'm. talking 
about local government, trade unions, churches, these 
organizations that are representative of society, with 
representatives on the board, to control the printing plant, 
to control the running of the presses without direct government 
control. I don't want direct government control, not 
by a long shot. But I believe that the community, through 
its organizations, can participate." 
. 
Any such radical conception of a complete transformation of the 
. 
existing press was remote from the vision of both Harold Wilson's Labour 
Government, and the national Officials of the print unions. However, at 
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the time protracted negotiations had already begun between Benn's 
Department of Industry and the Triumph workers in occupation of their 
factory at Meriden, with the aim of establishing a worker's 
co-operative. Newspaper co-operatives were known to exist in France 
and Italy, the most famous being Le Monde which enjoys a large 
circulation. With the precedent of Meriden, and with the enthusiastic 
assistance of Benn, the Action Committee hoped to secure some public 
funds to help set up the Scottish" Daily News Co-operative, despite 
the wariness of the government at becoming involved in the finances of 
the press. 
The Occupation of Albion Street 
Three days before the closure was due, Beaverbrpok agreed to offer 
the proposed co-operative first option on the building and plant. It 
was assumed by Beaverbrook that there was little chance of the co-operative 
idea succeeding, but this gesture would soften some of the damaging 
publicity of the withdrawal which could have serious consequences for 
the future sales of the Express 1 besides, it was unlikely that there 
would soon be other potential buyers of the out-dated plant and large 
building, particularly since the Albion Street workers were determined 
to see that the building was only used in the future for newspaper 
publishing. The emotional climax 
of the closure came on the final night of publication, 28 March, 1974, 
when the Action Committee had removed a story from the front page, 
and replaced it with an angry and bitter appeal to the Express readers: 
1. Considering the imperialistic thrust of the content of the 
"ScOttish Daily Express, Albion Street in which the Beaverbrook "colonial-
newspaper office was situated had been very appropriately named. 
"This is the last edition of the Scottish Daily Express as 
570,000 know it. Taking its place on Sunday is an English 
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version of the once-great newspaper. 
Run from Manchester. 
Printed in Mancheste~. 
The cost has been almost 2,000 jobs in Scotland with all the 
misery that entails. This committee is determined to right that 
wrong. To make sure as many jobs as possible are safe. 
To make sure that our many faithful readers in Scotland are 
not disappointed. 
To this end the employees hope to start their own newspaper, 
one that will reflect the interests and thinking of its readers. 
Already the committee, which represents the employees' interests, 
has contacted the Government, unions and industry for their 
support. The reaction has been very encouraging. 
Beaverbrook have offered their employees first option on the 
building and plant in Albion Street. The Government has 
promised us every assistance if the new venture is viable. 
Having been denied the right of ·expressing the views of the 
employees until now, we call upon readers to keep faith with us. 
Give us your ideas and suggestions for a new newspaper." 
However, this message, which must be one of the most significant 
communications between the workers of a contemporary national newspaper 
and the readers, if only because such communication is practically never 
allowed to occur, was stopped by the Beaverbrook management. Instead 
of over half a million, only 3,000 copies of the paper were printed, which 
was barely enough for the Albion Street workers to each receive a 
copy of their own appeal. 
f 
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In annoyance, Beaverbrook withdrew their offer of first option 
on the building to the co-operative, and in response the Glasgow 
workers took up occupation of the building, not so much as a defiant 
act of protest and assertion of control that typified many similar 
factory occupations at thetime, but rather as a bargaining counter to 
be used against an untrustworthy and conceivably reluctant vendor. 
Allister Mackie explained, 
"The occupation of the building was necessary to establish a good 
working relationship with Beaverbrook. We realised we would 
have to purchase the building and wanted to look after the 
machinery. Beaverbrook agreed to the occupation, and the 
te~ephone, heating and lighting were paid for by Beaverbrook. 
Later when we were trying to negotiate a lower purchase 
price than the £2.4 million that Beaverbrook asked, they 
said someone else was interested. We did not accept this. 
Part of the argument was the 'buggeration factor' 'if 
anyone else moves in, they'll get buggered around by the lads'." 
And so members of the Action Committee and some of their keenest 
supporters bravely moved into the dark cavernous building with sleeping 
bags and food supplies to mount an around-the-clock guard on the 
premises which they felt to be their own by virtue of their past efforts, 
and which they saw as the key to their future employment. 
Ron McKay and Brian Barr, in their vigorous history of the 
Scottish Daily News, have argued that it ~as a mistake, however inevitable 
it may have been, for the Glasgow workers to base their new venture at 
Albion -Street: 
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"Looked at rationally the idea of taking over Albion Street 
made no economic sense. It would be expensive to keep 
up in rates and heating, it was·several times too big for 
the proposed workforce, it would necessarily perpetuate 
an outdated production method. Any proprietor coming 
into the newspaper business for the first time would opt for 
a highly mechanized print system. But for the co-operative 
this would have meant a substantial retraining of production 
staff and even more redundancies. So that was not an 
option. And at this pOint, it must be said, the journalists 
who later came in for criticism by the rest of the workforce 
for failing to embrace the co-operative ethic, could have 
abandoned the rest of the workforce and set up their o~m 
newspaper, contracting out the printing to an outside firm. 
This possibility was investigated by the journalists and the 
costing indicated that they could produce a highly successful 
Glasgow evening paper1 but the whole idea was abandoned in 
favour of solidarity with the rest of their unemployed 
colleagues." (1976, pp.40-41). 
Certainly the building was too large for the proposed co-operative, 
and this accounted for the ghost-town atmosphere that existed throughout 
several floors of the building even when the Scottish· Daily News (SON) 
was· in full production. But McKay and Barr miss out the essential reason 
why either a new building or a new production system was out of the 
question for the Glasgow workers: they were trying to establish a new 
newspaper on a financial shoe-string, and whatever government assistance 
they could secure, they realised would be an absolute minimum. The 
virtue of the old building and old p+ant at Albion Street was that both 
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could be obtained, it was thought, quickly and cheaply. Probably 
loyalty to their colleagues was an important element in the motivation 
of the journalists, but there were other factors also. A 
conventional newspaper division of labour at the SON whatever innovations 
were made in the control of the co-operative, presented opportunities 
for hierarchy and status which ~~uld be missing in a streamlined 
_ journalists' co-operative, and in this respect the journalists were 
as motivated by traditionalism, and perhaps less defensibly, as the manual 
workers who wanted to work at their traditional skills. A new evening 
paper with contract printing could not employ as many journalists as 
the SON potentially could, and more importantly, there would be little 
scope to expand and develop other newspapers, which Albion Street left 
plenty of room to do. Furthermore, the new paper would need public 
and trade ~~ion support to succeed, which itmight lose if the journalists 
had split from the manual workers with the resulting acrimony. Finally, 
though a few of the journalists made an important contribution to 
developing the concept of the~ co-operative, and of the 
journalists revealed some flair for fund-raising and publicity, most 
of the initiative, resourcefulness and determination, which sustained the 
enterprise through a disheartening series of complex developments and 
interminable delays, came primarily from members of the manual unions. 
It is unlikely that those journalists who remained at Albion Street 
committed to the idea of launching an alternative paper, could have 
created a successful newspaper on their own, even using the most cost-
efficient methods of production available. In the last analysis the 
solid, imposing edifice of the black-glass Albion Street Beaverbrook 
building provided indispensable backbone in the fight to create the 
'Scottish Daily News for both the journalists and manual workers alike. 
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The Action Committee 
During the occupation, and throughout the long struggle to erect 
the co-operative, the role of the Action Committee was of critical 
importance in providing inspiration and both political and practical 
direction. The committee was an 8 man nucleus, drawn from the larger 
_ Federated Chapel which represented the 25 different union chapels 
in Albion Street, although under the pressure of work it was soon 
expanded to 17 members. Though they were all experienced trade 
unionists, several members of the Action Committee were surprisingly limi~€~ 
in their political consciousness and experience given that it was 
they who were to provide political coherence to the campaign. 
The Action Committee 
'Name 'Union'P'OC 'OCcupation Worker Director 
of'SDN 
-
1. Allister Mackie SGA Compositor Chairman 
2. Jimmy McNamara AUEW Engineer (Director) 
3. Charlie Armstrong NGA Stereotyper (Director) 
4. Ronnie Gibson APEX Librarian 
5. Jimmy Lindsay SGA Process Engraver Director 
6. Andrew McCallum NUJ Sub-Editor 
7. Nathan Goldberg NUJ Sub-Editor (Director) 
8. Alister Blyth NGA Stereotyper Director 
Allister Mackie had been Father of the Federated Chapel at 
the 'Express for nine years, and became chairman of the Action Committee, 
ane! later of the'~ co-operative". Brought up in a strong Labour Party 
family, Mackie was cautious of the political shortcomings of some 
members of the committee, and of the majority of the workers: 
"At that time there were only two political activists 
on the committee - a Communist Party member and a Labour 
Party member. Both were long time party members with 
a long history of political activity and experience. In 
addition there was a former Labour Party member who had had 
a brief experience in politics and a former Young Communist 
League member. The majority of the committee were Labour 
sympathisers with perhaps two or three SNP sympathisers 
included. They reflected the non-political' attitudes of 
the print unions and seemed unlikely to survive in the 
totally political situation they were swinging towards. 
However, the political backbone of the committee was 
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strengthened by the co-opting of a financial journalist who 
had the required political awarness, backed by a specialist 
knowledge of economics. Thus composed, the Action Committee 
bravely and optimistically set its face to the future but with 
the political element harbouring misgivings about the chances 
of success of launching the paper and fearful of the apolitical 
outlook of the majority of the workforcew• (Mackie, 1976a,p.2). 
In the first month after the closure, much reliance was placed 
upon the activities of a Working Party established under the chairmanship 
of the Lord Provost of Glasgow to explore the possibility of a new 
Scottish newspaper. The Working Party was convened on the 16 April 1974 
and had two further meetings in the following two weeks. It was 
composed of twenty_ representatives: five officials of the City Council, 
including the Town Clerk, Solicitor and Surveyor, five academics from 
the Chesters Management Centre of the University of Strathclyde; 
Sir Hugh Fraser and two other executives from Outrams Ltd; two 
civil servants from the Department of Industry; the joint 
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managing director of the Bank of Scotland; and an advertising company 
managing director. only two members of the SDN Action Committee 
were present, together with one of the committee's financial advisers. 
(University of Strathclyde, 1974,p.3). Whilst such an august body 
of men might have contributed considerable dignity to the examination 
of the SDN proposals, and may have been very competent to judge the 
fortunes of a conventional newspaper; since theSDN was unorthodox 
in both the manner of its arrival, its proposed management structure 
and its intended eqitorial appeal, it would be difficult to imagine 
a more ill-suited group of men to assess the~ potential: drawn 
uniformly from the higher salaried professions they were being asked 
basically, to decide the appeal of a newspaper conceived by workers 
to be read by workers. The major proposal to emerge from the 
deliberations of the Working Party was to commission a feasibility 
study of the ~ by Chesters Management Centre jointly with the 
Department of Industry. Soon the SON workers were to greatly regret 
investing their hopes in the proceedings of a professional Working Party, 
and relying upon a group of management consultants to produce evidence 
in support of a worker controlled newspaper. 
Meanwhile the garrison at Albion Street was becoming exhausted: 
as in some other occupations the commitment came from a minority of 
activists, though at the SON Charlie Armstrong maintained, these were 
few in number, 
... 
"During the sit-in we \-.ere lucky if we had 40 people in 
at any given time. Our weakness was the workpeople. 
Only 70 or 80 people were really involved. I believe that 
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is \,lhy the national unions were reluctant to help - they thought 
our own workforce was weak." 
Beaverbrook extended the deadline they had given the Action 
Committee to vacate the Albion Street building from April 19 to April 30, 
and at this point the committee took the agonizing decision to abandon 
the Albion Street building and move across the road to a group of large 
huts the Express circulation staff had used, thereby losing control 
of the object of their aspirations, but acquiring some commercial legality. 
Allister Mackie defended this critical step, 
"In the negotiations with Beaverbrook we agreed to move ou~ of 
the building to adjacent huts with free access. We had been spending 
half our time looking after the occupation and only half our time setting 
up the new paper. It was a difficult decision for the Action Co~ttee 
but it brought a sense of relief, as we could now concentrate on 
setting up the paper. . We'd been sleeping on the floor in the factory, 
which was not the best way to prepare for a day's work". 
Another crucial ideological shift which accompanied the move to the 
huts was the new focus upon creating a viable newspaper rather than 
saving jobs as the first priority, as Allister disarmingly put it : 
"One of our problems at first was that we had anticipated 
having a newspaper to employ • X' number of employees, 
we worked it out at 600, and I think this is one of the basic 
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mistakes we made earlier on. As one of the metamorphoses, 
one of the few that we had to pass through, we had to stop 
talking in terms of saving 600 jobs, we had to start talking 
in terms of creating a viable newspaper which would create 
so many 'jobs. So instead of saving jobs we had to talk 
about creating a newspaper." 
However these developments may be interpreted far more critically: 
the end of the occupation formally signified the end of the fight to save 
1,800 jobs. The co-operative was originally conceived as a vehicle 
tha~ could save jobs: the new emphasis on viability was part of an 
insistent, and ultimately overwhelming pressure,' under which the political 
struggle of the SDN was subdued and commercial considerations became 
paramount. These considerations were to dictate that whatever was 
to emerge from the ~ co-operative, it would certainly not be a newspaper 
dedicated to the ideals of class struggle. The legalistic and sanitized 
account of the occupation contained in the submision for assistance 
to the Department of Trade, however translated, was a clear indication 
of the direction in which theSDN was travelling: 
"We had remained in the premises at Albion Street after 
30th March, 1974 with the approval of Beaverbrook Newspapers 
Limited and durinq this time our representatives had entered 
into discussions with Beaverbrook Newspapers Limited's management 
for the purchase of Albion Street. 
The Manaqement of Beaverbrook Newspapers Limited were helpful 
in qrantinq certain options to us to remain in the premises 
at Albion Street whilst we were attemptinq to finance the project, 
but due to tpeir desire to close down 
completely the premises in order to reduce the running costs 
thereof, it was agreed that we would move to temporary. premises 
provided by Beaverbrook Newspapers Limited in Albion Street and 
that Beaverbrook Newspapers Limit~d would grant to us first option 
to purchase by 30th June 1974 the premises including the car parks 
and plant and machinery at Albion Street for a sum not exceeding 
£2,550,000. 
We are conscious of the assistanece which Beaverbrook Newspapers 
Limited have given us." 
(Scottish News Enterprises Limited,.4 June 1974,p2) 
f 
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CHAPTER THREE 75 
THE FOUNDING OF THE SCOTTISH DAILY NEt-iS 
with the occupation ended, and the prepararation of the SON 
enterprise begun in earnest, the first major commitment that the 
majority of the future co-operative workers were asked by the Action 
Committee to make was to contribute.a large proportion of their 
redundancy payments into a trust fund, which would later be repaid 
to enable them to subscribe to shares in the new coompany.The 
collection for the trust commenced on 8 May 1974 and by the 10 May 
£167,875 had been collected. Contributions continued, and by June whe~ 
the submission for government assistance was made £212,080 had been 
raised, with promissary notes for a further £25,150. (SNE,1974,pp2-3) 
A commitment of well over £400 per man, (£400 became the 
required minimum shareholding for SON employees), seems very 
impressive, until it is realised that Beaverbrook paid out £3.9 
million in redundancy and severance payments to 1,850 staff. If 
an average sum had been paid to each man this would have been over 
£2,000, however redundancy and severance payments are based on 
previous earnings and length of service: therefore the older senior 
journalists would have received more than double this amount, whereas 
the younger print workers would have received less than half. 
The contribution to the trust fund was a substantial financial 
commitment for most of the workers involved therefore, and swallowed 
-
up about half of the redundancy money of some. Moreover although 
• they did not fully appreciate it at the time, the workers all 
had ahead of them a bleak winter of unemployment which stretched 
into 13 months of living on the doIe. Though about £50,000 was 
withdrawn from the trust as a number of workers found jobs and 
some drifted away, this was replaced by other contributions, 
and by the following December £210,000 was still in the fund. 
Throughout the campaign the amount of money in the trust served 
as a barometer of the workers' morale, and an indication of 
the seriousness of their purpose. 
The Chesters Report 
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The first damaging blow to the workers confidence in the SON 
venture came with the revelation of the findings of the Chesters 
Management Centre feasibility study published on 14 May. The 
study had been hurriedly completed within a month and comprised 
a small market survey, an analysis of financial estimates, and 
an examination of the proposed management structure of the SON. 
The central conclusion of the report was quite dam ning: 
·In spite of the attractions of the concept of workers 
participating in ownership of the company, the 
·Scottish Daily News" is not a feasibility so 
long as the Scottish Daily Express continues 
to be published." 
(University of Strathclyde, 1974,p9) 
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The significance of the report was that, whatever its weaknesses 
and shortcomings, the findings it offered were consistently taken 
up and used as evidence against ~he vi~ility of the ~, 
particularly by the Industria! Development Unit and the Industrial 
Development Advisory Board of the Department of Industry. Though 
several other reports were prepared, with sharply different findings 
and conclusions, the criticisms of Chesters ' dogged the SDN 
throughout its life. Understandably, the SDN workers did not 
feel especially endeared towards, or impressed with, the work of the 
Management Centre: Allister Mackie expressed their feelings about 
Chesters, 
"They didn't know the first thing about newspapers. 
It was not a sweety shop we were proposing to run, or 
even nuts and bolts we were going to sell. A newspaper 
is different - you can't simply say 2 and 2 makes 4 as 
far as potential circulation goes. 
meaning, but they were amateurish. 
Strathclyde were well 
The day before the 
report was due, they came to us and asked, 'How do you 
work out advertising revenue? I 
was half the money. involved!" 
We were amazed. That 
There were certainly a number of serious weaknesses in the Chesters 
report. The fact that it had been hastily conducted was unavoidable, 
but later official interpretation of the report should therefore have 
been cautious, especially since several other studies were available, 
including the impressively detailed Action Committee submission prepared 
with the assistance of professional accountants and PA management 
consultants. The Chesters report was cobbled toqether by Allan Gay 
of the Management Centre from several discrete contributions of various 
members of the Lord Provost's Working Party into a rather flimsy whole. 
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However there were a few threads running through the report: the 
assumptions that the SDN should be an orthodox popular newspaper; 
and that whilst making concessions to worker involvement, the 
management authority and role.s~ould be as conventional as possible. 
It is a research truism that the answers you get depend upon 
th~ questions you ask: the questions to be answered by Chesters were 
well skewed in a particular direction: 
1. Is there a market for a newspaper to compete in the popular 
press range? 
2. Could this newspaper attract sufficient advertising to make an 
adequate contribution to revenue? 
3. Would it be possible to publish a newspaper to compete in the 
market? 
4. What would be the minimum staff required to publish a newspaper? 
5. Bow much money would be required to float a newspaper? 
6. What would be the management structure? 
7. Could the paper be produced at a profit? 
(University of Strathclyde, 1974, p.2). 
It was therefore inevitable that the findings of the Chesters 
investigation would emphasize competitiveness in strictly market terms, 
and that any consideration of the special Chracteristics and appeal 
of a workers paper would be formally excluded. 
Indeed, the assumption throughout the market survey, conducted 
by Research Surveys of Great Britain Limited (sic), was that the editorial 
content of Britain's first worker controlled newspaper would closely 
resembl~ that of the Express. When "theidea of a new newspaper"was 
first introduced in the questionnaire, resPondents were offered the 
following, somewhat less than splendid, choice of statements: 
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Response 
1. "The Scottish Daily Express will continue to provide 
the same service to Scottish readers as it always 
has done". . . ... 
2. "There is a need for a new daily newspaper in 
3. 
Scotland to provide the same service formerly prOVided 
by the Scottish Daily Express." 
"Don't know/Neither". 
(p.l2) 
22% 
55% 
23% 
When the questionnaire attempted to describe the editorial content 
of the SDN, it succeeded in constricting the desqription into purely 
geographical terms: 
"A new daily newspaper concentrating on Scottish News 
and also covering British and international affairs. 
Besides covering Scottish events in general, it would also 
report news in your own locality." (p.l2). 
Having discussed attitudes towards te Daily Express, and presented an 
apolitical editorial description of the SDN, respondents were then 
asked whether the SDN should be "a little more right wing", "a little 
more left wing", "about the same", or "no preference", compared to 
the Express. Predictably, given the fact that an answer to the 
question had already been provided in previous questions - "There is 
a need for ••• the same service" ••• , people predominantly said "about 
the same" or "no preference". The researchers ignored the fact that 
since the extinction of the Daily Herald a decade before, no mass 
circulation radical newspaper bas existed; therefore, without adequate 
explanation, many people could not be expected to appreciate that the ~ 
could ~ different to the rest of the popular press. When the survey 
encountered considerable public sympathy expressed for the redundant 
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Albion Street workers this was defined as an "emotional response" 
and deemed to be an unreliable indicator of support fer the new 
paper. (p.lS) . The surveys main editorial recommendations were 
mind-blastingly unimaginative: . Scottish news; sport; and the 
"political outlook should be much the same as the Express". (p.l6). 
The full extent of the researchers conflation of the Express and the 
SDN was pointed out by Jason Crisp: 
"Market research has been somewhat erratic and unscientific. 
Strathclyde University conducted a survey with a sample of 
500, showing a copy of the Scottish Daily Express with the 
Scottish Daily News masthead pasted on, ignoring the fact 
that the ~ was using a different format and taking a 
different editorial stance." (1975, p.2l). 
The circulation predictions were the second major weakness 
of the Strathclyde survey. Firstly, the respondents were asked how 
interested they were in reading the SDN: despite the fairly uninspiring 
description offered of the new paper, 34.5\ of people interviewed said 
they were "very interested" and 33.5\ said they were "fairly interested, 
a total of 68\. As Joe McGowan the FOC of the Scottish Graphical 
Association at Albion Street pointed out in his detailed analysis of 
the Strathclyde report, the ,livery interested" 34.5\ of the sample above 
would mean 517,500 people in the Scottish morning newspaper market, 
taking the survey's estimate of 1.5 million households. (In fact about 
1,750,000 morning newspapers are sold in Scotland). (SNE, 1975,p.2l). 
When respondents were asked how likely they were to buy the new paper: 
13\ said they would definitely; 16\ said probably; 18\ said most 
days; and 27\ said occasionally; a surprising total of 74\ of the 
sample. At the outset the survey declared, "It must be emphasised 
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at the start that the market study cannot provide a prediction of 
circulation and readership levels - these depend very much on the 
characteristics of the newspaper itself. What research can do is to 
give an indication of the level of interest in the concept and to 
describe some of the characteristics of the prime market." (p.lO). But 
in its estimate of circulation, the survey ignored the remarkably 
high degree of interest in the paper it had discQvered, and proceeded by 
a method of pessimistic reductionism to produce the circulation 
projections which it had previously said was impossible to do. 
Respondents were asked how likely they were to buy the new paper 
and were given a wide selection of replies, but in estimating the 
probable circulation from these responses Chesters chose to ignore all 
except the 13% who said they would definitely buy it or have it 
delivered every day. Not satisfied with this, Chesters broke down the 
"definites" into those who would buy the paper "instead of" or "in 
addition to" their present paper. Chesters confined their projected 
circulation to those who would definitely buy the paper instead of 
their present newspaper, 8\ of. the sample, giving a dismal total 
circulation of 120,000. Joe McGowan reworked the Chesters figures 
and produced mere optimistic results: 
Table 2 Circulation Projections for the Scottish Daily News 
Likely Purchase of 1 
New Newspaper: , of Chesters Sample 
Definitely 
i. instead of 
ii. in addition to 
Probably 
Most Days 
13' 
8' 
5' (if \ buy) 
16' (if \ buy) 
18' (if 4 days' '. 
out of 6) 
Circulation Projections 
McGowan Chesters 
120, 000 120, 000 
37,500 
60,000 o 
180.,000 o 
(75,000) 
(195,.000) 
Occasionally 
TOTAL CIRCL~TION 
27\ (If 1 day) 
a week 
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67,500 o 
465,000 120,000 
1. 1% of sample equivalent to 15,000 clrculation if total market 1. 5 
million. 
(Source~ Derived from: University of Strathclyde, 1974, pp 13-16; 
J.McGowan, Analysis of Strathclyde Feasibility Study, n.d., p.2). 
In fact the at of the total sample of 521 people who said they would 
definitely buy the paper instead of their existing newspaper consisted 
of 39 people, which reveals the ridulously small size of the sample 
and the implausibility of basing any accurate predictions upon it 
whatsoever: yet Chesters were prepared to make sales forecasts on the 
basis of 39 responses, which even on their own pessimistic daily 
circulation of 120,000 copies amounts to an annual total of 36 million 
copies. Richard Briston, the Professor of Accounting at Strathclyde 
and adviser to the SON, said at the time that the analysis. of circulation 
was "ultra-cautious" th~t from their figures it could well have 
been calculated at 500,000 and that "naive" was the kindest word for 
the survey. (Crisp, 1975, p.2l). Yet the IOU report of the Department 
of Industry treated Chesters prediction of 120,000 as the most probable 
circulation and made several references to the "professional market 
survey" conducted by "a member of a large and reputable consumer research 
organisation." (SNE, 1975, pp 21-3). The leader of the research 
team, Allan Gay, also stoutly defended their "professionalism" 
In fact the market survey was based on 
nothing more professional than uninspired guesswork, and the 
Chesters analysis and conclusions were based on nothing more 
rigorous than pessimism at the p~ospect of entering a crowded 
market with ~ new product. 
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The conservatism of the Strathclyde report became clear in its 
consideration of the proposed management structure of the co-operative. 
though perhaps it was asking a little too much to expect management 
consultants to provide a blueprint for workers control. The report 
envisaged a policy committee comprising equal representation of 
investors and workers together with the general manager and assistant 
general manager, and an independent chairman, therefore giving a 
majority of representation to the investors and management. Policy 
formulated by the committee would be implemented by a general manager 
who would be the chief executive and responsible for corporate planning, 
the report maintained, "the general manager must be "of a very high 
calibre, and his salary should reflect this". (p.33). A middle 
management team including chief editor, would have wide executive 
re~nsibilities. Finally an advisory committee composed of 
elected representatives from the chapels would be able to make 
recommendations to the Policy committee, and advise middle management 
on day to day problems. This seems to be a plan for workers 
participation and management control, and the report endorsed this idea: 
"We consider there should be clear and agreed definitions 
about the scope and subject of advice which the advisory 
cOUIIlittee is expected to give to ensure the retention of 
the best features of conventional supervisor/worker 
relationships ••• We have suggested a management structure 
that could give an opportunity to blend worker involvement 
with management authority and should provide a framework for 
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company goals to be planned for and effectively worked 
towards." (pp.33,40) • 
The management structure proposed by the Action Committee was far 
more ambitious. "OVerall management", including company policy 
and direction would be in the hands of the Works Council composed 
of management and workers, with workers in the majority. The 
general manager and middle managers would not be restricted, but at 
all times would be answerable to the Works Council. Emphasis was 
placed on the importance of a disputes procedure to resolve any 
remaining grievances with the Federated Chapel playing a central role. 
Finally a Representative Council of FOCs and middle management would 
consider day to day production problems, with the right to make 
decisions, though not contrary to those of the Works Council. The 
Chesters report could have focussed upon the obvious contradiction, 
which was to have constant repercussions at the SDN, between having 
"no restrictions" upon management, and management "at all times" being 
answerable to the Works Council. But instead the report simply 
wheeled out the traditional management arguments against democratic 
control: 
"Our view of this type of management is that there could be 
an excess of committee discussion when action is needed. 
The day to day running of a business such as a newspaper demands 
rapid decision making often in uncertainty. The decision may 
be a choice of one of several alternatives and once it has 
been made it is probably implemented so rapidly as to preclude 
any second thoughts. In such circumstances group decision 
making can at the best be time consuming and at the most, time 
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wasting and ineffective. The manager at top and 
middle level must be confident that he has the 
authority to make decisions accepting, of course, his 
accountability for the quality and results of his decisions." 
(pp. 35-6). 
Since both circulation and advertisement revenue were basically 
imponderable factors, the Action Committee felt, with some 
justification, that the root cause of the Chestersreport's opposition 
to the SDN project, and the reas9n for later official hostility, 
was essentially the unconventional democratic management structure 
proposed for the enterprise. (Mackie, 1975, p. 119). 
The report ended with all the dynamic articulation management 
consultants can command: "The aim of a feasibility study is to provide 
a positive recommendation to enable a 'GO/NO GO' decision to be made. 
The final responsibility of making the'GO/NO GO' decision rests in 
this case with the Workers Action Group for whom the Lord Provost 
commissioned the feasibility study." (p. 37). As far as Chesters 
themselves were concerned, they made it perfectly clear that they 
regarded it as a "NO GO decision": "The conclusion to which we have 
come is that the Scottish Daily"News could not succeed as a self-
sufficient enterprise." (p. 41). Thus Chesters was prepared to condemn 
the jobs of 500 men on the flimsiest of evidence. Chesters assessment 
that the SDN was unviable stimulated the official antagonism and 
commercial sceptism consistently directed at the cooperative, which 
made it difficult to qet investment and advertisement revenue,but the 
damaqe did not end there: 'a considerable influence was exerted upon 
the editorial, manninq, and pricinq policy of the newspaper in the 
attempt to meet some of the central criticisms contained in Chesters, which 
was to have serious consequences in the future. 
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The influence 
of the report itself constituted one of the biggest problems that the 
SON workers had to overcome. 'A developing irony at the SON 
was that many of the predictions of Chesters were to prove uncannily 
accurate, though, as is often the case with surveys, for entirely the 
wrong reasons. 
The Arrival of Robert Maxwell. 
A distinguishing feature of, the ~ campaign was that it derived 
support from the most unlikely quarters, whilst,being largely 
neglected by those organisations one might have expected to be sympathetic 
towards the ideal of a co-operative newspaper. Realising the 
enormity of the task of raising sufficient finance for the newspaper 
launch, the Action Committee were fairly in~iscriminate in who they 
approached to request assistance. 
Scottish and "left" millionaires. 
Among those approached were various 
Most responded with little more 
than sympathy, but Robert Maxwell, the chairman of Pergamon Press 
and ex-Labour MP, seized the opportunity to become involved. Robert 
Maxwell "was a self-made man with, certainly, a large measure of regard 
for his creator". He repeated frequently that in helping the SON 
he was "interested in nothing else except the political mileage." 
(McKay and Barr, 1976, p.9). However, Max~ell had long held an 
ambition to expand into newspaper publishing, and had made several 
abortive attempts to take over newspaper companies,. including a bid to 
take control of the News of the World organisation in 1968. Though 
Maxwell's prodigious efforts in book publishing had met with considerably 
more financial success; in the early 1970s the affairs of his publish!nq 
87 
companies were the subject of a prolonged investigation by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, after the failure of m~rger 
negotiations with the Leasco Dat~ Processing Corporation of the 
. 
United States' when they became suspicious of inflat.ed profit figures 
for Pergamon Press. The massive DTI report was finally published 
in 1974, and contained scathing comments about the standard of Maxwell's 
stewardship. Maxwell's political career also suffered a considerable 
setback, when he lost his Buck~ngham seat in the 1970 general 
election, and failed to regain it in 1974. But by 1974 he had managed 
to claw his way back into control of Pergamon, and the SDN provided 
an exercise in which Robert Maxwell could fulfill both his commercial 
ambitions to become involved in national newspaper publishing and 
his political aspirations to restore his lost credibility within the 
Labour Party. 
Maxwell's first, and most important, gesture of support to the 
SDN was to offer 50 pence for every El which the SDN workers 
themselves invested in the enterprise, which he later changed to a 
maximum of £100,000. This had a considerable morale boosting effect 
at Albion Street, but also was to secure Maxwell unlimited amounts of 
free publicity, since every time the SDN campaign was mentioned in 
future press reports it was linked to the generosity of Maxwell's offer. 
Maxwell also offered practical help in recruiting Professor Richard 
Briston, the head of the accountancy department at Strathclyde University 
to advise the co-operative on financial matters; and in obtaining 
the services of Michael CUdlipp, a journalist and consultant, to 
advise on editorial plans. When he heard of the critical contents 
of the Chesters report, Maxwell travelled up to Glasgow to insist 
that the report, should be scrapped, and said that the situation had 
changed dramatically since a man with his commercial experience and 
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connections had become actively involved in the project. (The irony 
was that it had, but not in the way MaXwell meant. Before the 
Chesters cri~icism of the lacK of management structure and the 
potential authority conflict at the SDN could be dismissed as 
speculation without foundation. With Maxwell involved, friction 
between the co-operative structure and his dominating entrepreneurship 
became a certainty). As McKay and Barr maintain, "Robert Maxwell was 
singularly well-qualified to assess the impact of unfavourable 
official reports." (1976, p.43): The most important tactic adopted 
to minimize the effects of the Chesters report, .was to complete and 
publish first a parallel study prepared by French and Cowan, a Glasgow 
firm of chartered accountants in which professor Briston was a partner. 
The French and Cowan report, presented detailed financial projections, 
concluded that the SDN could be profitable with a circulation of 
240,000 and 40' advertising content, and was to form the basis of 
the company's application for assistance under the terms of the 
Industry Act. The workers at Albion Street, determined to prove 
the extent of publiC support for a new paper, conducted their oWn 
market survey in May and June. People were asked if they would sign 
a form stating that they intended to buy the new newspaper for the 
first three months after publication, and of the 180,000 people 
asked, 153,000 signed. (SNE, 1975, p.13). This method of assessing 
interest has been dismissed as "unscientific". (McKay and Barr,1976,p.43). 
But the high level of interest discovered has some relation to that 
found in the Chesters survey, and since the SDN sample was 350 times 
larger than the Chesters sample, it should have carried some weight. 
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The SDN Submission for. Assistance. 
, 
Drawing the accumulated material together, the Action Conunittee 
lodged their forty page submission for assistance with the Department 
of Industry on 4 June, 1974. The submission gave a brief outline of 
the events of the closure, and the subsequent negotiations with 
Beaverbrook. Then followed a rather restrained consideration of the 
Chesters criticisms, stressing the "need for an independent Scottish 
newspaper tied to no political party to off-set the three major national 
groups." (SNE, 1974, p.4). The decline in the circulation of the 
Express since the move to Manchester was pointed out, and the 
expectation that a circulation of 200,000 - 250,000 could be readily 
obtained, together with sufficient advertising revenue. A full 
analysis of projected revenue and expenditure by weeks was presented 
in order to arrive at an estimated short term peak working capital 
requirement of £800,000, necessary to finance initial costs, costs 
incurred before revenue was received" and costs incurred due to the 
terms of credit. At a circulation of 250,000 the estimated trading 
account showed a loss of £30,665 in the first year, a profit of £404,040 
in the second year, and a profit of £390,894 in the third year. 
Analysing profitability at different levels of circulation the following 
conclusion was reached : 
"Based on our assumption it can be seen that at present cost 
levels including a 10\ addition to wages to take account of 
the imminent national wage award the company would break 
even at a circulation of 200,000 as far as the equity 
shareholders are concerned and at the same circulation it 
would show a return on overall c~pital employed of 7.6\. 
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If 250,000 circulation is achieved there will be a return 
on overall capital employed of 18.7%. If we were to assume 
pessimistically that newsprint would increase in price by 10% and 
that we were unable to increase our cover price to compensate for 
this, we would still show a reasonable return at the same circulation. 
We would stress that we regard these figures as.realistic though 
erring on the side of caution with contingencies built into the 
estimates at all levels. We are confident that the newspaper 
would break even on a circulation of 200,000. If a circulation in 
excess of 250,000 could be achieved, (as we believe possible) the new 
company should be.a highly profitable enterprise." (p.ll). 
A further series of computations estimated cash flow in the 
first year of operation, assumed that the full anticipated level of 
advertising would not be attained until the end of the fourth 
month , and that there would be a cumulative monthly deficit until 
then, when a monthly surplus would begin to reduce the deficit until 
it was almost eliminated by the end of the year. (Unfortunately, 
the ~ the following year never overcame this critical financial 
watershed, but collapsed at the end of the sixth month). 
The submission then outlined the capital requirements of the 
SON and the proposed method of financing, commenting that, "The 
nature of the proposed capital structure may be variable and will 
d~pend on the attitude of the various institutions which we intend 
to approach". Cp.20). 
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Table .~ Capital Requirements and Proposed Capital Structure 
of the SDN 
A. Capital Requirements 
Buildings and Car Park - to· be 
purchased from Beaverbrook Limited 
Plant and Machinery - to be 
purchased from Beaverbrook Limited 
Additional items -
Metal 
Microfilm Equipment 
Contingency Reserve 
Working Capital 
B. proposed Capital Structure 
Loan from Department of Industry 
15\ Loan Stock 
Employees' Shares 
'A' Ordinary Shares 
Estimated contribution from 
employees 
From other sources 
(Source: SNE, 1974, p.20). 
£800,000 
40,000 
10,000 
100,000 
E200,000 
E1,000,000 
E1,750,OCC 
950,CXX) 
800,OCC 
E3,5OO,CO:· 
£1,750,00: 
SOO,CXX> 
SO,OCX) 
E1,200,OC:C 
£3,500,00: 
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Finally the submission contained a precis of the articles 
of the company Scottish News Enterprises Limited and a copy of 
the company memorandum, which was incorporated on 30 May 1974 
to operate the newspaper. The. 'A' ordinary shareholders of the 
company would have the right to elect an Investors Council with 
limited veto powers over financial matters, which in turn would 
elect two of its members to the Executive Council. The EC 
would be the policy-making body of the company: 
"The Executive Council will be composed of six representatives 
of the employees shareholders, theeditor and General Manager 
and two representatives of the Investment Council and will 
not be a forum for employee/investor confrontation. It 
is our intention that the combined resources which will be 
brought to the Executive Council by its members will help 
in the effective running of the new newspaper. We are fully 
seized that we require the assistance and guidance of the 
investor shareholders and plan that the Executive Council 
will manage the Company for the benefit of all shareholders." (p.2l) 
(The articles did not pursue the question of how the EC would manage 
the company to the ben~fit of all shareholders, when the majority of 
the EC members (the workers representatives), would be representing 
a minority of the shareholding, and possibly a minority of the 
shareholders. But in the event, due to changes in the capital 
structure, this problem did not seriously arise). The significant 
classes of the articles of association outlining the rights of the 
'A' Ordinary Shares and the Employees Shares were : 
a. (i) .d. "The holders of the 'A' Ordinary Shares will 
have no voting rights in the Company in General Meeting 
save with regard to a Resolution altering or purporting to 
alter the rights attaching to 'A' Shares" (p.23). 
a. (iii) .e. "It should be noted that, as outlined above, 
the Employee shares carry l'lo dividend rights, will have 
deferred rights on the liquidation of the Company and 
will attr.act no capital appreciation in the period during 
which they are held." (p.24). 
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In the memorandum of association, the language of the stockbroker 
and accountant, which must have been obscure enough as far as the 
majority of the SDN workers were concerned, gave way to the even more 
alien, impenetrable, and possessive, language of the commercial lawyer, 
thus the third object of the company was supposedly: 
"To acquire any shares, stocks, debentures, debenture stocks, 
bonds, obligations, securities, life and sinking fund policies, 
annuities, mort9ages or charges or other property (heritable 
or moveable, real or personal), by subscription, syndicate, 
participation, underwriting, tender, concession, grant, 
purchase, exchange, or otherwise, and that either conditionally 
or otherwise, and t~guarantee or underwrite the subscription 
thereof, and to exercise and enforce all rights and powers 
conferred by or incident to the ownership thereof." (p.26). 
The memorandum continue with this almost orgiastic litany of 
commercial crap for six pages: one can only conclude that they seem 
rather odd objects for a company based on a workers co-operative to purs~_ 
In its concluding remarks the submission stressed the editorial 
concept of the newspaper, financial feasibilitYI experiment in worker 
control,and provision of employment. Editorially the paper was to be 
a national Scottish newspaper, as di~inct from a Scottish nationalist 
newspaper, and sensitive to the ~egional variations within Scotland: 
"The concept of the new newspaper is as we see it that 
it will be a national Scottish newspaper. We envisage 
three main and two sub editions initially. The first 
edition will be for Glasgow street sales, Aberdeen and 
Inverness, the second for Perth, Dundee and Fife, and 
the third for Edinburgh, Lanarkshire and Glasgow. We 
envisage each edition will contain local news for the 
area to be covered by that edition. We also feel that 
printing in Glasgow will give us the advantage of later 
scottish and world news cov~rage than papers printed in 
England. The committee has agreed that the paper 
should be politically independent and should reflect all 
shades of opinion". (pp.33-4). 
on feasibility a rather laboured tone of caution was adopted: 
"We have fully covered all contingencies that may arise 
and in the interests of producing a document which is 
reasoned have been rather over conservative. This we 
believe is not altogether a disadvantage as it shows the 
responsible way in which we have considered this project 
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and which would show in the running of the new newspaper." 
yet financial conservatism seemingly combined with a revolutionary 
management structure: 
"In oUr opinion the projected management of the newspaper is 
in advance of anything at present in operation in either Britain or 
EurOpe. We believe that the concept envisaged in the control of 
the Company will be adopted by more and more companies and that the 
attitude which we have adopted towards the project will serve to prove 
. 
that the concept can be accepted fo~ the benefit of investors and workers.-
95 
Finally it was pointed out that in funding the venture, 
instead of paying unemployment benefits, the state might actually 
~ money: 
"We feel'that the support of this newspaper will maintain 
the employment of aroID1d 500 skilled persons mainly in 
the West of Scotland. This we feel to be a wholly 
worthwhile reason for supporting the paper in that the 
costs both financial and social which would be met by 
the State if these workers were not employed far outweigh 
. any cost involved in the new project." 
In the last sentences of the submission, how crammed with contraditions 
was the SDN enterprise became revealed: 
"We do not seek to conceal any problems which may arise 
in the project but we consider that we have proved that the 
new newspaper could be viable and that it will also have 
great social implications not only in the method of 
organisation but also in the fact that it will be an 
independent non-political Scottish newspaper operating 
commercially." (pp.3S-6). 
The SDN was to discover the hard way how difficult it is to be 
"non-political", and to remain ind~pendent while operating commercially. 
Assistance and Antipathy 
One of the important reasons for the professional precision 
of the ~ submission, and for its apolitical orientation, was the 
central role Professor Richard Briston had in compiling it. Briston 
immediately impressed the Action Committee with his competence and 
energy, quickly became the most trusted adviser of the ~, and played 
a decisive part i~ the negotiations with both Beaverbrook and the 
government. Similarly other professional people took an interest in 
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the co-operative as an innovatory and worthwhile experiment, and 
offered their services in assistqnce. For some the co-operative 
was an object. of academic interest, others recognised the 
possibility of developing consultancy work, but for a few the 
commitment went deeper, as Richard Briston explained: 
"This is •••• a unique opportunity for adopting the 
experiment of workers control for it is probably the 
first occasion when there has been simultaneously a group 
of unemployed workers with capital to invest, with an 
available project which they believe to be ~ommercially 
viable to the extent that they are prepared to take 
the ultimate risk involved in holding the equity of the 
company, and with a proven record of managerial skill 
and responsibility." 
The professional and managerial contribution had a significant 
influence upon the shape and direction of the SDN, and as Allister 
Mackie lamented, "We were inundated with professional help that 
didn't cost anything. But we received hardly any help at all from 
the official trade union movement. This is a serious criticism of the 
TUC." 
Although professional consultancy was freely available to the 
co-operative, hard cash from the financial institutions proved immensely 
more difficult to come by. French and Cowan, the ~ accountants, 
and Boyds their lawyers, prepared a draft prospectus which would be 
used to raise the necessary finance and approached two leading 
Scottish merchant banks to ask their assistance in raising the money. 
But both banks refused, one claiming a conflict of interest, and the 
, 
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other "that having taken soundings in the market there was no 
prospect of raising the funds required on the terms envisaged." 
A number of other Scottish merchant banks were approached without 
success. In mid-June Richard Briston convened a meeting of 
representatives of Scottish merchant and joint stock banks and 
other prominent Glasgow businessmen where he outlined the 
difficulties that the ~ was encountering in raising the 
finance and asked for positive support and suggestions. 
"The views expressed at that meeting were that whilst 
there was a great deal of public sympathy for the 
new newspaper which might be converted into hard cash 
if some form of public issue was undertaken, the 
Institutions as such felt that due to pressure on 
funds at the time there was little any of them could 
do to assist the project." 
(Letter from French and Cowan to Allister Mackie, 2 August 1974). 
Briston therefore felt that it was essential to obtain government 
backing for the project, and that on receiving this, the raising of 
alternative finance would prove considerably easier. When the 
government offer of funds was received in mid-July it was felt that 
the project could be initially financed by short term borrowing, 
if possible.secured on the premises at Albion Street, which would 
eventually be repaid by a share issue when the newspaper had proved 
itself. Two of the leading joint stock banks were approached on this 
basis, but again both felt unable to assist, one due to lack of 
availability of finance and the other due to their view that the· 
project was non-viable. After negotiatin~ a considerable reduction 
• 
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in the selling price demanded by Beaverbrook, and reducing 
the capital required by £'1 million, the Co-operative Bank was 
asked for an overdraft to meet· a.poss.Ui1e shortfall of funds 
secured on the Albion Street premises on a short term basis; 
also the merchant banks were approached again to re-appraise them 
of the situation and ask them if they were prepared either to invest 
money in the project on a short term basis, again secured over the 
property, or to find such finance; finally the insurance companies 
were contacted with a view to them investing on a loa~ basis secured 
on the property. All of these financial institutions refused to 
assist in any way. Richard Briston concluded from the whole wearying 
experience: 
"During the past seven months it has become clear that 
there is no easy source of finance available for workers 
co-operatives. Financial institutions and trade unions 
rival each other in their degree of conservatism. Many 
of the institutions which were visited made it clear that they 
regarded the workers as Communists, while the unions 
argued that workers in co-operatives would see themselves as 
managers rather than workers •. In fairness, both groups 
were discouraged by the adverse recommendations of the 
Strathclyde Report and the Industrial Development Unit 
Report and took no account of the very strong argument which 
the workers advanced against these reports." (Accountants 
Weekly, 13 December 1974) • 
Trade Union Ambivalence 
The attempt to gather trade union support and investment was handled 
by the union activists on the Action Committee, and understandably, if 
f 
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a little ironically, their appeals were phrased in rather different 
terms to the applications for assistance to the major banks. 
McNamara declared: 
"Th,e development of this paper is important, not just for 
the right to work, but to establish the right of workers 
in the print industry to control their newspapers. It 
Jimmy 
is also j.mportant socially for theScottish people in breaking 
the trend toward the concentration of news gathering and 
dissemination in the hands o! the big monopolies, and 
providing an independent source of information and comment." 
(Morning Star, 28 June 1974). 
However if the attempt to appease the established financial institutions 
of the managerial propriety and editorial orthodoxy of the SDN 
failed, so too did the attempt to convince the trade unions that the 
SDN would be under workers control and could offer valuable editorial 
defence and support for the union movement. It was significant 
that it was only after all the financial institutions had refused to 
help in any way that the ~ turned directly to the union movement 
as the only remaining source of finance. In the SDN appeal for 
investment it was stated: "Being a worker controlled newspaper, it 
will be appreciated that our extra finance cannot be raised from 
normal commercial sources - we need the financial support of the 
qrass roots members of the trade union movement." The Morning Star 
recognised this weakness in the ~ approach, that it had turned 
to the trade union movement as its major source of financial support 
in the face of the refusal of the private sector, and argued that 
a clear and categorical editorial stand on the side of the union movement 
was necessary before support could be qiven. (12 August 1974). 
Mackie described the depressing search for official union 
backing: 
"The general secretaries of almost every national union 
were personally visited by members of the Action 
Committee. Armed with their submissions and encouraged 
with the blind faith that their case was unchallengeable 
they slogged their way around the unions headquarters. 
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Since its editorial policy would be aligned broadly to the 
Left, it was assumed that in their own interests the 
official union movement would help finance the paper. 
However, despite encouraging meetings with top executive 
members it soon became evident that there was either hostility 
or indifference in the majority of the Executive councils. 
Some unions argued that they would have to have some say in 
the editorial content of the paper; others again bluntly 
and honestly stated that they did not believe in workers' 
co-operat'i ves, while still other.s had many misgivings 
about Maxwell's involvement, but the majority of the unions 
stated that they could not show a financial interest unless 
and until the print unions had first declared their support. 
All of these unions who showed sympathy to the project stated 
that until the Government had declared their intention to 
qive financial assistance, they could make no commitments. 
Only one union, ASLEF, reacted spontaneously,by investing 
immediately, declaring that the nature of the struggle 
merited support." Cl976b, pp.ll9-l20). 
D.:f.sreqarding -the traditional conservatism of the print trade unions, 
they were in a difficult position: t~y believed that the national 
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newspaper market was contracting and that any circulation achieved 
by the ~ would be at the expense of other newspapers. Since 
they conceived and operated with~n these market constraints, how 
could they ask their members to financially contribute to the SDN, 
when this might directly undermine their jobs? Mackie explained: 
"The print unions themselves showed little enthusiasm. 
Perhaps they feared that a successful Daily News would 
jeopardize their members' employment in the other 
Scottish newspaper offices. Whatever their reasons, 
and they were never openly declared, the print unions, 
with the possible exception of the Scottish Graphical 
Association, did not give their full unqualified support.1I 
(1976, p.120). 
The lack of enthusiasm of the print unions for the SDN, repeatedly 
placed the government loan in jeopardy, since when Benn raised the 
matter of aid in the cabinet, critics of the co-operative, themselves 
on the right wing, could point to trade union antipathy as a reason 
why the project should be abandoned. Benn and other Scottish ~~s 
requested the Action Committee to drum up more print union interest,' 
however the best they could do was to gain the active assistance of 
Fred Smith, the general secretary of the SGA, and the verbal support 
of Lord Briginshaw, the general secretary of NATSOPA. (SDN Minutes, 
Mass Meeting, 30 January 1975). (In fact NATSOPA was hardly in a 
position to offer anything else, since it was hovering on the brink 
of bankruptcy due to financial. mismanagement). (New Statesman, 30 
March 1979, pp. 432-3). Both of these general secretaries were on the 
fiBr right of the trade union movement, and t~e failure to acquire 
more extensive union support was a cr1tica1 weakness throughout the 
life of the SDN. 
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~~en a meeting of the five printing unions affiliated to the 
TUC was arranged to consider the possibility of financial support 
for the SON, representatives of the SON itself were excluded, 
which infuriated the Action Committee: 
"This could be a make or break meeting for us. We want 
to be represented at our own trial, and this could turn 
out to be a trial. One would anticipate, with the 
possible creation of 500 printing jobs, that they would 
have shown a greater deal of. co-operation." 
(Scotsman, 16 August 1974). 
The Committee sent a telegram to Len Murray, the. general secretary 
of the TUC, who was to chair the meeting, urging that the SON should 
be represented, and threatening that if they were not invited they 
would picket the meeting and claim the support of Fleet Street. 
The day before the meeting the ~ had received no reply to the telegraz:: 
and an 80 strong delegation travelled overnight by bus from Scotland 
to picket Congress House. The unions involved in the talks were 
NATSOPA, SGA, SOGAT, SLADE and the NUJ. The NGA was unaffiliated to 
the TUC, but had agreed to make a financial investment in proportion 
to that offered by the other unions. But no pledge of financial 
backing was forthcoming, the TUC simply issued a terse statement, 
"All those present expressed sympathy for those unemployed ••••• n 
(Glasgow Herald 21 August, 1974). Whatever other aspects of the 
co-operative contributed to the reluctance of the print unions, 
certainly there was doubt about the SON's commercial viability, and 
the condition of the government loan that shareholders would be 
unsecured was an important restraint. 
f 
But it should be remembered 
that, contrary to popular legend f thetrade unions are not weal thy 
organisations: if all the print trade unions total assets were 
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combined they would scarcely amount to ~he capital reserves of the 
smallest merchant bank. In ~act relative to their membership size 
and organisational commitments British trade unions are under-financed, 
which is one of the factors which dictates the official conservatism 
in many unions against taking any form of action likely to incur 
additional costs. If they were to stake what little resources they 
have in operating businesses, such as co-operatives in which it was 
impossible to quickly recover funds, then this would encourage official 
-
union conservatism even more, besides enmeshing unions more fully 
in corporate responsibilities than they already are .• In an appeal 
to the TOC, the SDN called for 10 unions to step in with £50,000 
each. (SDN, Special Tue Edition, September, 1974). 
Half a million pounds could be used by the unions in many ways, to 
mount a major industrial campaign, or support a significant national 
strike. In organisational terms, what the SON asked for was the 
equivalent for each of the ten unions, of the salary of two full-time 
officials for five years, or the running costs of a regional union 
office for a year. It could be argued that the ~, even if it 
offered the most emphatic union support in its editorials, might not 
contribute as much as twenty union officers in the field. However 
the problem remains, that for many purposes unions have to maintain 
financial reserves, and that many union investments are in the most 
exploitive companies and industries, in Britain and abroad, which yield the 
highest profit. Many trade unions could certainly find more socially 
useful repositories for their funds, but it is doubtful whether the SDN 
could ever have made serious claim to being this, given the doubt 
surrounding its editorial intentions •• 
A major effort was made to elicit greater union interest, at 
the annual conference of the TOe in September 1974, for which a special 
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four page edition of the Scottish Daily News was published. 
Members of the Action Committee, low on funds, camped out in tents 
at Brighton, and attempted to persuade delegates about the merits 
of the newspaper. Leading Labour figures sent messages of good-will 
in the special edition, including Harold Wilson, Tony Benn, and 
Jimmy Reid. Ray Buckton, the general secretary of ASLEF, whose 
executive committee had decided to invest £5,000 in the SON commented: 
"ASLEF need no convincing of the necessity for another 
newspaper which is not in tqe control of big business. 
We have been subjected to a ferocious and U?scrupulous 
campaign by the right wing press over the years and in 
particular over the last two." 
Presumably Buckton was prepared to forgive the jou~alists of the SON 
who had contributed to such anti-union campaigns in the years that they 
worked for the Express. Since the SDN was asking for union 
investment a detailed statement of editorial policy might have been 
expected. However, what trade union activists attending conference 
would consider vague assertions were offered, rather than a clear 
definition of prinCiples: 
"Given the monopoly right wing press in this country with 
its stronq anti-trade union bias the political philosophy 
of the ~ is the most vital aspect. The SDN will be 
radical without being extreme and comment strongly on every 
important issue as it arises •••• without the strings of any 
political party conditioninq its opinion. Fundamentally 
the paper will be independent of any. political party or dogma. 
Such an att~tude will be projected into our news coveraqe, 
especially in the area of industrial relations. All too 
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often in the popular press the ca~e of the unions is 
buried in the deluge of ~oras explaining the other side's 
position. This will not happen in our paper. Trade 
union opinion will be given full and fair coverage, both 
at executive and grass roots level. Unions, however, 
are not alone in suffering from press prejudice. There 
are other groups such as students, social reformers, and, 
of course, all socialist political parties. The SDN 
. Pledges to be fair to all. II 
(SDN Special TOe Edition, September 1974). 
Though this editorial philosophy may sound reassuring, most mainstream 
capitalist newspapers would subscribe to such liberal principles, 
particularly if they were directing themselves at a solely trade union 
readership, as the SDN special edition was, without ever attempting to 
put such principles into editorial practice. 
A fascinatinq feature of the TUC special edition of the SDN 
--. 
was that in four pages of detailed explanation about the newspaper, 
there was no mention whatsoever of Robert Maxwell. The only clue qiven 
that he miqht have existed was a reference to "commitments from other 
sources" in the financial breakdown. This early initiation into 
censorship for the ~ was determined by the fact that it was difficult 
to reconcile the spectre of Maxwell with co-operative control. Maxwell's 
involvement was a decidinq factor as far as the NUJ were concerned: 
thouqh they contributed ESOO to the SDN fiqhtinq fund, they refused 
to invest in the enterprise. Other trade unions also were made wary 
by the association of the venture with a buccaneerinq entrepreneur 
of MaxWell's stature, and members of the Action Committee constantly 
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were asked to explain how the workers would retain control of 
the SDN to distinctly sceptical union audiences. 
However 'support for the Albion Street workers came more 
spontaneously, and less conditionally, from the Scottish trade union 
movement, and from some groups of rank and file workers. A drive to 
encourage investment was launched by the Clyde committee of the CSEU, 
and Joe Black, Chairman of the committee declared: 
"We are asking the shop stewards committees throughout 
the region to become shareh6lders in the newspaper. We 
are also asking for pressure to be put on tndividual trade 
unions to help finance the project." 
James Jack, the General Secretary of the Scottish TUC, was equally 
supportive, though less optimistic: 
"We gave the Action Committee an introduction to every 
affiliated trade union. We have supported the project 
from the beginning and have done a great deal in our own 
way ·without any tangible response so far from the great 
majority of trade unions." (Glasgow Herald, 7 August 1974). 
But the ~ workers usually received a warm reception from shop 
stewards and· workers at plants in the West of Scotland and even beyond. 
Often the workers were surprised at the extent of the support, one 
explained: 
"We had a flag day for the Scottish Daily News, and we were 
in Clydebank selling flags with our collecting cans. I 
was in an SDN van and we stopped outside Singers. One of the 
shop stewards came up to us and asked whywe didn't come in. 
So we arran~ed to go in the following day at dinner time. 
We met all the shop stewards in Singers and they put a steward 
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on all seven entrances of the factory with a collecting 
can for us. It was the same at Marathon shipbuilders." 
With migration there are probably more Scottish workers in England 
than in Scotland, and interest was shown in the new paper as far 
afield as Fords in Dagenham where the shop stewards at the body plant 
offered financial and moral support. (Morning Star, 18 July, 1974) 
Despite the reluctance of the print union executives to become 
involved, the chapels in Fleet Street frequently contributed substantial 
. 
sums to the fighting fund of the SDN Probably one of the more 
poignant contributions, was the El,ooo given by the chapels of 
Beaverbrook's Evening Standard. (Guardian, 12 July, 1974). 
But the perpetual fund raising activities distracted attention away 
from more serious thought about the editorial policy of the paper 
and how the co-operative was to be organised. During almost all of 
the thirteen months the workers were struggling simply to keep the idea 
of the SDN alive, as one worker sadly commented,"Money was a much 
harder thing to get than Signatures." 
The Metamorphosis From Confrontation to Commerce 
The necessary devotion to fund raising was only one aspect 
of the commercial orientations and activities the SDN workers felt 
forced to adopt. In turn these concerns exerted an effect upon 
the attitudes of the workers, particularly the Action Committee, 
Allister Mackie approvingly explained the transformation in the committe~: 
"Not one among them had held a management position 
previously yet they were becoming daily more capable 
of making commercial decisions that were necessary 
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for the launching of a newspaper. Their object at 
first was to "save" 600 jobs, but eventually moved 
towards creating a viable company that would produce 
a newspaper and give emplo~ent to many more people. 
The whole import of this change of attitude cannot be 
exaggerated. From being a group of active trade 
unionists, educated and skilled in the ways of 
confrontation and of defending their members' ~nterests, 
they were, on behalf of the workforce, being forced 
into an employer situation. In effect, the committee 
almost underwent a complete metamorphosis, but from 
that stage onwards, a successful outcome was possible. 
Correct decisions would be made because of the change 
of outlook". (1976b, p.1l7). 
The assumption of a commercial orientation by the committee, to 
the extent that people like Joe McGowan could rattle off the 
financial structure and circulation projections of the SDN like a 
hard headed stockbroker, might have assisted in overcoming the 
immediate business problems the co-operative faced, but there were 
serious implications for the essential direction of the newspaper. 
From the start it was accepted that it must be a commercial newspaper 
based on sales to the general public and advertising revenue: "The 
one truth that was self-evident to all at this time was that the paper, 
when it was launched would have to be a marketable commodity if it 
was to be a commercial success. It would owe its allegiance to no 
party, would be independent but with an alignment to the Left." 
(Mackie, 1976b, p.113). Even the Scottish Catholic Observer was 
• astute enough to recognize the moderation of the people involved in the 
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SDN, and the limitation of their rebellion: "Unlike the sit-in 
at Clydebank, the workers' takeover at Albion Street is a commercial 
transaction, with the redundant men negotiating the purchase of 
the premises from Beaverbrook Newspapers ••••• The Catholic Church 
in Scotland strongly supports the principle of the right to work, 
and the principle of a free press. It offers encouragement to 
those who are trying to establish a new and responsible newspaper." 
(lG August 1974). 
. . 
Manning Levels. 
Two important issues at the SDN over which there was openly a serious 
clash between the trade union and commercial orientations of the 
co-operative were the manning levels and editorial policy. The 
union principle upon which the ~ had been founded was to preserve 
employment which directly conflicted with the commercial priority 
to limit labour costs. The initial resolution of this problem, was 
to estimate the most generous manning the paper could afford: "it 
was apparant that there would be no possibility, no matter how 
optimistically viewed, of there being more than 600 employed within. 
the co-operative. Workers were advised to seek alternative employment 
to reduce the overall numbers. But even then the alternative 
prospects were so minimal that there were still an embarassing surplus 
of potential members." (Mackie, 197Gb, p.llS). However the 
Chesters report objected to this figure of GOO employed, and suggested 
"from informed opinion" that 500 was a "feasible and realistic 
manning figure", not on the basis of detailed study, but baldly stating: 
~The Workers Action Group have provided a 'minimum' manning figure 
of G04 staff and have supplied detaifs of the make up of this number. 
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It was not possible to check on this figure by studying physical 
production at Albion Street. The number seemed high however and 
it was decided to make cost c~lculations for a manning figure of 
500 as well as for a manning figure of 604." (University of 
Strathclyde, 1974, pp 6-7) . Predictably enough the PA consultants 
report on the SDN also recommended the lower figure. Feeling 
constrained to prove their capacity to take difficult decisions to 
assure the life of the paper, the Action Committee in the submission 
to the Department of Industry, accepted this lower manning. Allister 
. . 
Mackie understood the seriousness of the implications of the decision: 
"It is difficult for a trade unionist to comprehend 
fully what I'm saying unless you're totally involved: 
we discovered at the end of the day that we could only 
employ 500 workers, after we did a complete survey into 
the requirements of all the departments, which meant that 
we had to go through the lists and determine who could 
qet a job and who couldn't get a job. It was very 
painful, because you had to select all the best people 
and then because we had to be very selective who could 
qet a job, which was only the best workers." 
Moreover, as Table 4 shows, whilst Management, Editorial, and sales 
were almos~ unaffected, 60 factory and 24 clerical jobs were lost. 
It must be extremely rare in the newspaper industry for lOS potential 
jobs to disappear so quickly at manaqement suggestion with the complete 
compliance of union representatives. 
f 
Table 4 
---
Manning Requirements of the Scottish Daily News 
(Circulation 200,000 - 250,000 per day). 
FACTORY 
Stereo 
Engineers 
Electricians 
Natsopa 
Compositors 
Wire Room 
Machines 
Slade ' 
Distribution 
Total 
ADMINISTRATION AND SALES 
Top Managament 
Other Management 
Editorial 
Copy and Sales 
Clerical 
Circulation 
) 
) 
) 
TOTAL MANNING 
Total 
Action Committee 
Submission to 
Chesters: May 1974 
26 
22 
16 
127 
90 
12 
6 
40 
20 
359 
8 
110 
12 
95 
20 
245 
604 
......: 
III 
Action Committe: 
Submission to 
Department of 
Industry: 1 
June 1974. 
299 
3 
4 
100 
12 
71 
10 
200 
499 
===== 
1. In fact the new detailed factory manning had not been finally 
negotiated w~th the unions concerned by the time of the June submission 
to the,Department, and was probably a source of embarassmentto the 
Action Committee. 
(Source: University of Strathclyde, 1974, p.24; SNE, 1974,pp 8-9). 
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The national press were quick to seize upon the implications 
of the SON workers acceptance of low manning levels for the industry 
as a whole. A Daily Telegraph editorial commented "The fact that 
the staff will be confined to a few hundred •. suggests that its members 
are displaying a welcome reasonableness which too few of them would 
show if 'capitalist' owners were footing the bill and bearing managerial 
responsibility." (24 July 1974) Referring to the reservations of the 
print unions about the SDN, the Sunday Times observed: "The old Express 
operation employed nearly 2,000 in Glasgow. The new paper would have 
only 500. If it succeeded, it could" make the manning levels of other 
British national newspapers look bloated indeed." {25 August 1974) More 
sympathetically and more accurately, John Kerr explained in the Guardian 
"The manning proposals were worked out in consultation with the unions 
and conform to the levels prescribed in existing agreements for papers 
with a circulation of. 250,000 envisaged for the SON. So there should 
be no implied threat to jobs on other papers." (22 August 1974) 
Thus commentators in most of the national press had made 
the simple calculation of 500 workers at the SON compared with 1,900 
at the Scottish Daily News, without mentioning the two other papers 
the Scottish Sunday Express and the Evening Citizen that were also 
printed at Albion Street, largely by the same labour force, and that 
the projected circulation of 250;000 for the SON was about a third 
of the circulation of the previous papers combined daily 
circulation. Beaverbrook estimated that 1,400 workers were employed 
on the Scottish Daily Express exclusively, with a circulation of 
570,000. But since there was such a constant transfer and overlap 
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of labour between the different papers it is unlikely that the 
Beaverbrook figure is accurate, besides the interest Beaverbrook 
as an employer would have in finding evidence of overmanning. 
However although the SDN manning generally conformed with national 
agreements, and had been worked out in consultation with local union 
officials, there was a degree of undermanning in most departments 
compared to national norms, though manning levels were not as low as 
the national press would have liked people to believe. 
Mackie maintained, 
Allister 
"We discovered actually,having done a complete survey of 
manning and worked it out at 500, that it was in accord 
with the staffing arrangements on the Glasgow Herald 
and the Scotsman. We didn't know this at the outset, 
we discovered this at the end of the day, that we were 
not far removed from their manning requirements. All 
this justified our manning arrangements." Unfortunately, both 
newspapers had less than half the projected circulation of the ~, so 
they were· not such convincing comparisons. The national print unions 
remained sceptical about the ~ manning, and this was stimulated 
by newspaper proprietors eagerness to use the example of the SDN 
however inaccurately, to berate the unions over the manning levels 
in their own enterprises. One of the first proprietors to publicly 
use the ~ example in this way was Sir Don Ryder, chairman of Reed 
International, th~ parent company of the International Publishing 
Corporation, which o~the Daily Record and the Daily Mirror, and 
the future c~airman of the National Enterprise Board. At the annual 
sharehqlders meeting of Reed International, Ryder stated, as reported in 
the Daily Record: 
"As publishers and printers, we are wasteful in our use of 
manpower •••• Nor is it a coincidence that those ex-employees 
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of the Scottish Daily Express who are now trying to construct 
a new title the Scottish Daily News from the ruins of the 
old one, are talking of mannings way below those that are 
customary to the trade."· . (After bemoaning the low price 
of newspapers, Sir Don went on to announce record profits 
for the first financial quarter of 1974 of £22 million.) 
(1 August 1974). 
Editorial Policy 
An issue that was never fin~lly resolved was the conflict over 
the editorial policy of the paper. The unusual circumstances of 
the birth of the ~ venture, and the unconventional method of 
financing, gave the proposed newspaper a rather deceptive air of 
radicalism, the Daily Telegraph went so far as to complain: "Some of 
those connected with the project have been putting it about that 
the paper will be campaigning, investigative, independent and all 
that. So long as the sceptical folk of Edinburgh and Glasgow are 
prepared to part with their daily cash for that sort of stuff, all well 
and good - although a diet of sub-Trotskyism has seldom proved a sure-fire 
seller in the past, outside Hampstead." (26 July 1974). The editor 
of the Telegraph need not have worried: the decision to depend on 
advertising for nearly half the revenue meant that the paper could not 
afford to offend business interests in general. It was only a short 
step from this position to the formal acceptance of a "non-political" 
editorial policy which was declared under the editorial guidance of 
Michael CUdlipp. In fact just as the decision to produce a commercial 
newspaper, a "marketable commodity", was simply a resort to what the 
E!press workers were used to; so the editorial approach of the new 
paper came to resemble that of the EXpress.· To an extent this was 
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a conscious policy, since disaffected Express readers were the 
primary targeL of the SDN. "The News is going to be a popular 
paper, but not as 'popular' as the ~~ Daily Record or Daily Mirror. 
It is aiming ,right for the middle of the market, but unlike the 
Express it will be truly independent and Scottish." (Campaign, 26 
April 1974). But many of the activists involved were determined 
to see an altogether different p~per completely committed to the 
labour movement. Others set the highest journalistic standards for 
the newspaper, among them Jimmy Russell, the city editor of the SON, 
and financial expert on the Action Committee: "It will be a popular 
newspaper but responsible. We hope it will be politically intelligent 
and up market." It seemed to many observers quite natural that 
it should be a paper of the Left, even Accountancy Age acknowledged: 
"Not altogether surprisingly it will be 'left of centre' politically 
and when you consider that Scotland is predominantly Labour, they are 
purely satisfying the desires of the Scottish people." (7 March 1975). 
Scottish nationalism was another editorial tendency which 
emerged in strength at various moments in the life of the SON. Thus 
the award of government money was greeted as "a tremendous breakthrough 
in the struggle towards publication of a new and independent voice for 
Scotland, published in Scotland, and reflecting the political, economic 
and cultural affairs of the Scottish people". (Glasgow Herald, 
26 July 1974). The Scottish National Party were keen to claim 
the SON for their own, as George Reid declared in the Commons, quoting 
Lord Beaverbrook's opening editorial of the Scottish Daily Express 
in 1923, he hoped the basic purpose of the newspaper would be to 
return to the display of "those characteristics and doctrines which are 
essentially Scottish: independence, self-reliance, reverence and 
patriotism." (Hansard, 14 May 1974, p.1190). However the Scottish 
Nationalist views of a few of the Action Committee, which perhaps 
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predominated among the journalists, if not the workers as a whole, 
did not represent a deeply thought-out politica stand, but a simple 
retreat from conservative free market values into nationalism as 
a panacea for the economic problems associated with the domination 
of Scotland by private and public economic power in London: the 
capitalist econc~ic system would remain, if on a smaller scale, in 
an 'independent Scotland'. The subdued nationalism of the SDN was 
unlikely to win friends in the Labour Government which witnessed the 
erosion of support in the tradittonal Labour strongholds of Scotland 
in the two elections of 1974. 
The Industrial Development Unit report barely mentioned the 
editorial policy of the SDN but emphasised the crowded market the new 
paper was proposing to enter, listing the morning papers that are either 
printed in Scotland or (in the case of the Scottish Daily Express 
now printed in Manchester), aimed specifically at the Scottish market: 
Table 6 Scottish Newspapers Circulation 
(Aberdeen) Press and Journal 
(Dundee) Courier and Advertiser 
(Edinburgh) Scotsman 
(Glasgow) Daily Record 
(Glasqow) Herald 
(Glasgow) Scottish Daily Express 
(Source: SNE, 1975, p.21) 
Circulation (July-Decembe~ 1?73: 
104,000 
126,000 
80,000 
589,000 
89,000 
571,000 
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In addition the national dailies including the Sun, Mail, and the 
four quality newspapers circulate in Scotland making a total of 
12 morning papers. Finally IDU'mentioned that there were six 
Scottish even'ing ne\>lspapers, three Scottish Sunday papers and about 
130 weeklies. However the fact which IDU refused to recognize 
was that although the Scottish newspaper market was crowded, it was 
crowded with very similar commodities: all of the papers in question 
were commercial, and committed to the centre or right of the political 
spectrum, with the exception of the Daily Record which nominally 
supported Labour. A glorious opportunity existed for the Scottish 
Daily News to present a dramatic and daring alternative to the 
hegemony of the capitalist press. But the chance to be different 
was not taken. The editorial vacuity and vagueness which was 
presented in the SDN submission and prospectus was dictated by the 
need not to offend the Department of Industry, and potential 
advertisers and business investors; but it also reflected a real 
uncertainty and conflict about editorial policy. The appointment 
as editor of Fred Sillito, an ex-deputy editor of the Scottish Sunday 
Express on the point of retirement, bestowed respectability upon the SDN 
but little else. The radicals of the SDN who were dedicated to a 
genuine trade union orientation, were overwhelmed by a majority of 
the journalists, who were prepared to use the rhetoric of the labour 
movement when necessary, but were committed to conservative concepts 
of editorial policy. 
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LIMITATIONS OF STATE INTERVENTION 
Early Expectations and the Frustration of Delay 
The torment of the SDN workers over the repeated delays of the launch 
date of the new paper is difficult to imagine: by early May 1974 they had 
conceived the papers' form and title; gathered the journalists and 
print workers necessary; collected a useful capital sum to initiate the 
enterprise, and negotiated an option on the machinery and building which 
would provide the means to launch t?e SDN, with government and investor 
assistance, upon what they believed to be an eagerly awaiting public. 
The first proposed launch date was June 13 1974, in time for Scotland's 
appearance in the World Cup in West Germany. Dependent upon a speedy 
official response to their project, this proved the most hopeless optimism. 
Though the Action Committee knew that within four weeks of receiving the 
necessary government support the paper could be on the streets, months passed' 
of delay, prevarication, and sheer antagonism on the part of the 
Department of Industry, which was exacerbated by the total opposition of 
financial institutions, and the equivocal and shifting nature of trade 
union support. New launch.dates were repeatedly set, only to arrive with the 
SDN buried deeper in the mire of negotiations with reluctant funders. The 
submission to the Department stressed "the need for a swift decision" 
and that the Committee was "available to discuss or to further enlarge 
any of our concepts at short notice." But the government kept the 
workers kicking their heels when they wanted to be at their trades, whilst 
their funds were dwindling, ther enthusiasm sagging; the interest of the 
public in the paper was evaporating; and the Scottish Daily Express 
was re-establishing its readership. 
The Industrial Development Unit Report 
The Action Committee submission was presented to the Department of 
Industry (Dol) on 4 June 1974 with a request for assistance under 
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Section 7 of the 1972 Industry Act of a loan of £1,750,000. The 
submission was considered first by the departmental Industrial 
Development Unit (IOU) and then the Industrial Development AdVisory 
Board (IDAB), both of which are composed la,rgely of businessmen. The 
conclusions of both bodies, based largely on the Chesters report, 
were almost wholly negative. IOU dispensed summarily of any special 
editorial appeal of the SON, and of the Action Committee's objections 
to the Chesters projections and maintained: 
"It is, of course, impossible to predict accurately the 
sales of an, as yet, unborn Scottish newspaper. However, 
given the highly competitive and non-growth nature of 
the industry, ~e cannot accept the Workers Action 
Committee's sales projections which are more than double 
those forecast as probable by the Chesters Management 
Centre study. This study, as has been noted above, 
was based on a professional market survey". (SNE,1975,p.21). 
Chesters had predicted a sales:advertising revenue ratio of 1:0.8. 
The Action Committee had computed advertising revenue by a combination 
of the ratio of editorial content to advertising content, with a 
maximum of 50:50, and the standard column inch rates at different 
levels of circulation, arriving at a sales: advertising ratio of 1:0.97 
at 250,000 circulation. Accepting that both estimates were 
speculative, IOU referred to the competition for advertising, and 
accepted the 1: 0.8 ratio. With regard to the financial forecasts 
of the submission, IOU acknowledged the thoroughness with which these had 
been carried out, but reworked the figures on the basis of an 1:08 
advertising ratio, which produced substantial losses. From 
the IOU figures, a circulation of 232,000 was needed to break-even, 
whereas break-even on'the SON fiqures occurred below 200,000. Takinq 
Table' SON Grid IOU Financial Projections 
0 
N 
* * .... SON IOU SON IOU SON IOU SDN IOU 
Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation 
120,000 120,000 175,000 175,000 200,000 200,000 250,000 250,000 
REVENUE E per week £ per week E per week E per week £ per week £ per week £ per week £ per week 
Circulation 22,700 33,075 37,800 37,800 47,250 47,300 
Advertising 18,100 38,016 42,240 30,200 46,464 37,800 
Total 40,800 71,091 80,040 68,000 93,714 85,100 
COSTS 
Newsprint and 
Supplies 14,000 20,330 23,446 23,400 29,676 29,700 
Other Costs 51,500 56,268 56,268 51,500 56,268 51,500 
Total 65,500 76,598 79,714 74,900 85,944 81,200 
=-= 
Weekly Profit Before 
Interest (24,700) (5,507) 326 (6,900) 7,770 3,900 
Annual Profit Before 
Interest (1,284,000) (286,364) 16,952 (359,000) 404,040 203,000 
* not available. 
(Source: SNE, 1974, p.12; SNE,1975,p.24) • 
In 
interest charges as E250,000 per annmn, IDU raised break-even to 
254,000. (The irony was that although.IOU underestimated the 
editorial appeal and potentia~ ~irculation of the SON, even they 
greatly overestimated the willingness of advertisers to place copy 
with the newspaper, though it is possible IOU were aware of this 
problem but felt it diplomatic not to mention it). 
The one helpful gesture of IOU, though it was not intended 
as such, was to point out the great discrepancy between the SON 
budget of E2.55 million for the buildings, plant and machinery of 
Albion Street, and the Glasgow City Estates Oepartment valuation of 
El.5 million, which proved a useful bargaining counter in later 
negotiations with Beaverbrook. But in considering the proposed 
management and control structure of the SON the IOU fully revealed 
the paternalism and uninspired orthodoxy of its approach: 
"It should be stated that we were impressed by the Action 
Committee'S dedication to this project. However, there 
must be questions as to the willingness of the proposed 
Executive Council to allow the essential freedom of 
action to the General Manager and Editor, particularly when 
management decisions prove unpopular with sections of the 
workforce. Clearly, no newspaper can operate successfully 
if day-to-day management decisions are subject to constant 
debate." (SNE, 1975, p.23). 
In its damning conclusions on the viability of the SON, instead of 
considering that the fact that no finance was forthcoming from commercial 
sources in theprivate sector revealed the necessity for state 
intervention in co-operative finance, IDU assumed that the lack of 
commercial support should disqual~fy'the venture from government 
assistance: "As yet only a small portion of the required equity and outs~·& 
debt finance has been committed, and there are no indications that any vil: 
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be forthcoming from commercial sources •.• On the basis of the 
information we have received and our studies, the prospects of 
success for the project must be regarded as very remote. In 
our judgement the project is'not viable." (SNE,l975,p.24) • 
The pessimism of IDU was based purely on an assessment of the price 
and competitiveness of the SDN in market terms; there was no 
appreciation of any special characteristics of the proposed 
paper; and the Action Committee was convinced that, as with 
Chesters, the objections of IDU hinged upon the innovatory 
management structure of the co-operative. 
The Terms of Government Assistance. 
By mid-July 1974 IDAB had considered and, predictably 
enough, endorsed the IDU report, thefourth deadline for the SDN 
to buy Albion Street from Beaverbrook had expired, and it seemed that 
the government was merely procrastinating in order to dissipate 
interest in the endeavour. Members of the Action Committee were 
considering admitting defeat when in a dramatic telephone call from 
the Department of Industry they learned of the offer of a government 
loan. Benn had succeeded in convincing the cabinet to disregard 
the advice of the Department's professional advisers and loan the SDN 
El.75 million, th ough with severe conditions insisted upon by IDU. 
The conditions were: 
1. That the company must find from non-governmental 
sources funds amounting to 50 per cent of the total capital cost of 
the project from persons who have seen the advice given to the 
government by IDU and are thus fully aware of the risk involved. 
2. That the company must have "actually and irrevocably 
received in cash" the sum of £475,000. In addition the company must 
, 
have received £500,000 in the form of equity or long term unsecured 
loans from commercial sources or the general public. Finally a further 
123 
£775,000 in secured loans must be raised. 
3. With regard to the secured loans, the lenders must have 
agreed to share available security pari passu with the government. 
4. All persons providing finance for the project must realise 
that in the event of the project's failure priority in claims on 
the assets would rank after priority creditors as follows : 
(a) all secured lenders including the government, 
(b) all unsecured creditors, 
(cl shareholders. 
5. That the company has accepted by writing to the secretary 
of State, that the government's contribution of 50 per cent of 
the capital cost of the project up to a maximum of £1.2 million would 
be the only government contribution to this project and that no 
further government finance will be made available and the company has 
confirmed that all persons providing finance for the project are 
aware of this. 
6. That the DOl would have the right to inspect the undertaking 
at any time and to require such further financial information as 
. necessary. (Guardian, 26 July 1974; SNE, 1975, pp 18-19). It is 
likely that no other company seeking government assistance has ever 
been confronted with such impossibly difficult conditions. Even the 
Daily Telegraph, staunchly against all forms of state intervention, 
described the conditions as "strict" and "stringent", and concluded, 
"The conditions which the Action Committee has to fulfil to Mr. Benn's 
satisfaction wouid appear to meet the requirements which the Industry 
Act imposes on applications for assistance. In view of this, 
Conservative MFs are unlikely to raise any serious objection to the 
qovernment's proposal." (26 July 1974). It did not need the 
financial brilliance of Professor Briston to explain to the Action 
Committee the profound'contradiction of the Dol approach: the 1nsis~~ce 
upon substantial public financial support as an essential prerequisite 
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of government assistance, whilst making it virtually impossible 
to raise finance from the public by stressing the non-viability of 
the project, and taking the major asset as security, allowing the 
remaining finance little sectir~ty. 
1974,p.1S). 
Beaverbrook as the Major Beneficiary 
(Accountants Weekly, 13 December 
A debilitating irony of the long and exhausting effort of 
the SDN workers to raise finance for the project was that the most 
immediate beneficiary would be Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd who made 
them redundant in the first place.. The government were aware of 
this anomaly and it must have been a restraining factor upon them: 
yet although informal pressure was exerted on Beaverbrook to lower 
the inflated price demanded for Albion Street, at no time was it 
sU9gested that the deal between the SDN and Beaverbrook was anything 
other than a normal commercial transaction. Beaverbrook had enjoyed 
profits for decades from the Express empire, but when it decided 
to abandon production in Scotland out of self-interest, the government 
·contributed to the redundancy payments it incurred. and now it was to 
receive further compensation, while the workers enterprise was 
desperately short of cash. This instance is symptomatic of how 
nationalization with lavish compensation strengthens the private sector 
at the expense of public industry. Beaverbrook had run newspaper 
production at Albion Street into the ground, it might be more appropriate 
for a company so mismanaged that it had to abandon a major centre of 
production to be the recipient of government sanctions not cash. 
If the ~ had received the £725,000 cash paid to Beaverbrook, it 
would have survived for another year and could have proved itself 
positively one way or another. However, Beaverbrook themselves were 
not in an entirely comfortable poSition, as vividly portrayed by 
McICay and Barr: 
125 
"Beaverbrook were locked into a grotesque paradox: 
for their long term survival they had to sell Albion 
Streeti to sell Albion Street they had to payoff 
the workforce, and to p'ay off the workforce they had 
to help launch a competitor in Scotland which might 
decimate their sales and advertising income north 
of the border. The best sequence of events for 
Beaverbrook would be a sale of Albion Street to the 
co-operative, followed by a quick collapse of the 
new newspaper before it could do irreparabl~ damage 
to Express circulation in Scotland. And, as a bonus, 
Beaverbrook might find a new brightness to their tarnished 
image by being seen to be generous to a potential rival." 
(1976, pp32-3). 
Workers jobs were caught up in this paradox: if the Daily Ne',.;s 
succeeded there would almost certainly be redundancies at the Express 
office in Manchester, thus either failure or success for the SON 
could mean further redundancies. (Militant 13 December 1974). 
Armed with the knowledge of the liquidity crisis Beaverbrook 
was experiencing, and the promise of a government loan if the 
exacting conditions could be fulfilled, Professor Briston, who had 
assumed the role of principal commercial negotiator for the Action 
Committee, pressed Beaverbrook to reduce the price for the Albion 
Street building and plant during August 1979. Beaverbrook were 
demanding £2.4 million for theplant and buildingi estimating the value 
of the building as El.4 million, when the chartered surveyors' valuation 
of the property, prepared for theSDN, and corroborated by the 
City Estates Departments' valuation was £740,000. 
, The SONs lawyers 
pointed out to Beaverbrook the problems of another buyer not intent 
on continuing newspaper production, including the "time taken and 
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expense incurred in providing vacant possession on the building", 
the greatly reduced proceeds likely from a forced sale of the 
plant, for which the SON was offering £660,000 • (Letter from 
. 
Boyds to Lovell, White and King, Beaverbrook's solicititors, 5 AUgust, 1974) • 
Finally, after the Albion Street car park and some equipment were 
removed from the sale, Beaverbrook reluctantly agreed to reduce the 
price to £1.6 million. The new price saved the SDN £950,000 on 
the original Beaverbrook demand of £2.55 million and reassessment 
of the financial requirements of the SON led to the reduction of a 
further E150,000, giving a total of £2.4 million instead of £3.5m. 
This reassessment made under the ~uress of the difficulty of the 
conditions impose? by the Dol, and the impossibility of raising funds 
from commercial sources, was to prove critical to the life of the SON: 
with no reserve funds the newspaper would have to prove an instant 
success or face immediate cash flow problems. 
Returning to the'DoI with these economies, the Action Committee 
hoped that the government would improve their original offer, but the 
Dol confirmed the worst fears of the committee and made the conditions 
even more exacting: the loan was reduced to £1.2 million, and the 
amount of cash to be raised in the secured loan was reduced from 
£750,000 to £225,000, reducing the risk on the government loan, and 
relatively increasing the riskfor other lenders (Mackie, 1976b,pp.123-4). 
However, a new approach to Beaverbrook, again at the informed suggestion 
of Briston, managed to secure from them the offer of the E500,000 
unsecured loan, and the E225,000 secured loan. Later under pressure 
from Maxwell at the time of the prospectus launch the following Spring, 
another E150,000 loan was extracted from Beaverbrook. .Beaverbrook's 
actions should not be misconstrue~ ~s generc sity: they needed the 
cash from the quick sale of Albion Street; there were no other buyers 
in sightJ they were selling an old building badly in need of 
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renovation and plant which had little market value. Jocelyn Stevens 
later admitted that his aim was to raise £1 million from the deal: 
although the £1.6 million received from the SDN was reduced to 
£725,000 by the loans Beaverbrook invested in the SDN; by the sale 
of the car park, and the return on the secured loan, Stevens could 
leave the affair smiling with the £1 million comfortably in Beaverbrook's 
pocket. 
Negotiations With the Department of Industry • 
. 
By this time the SDN was amazingly inching close to the 
financial target of £2.4 million. The position was 
£ 
Department of Industry Loan 1,200,000 
Beaverbrook Unsecured Loan 500,000 
Beaverbrook Secured Loan 225,000 
SDN Workers Trust Fund 225,000 
Robert Maxwell 112,500 
Public and Unions 60,000 
2,322,500 
Only £77,500 was needed to make up the £2.4 million, which was to be 
raised from the public by the issue of a prospectus for SDN shares. 
At this point it seemed sensible and enterprising to launch the 
paper and stimulate interest in the ~ before the prospectus 
was launched. The Action Committee approached the Dol for a bridging 
- loan of £77,500, which Benn was in favour of, pointing out that the 
cost to the government of unemployment benefits and in loss of income 
tax revenue for the 500 workers was about £20,000 per week. However 
the official Departmental response was completely negative: the 
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capital would have to be raised in full before the paper could 
be published. This blow stunned the ~ workers, "It was as if 
we were running a Grand National course, and every time we won the race, 
the 001 said we had to go round again! ". But as far as the Action 
Committee were concerned, "We didn't waste our time trying to get the 
government to change their mind. \'1e accepted the philos:ophy that once 
they had made up their mind it would be impossible to change them. 
So we had to work very hard on where we were going to raise the 
rest of the money from." Briston suggested to the Action Committee 
that they should launch the prospectus immediately,that Beaverbrook 
would be forced to meet any shortfall to guarantee its own payment, 
and that the government would be carried along by the momentum of 
the action, and unable to object to the Beaverbrook effective underwriting 
for fear of openly revealing the extent of their hostility towards 
the project. 
but then: 
It seemed a convincing plan with a good chance of success, 
"At this stage, when it looked as though the launch of the paper 
seemed reasonably assured, Maxwell reappeared. He persuaded the 
Action Committee that no one would invest unless the prospectus was 
underwritten. Indeed, he doubted if he himself could invest until 
it was underwritten. The threat was heeded." (Mackie,l976b,p.l2S). 
This caution of Maxwell was completely out of character: he had 
acquired the Pergamon publishing empire in an adventurous series of 
gambles, and this was very much his business style. Yet, with the risk 
of losing his money, the Action Committee accepted Maxwell's argument 
.and the December launch of the prospectus was delayed to allow 
negotiations with the DOI over the ~derwriting. Briston opposed 
the delay, claiming that the government would refuse to allow the 
Beaverbrook underwriting if they were forewarned, and that with enough 
time, sufficient investment could be raised without MaxWell's contributionl 
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thereby displacing his influence. 
The opportunity was missed and further delay became 
inevitable as the intransig ~n~e of the Dol developed. Firstly 
the Department insisted upon the inclusion of the unfavourable IOU 
report in the prospectus, which made it unique in business history: 
a prospectus for potential shareholders with five pages of reasoned 
argument why potential investors should not invest. "The department 
seem to want to use our prospectus for damaging our cause. I feel 
we are being discriminated against", declared an angry Mackie. 
(Scotsman 23 December 1974). Mass meetings were downcast at the 
news of the government's attitude: it was assumed that the hostility 
of the Do! was tantamount to sabotage of the ~, and that the 
inclusion of the IOU report was intended to strongly advise people not 
to invest. (SON, Mass Meeting Minutes, (MMM), 11 and 18 December 1974). 
This was certainly how the matter was reported in the press: 
"Although Mr. Benn has insisted that every prospectus 
carries a Government warning to the effect that the 
company is not likely to be viable - which means 
that everyone is likely to lose every penny of their 
money - he is still prepared to throwaway El.2million 
of Government money." (Glasgow Herald, 13 March 1975). 
In a letter to the DOl, Mackie vainly protested: "the inclusions 
insisted upon are so damaging that they make the entire prospectus 
appear ridiculous and the decision by the government to offer the 
loan in the first place nonsensical." (11 December 1974). Secondly, 
in early January 1975, the Dol refused to allow Beaverbrook to 
underwrite the prospectus: "they declared that although the co-operative 
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had met the conditions of the loan they had not done it in the 
way it had been intended. The government demanded that there 
be a show of public support for the paper by way of public 
investment before the loan be.m~de." (Mackie, 1976b,p.l26). 
Whilst there was a superficial plausibility in the Department's 
request of proof of public support for the SDN enterprise by the 
attainment of a significant proportion of public investment, it was 
inherently illogical to expect the supporters of a mass circulation 
popular newspaper, who might well be keen to spend 5p a day, to show 
support by investing E25 in the minimum shareholding possible in the SD~, 
which most could ill-afford. The DOl officials, whether naively 
or maliciously, were transposing the affluence and practices of the 
business classes of the City of London to the low paid working class 
of the West of Scotland. 
The government offer of a loan was due to expire on 1 April 197 5, 
after two previous extensions and it was almost a year since the SDN 
workers had first become unemployed. After such protracted and painful 
delay the Action Committee wanted to launch the prospectus as quickly 
as possible in order to allow· the maximum time to arouse public 
interest in the SDN share issue, and to collect the funds promised 
from the labour movement. At this critical moment, and although 
the prospectus was now in its tenth draft, Maxwell insisted upon 
further changes to "liven up the detail to make it attractive to the 
reader", which reduced the six weeks available for the issue down to 
three: however inspired the changes, they were minor details, and 
could not compensate for the damage caused by halving the issue period. 
(MMM,21 February 1975). Meanwhile Maxwell secured 
the further E150,000 from Beaverbrook by threatening to withdraw his 
own investment. The 001 was not-entirely happy with this continued 
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involvement of Beaverbrook, and it took a few strained telephone 
calls to A.J.Lippitt an Under-Secretary at the Dol, to convince 
him that the conditions were not being breached. (MMM, 25 February 1975). 
Government Policy 
To the SDN workers in Glasgow the DOl loan offer seemed 
designed to allow the government to make a politically important 
gesture, yet make it impossibly difficult to transform the gesture 
into reality. This paradox was the compromise resulting from a basic 
political struggle in Whitehall-between an enthusiastic Benn, reluctant 
Cabinet, and hostile Treasury. Bepn regarded the SDN as a proving 
ground for workers control,greater operating efficiency, and the 
creation of a non-capitalist press. The argument in the Cabinet was 
whether to accede to the principle of subsidising a newspaper. The 
Treasury throughout remained anxiously hostile about creating a precedent 
of this kind at a time when many other regional and national newspapers 
were experiencing severe financial difficulties. (Glasgow Herald, 
26 July 1974). Members of the Cabinet were sceptical of the concept 
'of workers co-operatives, and Benn explained their reasoning to 
representatives of the Action Committee. 
"It was the opinion of'some members of the Cabinet 
that it was wrong to have workers money invested in 
this project. On the other hand, if there had 
been no workers money in, they would have equally said 
it was wrong and that there should be. So it 
appeared that no matter what the circumstances were, 
they were against ·the loan being granted." 
(MMM, 30 January 1975). 
But beneath the double logic which afflicted the government opponents 
of this and other co-operatives, lay a muchmore fundamental reason for 
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their opposition~ that while government support to an individual 
enterprise like the SDN was innocuous enough; in the context of 
an industrial crisis, particularly critical in ~he newspaper 
industry, government support might encourage a national wave of 
factory occupations in failing businesses which seemed a very real 
spectre in 1974-75. The one policy Labour Governments have 
always consistently pursued is to disourage and restrain the independe~~ 
action of the rank and file of the labur movement. ~~ilst the 
government felt constrained to assist the formation of three 
co-operatives during this perioQ, it was· determined 'not to generate 
others, and, therefore, in the case of the SDN imposed the most diffic;l~ 
conditions conceivable. Government policy towards the ~ may 
therefore be traced through three stages: initial disapproval, with 
efforts to discourage the workers without categorically saying Inol; 
then qualified assistance, but hedged in with conditions, ostensibly 
to guarantee a secure footing for the enterprise, but in practice 
disastrous because they enforced indefinite delay, the involvement of 
Maxwell, and much adverse lame duck publicity; finally the policy was 
one of malevolent neutrality as the co-operative was destroyed by marke~ 
forces and wound up by the terms of the 1948 Companies Act under 
which the government had insisted the co-operative was registered. It 
was, primarily, sensitivity to the precedent of government involvement 
in the funding of the press which accounted for the stringency of the 
SON conditions; however, this does not explain why, having made the 
commitment to offer the co-operative assistance, the amount provided 
was sufficient to launch the ~, but scarcely sufficient to sustain 
it through a short, and financially precarious existance. 
The Government loan to the SON was a comparatively small sum, 
was secured and attracted 10\ interest per~um. What was contentious, 
therefore, was the principle of support, not the extent of support. 
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Yet as pointed out by John Kerr in the Guardian during the early 
negotiations for the loan, "In terms of 'real industrial democracy 
and independence 1 the proposed paper conforms closely with the 
principles outlined in the Labour recommendations for reform of 
the press." (12 July 1974). 'Labour's Programme 1973 1 stated that 
a truly independent press -
"can corne about only if there is freedom from government control and 
other forms of censorship; freedom from financial dependence upon 
limited interest groups and from the danger of take-over; and 
freedom of the editorial function from control by either owner or 
advertiser. Internal democracy, in fact, is one of the strongest 
possible guarantees of a democratic and responsive press. The 
extension of industrial democracy must be an essential part of any 
new approach to the media in general." (Labour Party, 1973). 
Between May 1972 and May 1974 the Home Policy Committee of the 
Labour Party convened a series of meetings of people working or 
interested in the media, which were chaired, until March 1974, by 
Tony Benn. The findings of this body were pubUhed in 1974 as a 
Labour Party discussion document The People and the Media with 
a glowing foreword by Ron Hayward the general secretary of the party. 
and concluded on press democracy: 
"We believe that industrial democracy lies at the 
heart of any acceptable scheme for long-term reform 
of the press •••• Possible solutions might range 
from full co-ownership to a supervisory board model -
composed of management and worker representatives. 
We certainly want to see developments in worker 
participation going ahead much faster than they have been 
able to so far. 
, 
The introduction of a minimum of 
internal democracy should be a condition of any publicly 
financed aid to a publication. Alterations to 
the financial structure of the press industry 
would hopefully make it ,once more practicable 
for 70-operatively run publications to be 
established." (Labour Party, 1974,p.32). 
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Although reform of the press was therefore high on the agenda of 
the Labour Party, the Labour Government of 1974-1979 responded 
with scarcely concealed reluctance to the one opportunity it faced, 
with the Scottish Daily News, to do something practical, and then 
proceeded to do nothing about the press, beyond the diversionary 
appointment of a Royal Commission, for the remaining four years of 
office. 
The government fear of a public outcry at the proposal of 
state involvement in the press was, as Jimmy McNam~ra insisted, 
both unwarrented and misconceived: 
"Society will accept government participation in the 
form of radio and teleVision, but we are so brainwashed 
that we will not accept government involvement in 
newspapers. This is ridiculous: We have got 
qovernment funded TV stations, and government funded 
national radio, and government funded local radio. 
But when it comes to newspapers, there is this great 
'Freedom of the Press' cry! It's not freedom of 
the press, it's freedom of Max Aitken, and IPC, and 
these people to propagate their reactionary point of 
view, that's what freedom of the press means. It's 
not freedom for anyone to start a newspaper - which is 
just impossible. If the government don' t give them 
a loan nobody el se can start a newspaper. Nobody. 
And the economics are such that there isn't a national 
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newspaper making a profit. They're just getting enough 
to survive on, or they're living on outside interests". 
Thus the Conservative Party's defence of the 'Freedom of the Press', 
one of the most sacred articles of Tory faith, is merely an 
important bulwark of the self-interested Tory defence of the rights of 
private property. (Curran, 19791 Conservative 
arguments against press subsidies, contending t~at the 'free press' 
is supported voluntarily by advertisers and subscribers, whereas a 
subsidized press would be a compulsory charge upon the taxpayer is 
about as shallow as Conservative logic can get. The total 
circulation of daily newspapers in Britain is approximately 16 
million, and it is safe to assume that two-thirds of all households 
receive at least one newspaper per day. The price of each of these 
newspapers is subsidized by advertising, which contributed approximately 
£678 million to the revenue of newspapers. (RCP Final Report,1977). 
This money is added quite compulsorily, to the price of goods people 
purchase. People are paying to be convinced that they should buy 
products ~hich they may not want or need, and complete deception is 
part of this process. 
The twin forces of proprietorial and advertisinq control 
exert a powerful pincer effect upon the national press, constricting 
editorial orientations into a narrow ranqe completely supportive 
of the maintenance of the capitalist system and the interests of the 
. c~pitalist class. If any form of public subsidy or involvement is 
introduced, the Conservatives are determined that there will be nO 
escape from these editorial restrictions. Hence John Farr's almost 
hysterical reaction to the announcement of the loan to the SDN: 
. -
"Another aspect that worrie~ me very much on the 
proposed Scottish Daily News relates to the politics 
of the new newspaper. Let us suppose that the 
Government loan of £1.75 million, representing about 
half of the money needed, enables the group to publish 
a daily newspaper. Is it not right that if public 
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money is to be spent the newspaper must at least be 
impartial, that at the very least it must present its 
politics and news in an unbiased manner, and that at 
the least the committee that is to run it - a committee 
composed of 16 people - should consist of all shades 
of political opinion, It is surely better that they 
should be not extremists'to the Left or to the Right, 
but preferably moderates and at any rate conveying 
the full spectrum of opinion. 
Yet when we examine the committee that is to run 
the proposed newspaper we find that, far f~om representing 
moderate or centre opinion, many of the l6-strong 
committee are very far to the Left in politics. Its 
chairman is Mr. Allister Mackie, who is a Bathgate Labour 
councillor. In addition, the spokesman for the committee 
is Mr. Nathan Goldberg, who describes himself as of 
International Socialist sympathies. Five or six of the other 
Committee members are very Left-wing Socialists and in 
addition there is at least one paid-up member of the 
Communist Party. If taxpayers' money is to be put into 
a project of this nature, and if Parliament is not to have 
a chance to debate it, surely at least the committee set 
up to run the project should be of moderate and centre-of-the-
road appearance." (Hansard, 29 July 1974,pp.5l-2). 
Unfortunately, it John Farr had researched the politics of the Action 
Committee and the SON workforce, more thoroughly, he would have 
discovered that the left-wing members were outnumbered by members 
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whose politics were not too distant from those of himself. 
Further ramifications of selective state funding of the press 
were braodcast in proprietorial'outbursts: the deputy managing 
director of Fraser Newspapers in Glasgow complained -
"There is no question about it, this is unfair 
competition. In this modern climate of helping 
lame ducks the Government has overlooked one 
significant point: that if this newspaper is 
successful it could well endanger the jobs of other 
employees in other newspaper companies." 
(McKay and Barr, 1976, pp 59-60) 
To which a Fraser journalist added: 
"And if this subsidised paper ruins the parlous 
economics of some existing Scottish papers, will 
the taxpayer be forced to subsidise these too?" 
(Glasgow Herald, 13 March 1975) 
The contradiction in government policy to which understandibly the 
proprietors of the press made no reference was that selective 
.state intervention in a: market economy is frequently inadequate 
and self-defeating when general changes are needed. 
Contradictions of State Intervention 
TOny Benn's yerdict on the conduct of his Cabinet colleagues 
in the 1974-79 Labour Government was that: 
"The majority of the Cabinet did not understand or 
support the policies on which we were elected • 
••• Although we had the support of Conference and 
through the Manifesto the electorate, we did not 
at any stage have the support of the Cabinet for 
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the Manifesto's industrial policies." (Trades Councils, 
1980,p37) 
The Labour Government was elected in February 1974 with the 
most radical industrial policies proposed since 1945 which proposed, 
in the resounding statement of the Manifesto,"to bring about a 
fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of wealth and 
power in favour of working people and their families." The regeneration 
of British industry was to be achieved through extensive planning 
agreements with major comapnies, tpe development of public ownership 
through the National Enterprise Board, and the control of workers 
enhanced through industrial democracy schemes. Planning agreements 
were to cover all large scale and strategic companies in the private 
sector and to entail consideration of investment, prices productivity, 
employment, exports, products, industrial relations, and consumers 
interests. The National Enterprise Board would be a major new source 
of investment capital for manufacturing industry, would promote 
reorganization and sponser new ventures, would be an instrument to 
create employment in areas of high unemployment, and would provide 
the means to extend public ownership into profitable private manufacturing 
industry. On industrial democracy the February Manifesto promised 
wan Industrial Democracy Act, as agreed in our discussions with the 
TOe, to increase the control of industry by the people." 
TO fulfil such commitments would have involved considerable 
resolution on the part of the government when confronted by the 
outraged hostility of capitalist industry. In the event, the commitment 
of the Cabinet to the maintenance of a mixed economy, proved greater 
than the commitment to a socialist industrial strategy aimed at 
alleviating unemployment (Cripps and Morrell, 1979) Despite the manifest 
failure of limited Keynesian measures to stimulate investment in industry 
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and revive the Briti~h economy, the government felt compelled 
to retain the confidence of finance and 'industrial capital by 
abandoning and undermining the policy of extensive state intervention 
in industry. The social democratic majority in the Cabinet directed 
their energies at the dilution of the Industry Bill to a degree that 
amounted to deliberate sabotage. (Forester,1979) The wrecking 
amendments were led by the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and 
reportedly saw the Bill through 25 different drafts. This was the 
height of the obsession with defeating Bennery, which possessed the 
City, Treasury, civil service, ,and Fleet Street in 1974~75, that 
some of Benn's ministerial colleagues enthusiastically joined in, and 
which resulted in his demotion to the Department of Energy,in June 
1975. Though the form of Labour's industry proposals remained, the 
substance had been effectively discarded. 
At the forefront of the effort to dismantle the radical 
implications of Labour's industrial policies was the civil service. 
Whether or not Sir Anthony Part, the permanent secretary at the 
Department of Industry greeted his new Minister with the immortal' 
words, "I presume, Secre~ary of State, that you don't intend to 
implement the industry proposals in Labour's manifesto," is 
irrelevant, what is important is that the civil service, including 
senior officials in Benn's own Department systematically opposed and 
prevented the implementation of radical interventionist policies. 
(Freeman, 1982,p66) Senior officials at the Dol regularly briefed 
their colleagues at the Treasury, the fulcrum of the opposition to 
Benn's industrial strategy. (Forester, 1979,p9l) Part employed his 
close contacts with the media to damage his Minister, claimed Brian 
Sedgemore, the PPS of Benn. (Hansard,16 January 1979) 
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The official line of Whitehall is that the civil service 
are professional administrators who serve no interests, and have 
no policies, except those of the democratically elected government. 
In practice it is clear that the civil service have strongly defined 
views of their own, and the methods to mormally ensure their 
acceptance by the government of the day. Civil servants attempt to 
bend Ministers to the Whitehall line by constant ~dvice and persuasion 
in a particular direction, by a deluge of supportive information, the 
deletion of contrary evidence and the doctoring of statistics, by 
diversion and procrastination - for example the late arrival of 
complex papers prior to Cabinet meetings, and by the co-ordination 
of opposition, including leaks to the press. The result is that 
Ministers are relegated to a largely reactive role, rubber stamping 
rather than initiating policies, indeed Ministerial 'interference' 
in the drafting process is resented by senior officials. (Meacher, 
1979) In a stinging attack upon the prejudices of the civil service 
contained in an appendix to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Expenditure official report, Br~an Sedgemore accused the civil 
service of attempting to govern the country according to their own 
"narrow, well-defined interests, education and background, none of 
which fits then on the whole to govern a modern, technological, 
industrialised, pluralistic and urbanised society." Sedgemore 
vehemently accused the civil service of being "steeped in nineteenth 
cen~ury attitudes," and of having been "culpable in frustrating the 
interventionist industrial policies of the current government." (Guardian 
16 January 1977) 
The commitment of the civil service to the status quo is associated 
with their close connections to the bqsiness .community. Michael 
Meacher an MP who has studied the predicament of left-wing Ministers 
faced with unco-operative officials has ascribed this to: 
" ••• The enmeshing of the senior echelons of the 
civil service within-tqe business-finance power 
structure outside. This occurs at both the 
administrative and personal levels ••• This close 
symbiotic relationship with leading representatives 
of industry and finance must inevitably raise 
questions of the impartiality of civil service 
advice. Not that any implication of conspiracy 
is intended here, but rather that similarity of 
class origin and mutuality of interest tends to 
lead the civil service to a view of·what is 
right in any given situation which closely 
coincides with the establishment consensus 
outside Whitehall." (l979,ppl79,l8l) 
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There is therefore, a subtle but persistent and effective extra-
parliamentary power of capital to impress its interests upon 
governments through the civil service. Senior civil servants are -
well rewarded for their ~oyalty to private industry, and upon their 
retirement can look forward to comfortable sinecures in the boardrooms 
of- leading companies: 26 top civil servants of permanent secretary or 
equivalent level were recruited by firms in the private sector between 
1974-1977. On leaving the Department of Industry in 1976, Sir Anthony 
Part himself became a director of Debenhams, EMI,the Life Association 
of Scotland, Metal Box, Savoy Hotels, and Lucas Aerospace. Industrialists 
and financiers are, in their turn, welcomed in the corridors of Whitehall, 
where they are extensively recruited to serve on advisory bodies, for 
example of the 12 members of IDAB in 1974, 11 were company chairmen or 
senior directors (though this was reduced to 9 later). (Meacher,l979,pl8l) 
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The same cordiality is not, of course, extended by senior civil 
servants to trade union representatives. On several occasions Benn 
upset his senior officials at the Dol by agreeing to meet delegations 
of shop stewards, as he later stated, n~le idea of talking to shop 
stewards then was anethema to most of the civil service." Once Benn 
was gone, shop stewards who secured access to the Dol, such as the 
Lucas Aerospace workers were distressed to discover that Ministers 
were briefed by civil servants who had consulted only with the 
management in the company concerned, and who were committed to defending 
the management position. (Wainwright and Elliot, 1982, pp 83,177) 
The two elections of 1974 were studded more than most with 
Conservative and employer condemnation of trade union action in 
defiance of the government of the law. Yet with the election of a 
Labour Government formally committed to increasing state involvement 
in industry, industrialists embarked on a policy of open defiance of 
the government. The CBI rejected planning agreements and information 
disclosure as unacceptable constraints on the freedom of capital. When 
the Director General of the CBI was questioned by the Industry Bill 
Standing Committee about what would happen if the government allowed 
trade unionists to get company information by law, he maintained 
companies would still refuse to give it, and insisted, "Well, it's human 
nature that if you try to make people do things they don't do them.· 
After a visit to the Dol, shocked CBI officials realised Benn was serious 
about the industry proposals contained in the Manifesto, and immediately 
launched a publicity war of opposition, announcing that it "regarded 
as non-negotiable any attempt to subject the leading 100 companies to 
a planning agreement system." Incessant whispers began to come from the 
City that only if ~ny Benn was sa~ked would confidence be restored, 
and industrial investment be resumed. (Trades Councils, 1980, pp 40-44) 
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The 'confidence' factor was instrumental in diverting the 
government away from policies which capi~al considered harmful to 
private enterprise, as it had dQne' countless times before.~The amount 
of industrial investment, the level of output and employment, even 
the survival of governments is decided by the state of confidence, 
which is assumed to have some objective reality, whereas 'confidence' 
is nothing more than a political prize awarded by world bankers when 
they are satisfied that governments are pursuing policies acceptable 
to the international financial community." (Benn,1982,pll) And during 
this Period the confidence of international capital was badly rattled 
for example William Rogers, an official in the us State Department 
said concerning the December 1976 IMF loan to the UK: 
·We had the feeling if could come apart in quite a 
serious way_ As I saw it',l it was a choice 'between 
Britain remaining in the liberal financial system 
of the West as opposed to a· radicaL change of course, 
because we were concerned about Tony Benn precipitating 
a policy decision by Britain to turn its back on the I~_ 
I think if that had happened the whole system would 
have begun to come apart." (Sunday Times, 21 May 1978) 
Arthur Burns, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank put the situation 
more bluntly: 
·1 had ~ doubts whether the British could correct 
the fault in their economic management on their own. 
You DUst remember I am a neanderthal conservative, 
and naturally suspicious of a Labour Government. 
I thought it was a profligate government." 
(Sunday'Times, 28 May 1978) 
Right wing cabinet ministers and civil servants were able to refer to 
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this kind of negative reaction of international financial interests 
whenever controversial proposals were c~nsidered. As Fred Hirsch, a 
former official of the IMP has .revealed, the true relationship was 
JOC)re complex: the Treasury and City were quite capable of using 
their international financial contacts to bounce the Cabinet away 
from sensitive areas, that is financial crises could be engineered 
when they were necessary. (Glyn and Harrison, 1980, pp 112-3) 
Trade union leaders were ineffective in resisting tile pressures 
of capital upon the governments and insisting upon the proper 
implementation of the electoral promises to the labour JOC)vement. 
The main reason for this failure was" that although union leaders were 
formally committed to Labour's industry proposals, indeed the TUC 
had played a major role in framing them, they were reluctant to support 
active campaigning for the achievement of these policies at the corr~pny 
level by shopfloor trade unionists, let alone to lead this struggle. 
TUC leaders had attained a close relationship with the government, much 
closer Benn has argued than the relationship between the government 
and the PLP or Party NEX:. (l982.,p37) Equally they had. discovered a new 
found status in industry level negotiations with employers on the NEDC 
and other quangos. What they did not realise , or accepted if they did, 
',was that they were becoming junior partners in a new corporatism, as 
Alan Freeman tersely described it, "The state served the ruling class, 
the cabinet followed the state, the Commons legitimised the cabinet's 
ac~ions and union ~eaders policed them." (1982,p82) In this situation 
some trade union leaders regarded their own rank and file as the enemy 
to be defeated. rather than a renegade Labour government or obdurate 
employers. 
The institutionalised inertia, -~ck of imagination, and downright 
authoritarianism of the senior echelons of the trade union movement was 
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revealed almost every time workers attempted to independently 
put forward proposals for industrial change in line with Labour's 
industrial strategy. The SON saga was one example of this, but there 
were other graphic illustrations: For instance the inspirational 
Corporate Plan designed by the Lucas Aerospace Shop Stewards Combine 
received a blank response from the official union movement, which 
revealed starkly the failings in official structure, policy and 
leadership. The AUEW took two years to officially approve the Lucas 
plan by which time it was too late to do anything constructive in 
support of it. The CSEU proved itself a moribund body spreading 
paralysis: at first it made no response tothe Lucas proposals, and then 
it forbade the shop stewards from directly contacting the ~linisters 
concerned thus preventing them from pressing the Corporate Plan 
themselves. Finally, TASS, which as the main union involved should 
have been at the forefront of the struggle to get management 
acceptance of the plan, seemed to be more concerned with the 
connection between the plan and internal union differences of the 
past. Ken Gill, the general secretary of TASS, began rationalisation 
and redundancy negotiations with the Lucas management without informing 
the Lucas Aerospace shop stewards. (Wainwright and Elliot,1982) 
Consequences 
Labour's industrial strategy in 1974 was intended to halt the 
de-industrialisation of Britain as measured in the sustained fall of 
manufacturing output, manufactured exports and industrial investment 
relative to other industrial countries. (Benn,1980, pp 47-73) The 
abandonment of this stratgy meant a critical retreat from the fight 
against mass unemployment: 
. 
wWhen Labour took office in February 1974, unemployment 
stood at half a million. When Labour left office in 
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March 1979 unemployment was l~ million and was 
expected to rise to 2 million within two or three 
years. The manifesto qn which Labour lost the 1979 
General Election pointedly excluded any commitment 
to reverse this trend." (Cripps and ~brrell,1979,p95) 
All the major pla~sof Labour's industrial programme vere 
jettisoned. The first to go were planning agreements, which were 
originally intended to be mandatory, at least for those companies in 
receipt of financial aid from the government. The rernoyal of any 
statutory requirement for companies receiving financial assistance 
to engage in planning agreements, transformed planning agreements 
into a useless limb of government. Only one planning agree~nt 
was ever concluded, with Chrysler UK at a cost of £169 million, 
which in the event proved to be both transitory and cosmetic. The 
rest of private industry was left to receive in excess of £1,000 
million per annum, without any detailed public accountability as to 
the purposes it was to be used for. Similarly the NEB was quickly 
transformed from the conception of a radical agency for L~us~rial 
regeneration with an important employment creating function, into an 
industrial bank rationalising companies according to conventional 
market criteria. Workers who looked to the NEB as a sign of hope for 
a better future soon learned to associate it with mass redundancies 
and plant closures: after the NEB became involved in 1976-77 there 
were 19,000 jobs lost at BL, 5,600 at Rolls Royce, 1,100 at Feranti, 
800 at Alfred Herbert and 1,300 at. reL. (Glyn and Harrison, 1980, p 114) 
The government's prevarication on the promised industrial democracy 
measures was so successful that it took four years to produce proposals 
which were so equivocal that the interest of the most enthusiastic 
supporters of workers control was effectively stifled. (Cmnd 7231) 
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With regard to the public sector ~~e February 1974 rnanaifesto 
had promised, "We intend to socialise the nationalised industries. 
In consultation with the unions, we shall take steps to make management 
of existing na'tiona1ised industr ies more responsible to the workers 
in the industry and more responsive to consumers needs." In rea1i ty 
successive public expenditure cuts shook the job security of the public 
sector: the cuts announced in July and December alone accounting for the 
loss of 100,000 jobs each. The aggressive injection of capitalist 
rationality into management controls in the public sector was 
accompanied by extensive restructuring which involved 1a~ge scale 
redundancies in the public services and nationalised industries. 
(Fryer et a1, 1978) In the few industries that were nationalised 
during this period such as shipbuilding, the shop stewards who had been 
the strongest advocates of nationa1isation sometimes'found themselves 
on the streets, whilst the executives who opposed nationa1isation got 
a place on the nationalised board. (Beynon and Wainwright, 1979, p53) 
Meanwhile as the dole queues lengthened, declining public sector 
employment was to an extent compensated for by work creation and 
training schemes to enab~e the government to reduce the unemployment 
figures without reflatinq the ec~nomy, and to keep the unemplcyed in 
contact with the disciplines of work at the lowest possible cost, 
thllS 'oiling' the reserve army of labour. (wney, 1979) 
Ironically the main priority of the government during this 
period was to maintain the life support system of capitalist industry, 
in the panoply of measures designed to sustain corporate profitability: 
-They include grants, loans, and subsidies to invest, 
to re-equip, to relocate, to train and retrain, for 
researc~ and development, for export promotion, to 
halt closures, to finance expansion, to restrain prices, 
to sustain jobs, to create jobs, to promote mergers 
and to help small businesses~1I (Benn,1982,p144) 
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In this way approximately £5,000.million was dispensed from April 
1974 up to and including forecasts for 1978-79. (Hansard, 20 January 
1978, cols 407-8) Since the criteria of financial assistance of the 
1975 Industry Act concern the modernization, efficiency, and 
restructuring of industry, as well as employment preservation, the 
effect of public aid would more frequently lead to a reduction in 
employment rather than an increase. Indeed the normal deal between the 
government and companies, even when very large sums of aid were involved 
was simply the agreement by the company to impose less drastic 
redundancies than previously contemplated. Thus for a £6m grant in 1978 
Lucas agreed to preserve 500 jobs in Liverpool from a wQrkforce of 
1,1450 (while they transferred production overseas). (Wainwright and 
Elliot, 1982, pp181,199) 
The verdict of a Trades Councils' inquiry into the problem was 
that ·state intervention in industry, which has always been a major 
part of any socialist programme, has failed to live up to people "s 
expectations." (l980.p9) Those workers who had taken La bour's 
industrial policies seriously were subjected to a protracted and 
very painful process of disillusionment. It was not only the SON 
workers who frequently felt betrayed and rejected by the Labour 
government. For example, rather than embracing the Lucas workers 
plan as a remarkable step forward in the constructive participation 
of shopfloor people, the government regarded the Lucas stewards as 
a constant irritant. The Lucas workers had good reason to be sceptical 
of the intentions of Labour's industrial policy, since the AerQspace 
company was a child of Wilson's Industrial Reorganisation Corporation 
and had rationalised the aerospace components industry without any 
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public acco~ntability or consultation with those on the receiving 
end. The Lucas management repeatedly had attempted to impose closures 
and mass redundancies, and reduc~ the Lucas Aerospace workforce 
from 18,000 to 12,000 in the period 1971-81. The stewards plan was a 
strategy to end this contraction through the manufacture of a wide 
range of socially useful products. When the stewards met Gerald 
Kaufman, the Industry Minister responsible in 1970 they were received 
with kind platitudes and the advice that they should pursue their 
proposals through the ·local consultative procedures with Lucas 
management. The only problem with this was that the Lucas management 
were firmly opposed to any meaningful negotiations with the Shop 
Stewards Combine and were determined to resist any diversification 
along the lines contained in the plan. Later when stewards pleaded with 
Kaufman to help persuade the Lucas management to consider the plan he 
.refused to see them on the grounds that they were"not representative~ 
A technical manager for Lucas admitted "I'm quite sure personally 
that the issue was not the viablity of the products from an.engineering 
~int of view: the real issue at stake was who manages Lucas." 
(Wainwright and Elliot, 1982,pl14) And it was quite clear the government 
backed the management. 
The 1978 tabour Party Conference called for a planning agreement 
with Lucas over the implementation of the plan, and for the company to 
be taken into public ownership if it refused. The White Paper on 
industrial democracy published that year had insisted that people should 
be able to participate in company decisions which vitally effected 
. their jobs and, lives, but behind the rhetoric, the technocratic 
arrogance of Labour Ministers was portrayed by Gerald Kaufmann who 
revealed his lack of faith in the capacity of shop stewards to draw 
up a corporate plan, "You really are quite often in the position 
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where the shop stewards in the company can only see the tree 
trunks because by definition they are very low down. They are 
grassroots representatives and .t~ey can't see wider problems." 
(Wainwright and Elliot, 1982,p178) Stewards from the NEB companies, 
the nationalised industries, the co-operatives and other companies, 
received an equally peremptory response and learned not to look to 
the Labour Governn~nt for any practical support •. 
In this way the traditional industrial areas of South Wales, 
the North East, and Clydeside were neglected and abandoned to 
structural decline as the whole country became a special industrial 
development area. The regional NEBs criteria for industrial assistance 
were so commercial, . that most of the funds available remained unused. 
(Trade Councils, 1980,pI2) Regional incentives to industry did 
not produce balanced growth or a viable industrial base, and the 
.Regional Employment Premium was dropped in 1976 under IMF pressure. 
(MSRG,1980) Anyway regional incentives had no effect upon companies 
attracted by the prospect of cheap wages and no taxes overseas. 
(Holland, 1976) The wide array of industrial assistance and job 
creation measures did little to a~rest the accelerating destruction of 
jobs through closures. (Craig et.al, 1979) 
The Labour Government ofl974-79 bears a heavy responsibility for 
the demoralisation of the labour movement and the collapse of the 
fight against unemployment in Britain. The government responded to 
those workers who took some form of action to prevent closures and 
redundancies in a very negative manner, and refused to consider 
.seriously any solution beyond those imposed by the market and 
company management. The futilityof.resistance was impressed upon 
workers. And this hopelessness was extended to the future too, 
151 
"Harold Macmillan's book The Middle Way, published in 1938, in 
which he called for a planned economy to get rid of unemployment ••• 
advocated policies well to the .l~ft of the 1979 Labour l-1anifesto." 
(Benn,1982,pl07) Indeed the confidence that mass unemployment could be 
cured seemed to have evaporated among senior Labour.politicians, and 
as Beveridge insisted in 1944 in advocating a massive increase in 
public expenditure and major extension of the public sector of industry 
to stabilise investment and bring the monopolies under p~blic control: 
."Full productive employment in a free society •• is a ,goal that can be 
reached only by conscious continuous organization of all our productive 
resources under democratic control. TO win full employment and to 
keep it, we must will the end and must understand and will the means." 
(pp272,l6) 
The fury within the Labour Party at the dismal failure of the 
1974-1979 government to challenge the right of capital to reintroduce 
the social and economic misery of mass unemployment led to a n~mber 
of important constitutional changes fn the Party, including the 
mandatory reselection of MPs, the extension of control over the 
manifesto, and the establishment of an electoral college for the 
leadership elections. However in 1981, despite a renewed commitment 
in the Party to an alternative economic strategy, it could still be 
claimed that, "Leading front bench spokespeople were almost without 
exception opponents of the poliCies they were supposed to fight 
for.· (Freeman,l982,pl29) In this context, the monetarist orthodoxy 
of Thatcherism had a field day and to the astonishment of many 
encountered little militant opposition on the ground as the British 
-econOmf was almost consciously driven into reverse. In a brief 
decade the courage and idealism w~ic~ inspired the UCS workers to 
stop the closure of the shipyards on the Clyde in 1971 was replaced 
152 
by the despondency that allowed the closure of the Talbot Linwood 
car plant near Glasgow wi'thout any effort at resistance. 
Benn and ~vorkers' Initiatives 
In a powerful but unfortunately not prophetic statement to 
the 1973 Labour Party Conference Benn declared, "'Ihe crisis that 
we inherit when we come to power will be the occasion for fundamental 
change and not the excuse for postponing it." (Coates, 1979,pp 127-8) 
However Benn was regarded as so d~ngerous ,by the establishment, as 
there were grounds to believe he meant what he said, and since he 
seemed to be taking the opposite political trajectory to most 
Government Ministers: 
"It may seem strange that a Cabinet Minister should 
be radicalised while in office. It would be more 
usual for a radical MP to be converted to respectability 
the moment that he receives his Seals of Office. For 
me it was different. The shipyard workers who 
organised the work-in at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, 
the brave men and women who fought so hard to set 
up Meriden and Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering 
as co-operatives, and the brilliant and humane shop 
stewards at Lucas Aerospace combined with hundreds 
of others to give me an education in the real 
meaning of practical socialism which no books or 
teachers could have matched." (1980, pp 16-17) 
Benn could not see why trade union negotiating rights should be 
restricted to wage bargaining, and wanted unfons to tackle the 
, 
"real causes of progressive decline" by negotiating over investment, 
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prices, research and development, export marketing, and products." 
He insisted, "The contradiction, to whi~h socialists have often 
drawn attention, of unmet needs, unused resources, and unemployed 
people side by side must be resolved." (1980,pp152-4) BennIs 
enthusiastic receptiveness to workers initiatives to maintain 
employment dismayed senior civil servants at the Dol: the sight of 
a delegation of 34 shop stewards from the Lucas Combine Committee 
crowding into Benn's office at the Dol in November 1974, induced 
something close to panic! The worry among officials was that Benn 
. 
was not simply listening to proposals from workers he was actually 
encouraging them. It was Benn who suggested that the stewards should 
draw up a corporate strategy for Lucas Aerospace. (Wainwright and 
Elliot, 1982, pp 7-8) In the case of KMi Benn simply refused to 
talk to the existing management of IPD whom he distrusted, but 
instead offered the union stewards a feasibility study and assured 
them he was ready to consider a request !!2m them for assistance. 
This meeting occured on 25 June 1974,. and the factory occupation did 
not begin until 12 July when the receiver was called in. (Clarke,1974,p7) 
The constitutional dilemma Benn had exposed, to the consternation 
of his colleagues, was the relationship between socialist change 
through parliamentary means and extra-parliamentary direct action. 
Benn was not a revolutionary, and shared the veneration for the 
peculiarly British tradition of parliamentary democracy of other long 
standing Labour MPs. However whereas other Labour Ministers translated 
this principle into a duty to discourage the labour movement from 
attempting any effective form of direct action, Benn elaborated a 
distinction between "law breaking in pursuit of conscience" and 
"revolutionary action to replace parl~ament." (Freeman,l982,p14l) 
The practical support that Benn was able to offer to workers struggles 
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was successfully confined by the Cabinet to a few cases, however 
the fear that Benn was capable of provoking a dangerous mood of 
militancy that might be less easily controlled in the future 
disturbed them. 
From 1979 onwards distinctly different interpretations of the 
alternative economic strategy existed between Benn and his supporters 
and the official shadow cabinet. The shadow cabinet regarded the 
AES as little worse than a more radical expression of Labour's 
traditional commitment to increase state intervention in industry. 
Benn believed the AES could only be implemented by a socialist 
partnership between a Labour Government and an active trade union 
movement pressing for the same changes. Yet socialist critics of 
Benn and the AES, maintained that the strategy contained the same 
flaws as previous efforts at intervention: there was no resolve to 
effectively control the extra-parliamentary power of capital, there 
was little awareness of the likely extent of retaliation and the means 
to combat it, and working class support was assigned a secondary 
roleJ therefore the erosion and assimilation and ultimate failure of 
the alternative strategy was as inevitable as it had proved in the past. 
Benn has never recognised the possibility that "the acts and omissions 
by Labour Governments which are castigated as 'errors' and 'betrayals' 
are in fact a natural outcome of the logic of reformism; and that this 
logic is inherently antipathetic to working class mobilisation." 
(Hyman,l974,p256) Such critics recognise a crucial difference between 
'strategies for socialist change based on central government policies 
and official union structures, and the self-activity of the working 
class around locally based rank and file struggles for jobs, 
houses, schools and hospitals. (CSE~ ~979) ~n other words, in a neat 
reversal of roles, instead of Labour Governments calling upon the 
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loyalty and support of working class organisations, workers 
should develop their organisations as ~n effective source of political 
power outside the state \'lhich cou"ld command the loyalty and support 
of a Socialist Government: 
"This idea, that workers' industrial and social 
organisations should themselves develop political 
power, requires a reversal of the traditional 
relationship between these organisations and their 
representatives within present political structures . 
. 
We are arguing that it is workers' industrial and 
social organisations which have the potential 
power to control and eventually socialise private 
capital. The role, then, of a Socialist Government 
should be to provide a back-up, 3 means of co-ordinating 
and generalising this power and the initiatives which 
it creates." (Trades Councils, 1980, pl47) 
Benn's Support of the Scottish Daily News 
If the vision of a revitalised mass participatory democracy remains 
a distant prospect, doubts also surround the prospects of Benn's 
more pragmatic approach to socialist change. For example, though the 
three co-operatives Benn helped to found were small, but very 
significant monuments to his controversial tenure of the post of 
Secretary of State for Industry in 1974-75, the destructive constraints 
imposed on his policies, and the acute dilemmas which confronted the 
co-operatives, reflect contradictions in Benn's own political convictions. 
Though Benn had rejected the technocratic managerialism of his days 
as Minister of Technology in the 1960s, and increasingly assumed the 
ideals of a radical socialist in the mid-1970s, asserting 
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strongly the importance of working class initiatives, he still 
seemed to be firmly bound by governmental, parliamentary and 
corporatist institutions which systematically suppress, distort, 
and divert independent working class action, even though paradoxically, 
he had become the most celebrated critic of those very institutions. 
One result of these contradictory inclinations was that although 
Benn through a sustained effort was able to ensure the launch of 
three large co-operatives, he was not capable of preventing the 
imposition of financial straitjackets which guaranteed the disaster 
of the SON and the difficult life· of the other two organizations. 
As Minister Benn was the instrument through which the Government 
conditions on the SON were exacted, and the mass media frequently 
identified him with these conditions which he bitterly opposed. 
The workers at the SON were immensely reassured that they had the 
Minister behind them, but often he seemed powerless to help against the 
attacks of the government and even his own civil servants. Benn often 
advised the Action Committee on how to overcome these attacks however, 
and applied an interesting interpretation of the notion of collective 
Cabinet responsibility to which all Ministers are formally shackled. 
Thus at the end of January 1975, when it looked as if the government 
was considering withdrawing the offer of a loan, it was reported to 
a mass meeting that: 
-A.W.Benn, himself, was of the opinion that the 
conditions had been met but he was subject now to 
the Cabinet decision and urged and encouraged and 
outlined the tactics that should be adopted to 
defeat the hostile factions.- (MMM, 30 January 1975) 
Though the SON loan was eventually s~eezed out of the unwilling 
government, the crippling conditions were preserved intact, and the 
frequent attempts to alter them proved fruitless. In particular, the 
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financial contribution. and .consequent participation of Robert 
Ma~'ell in the venture seemed extremely hazardous. Despite the 
adverse reports on f.iaxwell recently prepared by his own Department 
Benn was unable to help and was, somewhat naively, optimistic 
about the resiliance of the SDN workforce. Mackie pleaded with 
Benn to replace Maxwell's money with a Dol loan, but Benn replied, 
"I think you lads can keep Maxwell in check." 
CHAPTER FIVE 
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THE DESCENT OF ROBERT MAX\'lELL 
Robert Maxwell descended upon the struggling workers of the 
SDN from the heights of prestigious international publishing, 
conglomerate financial manoeuvre's, and board room intrigues, which 
had made him in the opinion of the Sunday Times which followed his 
complex career closely, "one of the most significant entrepreneurs 
of the past twenty years." (24 August 1969) Yet as a Labour MP 
intimately connected with the academic establishment on both sides 
of the Atlantic Ma~~ell had also accumulated more than a veneer of 
social respectability. It is therefore important to' examine the 
business development of Robert Maxwell carefully to appreciate the 
seriousness of the threat with which the SDN workers were confronted 
in retaining control of their company, the immense difficulty of 
restraining such an overwhelmingly dominant character, and the full 
extent of the responsibility of the Dol in knowingly unleashing 
Maxwell upon a commercially vulnerable and politically unprepared 
workers co-operative. 
By the development of aggressive modern business techniques in the 
traditional and gentlemanly world of academic and technical publishing, 
Maxwell had built the Permagon group into a mUlti-million pound concern 
by the late 1960s. However the path of Maxwells business progress 
was not exactly strewn with commercial successes, in fact, the opposite 
was nearer the truth: 
"Maxwell's first major business operation, in the early fifties, was 
to get control of Simpkin Marshall, the large and respectable book 
wholesaling firm. Four years after he had acquired it, Maxwell had 
run it into the ground, and into liquidation, with debts of half a million 
pounds. At the same time he had as a bookseller managed to deal a 
severe blow to the British book trade in general. But Maxwell, remarkably, 
managed to avoid much of the blame. The company was over a quarter of 
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million pounds in debt when Maxwell bought it in 1951 for a mere 
£50,000 in cash. The rest of the acquisition deal concerned some 
intricate operations with the company's 'debts, which showed that, at 
one stage Maxwell was owed £l60,OPO py the ailing company. 
Maxwell then raised finance for Simpkins, on which he paid interest, 
and proceeded to advance substantial sums from Simpkins, interest free, 
to his other private enterprises. He was therefore using Simpkin 
Marshall, bluntly, as a bank - and on exceptionally favourable terms. 
Simpkin Marshall collapsed ignominiously in April 1955. Maxwell, 
as the Official Receiver discovered, had been financing major operations, 
especially the acquisition of the British Book Centre in New York -
now the base of his US operations - out of an inso1vant company, Simpkin 
Marshall." (Sunday Times, 21 September 1975). 
From this time Maxwell began to build the wealth and reputation of Pergamon 
on the basis of the enormous post-war expansion of scientific and 
educational publishing. Pergamon captured the market in important 
academic areas and then proceeded to charge extremely high prices for 
this specialist knowledge. The Sunday Times reported: 
"In 1965 the calculated average annual subscription to scientific, 
journals other than Per~amon's throughout the world was £6-1s-Od. 
British journals, excluding Pergamon, averaged only E4-3s-8d. The 
average Pergamon journal cost E16-7s-4d. Four years later the prices 
were E9-9s-4d, ES-12s-9d, and E2S-lls-Od." (21 September 1975). 
Pergamon's progress was admired in financial circles in the 1960s and 
shares in the company were popular in the City when Maxwell turned 
Pergamon into a public company. The trading relation between Maxwell's 
private companies and the Pergamon public company provided a means to 
artificially, and temporarily, increase the profitability of Pergamon, 
thus improving the' share value. Pergamon shares were then used by 
MaXWell in an incredible series of takeover attempts: 
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"Maxwell had grasped the essence of the takeover game: that a public 
company did not need cash to take over other companies. If you 
could keep your share price high, then the shares themselves made 
a most effective currency, which' could be used to buy the shares of 
companies with lo\"er prices. Share price depends to some degree 
on a company's image, and Maxwell was expert at using the media 
to project an impression of streamlined, computerized efficiency. But 
in the end, share price depends upon expectation of profit, and 
during the Sixties Pergamon reported startling profit growth. By 
1968 Maxwell was talking in term~ of profits of £2m on a turnover of 
less than £lOm. Dazzled, the City attributed scepticism to 'sour 
grapes' • In reality, Pergamon's profits were being inflated by, 
among other devices, manipulating the relationship between the public 
and the private companies. When profits were needed, Pergamon would 
'sell' large quantities of stock to the Maxwell private interests, 
hopelessly bad debts would be transferred into one of the private 
concerns in order to avoid deductions from the Pergamon profit." 
(Sunday Times, 21 September 1975). 
In 1965 Pergamon had a deal with the Macmillan Company of New York, 
which effectively committed Macmillan to take up to two-fifths of the 
total print run on some categories of books, no matter how many, or 
what kind of books Pergamon chose to produce. Typically, the deal 
collapsed in a furious burst of litigation. Maxwell then turned his 
attention to George Newnes Ltd, an encyclopaedia publisher, which he 
acquired in partnership with the British Printing Corporation (BPC) 
and transformed into International Leaning Systems Corporation (ILSC). 
At this time Maxwell was chairman and managing director of Pergamon, and 
chief executive of ILSC. Exuding supreme confidence, Maxwell typified 
the extrovert, acquistive optimism and weak commercial foundation of 
the fast-talking businessmen of the late 1960s. However Maxwell's 
ambitions reached their apex when he was prevented from ente~ing the 
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enticing world of national newspaper publishing and failed to 
acquire the News of the World organization in a £26 million bid in 
September 1968, being beaten by Rupert 'Murdoch an aggressive global 
publisher and entrepreneur of ev~n greater stature. An attempt to 
takeover another major publisher, Dutterworths, brought another reverse 
when Butterworth's chairman cast doubt on the projected Pergamon profit 
figures offered to Butterworth shareholders. Finally Maxwell failed 
to negotiate the sale of Pergamon itself, when in August 1969 the Leasco 
Data Processing Corporation of the United States withdrew a £25 million 
bid for Pergamon Press due to the condition of the accounts of ILSC; 
the relationship between Maxwell's private company MSI Inc and the 
public company Pergamon; and the composition of Pergamon's last profit 
forecast. 
The DTI Reports On the Affairs of Pergamon Press. 
The dramatic failure of the Leasco deal rocked the stock market, 
'the Pergamon shares plummeted,dealing in them was suspended,and the 
City Takeover Panel was rather belatedly alerted. The Board of Trade 
appointed inspectors under Section 165 (b) of the 1948 Companies Act 
to investigate the affairs of ILSC and Pergamon in September 1969, and 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) extended the protracted 
inquiry to include Maxwell Scientific International (Distribution Services) 
Limited (MSI(DS» and Robert Maxwell and Company Limited. (R.M & Co.). 
in January 1971. The inquiry reported in three impressive volumes 
published by the DTI: 
1. Report on the Affairs of International Learning Systems COrporation 
Limited and Interim Report on the Affairs of Pergamon Press Ltd. (HMSO,197l). 
2. FUrther Interim Report On The Affairs Of Pergamon Press Ltd (HMSO,1972). 
3. Report On The Affairs Of MaxweI~ SCientific International 
(Distribution Services) Limited, Robert Maxwell and Company Ltd, and Final 
Report On The Affairs of Pergamon Press Ltd. (HMSO, 1973). 
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These volumes make gripping reading, they are comprehensive, 
detailed and almost unremittingly damning of the business orientations 
and practices of Robert Maxwell. They would make informative and 
exciting course material for students of company law, accountancy, 
business studies and social science. If they had been published 
in paperback they would have been a runaway bestseller, though people 
may have found it hard to believe that it all actually happened. 
They amount to a fascinating, and probably unique, insight into the 
personal psychology and business practices of a prospective press baron. 
The inquiry was conducted by a barriste~ Sir Owen Stable, and a 
chartered accountan~Sir Ronald Leach, and examined with great diligence 
the intricate business connections of the Maxwell companies despite the 
constant impediments which were placed in their path. Maxwell 
originally wrote to the DTI inspectors, "I entirely share your view that 
speedy completion of the Enquiry is most desirable from everybody's 
point of view." (HMSO, 1971, p2) ,but when the inspectors declined 
to give him several undertakings Maxwell refused to appear before the 
inspectors who had to apply for a court order which took nine months 
before he was forced to give evidence. The inspectors were als9 delayed 
because no audited accounts existed for ILSC from June 1967 before 
July 1970. Such technical problems beleaguered the inspectors who 
declaimed "the casual and unbusinesslike manner in which the affairs of 
the ILSC were carried on", and"the laxity and carelessness that was 
shown in observing normal business procedures in Pergamon". (HMSO, 1971), 
(pp 69,81). To make matters even more difficult, Maxwell showered the 
inspectors with lawsuits which held up the inspectors work, though 
Mr. Justice Wien declared in December 1972: 
"I am satisfied that in every instance the Inspectors gave proper and 
sufficient notice to Mr. Maxwell of what was said against him or what 
it was he had to meet He was given ample opportunity of making any 
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explanations he wished •••• I consider that they succeeded in being 
eminently fair and that the plaintiff has no just cause for complaint 
In my judgement this action completely fails. Not a single allegation 
which has been made by Mr. Maxwe~l can be substantiated." (HMSO, 1973,p.659). 
Yet Maxwell, disingenuous as ever, actually used the delay which 
he was primarily responsible for, as proof of his innocence; thus 
he pointed out that under the 1967 Companies Act if the DTI inspectors 
had evidence of serious offences they would be impelled to take action 
immediately, and approvingly quoted his successor as chairman of 
Pergamon, Sir Henry d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, "The mere fact that they have been 
sitting on the business for a year and a half and have not reached any 
conclusion must indicate a sort of negative evidence." (Sunday Times, 
2 May 1971). In fact Maxwell succeeded in delaying publication of 
the final report of the inspectors, on the dealings between his private 
companies and Pergamon, until April 1974, when the House of Lords 
dismissed his appeal, but by which time he had regained control of 
Pergamon and was about to embrace the Scottish Daily News. 
Hire Purchase Books. 
The saga which erupted inthe Lea sco storm, really began with 
the acquisition in December 1965 of the Newnes Subscription Book Division 
(SBD) for £1 million to become a part of Pergamon SBD. Newnes SBD 
was sold by the International Publishing Corporation who had inCidentally 
acquired it in another takeover. IPC were not interested in the 
subscription book business and withheld publication of the fourth edition 
of Chambers' Encyclopaedia after it had been printed. The chairman 
of IPC, Cecil King, informed the inspectors that he did not consider that 
a subscription book business could be run profitably unless selling 
methods were employed which he did not regard as ethical, and which he 
was not prepared to countenance. As the Sunday Times caustically 
pointed out, subscription books are hire purchase books disposed of/~e worst 
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conceivable sales methods, "one must rid oneself of any lingering 
illusion that the encyclopedia world is in any way a quiet or 
scholarly one. In it are found some of the most carnivorous 
salesmen who ever stuck a foot· in a door." (24 August 1969). When 
Maxwell was asked why Pergamon decided to go into the subscription 
book business, he replied: 
"Because it (pergamon) expected it to be a very profitable venture. 
Having had the background of representing Encyclopaedia Britannica in 
this field and knowing how profitable that business was and knowing 
further that Chambers' Encyclopaedia was as good as anything the 
Americans had, there was no reason why, given the American marketing 
technique, we should not obtain a very reasonable share of the world 
market." (HMSO, 1972, p,2ll). 
Yet in a letter to the DTI Inspectors Cecil King disputed both the 
potential profitability and the morality of this activity: 
"The reason (why I.P.C. sold) was that we had bought 3 subscription 
book companies in various takeover bids, and it had become apparant 
that it was impossible to make.money in such enterprises by methods that 
could be countenanced in private or defended in public. In the ease 
of Chambers, for instance, at anyone time there were large numbers of 
eases outstanding in the county courts forcing people to pay their 
instalments on very expensive books they did not want." (HMSO, 1972,p.328). 
Such considerations though, did not disturb the pursuit of profits 
by.Robert Maxwell ~ho passed the debts of Newnes SBD and later Pergamon 
SBD to Messrs Wilders and Sorrel, a firm of solicitors who collected 
debts as part.of their practice, employing the full weight of legal 
duress.. The numbers of people pressured over Chambers subscriptions in 
this way was quite staggering: 
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"At the 1st January 1967 the face value of the debts with Wilders 
and Sorrell amounted to approximately £88,000 and were the aggregate 
claims in 9,500 court cases of which 7,000 were in English and Welsh 
County Courts and the remainder in the courts of Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Eire." (HMSO, 1973,p. 382). 
Later £45,213 worth of debts of Pergamon were sold to MSl (OS), to 
avoid avoid adjustment and reduction of the assets of Pergamon when 
Maxwell was trying to buy the News of the World. Maxwell was asked 
by the inspectors whether debt collection was the line of work of MSl (~S), 
to which he replied: 
"No. But I intended and planned for MSl (OS) to expand into this line 
of business, with the Newnes debts of Pergamon and many others which 
were available then, because I was very impressed by the excellent 
success and returns that Hayes Securities were making out of this line 
of business, and the demand for this type of service, both by accounting 
firms and banks with companies which had got into trouble, was rising, 
and I felt that this would be good b~siness for MSI (DS) to be in, but 
not good business for Pergamon to be in •••• These people must be sued, 
and I just did not want Pergamon and its subsidiaries to be involved. in 
this suing people in county courts allover the country •••• We would 
have had to report in our annual accounts that we had gone into this 
type of business, and I think the papers would have picked it up as a 
pergamon subsidiary whereas my judgement was that as a Maxwell private 
company it would not have made any difference. It would have lowered 
the imagine of Pergamon to go into this business." (HMSO, 1973,pp 415-6). 
Pergamon were advised by both their business consultants and 
~erchant bankers not to expand into such a risky and difficult area, but, 
"were more or less told that Maxwell ,was the organ grinder and knew what 
he was doing." Maxwell announced to the press that "this major 
acquisition will substantially increase the profitability of the group." 
(BMSO, 1972, pp 215,216). In a letter written in 1965 MaXWell 
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predicted profits of between E300,000 and E5oo,000 per annuc 
from subscription books. By the unjustified transfer of bad debts, 
the listing of overheads as non-recurring expenses, and the invoicing of 
sales to Maxwell companies which.never took place, the "profits" 
of Pergamon SDB were inflated, and from the date of Pergamon's acquisition 
of Newnes SBD to the transfer to ILSC in July 1967, Pergamon included 
in its accounts "profits" of El,269,000. In reality, as Maxwell later 
acknowledged, encyclopaedias were an unmitigated disaster for Pergamon. 
"International Leaning Systems Corporation was a real whopper - the one 
element in Pergamon that I really regret." (Sunday Times, 2 May 1971). 
The report on the Pergamon accounts for 1968 and 1969 by Price Waterhouse 
recorded Pergamon's share of the ILSC total losses as ~2,l23,OOO. 
(HMSO, 1972, pp 326-8). Yet Robert Maxwell was remarkably unrepentent 
about having engaged in a business of such low esteem as door to door 
selling, and focused upon the technical rather than moral problems 
involved: "I was and am convinced that the publisher of the future has 
to have a door-to-door sales force. Electronic video recording in 
particular, which must represent the 'dominant education, training and home 
entertainment package of the future can only be sold in this way, and even 
in conventional books, only 7' of people in the UK ever go into a 
conventional bookshop. I would still be prepared to go back into 
direct selling. But next time I would be very careful about training, 
and put a high premium on honesty. And the people would be on salary, 
not on commission, where the temptation - as we found out - is to sell 
encyclopaedias to the names on the tombstones in the nearest cemetery." 
(Sunday Times) 2 May 1971). 
A World Tour. 
f One amuSing adventure which revealed the essence of the Maxwell 
style of business occurred in January 1967 when Maxwell embarked upon a 
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world tour to promote sales of Chambers encyclopaedias. Immediately 
upon his return, Maxwell organized a press conference at the Dorchester 
Hotel, where he declared'the success of his 70,000 mile inter-
continental tour was "a lesson tor the rest of the British business 
community. He stated that he had sold 7,000 sets of the fourth 
edition of Chambers worth £1 million in the course of his travels, 
and that he had secured firm future orders worth £3 million a year 
for Pergamon's publications, £l~ million for Chambers, and El~ million 
II for other Pergamon products. (Financial Times, 24 February 1967; 
Sunday Times 24 August 1969). Yet the total sales qf Pergamon SBD 
during the six months to 30 June 1967 were recorded as £584,000. 
Maxwell had claimed that out of the 7,000 sets sold, 500 had gone to 
the Standard Literature Co. of India, but a telegramme to the managing 
director of the company received the response "No order placed". 
The United States had supposedly ordered 1,500 sets, but the inspectors 
concluded that the sales had already been made and accounted for. The 
marketing manager for Pergamon SBD, Philip Harris, when Maxwell cabled 
his sales figures from abroad, arranged a meeting with production staff 
to organize an immediate reprint. The unfortunate Harris explained: 
"I had about an hour's session with all the production people saying 'I 
have had such figures from the Chairman as lead me to suppose that we shal! 
be effectively out of stock long before we can get a reprint in!' 
On the last advice it was going to take the best part of 12 months to 
reprint and I am taking it on myself now to put everything in hand at full 
speed. I hadn't been asked to do it by Maxwell ••• but if his figures 
were right, and I had no reason to suppose they were wrong, we were out 
of stock or would rapidly be I was severely clipped behind the ear 
by Maxwell when he came in. Be said, "You!ve upset them all at Oxford. 
They have been running round set~in9 up reprints! But I said "You need i1:. 
I would have expected to be clipped for not doing so on your figures'. Be 
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said, 'Those figures are for the public When I left in .June 
(1967) there was no reprint put in hand and there was no urgent panic about 
being out of stock". (HMSO, 1972,p.34l). 
In fact, far from selling 7,060 'sets during the world tour, less than 
7,000 sets of the fourth edition of Chambers were sold, or given away, 
during the year and a half Chambers was a Pergamon SBO publication, 
before transfer to ILSC. 
affair: 
The DTI inspectors sternly concluded on this 
"In our opinion Mr. Maxwell made the claims for sales and firm orders 
which the Press reported him as ~aving ma~e at the Pr~ss conference on 
22nd February 1967. We are. firmly of the opinion that the claims 
which Mr. Maxwell made were exaggerated and that he knew that they were. 
In our view this is a serious instance of a director of a publicly 
quoted company falling below the standard which we consider should be 
observed when commenting upon the affairs of his company to the Press 
The history of Pergamon SBD is a history of the overstatement of its 
normal trading profits and of exaggerated claims of the sales of the 4th 
edition of Chambers Encyclopaedia. Both are in our view serious matters 
because both must have had a material effect on the value of Pergamon's 
shares in the stock market: both must have had far reaching effects 
on BPC and its shareholders and both must have played a significant 
part in bringing the shareholders of Pergamon to their present unenviable 
plight." ·(BMSO, 1972, pp 344,347). 
International Leaning Systems Corporation. 
A second tributary that simultaneously led to the Leasco affair, 
was the acquisition of Caxton Holdings Ltd by Pergamon. The OTI 
inspectors record how Maxwell poached the s~les staff ofCaxton in 
South Africa, which provided a qu~t~r of the business of Caxton, and then 
made a takeover bid for Caxton and secured it at a much lower price than 
be could otherwise have done. During the takeover a document was sent 
to shareholders of Caxton asserting: "There is no agreement or 
arrangement whereby any shares of Caxton acquired pursuant to the 
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offers \o1ill or may be transferred to any other person." When in 
fact Pergamon had been discussing with the British Printing Corporation 
for them to take 50\ of the Caxton business, upon completion of the 
Pergamon deal (HMSO, 1971, P 44) Caxton Publishing was merged with 
the Purnell and Buckingham (Pergamon SBO) companies to form the 
International Learning Systems Corporation, which was owned jointly 
by Pergamon and BPC. On the pretentious change of name of Caxton to 
ILSC the inspectors sadly comment: "the man whose invention probably 
made a greater difference to the habits of mankind than any other 
invention before or since ceased to be brought to mind by having his name 
incorporated in the name of a publishing or printing company." 
(HMSO, 1971,p.72). 
The relations between Maxwell and the ILSC management reveal 
clearly the paradox that his own dynamism resulted directly in the weakness 
of the corporate structures of the companies he controlled. L.C. 
Schilling, previously the secretary of Caxton, became the financial 
controller of Buckingham in November 1966, and was asked by the inspector 
to describe Maxwell, he'replied, "He is tough:hard. Whatever he wanted 
he went after - a very difficult man to work for, inclined to run 
everything under his own aegis. It was very difficult to make a decision 
at any time without seeing him. He was a very difficult man. One 
never knew quite what was behind some of the decisions that he made and 
he never said." The inspectors agreed that Schillings assessment 
of Maxwell was accurate. (BMSO 1971,p.l3). The financial director of ILSC 
from December 1967 to 1969 was H. Moppel, who had a disagreement with 
Maxwell, and resigned in 1968 with six months of his contract to serve: 
"he asked me to disappear and not to come back for six months. He forbade 
me to take any other appointments during that six month period In 
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May 1968 he had six senior executives, five of whom were discharged 
within probably a month of each other, and he did not replace these 
senior people. We lost all the experienced, good management of ILSC, 
people who knew the business .. : •• All these people went in one fell 
swoop basically." Asked by the inspectors what accounting and 
management information he found was available to the ILSC board when he 
arrived, Moppel replied, "The simple answer is none whatsoever. No 
accounts had been produced of any nature since the formation of the 
company •••• " (HMSO, 1971, pp 77-78). Maxwell displayed hardly 
enlightened staff relations for tJ. Labour MP and appli'ed a novel techniq-.:e 
in dismissing senior staff: "On the 15 May 1968 Mr. Maxwell removed 
Mr Le Bas (Director) and Mr. Jenman (Sales Director) from their 
appointments. He did this by dating resignation letters which he 
had required them to sign undated at the time whenPergamon's takeover 
of Caxton had been completed." Their removal followed allegations 
against Mr. Jenman from an employee of ILSC: "Mr. Maxwell moved with 
great speed'. He acted to remove Mr. Le Bas and Mr. Jenman without 
asking either of them whether the allegations were true or giving them 
any opportunity to say anything about them." The ILSC board minute 
of Jenman's dismissal was an intriguing example of newspeak: "It was 
resolved that in order to simplify procedures: 1 Mr. R.E.Jenma."l be asked 
to resign from the Board of ILSC •••• " The inspectors noted, "During 
the period from 1 July 1967 to the date of our appointment (September 
1969) the office of secretary (of ILSC) was held by five different people. 
(HMSO, 1971, pp 154-5). Thus although with his personal business 
dynamism Maxwell cut a swathe through a series of complex takeover deals 
and achieved the acquiSition of a range of companies, the trail of 
resignations Maxwell's approach occasioned and the flimsy, if highly 
• 
centralized, control structure which ensued, meant that in reality the 
MaXWell companies commercial activities were poorly administered. 
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The DTI inspectors thorough investigation of the business practices 
of ILSC revealed a catalogue of corporate laxness and misconduct. 
The inspectors discovered four agreements executed on 1 March 1968, 
which had been antedated, two to 29 December 1967, two to 30 Dec~~er 
1967, "by which ILSC was clothed with legal formality ••••• None of 
the boards of any of the six companies concerned met to authorise the 
execution of any of these agreements". (HMSO, 1971,pp 106-7). The 
minutes of board meetings of ILSC were equally suspect "There are a 
number of minutes of meetings which did not take place recording decisions 
as decisions of the directors stated in the minutes to have been present, 
. 
which were decisions of one or more directors of which the others 
in some instances were totally unaware. We were also told that we 
could not rely upon the accuracy of those parts of the minutes which 
record that previous minutes were read and approved." The inspectors 
reported that there was no record that the accounts of ILSC for the year 
ending 30 June 1967 were formally approved at a directors meeting. 
The scale of the problem of unreliable minutes the inspectors unearthed 
was considerable: 
"There is a document, signed by Mr. Maxwell which purports to be the 
minutes of the Board of ILSC of 30 January 1968 ••• authorising that 
the capital of ILSC be increased from £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 and 
resolving to hold an EGM and that the secretary serve on the members 
notice of ~e meeting and obtain their consent to the EGM being held at 
short notice. The meeting of directors is, according to the minutes, 
said to have adjourned and then to have reconvened, when Mr. Maxwell 
reported that the EGM had passed the resolution to increase the capital 
There is no record of attendance relating to this meeting and we are 
of the opinion that the meeting never took place, though allotment letters 
were issued by ILSC •••• We think ~ha~ the minutes were brought into 
existance to clothe with some semblence of formality a decision between 
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Mr. Maxwell, whose signature appears on the minutes, and the BPC, taken 
without any regard to the restrictions on the powers of the directors 
of ILSC as set out in the Articles of ~ssociation, without regard to 
the method of altering the capital as set out in the Articles of 
Association and without regard to the views of other members of 
the Board of lISC". (HMSO, 1971, pp 116-125) • 
The payment of improper and unjustifiable dividends by ILSC 
was another subject which concerned the inspectors. In 1968 ILSC 
paid a dividend of £47,453 to Caxton Holdings: "This payment was 
made not only without the Board of ILSC recommending the declaration of 
the dividend but also without any director of ILSC, who was also a 
director of BPC being aware of it, and without the shareholders of ILSC 
authorizing the payment at a general meeting before payment ••• we are 
of the opinion that Mr. Maxwell had no power to authorize the payment 
and that it was an improper payment." Furthermore two interim dividends 
of £100,000 net were paid by ILSC to Pergamon and BPC on 29 December 1967, 
and 30 June 1968 (and then loaned back to ILSC)i the decision to pay 
the first interim dividend was made at a board meeting of ILSC which did 
pot take place in the view ofothe inspectors, and despite the fact that 
"there was no information available to the Board regarding trading 
results of the first six monthso of the venture and apart from a general 
air of optimism, none of the directors had any information regarding 
profits." One director, Le Bas, laughed when he was informed by the 
inspectors that a dividend had been paid, and when asked "WOUld he have 
, 
assented to a dividend at that time replied: No. It was absolutely 
crazy. There could be no possible reason why we had £200,000 to pay 
out in profits. • • There wa~ not any accounts • 
The confidence of Maxwell on the ILSC balance was based on the 
level of sales, but the inspectors·Commented "whereas the level of sales 
in many businesses i~ a useful factor in estimating profits, it has 
little value in the business of selling encyclopaedias on credit terms. 
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In fact, since very substantial commission - as high as 40\ - is 
paid to salesmen when the order is obtained (and a small down payment 
only, made by the customer) sales can ~epresent net losses ..• the key 
is whether the customer is prepared or able to contribute his monthly 
payments. Despite sales aggregating £15,870,000 for t~e 27 months 
to the 4 October 1969 ILSC according to the aUdited accounts made 
a trading loss of £3,687,000". Why were these payments made when 
there was no justification for them? The inspectors concluded: 
"Mr. Maxwell and Mr. Pickard were the directors responsible. In our 
opinion, they were determined that a dividend should be paid so that the 
. 
profIts of the two parent companies should include a return on their 
investments in ILSC." (HMSO, 1971, pp 121-141)'. Similarly, the 
accounts of ILSC were delayed through 1968 and 1969, because, the 
inspectors thought, Maxwell wished to state to Pergamon's shareholders 
that ILSC was "at present profitable", but he was made aware that BPC 
"would have difficulty in joining him in this assertion". Maxwell 
wanted to state to Pergamon shareholders that ILSC had no claim against 
Pergamon or BPe under the profit warrenty, by which Pergamon had guaranteed 
a certain profit level to BPe, when BPe believed that Pergamon's 
liability was Eloo,ooo - E150,000. CHMSO, 1971,p.162). 
The Leasco Takeover Deal. 
This frenetic financial activity was intended in 1968 and 1969, to 
inflate the profit levels of Pergamon, and thereby bolster its share price, 
firstly in the abortive attempt to takeover the News of the World organisation 
in September 1968, then in the equally spectacular failure to sell 
Pergamon itself in August 1969 to Leasco Data Processing Corporation. 
In May 1969 Maxwell wrote a letter to Bernard Schwartz, President of 
Leasco which was a tissue of misrepresentation: 
1. Maxwell seriously misrepresented the activities of another company 
which was also a business partner: 
-SPC have recently been doing all they can to depress the value of 
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ILSC in the hope that they might buy it cheaply; a consequence of 
this has been that the price of Pergamon shares has been adversely 
affected." The i.nspectors maintained, "We have not come across a 
scintilla of evidence to justify this statement. Mr. Maxwell, in 
giving evidence to us on the affairs of ILSC over six days, produced none. 
Such evidence as there is indicated that at this time BPC were 
contemplating selling their interest in ILSC to pergamon". 
2. Maxwell indulged in character assasination: "For the first year 
the business was being run with my consent by the founder of Caxton 
Publishing Company and the protege of BPC, Mr. Le Bas, whom I had to 
fire because he was too fond of liquor." The inspectors stated "We do 
not think Mr. Le Bas' drinking habits had anything to do with his dismissal, 
the complaint (from an employee) against him is that of failing to 
take effective measures to prevent extravagence in the administration in 
Australia. There is no hint in the letter that Mr. Le Bas was 
drinking to excess. The evidence we have heard •••• has caused 
us to be of the opinion that at the time of his dismissal, Mr. Le Bas 
was an abstainer." 
3. Maxwell complained of other managers incompetence, when he was in 
control, in order to blame them for commercial problems he was responsible 
for himself: "It was not until after the battle for the News of the Wc.~l= 
towards the end of last year that I realised the inadequacy of the then 
management. I had tomake a clear sweep by dispensing with Mr. Moppel's 
services and two others. I then took on, almost on a full time basis, 
the day to day management of the company, implementing in detail all of 
the policies that I had asked previous management to do". Maxwell 
later asserted to the inspectors that he was never really chief executive 
other than in name whilst Le Bas w~~ managl.ng director of ILSC and that 
whilst he did have the right to countermand, he left the entire running 
of the company to Le Bas and did not interfere. But the secretary of 
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ILSC at the time, Harper, described his duties to the inspectors 
as, "To carry out Mr. Maxwell's orders to the letter and do nothing 
more ...• It was to Maxwell that I re"ported .•• I was required to report 
at any time on every day to Maxwell." Another director of ILSC, 
Holme, commented: "There used to be rather humiliating scenes in 
Board Meetings when Maxwell would tell Le Bas off and treat him like 
the office boy, but one felt nevertheless that Le Bas was relatively 
quite a strong character. Probably on a day to day basis Le Bas was 
running the Company but with considerable pressure from and interference 
from Maxwell." 
4. Maxwell presented optimistic and unreliabl~ accounts and forecasts: 
"I also enclose •.• a copy of the first quarters management accounts 
and profit forecast prepared on a most conservative basis. These 
accounts were presented to and accepted by the ILSC Board last Thursday, 
you will see the company is running well, margins have already improved 
substantially and will continue to do so as we reduce our administration 
costs". The inspectors caustically commented, "We have not found a 
single item of any forecast or management account which has been drawn 
on a conservative basis, let alone a whole forecast or whole account. 
Wherever the preparer 6f an account or forecast has had a choice between 
alternatives, he has chosen the least conservative. The reference to 
last Thursday's meeting of the ILSC Board is a reference to the meeting 
held on 15 May 1969 ••••• According to the minutes the Board did not 
approve anything •••• " 
5. In conclusion Maxwell grossly exaggerated the profit level of 
ILSC and misrepresented the reasons for BPC's caution: "If it were 
not for BPC's fear of me (because I attempted to take them over last year) 
and their conse~ent desire to sever the partnership and if possible 
acquire ILSC, then I doubt that we would have had any differences over 
the accounts. ILSC made a substantial profit for its first 18 months 
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trading " The inspectors declared that this was "recklessly 
optimistic in more than one respect. Mr. Maxwell must have known 
that the differences over the account~ had nothing to do with BPC's 
fear of him or their desire t9 sever the partnership. The differences 
over the accounts were due to ILSC being unable to produce them in an 
auditable state •••• when the accounts were eventually produced they 
showed that ILSC made a loss of £2,598,000 in the first eighteen months 
trading and that the accounts for the next nine .months showed further 
losses of El,089,000 in that period. In these circumstances, we 
think that Mr. Maxwell was not justified in writing, 'ILSC made a 
substantial profit for its first 18 months trading' to Mr. Schwartz on the 
17 May 1969. We do not think that there was ever a moment of time 
when ILSC was 'running well'. (HMSO, 1971, pp 163-168). 
On 17 June 1969 Leasco agreed in writmg with Maxwell in his 
personal capacity to acquire the issued shares of Pergamon. Maxwell 
agreed that he would accept the offer and made a number of warrenties. 
One was that Pergamon had no liability in respect of the warrenty of 
ILSC's profits. On 18 June 1969 BPC, Pergamon and ILSC executed a deed 
.which confirmed that Pergamon·was not liable to make any payment to !LSC 
or BPC, until then none of the directors of ILSC-Pergamon had any 
justification in stating that t.hey did not think that they were liable 
under the warrenty. The deed was part of a "Secret Agreement" 
between BPC and Pergamon that any agreement to sever their relationship 
should be secret until there was a joint statement. On this conspiratorial 
interlude the inspectors commented: "Whilst we appreciate the desire 
of the directors to keep information confidential which might affect the 
commercial welfare of their companies r the history of the ILSC, with 
regard to what was disclosed is a serieSof suppressions of information 
and of optimism verging on recklessness with the occasional statement which 
was untrue and calculated to mislead." 
The confidence trick collapsed on 21 August when Leasco and their 
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advisers Rothschilds announced that Leasco did not intend to proceed 
with the proposed offer. One of the reasons was the position of 
ILSC. No audited accounts of ILSC wer~ available in July 1969. The 
auditors, Chalmers Impey and Coo~erBrothers predicted a loss before tax 
of £437,000, which despite his earlier optimism was the best Maxwell 
could hope for, but they were troubled by a number of matters. Maxwell 
had made a number of transactions which materially improved ILSC's 
position by the sum of £398,895 at the expense of Pergamon, without the 
knowledge of a single Pergamon director. Without audited accounts, 
negotiations for the renewal of credit facilities for ILSC could not be star~1 
by 31 August 1969 which would mean that two clauses in the agreement with 
Pergamon, vital to BPC would lapse. By 21 August 1969 BPC discovered 
that it was proposed to disclose the existance of the "Secret Agreement" 
in the Leasco offer documents, and accordingly they wrote to Rothschild. 
On that day the deal collapsed. (HMSO, 1971, pp 172-183). 
The Reckoning. 
The next day a rather tense meeting took place to draft a press 
statement which might extricate Pergamon somewhat from the affair. The 
meeting consisted of representatives of Pergamon; BPC; Cooper Brothers and 
Bill Samuel (both as BPe's advisers)~ Forsyte, Vierman and Phillips, 
Chalmers Impey and Flemings as Pergamon's advisers; and Whinney Murray 
(as Flemings' advisers). The press statement published by this eminent 
body of men suggested that it was unlikely that Pergamon would be liable 
under the terms of the warrenty on the profits of ILSC, and that "The 
management accounts of ILSC show that it is now trading profitably". 
Displaying rather unjustified restraint the inspectors reproved,"The 
fact is at this stAge the truth about ILSC was most unpalatable. Its 
records and accounts were in a shambles. The crisis had been reached. 
It is unfortunate that a meeting attended by a large number of professional 
men of integrity - whose integrity, in our View, is in no way impeached 
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by what occurred on the 22 P.llgust 1969 - should have resulted in a 
document being published, which is so open to criticism". The City 
Takeover Panel criticized the lack of information at such a critical 
time offered to Pergamon shareho~ders, but in his submission to the Board 
of Trade arguing against appointing the inspectors Maxwell concluded, 
"It is submitted that these facts, coupled with adverse press comment 
at that time, could not have led shareholders to believe that ILSC could 
make a profit in the year ended 30 June 1968". To which the inspectors 
dryly replied, "Nor, in our opinion, does it lie in the mouth of a Chairman 
of a publicly quoted company to rely upon adverse press comment as a 
SUbstitute for the information which he ought to have given his shareholders. t. 
(HMSO, 1971, pp 189-193). 
At an EGM on 10 October 1969 the shareholders of Pergamon removed 
all the existing directors of Pergamon and appointed others in their 
place, and on 15 October, Maxwell and the other directors resigned from 
·ILSC. BPC acquired 80\ of Pergamon's interest in ILSC,and Pergamon were 
to pay ILSC of E175,000 in satisfaction of its obligations under the 
profit warrenty. 
In their concluding summary of the evidence on the mismanagement of 
ILSC, the OTI inspectors focused on the draft accounts: the first draft 
of the 18 months to 28 December i968, dated 3 March 1969 showed a profit 
of £806,000. By the time the auditors expressed an opinion on 13 August 1969 
on the results of this period which they subsequently withdrew, the draft 
accounts showed a profit of £40,000. When the accounts were finally 
audited, they showed a trading loss of E2,589,000. In March 1969 the 
financial director of ILSC, Hazard, resigned "because draft accounts prepared 
by Mr. Hazard under Mr. Maxwell's direction were, in Mr. Haxard's opinion, 
so misleadinq that he refused even to show them to the auditors." The 
inspectors were perfectly aware of the reason for this bizarre behaviour: 
"Maxwell at all times reqarded the price at which Perqamon shares were 
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quoted on the Stock Exchange as of paramount importance, particularly 
since this would be an important factor in attempted takeover bids, 
such as Butterworths and the News of the \'10r1d. In our opinion, 
this insistence upon having optimistic draft accounts prepared was 
to justify the "bullish" statements which he maintained about ILSC. 
This is not to say that we have not found Mr. Maxwell to be a supreme 
optimist. We accept that his earlier statements and some of their reckless 
quality to this characteristic, but we reject that he lived in a "fools 
paradise" for as long as he contended that he did. (HMSO, 1971,pp194-202). 
Finally the inspectors gave short shrift to Maxwells lame attempt 
to transfer responsibility. "Mr. Maxwell maintained he left financial 
and legal matters to his professional advisers. This we cannot accept. 
He had an unusually acute appreciation of financial and accounting 
matters and is not afraid to enter into agreements of far reaching effect 
without legal advice. The evidence we have received convinces us that 
no major decision on financial or business policy was made in ILSC or 
Pergamon without his approval and they were usually his decisions .•• 
We are also convinced that Mr. Maxwell regarded his stewardship duties 
as fulfilled by showing the maximum profits which any transa ction could 
be devised to show. ~rthermore, in reporting to shareholders and 
investors he had a reckless and unjustified optimism which enabled him 
on some occasions to disregard unpalatable facts and on others to state 
what he must have known was untrue." (HMSO, 1971, p.209). 
The Maxwell Private Companies. 
A further contribution to the Leasco affair, which was the key to 
why Robert Maxwell survived his ejection fra. the Pergamon board, even 
though the Pergamon public company had suffered so badly in the fiasco, 
was the plethora of Maxwell private companies inter-connected with the 
Pergamon business. In. the third volume of their report the DTI inspectors 
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focused on the relationship between Maxwell Scientific International 
(Distribution Services) MSI (OS» and Robert Haxwell and Co. Ltd 
(R.M. & Co.). The highly impressive name of MSI (OS) was again 
deceptive: "MSI (OS) is a priyate company owned and controlled by 
Mr. Maxwell. It was incorporated in Great Britain on the 18 December 
1945 with the name of Low-Bell Limited, as manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers of fancy goods and kitchen utensils, with an authorised 
capital of £100 divided into 100 shares of £1 each. On the 16 October 
1947 its name was changed to Low Bell and Maxwell Limited and on the 24 
March 1959 to its present name. On the 17 August 1960, MSI (OS) changed 
its objects clause to that of being a general finance and investment 
company." (HMSO, 1973,p.364). 
In attempting to complete this part of their investigation, the DTI 
inspectors faced, in the words of Mr. Justice Wien "almost every 
conceivable obstacle" placed in their path by Maxwell. They lamented, 
"From the time Mr. Maxwell saw our report dated 2 June 1971, we experienced 
great difficulty in obtaining information from him, so much so that we 
believe Mr. Ma~ell has been determined to obstruct the course of our 
investigation and to delay its completion for as long as possible 
By January 1972 it was obvious to us that, if Mr. Maxwell was unable to 
prevent us from disentangling the affairs of Pergamon, R.M & Co. and MSI (D.S) 
from the puzzling skein which he has woven about them, he was determined 
to delay our doing so for as long as possible." (BMSO, 1973,pp 456-8). 
The first matter the inspectors explored, was the purchase of 
large numbers of Pergamon shares by MSI (OS) at the time of the News of 
the World takeover bid. But the inspectors pointed out that "MSI (OS) 
borrowed £200,000 from MSI ( 1964) on 2 November 1968. Again that 
appears to us to be a breach of Section 54 of· the Companies Act by 
, 
Pergamon: on this ground, I thi~, that MSI (1964) was a subsidiary 
Cof Pergamon), but MSI (1964) was lending money to a third party (MSI (DS» 
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to buy Pergamon shares." (HMSO, 1973, p. 461). Hence Pergamon 
was loaning money through a subsidiary for a Ma~~ell private company 
to buy Pergamon shares, in order to inflate the stock market price of 
the shares, and assist the tak~over deal. 
Delving deeper into the Maxwell private concerns, the inspectors 
discovered a private company ~~I Inc: 
" ••••••• this private company (MSI Inc) controlled by Swiss trusts 
for the benefit of Mr. Maxwell's sister and her children was in receipt 
of substantial terms of credit from thepublic company (Pergamon MSI (1964») 
whose shareholders had entrusted Mr. Maxwell to conduct its business on 
their behalf. Such substantial terms of credit especially when large 
sums were involved, ought we think to have been a matter to which the 
Board of Pergamon, as a whole, should have given anxious and careful 
consideration before granting •••• The fact is that there is not one 
mention in the minutes of Board meetings of Pergamon to the credit terms 
enjoyed by MSI Inc: not a Eingle director, other than Mr. Maxwell and 
possibly Mr. Clark, knew the terms on which Pergamon was trading with 
MSI Inc, and no one in Pergamon as far as we Ian discover, other than 
Mr. Maxwell, and presumably thetypist, had ever set eyes on the definitive 
document in which, acco~ding to Mr. Maxwell, the terms of credit were 
set out ••• " 
Moreover in another agreement on trade termsbetween MSI Inc and Pergamon: 
ftlt would not be an exaggeration to say that Mr. Maxwell by this 
agreement handed over an important part of Pergamon's future to an American 
private company set up for the benefit of his sister and her children 
which we find in Chapter XXXlX of this report was a company over which 
Mr. Maxwell had considerable influence." In their final comments on 
trade terms between MSI Inc and Pergamon, permitting MSI Inc to distribute 
journals and back copies of books of Pergamon, the inspectors concluded: 
"We have the strongest criticism to make of a chairman of a public 
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company who having entered into a 20 year agreement in which he saddled 
that company with a large contingent liability, having granted rights 
which were of large potential value to a private company which belonged 
to trusts created for the benefi~ of his sister and her children, kept 
the existance and the terms of the agreement from the Board and the 
shareholders." (HMSO, 1973, pp 483-510). 
In a further effort to boost thePergamon share price at the time, 
Maxwell through his private company MSI (OS) indemnified the Vehicle and 
General Assurance Co. Ltd for the purchase of 100,000 Pergamon shares 
during Pergamon's bid to take ove~ the News of the World. When the bid 
failed, MSI (DS) became due to pay E58,677 to compensate V & G for 
their losses on the sale of the Pergamon shares which had fallen in value. 
Instead of this money being paid by MSI (DS), it was paid by MSI (1964), 
a subsidiary of Pergamon, which, if deliberate, would contravene Section 54 
of the Companies Act, which prohibits co~anies funding purchases of 
their own shares. Maxwell dismissed this payment as "an error" due to 
confusion. The inspectors maintained "We find it difficult to accept 
Mr. Maxwell's explanation that the payment was made by MSI (1964) by an 
e~ror, which was corrected as soon as it was noticed. The payment was 
made as a result of his own act, as evidenced by his letter to the bank, 
and is another instance of the intermingling of public and private companies 
funds. We regard this payment as a typical example of the way 
Mr. Maxwell conducted the affairs of Pergamon in conjunction with his 
and his family's private companies." (In fact there were frequent 
references by Maxwell to accounting "errors" in his companies' accounts, 
a number of which were of staggering dimenSions, and were treated with 
'some scepticism by the inspectors. However Maxwell's personalized 
business style did give rise to confusion among poorly informed staff, 
moreover the interconnections and tran~actions between the publiC companies 
he was chairman of, an~ the private companies he owned or had an interest 
in, were indeed complex. Whatever difficulty was entailed in these 
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transactions could only be compounded by the fact that a number of 
the companies had similar names and often this included the name 
Maxwell as in MSI (1964), MSI l,nc, R.M. & Co., MSI (DS). This led 
to frequent accounting conundrums' such as the following from an 
assistant company secretary: liThe £390,00 ($936,000) paid to MSI (1964) 
and credited to MSI Inc's account in June 1969 was credited in error. 
At MSI Inc's request Mr. Ma~ell has instructed that this payment was 
paid on behalf of RM & Co. Accordingly debit MSI Inc with the sum in 
your August Transfer Journal and credit the RM & Co current account in 
the MSI (1964) private ledger. ") • (HMSO, 1973, pp 528-625). 
Perhaps understandably, in the context, the Pergamon profit 
figures and accounts for 1968 were not quite what they appeared. Profits 
for 1968 were reported as £2,104,000. Price Waterhouse with the benefit 
of hindsight concluded that the profits should be reduced by £1,609,000, 
and that of the remaining £495,000, no less than £355,000 represented 
profits on sale of back issues to MSI Inc. These reduced profits excluded 
Pergamon's share of the losses of ILSC for 1968, calculated at £787,000, 
and thus there was an overall loss for the year. With regard to the 
Pergamon accounts the inspectors affirmed: "there were material' items 
affecting the accounts of Pergamon from the 1 November 1964 to the last 
accounts published whilst Mr. Maxwell was Chairman (namely for the year to 
the 31 December 1968) which benefiCially affected reported profits and which 
we consider unjustified. With hindsight we are not satisfied that any 
of these accounts showed a true and fair view of the affairs of Pergamon 
at the material time or of the profits reported for the relevant period 
We appreciate that the criticism •••• is a serious criticism to make of 
any company accounts, public or private, and we have not made it lightly." 
(HMSO, 1973, p. 625). 
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But the difficulties of Pergamon did not end after Robert Maxwell 
was voted off the board in 1969. Due to the interpenetration of 
the public companies activities with the private Maxwell concerns, his 
influence over the fortunes of Pergamon remained considerable. The 
inspectors deplored one particularly debilitating aspect of this 
relationship for the new Pergamon directors: 
"The board which took over the conduct of the affairs of Pergamon on 
10 october 1969 were faced with a thankless task. Pergamon was short 
of liquid resources, but according to its books and rpcords was owed 
large sums of money by a number of private companies controlled by 
Mr. Maxwell or in which members of his family had an interest. The 
sums exceeded El,500,000 in theaggregate. Obtaining any money from these 
companies was no simple matter. Either the original trading agreement 
between Perg~~n and the private company contained an escape clause for 
the benefit of the private company or there had been some subsequent 
transaction which the private company was able to pay in aid either to 
avoid paying its debts to Pergamon or as the foundation of a subsequent 
counter-claim against Pergamon." The inspectors calculated that 
E1,166,000 had to be written off by Pergamon in debts due from the private 
companies with which Ma~e11 was associated, and concluded, "It is a 
stark reflection on Mr. Maxwell's stewardship of Pergamon that on the 
termination of its trading with MSI Inc over whose affairs we find he 
exercised considerable influence, Pergamon incurred a net write off of 
E806,ooo ••••••• and on the termination of its trading with those 
private companies which he himself owned and controlled Pergamon wrote off 
E360,000 •••• n (BMSO, 1973, pp 630-639). 
The Restoration of Robert Maxwell 
Pergamon could not easily have extracted itself from the close 
commercial embrace of the other Maxwell publishinq companies, however 
once the immediate settlements were made and the accounts restored to 
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order, the new Pergamon directors showed little inclinat.i.on to 
escape, and contented themselves with performing a largely caretaker 
role. Besides Maxwell still owned 28% of the Pergamon shares, the 
reluctant Leasco owned 38%~ and ordinary shareholders owned 34%. In 
1971, less than two years after being voted off the board, in a 
settlement agreement with MSI Inc, the directors of Pergamon agreed 
to appoint Ma~~ell as a non-executive director, and to propose his re-electio~ 
at the forthcoming Pergamon annual general meeting. In a full page 
laudatory article in the Business News, the Sunday Times congratulated 
its old adversary (with withdrawn litigation a. distinct stimulus). 
Conveying as supreme confidence as ever, Maxwell beneath a large photograph 
of him, lounging in an armchair with a telephone to his ear, expansively 
declared: "I want to make one thing clear right at the start. It is 
not a question of a chairman having been kicked out and coming back 
ready to sack everyone else. I'm very happy with the present management. 
'What Pergamon needs - and what it has lacked for the past 18 months - is 
a man who knows authors and editors and the knowledge market intimately 
and has the time to travel widely to visit them •••• I do not plan to 
make a bid for the company until the business has fully recovered from 
its bad set-back •••• I could finance a bid from my own resources. I 
was prepared at an earlier stage. to finance a partial bid, but the takeover 
panel stopped me. But I want to make it quite clear that even if I 
was forced to take over voting control, the management of the business 
would still remain as it is. Even in two years time, I foresee no need 
for dramatic changes. What Pergamon needs is a salesman and a creator 
of products. That is where I can best heip to restore the future 
prosperity and credibility of the company ••••• Pergamon, even in the 
recent slack period, has been selling nearly £2 million-worth of books 
a year, but the sales and product-creation mOtor was missing. I expect 
to increase this by £5,00,000 in each department. Achieving that will 
be my contribution over the next two years. I am setting of'f shortly 
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on a world tour during which I shall meet some 1,000 of the editorial 
advisors concerned with our journals and book series and visit 400 
of the key international booksellers. I have had sheaves of letters 
from eminent academics and teachers allover the world expressing their 
personal loyalty to me - thanking me for the way I was prepared to 
back them and their ideas 10 or 12 years ago - and they have not, following 
my advice to them, as they easily could have, switched to other 
publishers." (2 May 1971). 
But the ambitious plans of Maxwell for Pergamon's future were 
temporarily thwarted when the chairman of Pergamon, Sir Henry d'Avigdor-
Goldsmid saw the detailed criticisms in the first volume of the DTI 
inspector's report published in June 1971, and succeeded in releasing 
Pergamon from the undertaking to reappoint Maxwell to the board. Instead 
a new subsidiary of Pergamon was set up early in 1973 called Pergamon 
Press Services (PPS) with a board of directors consisting of the 
"executive directors of Pergamon and Maxwell. The object of the new 
company was to provide consultancy services to the Pergamon board, and 
replace the weekly policy meetings of Pergamon. (HMSO, 1973, p.640). 
The support of the academics who publishd with Pergamon was acknowledged 
as a significant influence in the restoration of Maxwell. The new 
chairman of Pergamon Sir Walter Coutts somewhat impressionable 
explan at ion was : 
"Over 20 years or more Maxwell managed to build up the reputation of 
a very large number of very important people, particularly in the United 
States but also in this country ••• who up to that point had not been 
able to get their stuff published at all. The result is that they consider 
that they owe to Maxwell a very great allegiance. Furthermore, they 
maintain that they cannot deal with anyone else, but Maxwell over the 
particular publication of particular things which they wish to get 
published. These are all learned journals, and this is the extraordinary 
part of this man with whom we are dealing. I maintain that he has a computer 
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brain in that he can read things, particularly in scientific magazines, 
which he will store away and at the right moment of tice it will come out 
of the computer and he will be able to talk to these people in the 
same language that they talk amongst themselves and understand what 
they are talking about. About August of last year we got a telex 
from the United States signed by a number of people saying, 'w-hy 
has Maxwell not been returned to the Board of Pergamon? We will 
only deal with Ma~~ell and we are not going to deal with anyone else' •..• 
Actually, I have brought for you today a copy of a letter from a 
Professor X from Montreal, and I ~ill leave it with you because I think 
it puts in a nutshell what the situation is; but he claims that he 
is talking on behalf of 10,000 nuclear physicists and biologists, and he 
ends up by saying: 'I do hope that you will succeed in your efforts 
to restore normalcy in the situation which menaces to destroy the 
remarkable contribution of Pergamon Press to scientific communication. 
As you have had ample occasion to notice, Robert Maxwell equates Pergamon 
Press in the mind of the scientific editors who cannot conceive a fruitful 
collaboration without his stimulUS.' ••••• (BMSO, 1973, pp 641-3). 
During 1973 a resolution of the Pergamon board to reappoint Maxwell 
was defeated, but a resolution recommending a general meeting to reappoint 
Maxwell was carried. The general meeting of Pergamon took place in 
re June 1973 when the resolution to/appoint Maxwell was adjourned, until 
October, and the expiry of the agreement by which Pergamon employed him as 
a consultant. At the time the DTI inspectors were preparing their 
final report on Pergamon therefore it seemed likely that Maxwell was 
to resume control of the company, and they offered the following advice 
to those involved: 
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"In considering the present position of Mr. Maxwell in relation to 
Pergamon, one must weigh up a number of factors. On the one hand 
Mr. Maxwell undoubtedly enjoys a strong .following amongst a large number 
of eminent scientists and academics on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
In the event of a substantial proportion of this talent declining their 
services to Pergamon and offering them to rival scientific publishers 
Pergamon's continued recovery would be seriously prejudiced. 
Against this one must weigh the following: 
a) The probability that Mr. Maxwell will assert himself to turn a 
. . 
subordinate position into a commanding one. 
b) There is reason to doubt whether the present full time executive 
directors of Pergamon will succeed in the future in influencing or 
restraining Mr. Maxwell. Those who were full time executive ~irectors 
when Mr. Maxwell was Chairman of Pergamon totally failed to do so then 
c) The experience of having an investigation under Section l65(b) of 
the Companies Act 1948, as amended, into four UK companies of which he was 
chairman and chief executive, followed by the publication of two reports, 
which were highly critical of Pergamon and ILSC, has not, to outward 
appearances, abashed him or affected his fixation as to his own abilities ••• 
d) The enormous trading losses suffered by ILSC of £3,687,000 (before 
crediting exceptional items of E548,000) during the 28 months period 
from its inception on 1 July 1967 until the 4 October 1969 (just 
before Mr. Maxwell ceased to be its chairman and chief executive on 15 
October 1969) according to its audited accounts •••••••• 
e) The accumulation of a deficit in the Pergamon group (partly 
reflecting the ILSC losses) which according to its audited accounts 
amounted to E4,52l,000 at 30 September 1972 •. 
f) 
, 
The pattern of Pergamon's trading with the Maxwell family private 
companies in the past and the continuing trading arrangements with 
some of these companies under the terms of settlement for a long period 
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of years. 
g) The difficulties created for Mr. Maxwell's successor in 
disentangling public company money and stock from private company money 
and stock, and the fact that Perqamon was unable fully to recover its 
debts from the Maxwell family private companies. 
h) The difficulties placed in our path in the conduct of our 
enquiries and the efforts made to prevent the emergence of cur reports." 
(HMSO, 1973, pp 645-6). 
The DTI inspectors must have been saddened and chastened men, to 
have laboured for so long, and so scrupul~usly, in the investigation of 
the Maxwell companies; to have produced a report so comprehensively 
critical that it amounted to a damning indictment of Maxwells business 
methods; to have fought a protracted legal battle against Maxwell to 
secure the publication of its findings; and yet to see their reports 
largely ignored, and totally ineffectual in preventing the resumption of 
Maxwell's control of Pergamon. But the inspectors were somewhat naive 
both in their exacting standards of capitalist business conduct and in 
their implied expectation that significant retribution would have to 
be forthcoming from Robert Maxwell before he was restored to corporate 
leadership. In fact, in the eyes of many of the business contemporaries 
Maxwell had only committed two unforgivable acts: firstly, his takeover 
bluff had fallen through and Pergamon had sustained large losses, and 
secondly, he had been caught. The business era of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s was the t~e that the phrase "the unacceptable face of 
capitalism" was coined by non other than the Conservative Prime Minister 
Edward Heath. It was a time of huge corporate takeovers, massive profits, 
and later even more spectacular disasters, which make the Pergamon-Leasco 
saga inconsequential by comparison. Slate~Walker, Poulson, London 
, 
and Counties, Real Estate FUnd of.America, and many other business scandals, 
all involved criminally corrupt practices, prominent British politicians, 
and the greedy pursuit of instant profits amountinq to tens of millions 
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of pounds: as the managing director of the Keyser Ullman merchant 
bank, whose shareholders lost £21 million by their involvement in a 
bid to takeover a property company in 1973, declared: "We lived in a 
tremendous, a most optimistic" world at that time. What you bought 
for a million pounds one day you sold for two the next and that person 
sold for three the day after." (Guardian 15 May 1979). Indeed, in 
that he was determinedly bent upon corporate growth at this time, 
Robert Maxwell deserves some credit that he remained in publishing, and 
did not embark into the activities of property speculation and secondary 
banking in which the fastest profits of all were made, a temptation which 
few contemporaries could resist. 
The Conclusion of the Leasco Affair. 
In their concluding remarks in the third report the DTI inspectors 
presented an assessment of the salient features of the complex dealings 
which led up to, and followed on from, the Leasco debacle: 
"Having now investigated a large number of transactions between Pergamon 
and the Maxwell family private compan"ies we have come to the conclusion 
that until the Leasco deal foundered the real purpose behind the 
transactions on which we have reported was to increase the value of 
Pergamon's shares in the stock market. The Pergamon saga and Pergamon's 
reputation as an exceptional 'growth stock' could not have been 
established ~ithout the network of related private companies and without 
undertaking transactions such as the ones on which we have reported, and 
this purpose is discernible through all Mr. Maxwell's conduct with regard 
toPergamon. It runs like a thread through all that he did up to the 
time when the Leasco deal went off. From the time when the Leasco 
deal foundered part of his energies switched-to ensuring that so far as 
• he could arrange matters the priv~te companies were relieved of some 
of the special transactions into which they had entered. This change 
of purpose can be seen in •••• the terms of settlement with the private 
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companies which Pergamon was obliged to accept in 1971 •.•.• 
Despite his protestations to the contrary, we think that Mr. Maxwell 
was extraordinarily astut.e in financial: transactions, not only in 
their conception but also in their treatment in the accounts. He 
seized many opportunities of creating 'instant' profits and took the 
fullest advantage of the fact that accounting standards at the time 
these transactions took place were to some extent undefined .... We 
have no hesitation in attributing the primary responsibility for the 
rise and fall of Pergamon to Mr. Maxwell ••• throughout our i~vestigations 
Mr. Maxwell has tried to shift responsibility onto others, not least 
. 
onto Chalmers Impey (the Pergamon auditors) and other professional men. 
In this endeavour he has singularly failed to impress us. l'le entertain 
no doubt whatever that the responsibility rests on Mr. Maxwell's 
shoulders." (HMSO, 1973, pp 658-664). 
The inspectors final condemnation of Maxwell was prevented from 
publication until April 1974, when Maxwell's loud complaints about 
"injustice" were put to rest by the House of Lords. By then Maxwell was 
back in charge of Pergamon and about.to launch his foray against the 
scottish Daily News • Maxwell in fact, was restored to the Pergamon 
board three hours before the inspectors final report came out, and 
certainly long before it was digested. There was only one outstanding 
matter for Maxwell to deal with before he was again firmly in the saddle: 
Leasco had sued him for fraud, to which Maxwell had responded with a 
typical cross-suit alleging "sabotage" by Leasco. Then in early summer 
1974 Maxwell offered to negotiate. The result of these negotiations 
was that Maxwell dropped all his actions against Leasco, and agreed to 
pay five million dollars damages to Leasco. Also Robert Fleming, the 
merchant bankers who advised him during the Leasco bid paid another $l.Sm. 
(SUnday Times 21 September 1975). 
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The Inception of the Scottish Daily News Affair 
The concluding statement of the DTI inspectors in the first 
Pergamon report was that : 
"We regret having to conclude that, notwithstanding Mr. Maxwell's 
acknowledged abilities and energy, he is not in our opinion a person 
who can be relied on to exercise proper stewardship of a publicly 
quoted company." (HMSO, 1971, p. 209). 
It might have been anticipated that such a resounding indictment would 
have haunted Maxwell throughout the rest of his business career. 
Yet within months of the publication of the third volume of the inspectors 
report in 1974, the Department of Industry accepted, and even encouraged, 
Maxwell's direct irivolvement with the Scottish Daily News workers 
co-operative. The Department did nothing to convey to the SDN workforce 
the critical contents of the report on Maxwell's role in Pergamon in a 
. form more readily digestible than its three volumes and 700 finely 
detailed pages. The workers merely believed Maxwell had been engaged in 
the belligerent entrepreneurship which was traditional in the newspaper 
industry. It is impossible to escape the contention of McKay and Barr 
that "the Department of Trade and Industry knew what Maxwell was like, and 
it should not have taken a great leap of the imagination for civil 
servants and politicians involved to predict what effect Robert Maxwell 
would have on a flickering workers' co-operative enterprise." 
(1976, pp 112-3). Indeed it is certain that there were senior civil 
servants within t~e Department, who had read the Pergamon report and who 
knew exactly what would happen when they released a man of such 
irrepressible. corporate aggression and unrestrainable energy as Robert 
Maxwell. upon the infant co-operative they disapproved of so strongly. 
Maxwell exploited the inconsistenCY-~f the Department to full effect, 
and in one press statement issued at the height of the terminal crisis 
of the SON refe~red to how he had been approached in 1973 by.the 
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Conservative minister to rescue Tinlings printers of Liverpool, while 
the Pergamon inquiry was still taking place, and declared : 
"Before becoming involved formally as co-chairman of the SDN, Mr. 
Maxwell asked senior civil servants in the Department of Trade and 
Industry, as well as the Secretary of State, to confirm that the 
damaging and one-sided DTI inspectors' reports about him would not 
prevent the government from making a loan of £1.2 million, and approved 
the prospectus which specified that Mr. Maxwell should be co-chairman 
of the enterprise." (Guardian, 22 September 1975). 
The financial adviser to the co-operative, Professor Briston had little 
doubt where the weight of responsibility for the involvement of Maxwell 
in the SDN should be: 
"I think the role of the government has been a very bad influence. 
The government made it so difficult for the workers to raise the necessary 
money that they almost imposed a financial straitjacket on the enterprise. 
They created a situation where the workers had to go public, where they 
had to invest their own money, where they had to accept Mr. Maxwell's 
money. Now, in the light of what the DTI had uncovered from its 
investigations into Mr. Maxwell's managerial style, they, I would argue, 
are responsible for creating the situation. All the government had 
to do was to put in the extra Eli4,OOO and the newspaper could have 
started as a complete co-operative." (McKay and Barr, 1976, p.113). 
Thus it was the antagonistic attitude of the civil servants of the 
Department, more than any other factor, which set Robert Maxwell up as 
the saviour of the Scottish Daily News. 
MaXWell Co-Chairman of the Scottish Daily News. 
The ~ workers themselves were open to serious criticism in 
welcoming Maxwell's money and his involvement in the first place. 
They were desperate, but this was another feature of their preparedness 
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to compromise at every stage which constantly diluted the principles 
upon which the venture was originally founded, until idealism was 
completely eradicated to be replaced by narrow self-interest. But 
in case the SON workers should be ~ondemned too severely for their 
folly, it should be pOinted out that the mighty TUC itself entertained 
seriously the advances of Robert Maxwell, when he proposed to set up a 
printing company and continue to publish the Daily Herald as a labour 
paper in 1963. In his explanaation of this propOsal to Congress, 
Bob Willis of the General Council, revealed a surprising susceptibility 
to the promises of Maxwell "who suggested establishing a big printing 
works in a distressed area. ~e places El million worth of printing 
orders himself now, and he felt that the trade unions would become part 
owners arid would take some of their work to this establishment, so that 
it should show a profit of E750,ooo, which could be used for subsidising 
a Labour paper He assures us he does not want to make any profit 
out of this. He is a Labour candidate. So long as he got his printing 
done at a fair price he would be satisfied that the profit should remain 
with the firm which he would establish. " (TOe, 1963, pp ii-iii). 
Among the SON workers there were· divisions in their attitudes towards 
Maxwell, which polarized sharply during 1975. Some workers regarded 
Maxwell with outright hostility f~om the start, they disliked what he 
stood for, were suspicious of his motives, and deplored his influence over 
the fledgeling newspaper. John Hodgeman was one of many who exploded 
when the subject of Maxwell was raised: 
"The argument that is put up by reasonable and moderate and respected 
friends in here who are journalists is that they're not too keen on 
·Robert Maxwell,· but having taken his money, you can't now boot him in 
the balls. Well I've got no compunction about doing that at all • 
Others responded to Maxwell with a pragmatic acceptance, often influenced 
by their own opportunism, Nathan Goldberg, the deputy editor explained -
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"It must be said of Maxwell, that he's the only guy that came across with 
any real bread outside the gover~~ent. Beaverbrook did it in their own 
interests, now some people IDay say that eventually it's going to turn 
out that Maxwell did it in his own interests for various reasons. 
But I think if this newspaper is a success there is no way he can do 
that - its only if it fails that he can come in and pick up the pieces. 
We don't want to give him an excuse for stepping in, and the only way 
to do that is by involving him." (The non-sequitor of the final 
sentence was a rationalization of the increasingly close relationship 
Goldberg was having with Maxwell) . 
Finally there were those who had a complete depenqence on Maxwell as 
a wealthy, powerful man who they thought could provide them with secure 
employment. At first this group were few in number, yet they 
multiplied rapidly as the insecurity of the SDN intensified in the summer 
of 1975, and their attitude degenerated from one of dependence into total 
subservience. But in the early days of the newspaper at least, the 
philosophical stance of Andy Riley the Slade FOC,probably expressed the 
feelings of most of the workforce: 
"I suppose this is a cross we'll have to bear, but I don't think there's 
any way that Maxwell could take over the board, even to an extent, because 
we've walked the streets for 13 months and this is our paper, no one 
else's paper. And we've not worked for 13 months for him to come and ta.1te 
it, or for anyone else to take it, it's just not on. I don't see how 
anyone is a real threat to us 
time but we'll overcome it". 
Mass Meetinqs 
anyway, we'll overcome it, it'll take 
In the winter months of struqqle thouqh, Robert Maxwell undeniably 
was considered by the ~ workers to be a life-line to which they clunq 
intently. The minutes of the mass meetings record how Maxwell's arrival 
was eaqerly anticipated as proof that his investment was still secure; 
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and the fears that he might still abandon them. When Maxwell asked 
to be co-chairman of the SDN with Allister Mackie, he found that he 
was pushing against an open door as far as most of the workers were 
concerned, despite the reservations of the Action Committee. The 
creation of this unique corporate hydra, rather than simply accepting 
the post of director, was indicative of the incapacity of Ma~iell to 
accept anything but the leading position in any enterpri.se he \o:as 
involved in. Maxwell's post was supposedly confined to the strict 
capacity of financial adviser, with the normal running of the newspaper 
and the editorial policy the responsibility of the Works Council as in 
the company articles, but this was to exert little restraint. In words 
that he would now profoundly regret, Allister Mackie declared to a mass 
meeting that, "Robert Maxwell could be the catalyst necessary to ensure 
the success of the venture." CMMM, 8 January 1975) • 
. Addressing a mass meeting a week later, in his new role as co-
chairman, Maxwell displayed the full force of his charismatic disingenuousncss~ 
"Mr. Robert Maxwell thanked the workfQrce for his election and the 
confidence that they had shown in their decision ••••• He thanked the 
workforce for their warm welcome and their applause in their assumption 
that Robert Maxwell had played a major role in the success of the 
Scottish Daily News but he p~inted out to the workforce that it was not 
Robert Maxwell alone who had been responsible but that the Action Committee 
had been largely responsible and the fact should be acknowledged. 
(The meeting accordingly recorded their approval by resounding applause)." 
(MMM, 16 January 1975). 
Several other elements of Maxwell's approach which were to loom far more 
threateningly in the future were intimated at this meeting. Allister 
Mackie revealed that on the negoti~tibns for the underwriting of the 
prospectus he had been "sworn to secrecy" by Maxwell and that although 
he had been tempted to reveal his information, due to the desire of the 
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negotiating parties, he had not even been able to inform the Action 
Committee. This introduction of strict connnercial secrecy at the 
behest of I>1axwell was an ominous portent of the way decisions would be 
made when the paper fell under.his control. Later in the meeting 
there was a question from an SGA member about how heads of departments 
were to be appointed. Maxwell interrupted to stress that the proper 
procedures should be used to express grievances, and introduced a sinister 
note to which he was to return with a vengeance r~peatedly in the future: 
"He felt and emphasized that any dissension in any degree could jeopardise 
the success of the venture and urged the workforce to take no notice 
or to weed out potential troublemakers." Maxwell also revealed his 
impatience, often unfounded, with the performance of others. In a 
discussion of metal" moulds, Charlie Armstrong referred to Beaverbrook's 
agreement to supply these if they were not available in time from the 
USA. Maxwell interjected at this point "it was all very well people 
. guaranteeing certain things but he did not trust Beaverbrook and he was 
fully aware that Beaverbrook did not trust us, and in his opinion 
it was necessary to have these agreements in black and white." 
Charlie Armstrong cut across the monologue by pointing out, to the 
approval of the meeting,that the agreement was in black and white. 
Whereupon 
However in a final remarkab.le contribution Robert Maxwell revealed 
that he was far more acutely aware of the importance of preserving at 
least the image of responsible trade union organization, when some 
~ workers seemed prepared to jettison this: 
"Norrie Montgomery' of the SGA commented on quotes recently in the 
newspapers on the ugly face of capitalism, and drew comparison with the 
ugly face of trade unionism. He hoped that the workforce would realise 
that it would be necessary to discard the old fashioned trade union 
attitudes and aim for closer co-operation between societies in the areas 
of demarcation. 
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Robert 1-1axwell noted t.he comment but pointed out the need for trade 
unions and the work that they did in industry, and that as a workers 
co-operative he would never depart from. trade unionism and \'lould uphold 
established trade union philosophy. He interpreted the comments 
relevant to demarcation and inter-societ.y disputes as meaning a 
recognition that each depended on his brother for success and that old 
fashioned demarcation lines would be adjusted to meet a new situation. 
He was very much aware of the trade unions suspicion over what might 
appear reviewed staffing and salaries which might lend ammunition to 
other newspaper proprietors and that the trade unions at branch and 
national level were quite justified in their concern but he could not 
see any argument put forward by any other newspaper proprietor based 
on the staffing and" salaries inthe Scottish Daily News holding water 
since this was a completely new concept and if they wished to put 
forward these arguments they would have to turn over their businesses 
to worker control." (MMM, 16 January 1975). 
Yet despite this fine statement of principles, once he had assumed power at 
the SON, Maxwell showed in practice that he had scant regard either for 
trade union standards or workers control. 
Through much of the campaign to establish the SON Maxwell's influence 
was limited and from the distance of Oxford, but in the early months of 
1975 when it seemed that the paper was becoming a reality, the pattern 
of his activity changed. Still he would spend several weeks at a time 
away from Albion Street, but these absences were interspersed with 
frantic bouts of activity, whether in negotiations with Beaverbrook in 
London, or in conSUltations in Glasgow • Whenever Maxwell appeared for 
. a mass meeting', he treated most of the discussion and questions as 
addressed to him, and assumed authority toanswer on almost any matter. 
In several uncomfortableepisodes the ~ction Committee and workers learned 
to expect a rough ride. from his attempt to command leadership. 
Firstly there was the long delay in the issue of the prospectus as 
Maxwell insisted that it should be underwritten by Beaverbrook, 
because "to put the prospectus out not underwritten is like having 
a car with no wheels", a worker r~collected he had argued. (MMM 25 
February 1975),. The government'rej'ection of the underwriting had 
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imperilled the loan itself, and had badly shaken the confidence of the 
~ workers, besides seriously reducing the issue period for the 
prospectus and bringing the time limit within which the loan had to be 
made dangerously near. (The pressure upon the SDN workers was so great 
at this point that at one meeting a ~rorker suggested they should walk to 
London as a gesture of protest •• This was seriously taken up until 
someone suggested catching the train might be a ~etter idea, to the 
immense relief of most of the workers, whose initial unthinking enthusiasm 
nearly committed them to a 500 mile, three week walk, that some -
considering their age and state of health - could not have hoped to 
survive (MMM 30 January 1975». Secondly, after the negotiations 
for the sale of Albion Street, Maxwell irresponsibly announced to the 
press that he had bought the building for £800,000 on behalf of SDN 
and that they would be publishing the newspaper within a month. Jocelyn 
Stevens smartly refuted this assertion "I have no idea where Mr. 'Maxwell 
got the figure. The price remains at £1,600,000". (Daily Record, 20 
February 1975). The supporters and workers of ~ were misled by 
these statements, and it was left to Allister Mackie to clarify that the 
figures were 1.6 million for the building and plant, to be paid in 
£875,000 cash, £500,000 unsecured loan stock, and £225,000 secured loan 
stock. Workers were distressed that the declaration they might be 
working wi thin a month was also a misunderstanding, Mackie explained 
"Robert Maxwell having completed the deal with Beaverbrook may have been 
sliqhtly euphoric and did not fully appreciate the technicalities of 
setting a newspaper going although given the right conditions without 
any further hold-Up it could be done." (MNN 21 February 1975). 
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Revealing his penchant to turn up at significant moments to 
claim the credit whether he had contributed or not, Maxwell gave 
another stunning display of his manifold talents at a mass meeting in 
the City Halls on 25 February 197.5. He victoriously announced that with 
the clearance of the Dol loan that "there had been more progress in 
the last weeks than had been possible in the previous six months." 
(Blaming the delay on the Dol, and not his insistence on underwriting). 
He explained that he had secured the extra £150,000 investment and 
maintained that he "had been able to get this commitment from Beaverbrook 
by stating that if Beaverbrook did not undertake this investment, then 
he himself would withdraw his £IOO,OOO",revealing a willingness to 
use his investment as a weapon, which he was later to forcefully direct 
at the SDN workers. Referring to the difficulties of making the 
prospectus attractive, and the importance of the commitment of the 
workers, Maxwell introduced an intimidation which he was to deploy with 
devastating consequences in the future in asserting that "the workforce 
must recognise they Had to make their mind up having a vested interest 
in the project whether they preferred a job or the dole". In one 
preposterous interlude, when considering the proposed low pay of the SDN 
workers, Maxwell serioualy suggested that he was "working on an idea for 
income tax rebates for the workforce which could amount to £900 in 
one fiscal year at a salary of £60 a week. He felt that since he was 
suspicious that the Treasury had been partly responsible for the rejection 
of the underwriting, that the workforce should nibble away at some of 
the Treasury assets." Almost as comically, but with more seious 
tmplications, Maxwell went on to give the SDN trade unionists a crash 
course in the salesmanship that undoubtedly he was a master of: 
"Robert Maxwell realised that although one or two members had a talent 
for salesmanship the majority of the workforce would possibly find it 
embarassing to have to seek money in this manner. Therefore the 
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inexperienced members should have the benefit of a teach-in where 
an exchange of ideas from the more talented or experienced of the 
workforce could help them·to overcome this barrier of embarrassment 
arising only through lack of kno~ledge of the facts. He hoped that 
the workforce would take from the prospectus four main points he 
considered were required to seek investment from friends and relatives. 
These being 1) That you are an investor and an employee of the 
Scottish Daily News. 2) Because you have a vested interest you will 
do your best to protect it. 3) Will you not therefore help us to 
create 500 jobs and provide Scotland with a newspaper ~t deserves. 
4) If you yourself cannot invest, will you circulate your own friends 
and encourage them to do so." However Maxwell reserved a full show of 
his corporate conceit for his final statement of advice: 
"If we had on the day of issue a uniformally bad Press, it would make 
the raising of the capital that much harder. The answer to these 
anticipated criticisms was the fact that following the Strathclyde 
report and the unacceptance of it by the Action Committee they had then 
approached him and roused his interest. He had then introduced professio~al 
newspapermen to look into the situation and he would accept their advice 
before the advice or comment of unqualified people like Lord Gray, and 
the Strathclyde and IOU reports, since they had never been involved in 
newspapers other than buying one." (MMM, 25 February 1975). 
The Prospectus. 
The ~ prospectus was issued by Scottish News Enterprises 
Limited on 6 March 1975 with the closing deadline set for 10.0 a.m. on 
28 March 1975 which was the last day the government loan offer remained open, 
by which time E475,000 had to be raised. The workers had agreed to 
subscribe E2oo,000,and Robert Maxwell,to match this with £100,000. 
This left E175,000, of which £60,000 had already been promised by trade 
unions and the public. However raiSing over £100,000 in three weeks 
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in hard-pressed Glasgow was a daunting task, made considera.bly more 
difficult by the fact that the final seven pages of the 24 page prospectus 
in the cautious Department of Industry letter setting out the details 
of the public loan, and the danming IOU report, did their best to warn 
potential investors away. 
The prospectus was very professionally put together, and was 
clearly designed to appeal primarily to the commercial instincts of 
prospective investors, indeed, on the front page in bold type \-Jas the 
rather heroic declaration: IIIf you are in any doubt about this 
Offer for Subscription you should. consult .your Solicitor, Stockbroker, 
Bank Manager, or other professional adviser." (It would be difficult 
to compile a list of people who would be less likely to recommend 
investment in the SON! ) The structure, advantages, financial 
projections and articles of association were set out in elaborate detail 
in the prospectus to convince the investor of both the viability and 
the propriety of the ~. However theofficial tone of the document, 
and the meticulous attention to commercial detail, was clearly a result 
of the work of the SON's lawyers and accountants, and reflected a curio~s 
paradox: the prospectus was written for professional people who 
could understand it, but would be commercially sceptical and politically 
antagonistic; the working people who would be sympathetic towards a 
workers newspaper, would find the prospectus difficult to understand, 
since it was not written for them. There were some brief bursts of 
largely apolotical enthusiasm in the prospectus: "The Proposals are 
designed to provide Scotland with a completely new and exciting popular 
newspaper with which the whole nation will be able to identify. The 
Directors are convinced that there is a need and a wish among the general 
public for such a paper." (p. S) • But generally there was a neglect 
f 
of any attempt to make political contact with the workers to whom the 
SDN was appealing for funds: professional advisers and company law 
had neatly and effectively been inserted between the SON workers 
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themselves, and the working class investors in SDN. 
Nevertheless, the campaign for funds was effective, despite the 
commercial formality of the prosp~ctus document the appeal SDN members 
made was at a more fundamental level·, "We're asking you to invest 
in a paper which was actually started by working class people, and 
will be run by working class people •.•. ."and the response of Scottish 
workers was impressive, as Allister. Mackie recalled: 
"There were heartwarming things. We had me~ers of the co-op going 
round ever.y factory in Scotland, and people who had never at any time 
sold anything in their lives, going into factories and raising £50 here, 
£25 there. It was done in £25 units, and if you consider that we had 
about 2,700 investors you can appreciate just how small units they were. 
The amount of work that our lads put in was absolutely tremendous, 
and the public response was tremendous. I remember on the last day of 
the prospectus we were still a bit short, we were still looking for 
public support,and the closing day was Good Friday at ten in the morning. 
Between 9 and 10 a chap turns up on a bicycle in a worn pair of 
dungarees, and said he wanted to buy some shares. We reminded him 
that it was £25 each, and he said, 'I r.eal ise that son t • And he put 
his hands through all his pockets and pulls out a £5 . here and a wad 
of notes there. He had £1,000 on him in his pockets. It worked out 
that he was a scrapdea1er, and everyone of his notes was absolutely 
filthy, so we couldn't identify what they were, but it was a £1,000 worth." 
Despite another last minute investment of £10,000 from a local businessman, 
the ~ Action Committee found on the morning of the 28 March that as the 
ten o'clock deadline approached, they were still £25,000 short of the 
target. Although other funds were promised from trade unions, they 
would arrive too late for the ~ to meet the clOSing date of the loan 
offer, and the Dol had insisted, "If it is not accepted by that date, the 
amount, terms and conditions may be subject to review by the Secretary of 
State. " (SNE, 1975, p.19). 
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Waiting tensely in the steamed-up wooden huts of the SDN 
headquarters as the sleet poured outside, the Action Committee slipped 
perhaps too readily into the belief that the only person who could 
raise the £25,000 shortfall in "time was Robert Maxwell. (f.1cKay and 
Barr, 1976, pp 3-17, colourfully evoke this dilemma). l-iaxwell had 
yet to provide the £100,000 he had promised, it was clear that he would 
exact further conditions from the SDN, but no one knew how dramatic the 
demands would be. 
The Good Friday Demands 
'Maxwell fully appreciated the total vulnerability of the SDN 
workers at this moment, when a newspaper seemed within their grasp, and in 
resonance with the sombre religious festival, he insisted that the 
Action Committee agree to such severe conditions that they amounted to a 
personal takeover bid, and the death of the co-operative spirit at the 
heart of the venture. The demands were : 
1. That Maxwell remain co-chairman of the Executive Council of the 
co-operati ve. 
2. That Maxwell receive the title of publisher. 
3. Agreement in principle that the SDN would be an American style 
24 hour newspaper with afternoon, evening and morning editions, but with 
the same proposed workforce of SOO. 
4. Agreement from the unions to unlimited overtime for at least 3 
months. 
5. That directors would have to commit themselves to resign in advance 
should they find themselves in a position of disagreement with the other 
directors. (BBC2, 10 November 1975; Mackie, 1976). 
It was the amazing proposal of a 24 hour newspaper which particularly 
staggered the ActIon Committee: they were baSically being asked to 
produce two or thre,e newspapers with the manpower for one. They knew 
the proposal was impractical, that it would severely undermine the jobs 
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and conditions of other print workers, and that the print unions would 
block it. But realising the impossibili.ty of dissuading Maxwell 
once had had made up his mind, they decided to agree to everything he 
had demanded and argue about it later. "Faced with the acceptance of 
the conditions, or the collapse of the co-operative, the Action 
Committee members had no alternative. They would go along with the 
conditions in the meantime but would feel no moral commitment to be 
bound by them." (Mackie, 1976, pp 127-8). Securing the compliance 
of the print union full-time officials to the Maxwell conditions was more 
difficult. They were called to a meeting·at the huts· to be addressed 
by Maxwell, and, on the way in,were met by pleas from members of the Action 
Committee to agree to everything Maxwell said until they had got his 
money. Again the 24 hour paper was the sticking point, John Hodgeman who 
was there in his role as branch secretary of the Glasgow NUJ explained, 
"He expanded on how marvellous this would be, but all he would say about 
how it would be done was that the present 500 workers would be able to 
do it as long as everyone agreed to work unlimited oVertime, which'of 
, 
course would be paid for." (1975, p.4). The union officials jibbed 
at this, "One man's overtime is another man's unemployment" as Alex Ferry 
the AUEW official put it. Hodgeman explained the terrible horns of the 
dilemma that Maxwell had cleverly placed them upon. 
"It was a hellish poSition to be in, to have this sprung on you. To 
realise that' if you said, on behalf of the other members you represented, 
whose jobs might be hanging by a thread and who certainly realised that 
a successful Scottish Daily News could end their jobs, that it wasn't on, 
then you would be writing off the job prospects of the 500. The dilemma 
was, accept conditions which put the 500 back in work but which undermined 
the job security of the rest of the industry, or tell these men to their 
faces that their unions were giving them the thumbs down." 
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As McKay and Barr argue, the SDN allowed Maxwell to reverse the 
roles of the union officials, by putting them in an employers 
posi tion of deciding the 'fate of 500 jobs, and being directly responsible 
for apparantly creating or destroying employment in a contracting 
industry. (1976,p.12). Though at least one branch secretary began 
to protest against the conditions, there were appeasing interruptions 
from around the table by SDN members. Finally the issue was resolved, 
until the union branch meetings could take place, by John Hodgeman 
making a vague statement of goodwill welcoming the project. 
After signing his cheque several times for the b~nefit of the TV 
cameras, Maxwell with an entourage set off for the City Hall to a mass 
meeting of the ~ workers. The rapture of the meeting was somewhat 
stifled when Maxwell repeated his demands, it seemed as if he had 
pulled off a last minute personal coup, and workers reacted, "Why have 
you done this to us? How can we do this now? How can we possibly 
produce a 24 hour newspaper within 3 weeks?" But Maxwell overpowered 
shouts of protest, and caught up the majority of the audience with his 
rhetorical incantation "We have a newspaper ! We have a newspaper , " 
The division between those who were outraged at what Maxwell had done 
and those "who just wanted to clap" was the first important sign of the 
schism that was later to tear the SON apart, as John Hodgeman recalled: 
"That was when the anti-Maxwell and pro-Maxwell factions were born. 
Some people,. the majority, were prepared to go to any lengths to get a 
job. Others like myself were suddenly realising that this man was 
dangerous. If he was prepared to kill the project once to sate his 
egotistical ambitions, then he would no doubt do it again." (l975,p.5) • 
Later that evening on BBC Scotland television, Maxwell was asked 
by the interviewer "Did you lay down any conditions for advancing that 
money?" 
f 
Be replied, "None at all~, to the astonished studio. 
Dominating the programme, Maxwell refused to entertain any doubts about 
the 24 hour newspaper and took the offensive "Certainly our first edition 
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will compete with the Evening Times, but we don't consider the Times 
competition at all. We're forced to provide a paper because our 
competitors are so dull." (MCKay and Barr, 1976, p.1S). Other 
newspapers reeled in amazement at Maxwell's plan to squeeze two days 
work into one, under the headlines "Newspaper \Olill be a printing 
bombshell," The Scotsman reported Maxwell's announcement to the mass 
meeting: 
"For the benefit of the members of the Press present here I can tell you 
what I am about to say is going to be a bombshell. The EC at its 
meeting this morning decided that the SDN will be printed in three or 
four editions as is the fashion in the US. For the first time in Britain 
a daily. newspaper will be available on the streets in the late afternoon the 
previous day. The SDN of Tuesday morning will be on the streets of 
Glasgow at 4.30 p.rn in order to provide Glasgow and Strathclyde with 
a viable, proper and exciting alternative to the Evening Times." 
(29 March 1975). 
Even Jocelyn Stevens was taken back by the proposal, "Mr. Maxwell had 
told him that it was his own iqea and he thought that the Friday 
announcement had also been the first time the Action Committee had heard 
of the proposal. He added "I don't think it's very practical. I 
would hate to try to staff a morning and evening paper, and it may never 
happen". (Scotsman, 31 March1975) 
Tr~de Union Resistance 
Union resistance to the 24 hour newspaper was soon galvanized. 
David Emmerson the Scottish Secretary of the NGA fired the first broadside: 
-The staffing arrangements agreed with the Action Committee of the SDN 
many months ago were related to the production of a normal morning 
newspaper. It in no way took account of Mr. Maxwell's ultra-radical 
proposals to prOduce an afternoon edition. It is not the intention of 
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the NGA to grant unrealistic staffing concessions to th~ SDN which 
would be d~nied to its competitors. Mr. Maxwell's revolutionary 
ideas would require to be'investigated in depth. Certainly the NGA 
will not be bludgeoned into makiQg an off-the-top-of-the-head decision 
as was the Action Committee last Friday when at the eleventh hour, they 
were presented with Mr. Maxwell's ultimatum: "Play it my way, or my 
cheque will not be forthcoming" •••.• As far as I am concerned this is a 
non-runner. My rule book is always flexible, put not to this extent 
I am not prepared to allow NGA members to be puppets manipulated by 
Mr. Maxwell". (Scotsman; Glasgow Herald; Daily Record; 4 April 1975). 
A meeting on the 9 April of the leaders of the seven unions engaged in 
the newspaper industry turned down the plans for an afternoon edition 
of the SDN, and issued the following jOint statement: 
"Trade union officers representing journalists, production and maintenance 
workers, meeting in Glasgow decided that they could not approve the 
publication of an afternoon edition of the SDN. The implications of a 
24 hour newspaper are such that they would necessitate detailed investigaticn 
and negotiation. Any resultant agreement would require to be ratified 
by the unions at national level. The trade union officers therefore 
decided to seek precise details relating to printing and distribution 
schedules for the projected newspaper, shift schedules and staffing levels 
in all departments. They expressed regret that the enterprise had 
apparantly been diverted from its original purpose of setting up a new 
morning newspaper." (Daily Record, 10 April 1975). 
News of the trade union officials decision reached Albion Street 
just before the Action Committee met Maxwell to discuss his plans. 
Maxwell was furious at the obstruction to his scheme, and threatened to 
resign and withdraw his investment. Charlie Armstrong vividly recalled 
f 
the drama of the confrontation: 
"Maxwell was obsessed by the idea of a 24 hour newspaper. He cornered 
the Action Committee at the meeting and talked solidly for six hours 
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about it. Six hours : The determination of the man defies 
description. 
and coffee. 
And half way through the editor was sent out for rolls 
The editor used as a tea boy As the meeting dragged 
on Maxwell became more and more heated, he started crushing the spare 
rolls in his hands, and sticking his fingers through them, then 
throwing them away all the time he was staring and talking at us." 
The decision which emerged under Maxwell's insistence was not to 
abandon the plan but merely to place it in cold storage. In his press 
statement Mackie said the decision "was due solely to the fact that 
it had been found impossible to implement 'it by the target date of 
5 May. However, Mackie denied that the decision had been forced upon 
the co-operative because of the opposition of print and journalists 
unions who agreed at an emergency meeting in Glasgow that they would 
not approve the scheme, and he stated 'The problems involved are so 
immense that more than three or four weeks would be needed to solve 
them" • (Scotsman, 11 April 1975) Thus having been rescued from 
the most exhausting and exploitative ?onditions of work conceivable by 
the forceful intervention of the print unions, the SDN Action Committee 
remained so under the duress of Maxwell that they were incapable of 
giving the unions credit for their help. 
Maxwell's Dominance 
During this period Maxwell was assuming an increasingly dominant 
role in the business affairs of the SDN. When Maxwell first became 
co-chairman he "insisted his appointment ••• was purely for prestige 
purposes. Be would probably visit Glasgow only for the annual meeting 
once the paper was launched." (Scotsman, 26 February 1975). Later 
in a BBC Scotland programme Maxwell maintained, "My role is only dominant 
to the extent that the executive council asks me to undertake certain 
jobs, the reason why you have seen me more dominant than I would have 
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liked at this in these stages is because we're dealing with very urgent 
negotiations of high business type to negotiate with Beaverbrook 
to get them to increase their co~itment from one sum to another, to get 
the government, and the lawyers to deal with the prospectus and public 
issues. These are all points of which my colleagues unfortunately, so 
far, being ordinary working people have no experience, (such as a~ person 
like myself, but once the paper gets going the people who will matter 
are the editor and general manager". 
exchange -
Which prompted the following 
Brian- Barr (interviewer) "The fact is Mr. Maxwell you've already been 
frustrated in bids to take over newspapers before and these were 
newspapers which you wanted to run. Is it not fair to suppose that 
you also want to run the Scottish Daily News? 
Robert Maxwell "No I don't think so. I didn't want to run those 
newspapers either. I certainly wanted to own and assist in the 
management of newspapers, that is still my ambition, and I shall do. 
I shall play my part to the extent that I am asked to ensure that the 
Scottish Daily News is a success. 
Allister Mackie "There is a role that Bob Maxwell can play in a newspaper 
that we cannot. We're not accustomed to dealing for example with high 
finance, top purchasing. We cannot deal with this area. OUr business 
is to produce a newspaper and its in this sense where Bob Maxwell is part 
of a team •••• In case Bob himself thinks he's going to run the 
newspaper, then he's in for a disappointment, he's part of a team". 
Maxwell "Bear Bear " (BBC TV, 28 March 1975). 
The exchange reveals the latent conflict, which continually erupted away 
from the media, between ,the aspirations of Maxwell and the orientations 
211 
of the SDN Action Committee. However although the recent threat of 
the withdrawal of Maxwell's cheque still hung in the air, it was quite 
wrong of Mackie to justify Maxwell's involvement in the business of 
SDN since this contradicted the experience of the Action Committee: 
it was they, with the financial advice of Briston who had negotiated ~~; 
original loan from the government, and the deal with Beaverbrook. Now 
Mackie was suggesting that, although they had acquired further professic~al 
support, they could not deal with the financial arrangements of running 
the company, which was completely untrue. 
In fact Maxwell's unpredictaBle influence frequently dismayed the 
Action Committee, "We spent half our. time worrying about Maxwell when 
we should have been. concentrating 100 per cent on producing a good 
newspaper" Charlie Armstrong maintained. On the eve of the prospectl.:S 
closure Maxwell summoned the general Manager Eric Tough, and the editor 
Fred Sillito to his office in London, where he demanded that if he 
was to continue to support the venture he would need their help as 'alta: 
egos' • They refused, but understood Maxwell proceeded to monitor 
the actions of the SDN management from Oxford and London. Allister 
Mackie despaired: 
"Maxwell made it clear by his phone calls from Oxford that although 
the rules stated otherwise he considered the paper his own. From Oxford, 
he sacked the Works Council's selection of financial controller three 
times over a ten day period; the general manager was threatened with 
the. sack because he agreed with the councillors on their' views of the 
evening edition; the councillors choice of insurers was overturned; the 
cash balance w~s to be deposited in a London merchant bank instead of 
the City of Glasgow; and so it wenton in one instance after another. 
Maxwell was transparantly incapable o~ working within a committee or board. 
while the council could not stomach his autocracy". 
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Several of Maxwell's decisions sorely embarassed the ~ON management 
and Council: in one case Maxwell had. negotiated a low price for ti.e 
agency wire services on the basis of a circulation for the SON of 
90,000, when the target circulation was 250,000. In another instance 
Maxwell had ordered 12,000 tons of newsprint, when 10,000 tons was the 
maximum annual requirement, and all from one supplier, when due to 
potential shortages all newspapers insist on several suppliers. 
Renegotiating these deals took time and effort from the SON Council 
and management, and risked damaging the good name of the co-operative. 
(McKay and Barr, 1976, pp 63-67) .• Charlie Armstrong, who was 
responsible for production, said "For the first two weeks after 28 March 
we couldn't get on with the business of setting up this newspaper because 
of continual interference from Robert Maxwell. He was phoning up from 
Oxford and creating havoc. He had people running about like half drunk 
idiots every time he spoke to them on the telephone." (BBC2, 10 November,19~= 
The Works Council's Attempt to Sack Maxwell. 
The SDN gained access to the Albion Street building at the beginning 
of April, and the Action Committee elected a Works Council from their 
number to supervise the 5 May launch of the newspaper. The Council 
included Mackie, McNamara, Armstrong and Russell who were determined to 
prevent Maxwell's attempt to take complete control. (By this time it had 
materialised that Maxwell had secretly borrowed £11,000 of the £25,000 
extra he had paid to make up the investment total from two senior SDN 
journalists. The fact that he had made his demands on the basis of only an 
extra £14,000, lowered his esteem in the eyes of the workforce. However 
the episode indicates where the loyalty of some of the senior journalists 
lay). The Council decided, in his absenc~, to call for the resignation 
• 
of Maxwell from his post as Co-Cha~rman, and Maxwell was informed of this 
decision at a Council meeting on Sunday 13 April. No longer would 
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Maxwell be capable of negotiating on signing contracts for and on 
behalf of the SDN without prior discussion or sanction by the Council. 
The following reasons were put forward by the Councillors to explain 
why they had thought it necessary to take this action, and were 
recorded in the minutes: 
"I) That it was impossible to conduct normal business, due to constant 
countermanding of directives of the Works Council by Robert Maxwell to 
the General Manager. 
2) The loss of credibility in the eyes of professional advisers and 
trade unions, who looked upon the enterprise as no longer being under 
Workers' Control. 
3) Confusion in the rate of progress through ignorance of events taking 
place in the South. 
4) Duty to the ultra-sensitive trade union movement in Scotland to 
retain the Worker Control concept as put forward over the past 12 months. 
5) The responsibility of the Council as such and that they cannot be 
subject to any single authority on the Council irrespective of person or 
position. 
6) That the help of Robert Maxwell in the past was greatly appreciated 
and the help he could be in the future was recognised. But the energy 
could not go unharnessed if the'Worker Control concept was to be seen to 
function correctly". (Works Council Minutes (WCM), 13 April 1975). 
Maxwell's response to his dismissal was a combination of mock 
penitence and belligerent defence: "Maxwell accepted all criticisms 
levelled at him, particularly in that the Executive had been required to 
report direct to him. He accepted that the General Manager should act 
as per the instructions of the Council in the best interest of the Company. 
But remarked that if the deadline of 5 May WaS to be met, the Council 
must realise the necessity of making'decisions independent of Council 
discussion. Maxwell-reminded the Council that he had made it a condition 
of investing that he be the Co-Chairman. Be had originally wished to be the 
Chairman but had conceded the point ••••• M 
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Listing a catalogue of his achievements, Maxwell was interrupted 
forcibly at several points where Councillors corrected his claims. 
Finally Maxwell concluded, without a trace of hypocracy, that "he 
felt that if he was to withdraw ~ompletely, th~e would be dissension 
in the workforce and the production of the paper would be delayed. 
It is necessary to present a united front to the public at large and the 
workforce in particular to maintain harmony and co-operation." Maxwell 
requested if he could be co-chairman non-executive, another remarkable 
invention. The Council refused, whereupon he asked that the matter be 
put to a mass meeting. Brian Dorman of Boyds, the S~N solicitors, ruled 
that this was out of order, and the legal ruling was accepted by Maxwell. 
"But he felt that democratically and especially being a co-operative 
set-up, he should be permitted this right as a worker." Several 
Councillors disagreed, but Alister Blyth supported Maxwell, and the Council, 
with an innocence they would bitterly regret, conceded to Maxwell's request. 
The riotous mass meeting which ensued on 17 April illustrated 
fully how Maxwell could overwhelm the primitive democracy which existed 
at the ~ and seize control of meetings. Mackie informed the 
workers "of the unavoidable clash of policy between Robert Maxwell and 
the works council. Due to different interpretations of the ideal of 
the workers co-operative. This had led to constant delays in production 
due to the overruling of decisions by Maxwell and the inability of 
management to function properly." The minutes record how, "At this 
juncture, the discussion degenerated into fierce exchanges and mudslinging, 
accusations and counter-accusations, until eventually the general body 
complained their disappointment at the Council allowing themselves to 
come to this poSition. The general opinion was that the situation should 
Have been resolved in council." Maxwell w~s asked why he would not 
accept a compromise, and he replied ~I would be the laughing stock of 
industry as would the Works Council to call first for resignation then 
ask me to continue." He was told by Rusty Steele of the NUJ that 
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"your attitude does not conform to the idea of a workers' co-operative". 
Nathan Goldberg suggested a further compromise of merely restricting 
Maxwell's brief but "Maxwell persisted-in his attempts to retain full 
authority." Within minutes th~ meeting became violent with repeated 
calls for order, and Maxwell eventually said that he was prepared to 
consider a compromise. The Council meeting was reconvened where 
Blythe suggested that Maxwell "should continue as co-chairman but non-
executive as per the prospectus. He would only negotiate on 
instruction of the works council and all subsequent agreements and/or 
contracts were to be referred to the full council for consideration 
before being ratified. In the event of deviating in any way from this 
brief, Maxwell would be dismissed forthwith". This was agreed, and 
Maxwell "promised he would act only on request and would not interfere 
with management." (MMM, 17 April 1975). 
At an earlier Council meeting Mackie reminded Maxwell "that it 
was impossible to intimidate unemployed people. There was nothing for 
him to threaten them with." Regrettably the bravery of Mackie's 
fUe comment ignored the vulnerability of many of the SDN workers, who 
repeatedly showed that after a year of unemployment, they could be 
intimidated to do almost anything by the promise of a secure job which 
they mistakenly thought Maxwell could offer. Later Allister Mackie 
appreciated the crucial significance of this development for Maxwell: 
"At this meeting he clearly identified his future power base within 
the company. Be discovered that there were members in the workforce 
who were prepared to speak on his behalf against the authority of the 
Works Council. In the main they were journalists and included some 
of the top editorial executives. Althouqh the meeting unanimously 
endorsed the council's decision to remove Maxwell's executive authority, 
at the same time they recommended that he be allowed to continue as 
co-chairman non-executive. The Works Council had no alternative 
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but to accept the recommendation knowing that they had failed in 
their attempts to remove him completely from the scene. Now they 
feared that Maxwell would make another bid ••• and another, until 
he had complete control." (1976, p.l30). 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE FIRST EDITION OF THE NEWSPAPER 
The first edition of the Scottish Daily News hit the streets of 
1975, 
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Glasgow on 5 May,/just five weeks after the close of the prospectus. 
The fastest launch of a daily newspaper in print history remains an 
impressive and lasting achievement of the SDN workers co-operative. 
For thirteen months SDN workers had struggled simply to secure government 
approval and raise the funds necessary to prove ~hat they could create 
a successful newspaper. Despite repeated requests on their part 
to the Beaverbrook management for access to the building so that they 
could clear and maintain the plant they were locked out. Now they 
were at last given the opportunity be prove their capacities, and they 
revealed immense en~husiasm and great technical skill in converting 
the almost derelict building and plant into an efficient newspaper 
operation in the three weeks they had between gaining access to the 
building and the launch date. In those few, brief, and overwhelmingly 
euphoric weeks, the co-operative spirit burst in abundance which promised 
to be the unique fuel that would carry the SON along to greatness 
regardless of the enormous problems the newspaper faced. Allister Mackie 
recorded the pervasive confidence and dedication of this time. 
"With Maxwell back in Oxford, quick progress was made with the 
launch preparation. Daily the co-op spirit was evident. In almost 
all departments, members' contributions were measured by their capacity 
to work and not by the amount of reward. In this prelaunch period no 
one worked to the clock: the length of shift was determined by the 
requirements of the department; no overtime was being paid despite the 
long hours being worked •••• In a space of only three working weeks a 
workforce had created a newspaper from a plant that had lain idle for 
over a year, another miracle had be~~ brought about, if only through 
hard vork. No other means of management than the co-operative could 
have produced so much in so short a time. The optimism of the members 
was high. 
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Technically they could produce a first class newspaper, 
far better than anything Beaverbrook had turned out in the same plant; 
the evidence was there to be seen." '(1976 ,p.13l). (My emphasis). 
"We're in the business of making' miracles", Nathan Goldberg 
declared with typical restraint. All the SON workers, many of whom 
had played a passive role in the year-long struggle to establish the 
co-operative, were caught up in this enthusiasm, "There was a bloody 
great atmosphere" Tony and Bill, two SLADE members agreed, "You could 
ask anybody to do anything and they would. The journalists had mops 
and were cleaning up the factory. If people were working on a job they 
worked to finish. When we started to be paid, people didn't start 
s creaming for overtime. In the old days people wouldn't work over for 
five minutes without being paid •••• We found the Express were throwing 
out old blocks, we found that they were quite good and asked the E~ress 
general manager if we could have them, and he agreed •••• It was wee 
things •••• marvellous wee things !" Andy Riley, their FOe, maintained, 
"We think this is a wonderful thing, it can work. We're proud of it. This 
feeling of your working for yourselves •••• It's a feeling we've never 
had before. This ~:venture can't really fail as regards the feeling 
of the members. It's a wonderful thing, we're all working for everbody 
else. It's great." 
Technical and Organizational Problems. 
The technical problems to be overcome in setting up the newspaper 
from scratch in such a short space of time and with extremely limited 
resources were considerable, even for experienced newspaper workers. 
McKay and Barr have provided a sound assessment of the extent of this 
accomplishment: 
"The achievement Qf reconsecrating the Albion Street building and, in 
a period of four weeks, bringing the plant and workforce up to the point 
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of producing a newspaper can hardly be overestimated. No newspaper 
has been launched in anything approaching s~ch a short period and 
the entire workforce, led by the worker. directors, were throwing 
themselves into the task with 9reat enthusiasm and efficiency. It 
is difficult for those who have never been involved in newspaper 
management or production to appreciate the complexity of setting up a 
plant ready to print a daily newspaper. Materials - paper, ink, metal, 
typefaces and a host of small items down to typewriter ribbons - had to 
be bought, machines which had laid idle for over a year had to be 
overhauled and tested; distribution had to be arranged; heating, lighting, 
telephones and wire services had to be negotiated; staff had to be 
hired, journalists had to start stock-piling stories and features for 
the launch period and pre-launch publicity had to be arranged. Behind 
that first edition of the Scottish Daily News on 5 May lay a superhuman 
effort by the workforce. And although most of the' workers knew what 
they were doing because of their long experience under Beaverbrook, the 
organization and coordination of all this effort stands as an impressive 
testimony to the efficiency of the co-operative management." (l976,pp 93-~). 
(Yet the Royal Commission on the Press in one of its few scant references 
to the ~ could smugly dismiss the effort and speed of the launch with 
the words, "We are bound to record that most of those involved who 
expressed opinions to us, including members of the co-operative, were 
extremely critical of the way the launch was handled." It should be 
noted that the Commission did not state who expressed these opinions, 
and that its criticism of the launch seemed to rest simply upon the 
failure to attend to pre-marketing with advertisers. 
1977, p.S3).) 
(RCP, Final Report, 
In the weeks preceding the launch the Works Council met daily, 
and sometimes twice a day in lengthy sessions of collective management. 
For example the Works Council met at 12-15 p.m on 30 April to consider a 
senior editorial appointment and the staffing structure of the advertising 
J 
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department. Then at 2.30 p.m. the Council met with NATSOPA to 
consider displacement of staff in the machine room day and night shift; 
the cleaning staff; and the pay for casual folders. Finally at 
4-35 p.m. the Council met all hea~s of department to judge the progress 
of the dummy run. The performance of each department was considered 
in turn: despatch, machine room, stereo, caseroom, process, wire-room, 
advertising, and after assessing the print run and anticipated sales of 
the first edition, the meeting closed at 5-15 p.m. Almost every 
conceivable problem was tackled by the Council including finance, 
technical, administrative, editorial, industrial relations, discipline, 
advertising and publicity. Brief discussion took place on most issues 
and decisions normally were reached quickly and proved effective 
solutions to the problems encountered. A wide range of matters were 
considered at each meeting as the staff, plant and building were geared 
up to commence publication. At a typical Council meeting on 22 April 
at 9 a.m. the following business was considered and recorded in the minutes: 
1. Staffing Accounts Department 
Circulation 
Advertising 
SWitchboard 
Library 
Security 
Copy Telephonists 
Stock Room. 
2. Stationary Letterheads 
Advertising Stationary 
Circulation Stationary. 
-3. Requisitions Stock, Machinery-, Books • 
4. Waqes • List of those Employed. 
Payment from 28 April. 
Computer1sat1on Through Bank of Scotland. 
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s. Time Cards. 
6. Office Acconnnodation. 
7. First Edition. 
A week later on 29 April the Council met the overseers to consider the 
progress of production and the following subjects were covered : 
l. Dummy Run Discipline 
Copy Flow 
Process Department. 
2. Despatch 
3. Machine Room 
4. Stereo 
5. Caseroom 
6. Editorial 
7. Copy-Telephonists 
B. Library 
9. Switchboard 
10. Advertising. 
The shopfloor Council members clearly expected to comprehensively supervise 
the organization of the enterprise at this stage: no problem was 
considered beyond their remit or' competence, and each was approached 
with diligence and responsibility. But the Council's burden of work 
was lightened by the eagerness and thoroughness of the SDN workforce: 
against a surprising number of matters "No problem", or "No obvious 
problems", was noted in the minutes. On other issues minor difficulties 
were easily resolved due to inter-departmental co-ordination and 
understanding. 
A few issues proved more intractable, and were soon to assume much 
more threatening significance. The first general problem which 
consistently recurred ·inthe minutes was the great shortage of funds and 
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resources which dictated a debilitating improvisation and parsimony 
in every area. New machinery and equipment was almost invariably 
beyond the means of the co-operative and the SDN workers usually had 
to make do with what Beaverbrook.haq left behind. The only provision 
for new plant in the original SDN proposal was £10,000 for microfilm 
equipment. This meant that even small items had to be refused. In 
the photographic department the overseer begged the Council to buy a 
processing developer, costing £250 which would expedite the production 
of pictures, particularly since he was short staffed. The Council were 
sympathetic to the problem but could only offer to investigate the 
possibility of hiring a developer, or obtaining a reconditioned model. 
In the rare instances when purchases had to be made, as in the case of 
the sales representatives Chrysler cars, the Council did everything it 
could to secure in return extensive advertising contracts called "contro-
deals". (WCM, 21 April 1975). Though a strict frugality was 
exercised, the expenses of the launch quickly reduced the SDN opening cash 
balance of £950,000 by over two hundred thousand pounds. Launch 
publicity, professional fees, stamp duty, the first weeks wages, and 
countless other minor items rapidly mounted up as Table 7 shows •. 
Table 7 
SCOTTISH NEWS ENTERPRISES LIMITED: 
EXPENDITURE FROM SETTLEMENT DAY TO LAUNCH DAY. 
OPENING CASH BALANCE ......................... 
EXPENDITURE 
Launch Publicity 
Spares,Stores,Rates (Beaverbrook) 
Lawyers 
Accountan ts 
Stamp Duty 
printing prospectus 
Metal 
Newsprint 
Van Purchase 
DepoSits (Car H.P) 
Telephone (Rent in Advance) 
S.S.E.B Deposit ••• 
Waqes to 5th May 
Workers' Expenses 
Sundries 
... 
... 
£50,000 
£49,548 
£27,556 
£14,418 
£24,251 
E 4,148 
£ 6,500 
£ 8,500 
E 1,100 
E 8,741 
£ 8,240 
E 7,000 
'£15,406 
£ 6,788 
£ 526 
£232,722 
£950,000 
• 
TABLE 7 (Cont'd) 
CASH BALANCE AT 5TH MAY, 1975 
MADE UP OF: BANK 
DEPOSIT, 
E17,278 
E7oo,000 
£717,278 
Thus they were able to start "trading" with £717,278 
in the Bank, and with stocks of Spares, Metal and Newsprint. 
Source: SON General Manager's Report, Number 1, 21 May 1975. 
223 
£717,278 
The financial weakness of the SON left it dependent upon hiring the 
services of other newspapers and agencies when it could not meet the 
cost of setting up its own operation: the racing section had to be 
transmitted from Beaverbrook's Evening Standard office in London, and the 
Evening Standard and Scotsman were approached for City page data. 
Another reflection of the shortage of funds was the reluctance of the 
Council to sanction the appointment of new staff until the chapels 
began to complain of undermanning. Quite a number of positions were 
deliberately left vacant to save money, when the staff could have 
contributed to a successful launch. When it was decided to fill posts, 
and there was no one suitable from the ex-Beaverbrook workforce, the 
recruitment of new people was severely hindered by the relatively low 
wages offered: new recruits to the ~ might be compelled by idealism, they 
would not be attracted by the pay. 
Another serious problem to emerge during the days of preparation was 
a clear dislocation between readiness and effectiveness of the production 
departments and the delay and lack of organization of the editorial 
department: since the production departments were dependent upon the 
editorial for their supply of copy and blocks to set and print,the delay 
was a source of immense frustration. The hold up partly was caused 
by the fact that the Press Association news service terminals and the telex, 
the staple source of national news for any paper, were only functioning 
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properly by 30 April and the news desk previously had been starved of 
material. Also it was claimed that there were insufficient editorial 
staff for features,sub-editing or writing. But obviously there 
was a crucial lack of leadership and commitment in the editorial 
department. . The process department , caseroom , stereoroom 
and machine room , all pleaded with the editor for as much advance 
copy flow as possible, to facilitate the efficient organization of their 
work and to prevent their pattern of work becoming long bouts of enforced 
idleness building up to an intense burst of activity to get the paper 
1 
out in time. To all of which the editor weakly responded that "He 
could forecast feature work only a week ahead, apart from the Matt McGinn 
serial, there was nothing he could let them have"" (WCM, 30 April, 1975). 
The other hundred journalists should share responsibility for the critical 
failure to produce features copy: while they were locked out of Albion 
Street there was nothing the print workers could do to prepare for 
publication, but the journalists had ample opportunity to prepare a good 
stock of feature stories which could have greatly assisted production 
in the early weeks, and dispensed with the need to recruit outside dignatories 
as regular feature writers, for the selection of which the editor later 
was justifiably severely criticized in Council. But there were other 
signs of a deep malaise among the editorial staff. 
A disabling hierarchy and status consciousness came creeping back 
into the SDN in the editorial department before anywhere else. 
Appointing a caretaker editor had created the problem of succession and 
the suggestion that Nathan Goldberg might become deputy editor distressed 
another senior journalist Denny McGee. As a compromise Goldberg suggested 
to the Council that he be appointed senior assistant editor and McGee 
be appointed assistant editor in charge of production. A major row 
broke out on Counc~l when McGee's competence for this position was 
questioned, and the obsession with petty nomenclature did not augur well 
for the future. MoreOver it was clear that some editorial stimulus was 
1. In the process department the photographic plates are madel in t~e 
caseroom the copy is set in type and made up into pages~ in the sterSroom 
cont 'a over;" 
metal blocks and moulds are made from which the printing plates are cast; 
finally, in the machine room the vast rotary presses print the newspaper 
from huge rolls of newsprint. 
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needed if the journalists were to escape from the Express mould in 
which most of their talents had been fashioned. Mary Holland, a former 
Observer columnist of considerable ability, was approached for the 
post of deputy editor. Sympat?etic to the idea of the co-operative, 
she took the invitation seriously and travelled to Glasgow to meet the SDN 
editorial staff. Instead of responding to her as someone who could 
make a valuable contribution to a fresh editorial orientation for the 
newspaper, she was greeted by a cabal of SDN journalists with jealousy 
and crude prejudice. They questioned her integrity, and in particular 
her sympathetic coverage of the problems of Northern Ireland. Their 
personal hostility, professional limitations, and reactionary politics 
drove her away, as later, Ralph Saunders, another talented senior journalist 
who tried to help was driven away. Allister Mackie was vituperative 
in his condemnation of the ~ journalists behaviour during these episodes: 
"Mary Holland and Ralph Saunders both were proposed as outside:t s to take 
on editorial responsibilty, but both were worn down by the animal hostility 
of the editorial department. Mary left immediately, and Ralph within 
a few days - a conspiracy of incompetence was waged against both of them." 
Relations on the shop floor of the newspaper were much happier and 
generally there was a good working atmosphere: in the print chapel 
tradition, people were responsible for completing their own work without any 
close supervision, and the FOes ensured that production was running 
smoothly rather than the overseers. The overseers were interviewed 
and appointed by a joint sub-committee of the Council and the Federated 
Chapel, they were ~ften popular choices, and carried little independent 
authority, but they did receive a 15\ differential, and the position of some 
was resented." The heads of departments occasionally indicated that they 
would l~ke to tighten up on labour discipline, at one Council"meeting the 
finance manager suggested the introduction of clock cards as "he felt 
that clocking in and out would help to identify in certain areas 
personnel start~ng varied shift times." But it was argued that time cards 
" 
, i 
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had only been used in the past to record wages and overtime, and ~lock 
cards were never introduced. (WCM, 22 April 1975). In fact the SON 
workers enjoyed considerable autonomy: . during their breaks they were 
free to move around the building.or to leave it at will, and the direction 
they normally took (often accompanied by the author) was Tom's Express 
bar immediately next door. (The bar was really the SON social club, 
at lunch time and in the evening it was packed with SON people and it 
was difficult to tell who had finished work and who was simply having a 
break. But the bar performed a vital function: it was here more than 
anywhere else that people from different departments could meet together, 
and regardless of skill or sta~us, discuss the paper and how it could be 
improved. The chairman and general manager would rub shoulders with 
the assistant machine minder~ foundrymen, and despatch folders, and would 
argue out production problems. In the newspaper office itself the 
separation between intellectual and manual labour might have been preserved 
in the division between the journalists and manual workers, but in the 
Express , there was no division and people lived on their wits. The 
street sellers would walk in with the latest edition of the paper which 
would be eagerly seized and analysed for changes: good editorial would 
be praised and poor sto~ies openly ridiculed and abused. All of this 
took place in a crowded, friendly, beery atmosphere, with bitingly funny 
Glaswegian humour and the vapours of good malt whisky filling the air. 
The Express bar was one of the best things about the SON!) But although 
most of the workers kept within the bounds of the hard drinking which is 
treated as an obligatory formality in Glasgow, a few went over the top and 
were criticized several times in Council for having drunk too much while 
on duty. 
227 
Competition from Other Newspapers. 
At a meeting earlier in the struggle Mah~ell had announced to 
the assembled workers" •••• from Sir Max Aitken to Lord Thomson, 
Mr. Pickering, Sir Hugh Fraser~ all of them have assured me of their 
goodwill and promise of co-operation for your enterprise." (BBC2, 
10 November 1975) • This statement proved a typically useless piece 
of pomposity. All of the Scottish national daily newspapers run 
by these men - the Daily Express, Scotsman, Daily Record and Glasgow 
Herald mounted expensive publicity cru~paigns to initiate a fierce 
circulation war at the time of th~ Scottish Daily News first edition, 
in a manner reminiscent of the competition of th~ early decades of 
the century. (McKay and Barr, 1976, pp 15-6). It was unlikely 
that the SON would create many Inewl readers, and even if it picked 
up all the hundred thousand readers who had abandoned the Express, they 
would still have to claim 150,000 of the readers of other papers to 
achieve their target circulation. Most of the Scottish papers, as 
the national press in general, were in a financially precarious state 
and the injury to their circulation done by this new intruder could be 
fatal. The Scottish newspapers were therefore only indulging in the 
competitive fight ~or survival which is the dynamic of the capitalist 
market system whatever destructive damage results. Though the SON 
workers did not express the public aggression of Maxwell toward their 
rivals, they had assimilated the competitive orientations of the industry 
which had survived their redundancy, and even been sharpened by the 
struggle to set up the co-operative. This competitiveness was 
particularly directed at the Scottish Daily E~ress now printed in 
Manchester: "That newspaper would have to be effectively killed off in 
Scotland before the Scottish Daily News could live ••• the co-operators 
relished that prospect even though, inevitably, it would mean that other 
print workers would experience the hUmiliation and indignity they had 
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so recently known ••. " (McKay and Barr, 1976, p.S8). The SDN 
the 
workers were caught in/contradiction that in attacking their previous 
employer who had treated them so cruelly, they were also directly 
attacking print workers who were brother Trade Unionists. One worker 
argued: "There were stories going around that 'We'll sort the Express 
out, even if we have to throw the lads in Manchester on the dole'. 
But not many people felt like that, after a year on the dole, you couldn'L 
deliberately throw anyone on the dole. Though we would throw Jocelyn 
Stevens out if we could ! " 
There were other, seamy, aspe9ts to the circulation war that the 
publication of the ~prompted. Tony and Bill of SLADE complained 
"In Edinburgh street vendors were told 'If you sell the Scottish Daily 
~ we'll not let you have our paper, and we'll shop you to the buroo 
I 
and they'll set the police on you. We gave them a couple of copies and 
they laughed. This is big business The newsagents often said, 
'We're not going to sell a Commie paper'. Nathan Goldberg the deputy 
editor, realised what was happening, though he was reluctant to talk 
about it: 
"There is a campaign going on in Fleet Street to destroy us, there's no 
doubt about it - but of course you can't say that in the columns of your 
paper. You can't even say it on the radio because it sounds like sour 
grapes. But there is no doubt about it, they're out to get us, nail us. 
y'know when -this paper came out I thought it might have been a reasonable 
story for some of the Scottish press to carry, and not one Scottish paper 
carried it, which is incredible really. Advertising is not something 
I'm involved in but it's amazing. Circulation especially - newsagents 
are hiding it under the counter. Newsvendors are saying to people who 
come up to them for the paper - 'Sorry, mate; do you really want to read 
, 
that fucking Communist rag?' And ~o on ad nauseum. And that does not 
help •••••• We're getting so many letters from people who can't get the 
paper, that's because you can't see it - usually it's hidden underneath 
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a pile of Donny Osmond LPs or something." 
The Success of the First Edition. 
On the evening of Sunday 4 Mayas the first edition of the Scottish 
Daily News was prepared for the presses there were scenes of wild 
excitement and emotion in the Albion Street building. Journalists 
and production workers crowded into the machine room to watch the presses 
roll in earnest for the first time with a co-operative newspaper; television 
crews jostled for position, and celebrities and politicians tried to 
become involved in the action. • People who had worked in the media all 
their lives and had travelled the world were overwhelmed by the occasion, 
and tears flowed freely. The paper was rushed out onto the night: streets 
to be greeted by an eager publiC, overcome by curiosity, if not by 
commi tment. The first edition was a complete sellout and the Guardian 
at least rejoiced at the successful birth of the paper: 
-The Scottish Daily News, the new daily paper produced by a workers co-
operative of former Beaverbrook employees in Glasgow fairly set the heather 
on fire yesterday throughout Scotland from the Solway Firth to the 
Shetlands. The first printing run of 280,000 copies was sold out within 
a few hours of publication. At Queen Street Station Glasgow customers 
were queueing up soon after midnight to buy the paper in batches of 
five. A street vendor in Edinburgh sold 1,000 copies before 8 a.m. 
and by mid-morni.ng the first edition of the new paper had become a 
collector's item. Ths immediate reaction of the management was to plan 
a bigger run of well over 300,000 last night, with the intention of 
building up to 350,000 as more distribution outlets are organized. 
The original budget for launching the project was based on a workforce of 
500 using three printing presses. If there is a sustained demand for 
• 
more than 350,000 copies the executive council of the company will 
consider the economics of putting in more machinery to give a capacity 
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of 470,000." (6 May 1975). 
A day earlier John Kerr had written an equally celebratory, but 
more cautious welcome: 
"There is probably no one in Scotland who does not wish the Scottish 
Daily News well Few projects of recent times could claim such 
a comprehensive consensus of moral support. At the same time there 
is a lingering query in the minds of many well-wishers as to whether 
the brave new enterprise can survive in a hard commercial world. While 
applauding the dedication and persistence of purpose that has brought 
the SDN to the point of publication, some simply wonder if a new daily 
paper is a viable objective in what is essentially a contracting industry. 
So Scot lands new daily - "The GOOD MORNING Paper" - is being launched 
in a strangely mingled mood of high enthusiasm and nagging reservations 
The basic underlying principle of workers' control is seen as the answer 
to most of the major industrial relations problems that have afflicted 
the newspaper industry in recent years ••• The events of the past year 
reflect two dominant characteristics ~n the ~ enterprise - an apparently 
unsinkable capacity in the men involved to work for what they believe in, 
and an ever-present financial stringency. Having come so far in the 
face of adversity it now remains to be seen whether the faith that the 
former Expressmen have in their own cause can be transmitted in print to 
the public at large and translated in a profitable readership." (5 May 1975). 
TOny Benn, the Minister who had fought to fund the co-operative, 
was present at the birth of the ~, and although he made it clear that 
he saw the project as something very special, he related its significance 
to the broader development of democracy in industry and society generally: 
"Perhaps I'm a watering can in this garden ~t the flowers are coming up 
everywhere. I was in Jarrow over the weekend arid there the shipyard 
workers are working on the plan for industrial democracy at Swan Bunter 
which is going to be brought into public ownership. The Leyland workers 
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in the Midlands are working. My aircraft workers in Bristol have 
published the most brilliant scheme for industrial democracy in the 
aircraft industry. In Meriden the motorbikes are being built again. 
In Kirkby in Liverpool they've"got their night storage heaters and 
their fruit juice and they're planning it. The thing is going like 
wildfire throughout the country and it's the most exciting thing that's 
happened in Britain since the war. But the advantage the Scottish 
Daily News has is that it can write about it from its own experience." 
(Granada TV, 5 May 1975). 
Benn.appreciated that if these developments were not to remain isolated 
experiments, but to build into a movement for social and industrial 
change then they had to be publicized widely, and the support of the 
organized working class secured: the virtue of the SDN was that it 
could do precisely this in the course of its normal operations, as Fred 
Smith, the general secretary of the SGA put it, "I don'~ think people 
are aware of the great interest there is in this part of Scotland in 
getting this paper together. A paper appears daily - living evidence 
that a workers co-operative is working." (Guardian, 5 May 1975). 
By its very existance the SDN had undoubtedly achieved a major 
innovation in industrial organization, but what it had yet to prove was 
that it could make similar strides forward toward democratic responsibility 
in its editorial orientation. Benn rebuked the capitalist press for its 
failure to respond to the problems of working people, and had great 
hopes that the ~ could compensate for this neglect: "One of the great 
tragedies about the press in Britain is that they do not speak for the 
British people. I am amazed when I read in editorials of the silent 
majority that is supposed to exist but never get a chance to be heard. 
I am surprised that the British press by and large does not take up 
issues that concern people and fight for thea as they ought to do. I 
believe that the Scottish Daily News will be a voice, not just in Scotland, 
but it will be a voice throughout the OK". (Guardian, 14 April 1975). 
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Yet if Benn had known the traditional background of most of the editorial 
staff and the scant attention to any retraining or reorientation on their 
part, he would not have been so confident of the possibility of a 
new journalistic departure, and ~hether the ~ print workers could 
exert an enlightening influence upon the editorial remained an open question. 
Martin Adeney correctly diagnosed the nature of the problem: "Nothing 
is guaranteed to raise a louder cheer at a trade union or Labour Party 
conference than complaints about the unrepresentative nature of the 
capitalist press. And it is this gut feeling, that a different kind 
of press would result from control by workers, as wel~ as an obvious 
desire to preserve jobs, which has made the Scottish Daily News, like 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders before it, a popular cause which committed 
shopfloor trade unionists have been glad to dip into their pockets 
to support. How far the promised 'left of centre' paper will meet 
the kind of demand that trade unionists continue to look for remains still, 
however, in the hands largely of the editorial staff of the new paper -
although at longer range the powers of the whole 500 staff in their 
co-operative may be brought into play·." (Guardian 5 May 1975) 
The Shock of the Conventional Editorial Content. 
When the excitement of the launch had subsided a little, the SON 
workers had the opportunity to examine their newspaper more carefully. 
The structure of the paper certainly did not proclaim a radical departure: 
4 pages of news, 4 pages of sport, with a pull-out racing section, 2 
pages of features, and 8 pages of advertisements. The front page 
headline of the first edition, "IT'S GREAT'ro BE ALIVE!" was an irrelevant 
human interest story which may have deserved a few lines in the middle 
pages, about a model who survived a car crash, and was used purely as a 
sentimental gimmick. other stories were largely on traditional 
• topiCS: disasters, accidents, trials, honeymoons, with a sprinkling of 
industrial and political news. In the few instances where the paper 
did offer a left-wing analYSiS, it did so with an awkward conviction, as 
233 
in a small story on the front page "Your Majesty is No Coorade" which 
reported a South Wales miners conference report that the Queen was the 
first person to break the social contra.ct when she got a rise of 
£420,000. (There were two other' stories about the Queen in the paper 
which were a great deal more complimentary). In the centre pages 
the editor indulged in some self-consciously inflated rhetoric: 
"THE NEW and authentic voice of Scotland rings out today 
across the country and far beyond. The Scottish Daily News 
has been the most talked about paper throughout Britain long 
before this first issue was printed. Now the most exciting 
publishing venture of the century erupts in the market place -
and the talking will go on and on. For this is a new kind 
of newspaper. Many looking on from outside saw it as a 
crazy dream, the miracle that could never happen. The 
answer is in your hands at the moment •••• We believe there 
is a hunger and a need for a popular newspaper looking out upon 
the world through Scottish eyes. A paper with which the whole 
nation will be able to identify. A paper sturdily independent 
of any political party, seeking to mirror as closely as 
possible the feelin~s of the people of Scotland - with a 
philosophy left of centre. The fresh air of freedom will 
blow through its pages. It will provide an open forum for 
conflicting policies and viewpoints "(~, 5 May 1975). 
Next to the editorial there was a large cartoon of a besuited 
businessman's hand and a sinewy worker's hand clasped together with 
the inscription "We're on the same side now". Beneath the cartoon 
was a large article by the news editor "It Was A Battle All The Way: 
Andrew McCallum Looks Back Without Anger", which despite its title was 
an apolitical and humourous look at their experiences, with heavy use 
of horse racing references. The only real sign of hope in the whole 
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newspaper for those searching for political commitment in a socialist 
direction, was the critical article on the Co~~on Market by the 
political editor Andrew Hargrave, "w~y the Market Can't Help Scotland: 
We Could Remain the Fringe of a Fringe Country". Though, regrettably, 
. 
Hargravewas not to stay with the SDN for long. 
Many SDN workers felt a profound sense of shock and dismay as they 
read the paper, that the result of all their idealism and efforts was 
practically identical to the newspapers that they had previously worked 
for, but never believed in. A legacy of under funding affected 
the paper immediately in that old plant and equipment, including a limited 
number of old Express typefaces, meant that the appearance of the paper, 
whatever its political identity, would be solidly traditional. Another 
traditional feature was the broadsheet size which the Action Committee 
had reluctantly decided upon, however unsuitable for the popular 
market, because the Express presses were geared for broadsheet, and 
the recent conversion of the London Evening News to tabloid had taken 
eighteen months and £160,000 to achieve. (SON, Discussion Document (OD),1975). 
Yet when the decision to convert the SDN presses to tabloid was taken 
later in the summer it was completed in a matter of hours and at.no 
cost. 
. Ctearly the most serious shortcoming of the paper was the 
editorial content itself. As McKay and Barr, who were accomplished 
journalists themselves, caustically explain: 
"Another factor militated against a new and radically different Scottish 
Daily News, the rutted thinking of the paper's editorial management who 
had no clear conception of what the paper should look like, think or say. 
Any 'fresh air of freedom' blowing through the pages of the Scottish 
Daily News, it quickly became obvious, would not be generated from the 
editorial summit of Albion Street ••• There was growing concern among 
some of the journalists. at the absence of any directions or stimulation 
from the editor, Fred Sillito. Requests for editorial meetings to thraSh 
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out a style, to define the policies and ethics of the paper beyond 
the vague phrases in the prospectus, brought no response. Like Topsy, 
it seemed, the paper was just going to grow haphazardly until it broke 
out of Albion Street on the night. It was becoming evident that what . 
was going to appear would differ little from what was already available in 
other newspapers and, indeed, from what had come out of Albion Street 
under the old management. The indications were, already, that the 
Scottish Daily News would be a tired mix of court reports, deaths and 
bland features, surrounded by football and national, agency news. 
Formula journalism, but of another age. The sedate and outmoded blend 
would, as a market research survey later showed, find its place among the 
old and elderly, totally failing to penetrate the younger market where 
newspapers and advertisers focused." (l976,pp 67-8). 
The lack of preparation for a new editorial orientation, thus meant that 
the majority of the journalists, who had many years experience with the 
Express, merely resorted to the journalistic formulae in which they had 
been trained. The absence of meetings to debate and decide the principles 
and politics of the new editorial approach did not mean that the journalists 
were individually free to experiment with new ideas, since most of them 
were firmly trapped by ~he past: to overcome this heritage would have 
involved a lengthy and exhaustive collective effort. A critical 
element which could have contributed further to a fundamentally different 
editorial approach would have been the active involvement of the SDN 
print workers, and of the working class readership, in the framing of 
editorial policy; but this never happened despite the horror expressed 
in some of the capitalist media at the supposed advance of a proletarian 
press. On the rare occasions when workers representatives on the 
Council tried to insist that the general 'left-of-centre' editorial 
guidelines agreed ·should be adhered to they were arrogantly rebuffed. 
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The World In Action. 
A major confrontation was inevitable between those members of 
the co-operative who believed they were pioneering a workers newspaper, 
and the editorial staff who simply wanted to manufacture a commercial 
product. The fact that this confrontation took place on the Works 
Council and that a Granada TV World in Actlon team was allowed to film 
it, was a remarkable testimony to the openness and innocence of the 
Council, which was predictably abused. The programme emphasised 
editorial conflict on the Works Council, and the alarm of Councillors 
that the editorial was slipping into a conservative trough seemed to be 
treated as confirmation of the reactionary prediction of the restriction 
of editorial freedom at the SDN. Thus the programme focused on 
criticism of the editor for including contributions from the Conservative MP 
for Cathcart Teddy Taylor, and former Glasgow Sherrif Harry Pirie. 
The dialogue erupted in the following angry exchange: 
Jiumy McNamara: "There's enough papers for Tories in the country. Tories 
qet every other paper. How can an article by Teddy Taylor be left of 
centre? He's right of right !" 
Allister Mackie: "That page as it stands, Fred, is right wing. With 
the exception of the leader column which says its left wing. 
makes ita mockery." 
That's what 
Jimmy McNamara: "We've got guidelines left of centre and if you work 
within that, my God, it's a tremendous licence you've got. 
work within left of centre." 
But you must 
Fred Sillito: "I think you're forgetting that for the dummy paper we had 
to put in the paper what we had, even if it happened to be stories like this" 
(Gramada TV, 5 May 1975). 
The reaction of many of the ~ workers to this public revelation of 
political divisions on the Council was one of anger and incomprehension. 
They were as distressed by the bad publicity as they were at the fact that 
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the fundamental editorial orientation remained unresolved, thus the 
strident public criticism by the Councillors was resented as much 
as the wea~ and uninspired conservatism of the editor. 
The external reaction to the SON editorial conflict resembled 
the rigid and 'unthinking authoritarian elitism of the appraisal by 
the Dol Industrial Development Unit: "there must be questions as to 
the willingness of the proposed Executive Council to allow the essential 
freedom of action to the General Manager and Editor, particularly when 
management decisions prove unpopular with sections of the workforce. 
Clearly, no newspaper can operate successfully if day-to-day management 
decisions are subject to constant"debate". (SNE, 1975,p.23). Clearly 
the people responsible for this statement would have been happy if a 
conventional editorial management had reigned at the SON and an orthodox 
newspaper had resulted. The Sunday Times, of course, also proudly 
defended the sanctity of editorial privilege: 
"producing newspaper is not the same as making orange juice or motorbikes. 
What goes into it is open to argument in a way quite different from an 
ordinary product. The Scottish Daily News's most awkward hurdle will 
not be printing the paper, which is something the workers can do adequately 
enough, but resolving conflicting political and social views about the 
way subjects and stories are treated. The journalists and print 
workers have to decide whether they or the editor runs things." (11 May 1975) 
(The prejudices of John Fryer, the author of this article, were 
blatantly revealed when he attributed the success of the launch of the 
SON to the few executives involved:" The main credit for getting 
the paper out on time must go to the six executives appointed by the 
workers council." In fact they had a very peripheral role to play, 
as they often complained. Thus one of the greatest achievements of 
co-operative management and workers initiative was conveniently dismissed 
by a managerialist! ). Allister Mackie was aware of the political 
reality which lay beneath the rhetoric of 'professionalism' and 'editorial 
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freedom': the systematic prevention of the expression of authentic 
working class views in the press. He argued: 
"If we talk about nuts and bolts, then it's possible for unions and 
management to g~t together to toal.k about co-operation, but when you 
are in a "factory" that is producing ideas,opinions and points of view 
and philosophies of life then you will never in a hundred years get 
management to co-operate with the workers. If you are to have 
worker's participation in the newspaper industry, it can only be by 
complete control by the workers, so that your working class point of view 
can be put across." (IWC, January 1975,pl7) • 
Jimmy McNamara explained the reasons for the editorial intervention on 
Works Council: 
"We had as far as I was concerned a responsibility to allay 
the fears of the people who put money in, on the assurances 
that we had given. We didn't lay it on the table, the 
editor lay it on the table, and it had to be answered at that 
point. The battle so far has been lost because Teddy Taylor, 
has still got his article in. I wouldn't disagree with Teddy 
Taylor having his article in as long as its not identified as 
the policy of the paper. Unfortunately it appears to be. 
You can't be all things to all people, and never at any stage 
did I argue that's what we'd be." 
The Fall In Sales. 
Sales of the Scottish Oaily News rose steadily in the first week of 
publication and peaked at 322,000, then they began to fall rapidly, and 
by the end of the second week were down to 220,000. Advertising, after 
the first few days of congratulatory pieces, was even more depressing, 
and was hopelessly short of the neces~ary 50\ content of the paper. 
The rapid launch and lack of funds inevitably had caused problems, there 
were 17 sales staff to cover 5,000 retail outlets,they had only just 
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begun their work, and in the first month the paper was on a sale or 
return basis which created an incentive for newsagents to sell all 
their other papers before the ~, which they could return. The 
advertising department was under~taffed and inexperienced, rate 
cards did not reach advertising agents till three days after the launch, 
and the rate of £700 a page was considered high when the SON circulation 
figures were unsteady and unaudited. But many people continually held 
the adverse publicity of the World In Action programme as the principal 
cause of the dramatic drop in sales; among the~ senior journalists found 
it very convenient to blame the Works Council public outburst for falling 
sales rather thantheir own inadequacies. Jimmy McNamara, who was 
later victimised for his stand on Council "I got thrown off the Works 
Council because I disagreed with an editorial decision", argued: 
"The easy way out is to blame the World in Action programme for the loss 
in circulation. Nobody will recognise the fact that circulation did 
'not drop the first week, the World in Action programme was on the Monday 
night, and circulation increased the next night. I would certainly 
nae claim that it went ~ because of the World in Action, but I think 
I'm entitled to say that a bloke who saw WOrld in Action wouldnae buy 
the paper the next day, and the next day, - he's nae gonnae wait 4 or 5 weeks 
before he stops buying the paper·- I think that's a fair assumption. 
I don't think they're correct in sayin World in Action lost circulation, 
although probably we were a wee bit over enthusiastic in putt in forward 
our beliefs. I But it was an emotional situation,yo~not unemployed 
for a year, and thQn let the Teddy Taylor'. of the world take over." 
Though acknowledging the effect of adverse publicity, Allister Mackie 
realised that 'the basic cause of the falli09 sales was the editorial 
failings of the newspaper: 
. 
"It was difficult to determine the root of the editorial weaknesses. The 
journalists seemed un~le to produce a page with a distinct identity. 
Fred Sillito, the editor, was undoubtedly possessed with good talents, but 
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seemed unable to lead the executives. The effect was that the papers 
philsophy varied from page to page and story to story. (Mackle, 1976, 
p 134). (It should be noted from this comment that Mackie was not 
immune to the notion of the sove~eign editor, and though he was aware 
of general failings among the journalists he tended to focus on the lack 
of editorial leadership from the executives). 
The Council were confronted by a circulation fall sooner and more 
disastrous than they had anticipated in their projections. Unforgiveably, 
they chose not to convey to the workforce how serious the situation was. 
Instead, obviously, the workers learned from well-informed rumour. 
The machine room men knew better than anyone in the building how many 
copies were being printed each night, and the despatch men knew how many 
copies were coming back. One explanation for this reticence to inform 
the workforce, that was somewhat less than satisfactory,was offered in 
an anecdote by Eric Tough, the general manager: 
"I remember one guy, now I admire that chap in many ways, who got up at 
a mass meeting, trembling with emotion and said, "Our current management 
is even more crooked than Beaverbrook' ever was "because we had put our 
circulation figures in the paper the previous night saying "300,000 and 
still rislng", when it was 250,000 and still falling. He demanded that, 
as an honest workers' operation, we should retract this. I told them 
that if they wanted to announce the real figure they could forget 
advertising" for ever. Every newspaper management cooks the circulation 
flgures - you can't survive without doing it. You have to tell lies, 
white lies, black lies, any kind. Now this is an educational problem 
and I think given time, it could have been overcome. But time was the 
thing we never had." (McKay and Barr, 1976, p 93). 
(If this was the kind of education the worke~s were to receive, then 
• perhaps it was as well that there ~as no time for them to finish the 
course.) 
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John Hodgeman was dismayed at the Council's assumption of commercial 
secrecy and at the opening this left for Robert Maxwell to regain 
control: 
"There was an apparent reluctance on the part of Mackie's team to impart 
the full facts and figures of a gloomy outlook to the employees - this 
reticence did not augur well against Maxwell's gauche 'frankness' 
From Oxford Maxwell's contributions to the company became a stream of 
erratic, nonsense letters and telegrams containing mainly negative tirades 
against Mackie and the Council •••• As the cold financial statements 
began to frighten the workforce, ~o Maxwell's protestations and criticisms 
from afar started to cut more ice." 
By the beginning of the third week sales had plummeted further, serious 
divisions were emerging among the ~ workforce as they began to lose 
confidence and the fear that they had not escaped the dole queue began 
to grow. At this point Robert Maxwell launched a new bid for control 
in the shape of a 2,000 word telex which arrived at midnight on 20 May 
and was addressed to the Works Council with copies to all the FoCs. 
The First Maxwell Telex 
The huge telex predicted imminent disaster for , the ~ and 
understandably shook away the last traces of calm among the Albion Street 
workforce. In the telex Maxwell expressed his astonishment at how the 
COuncil had attempted to eject him; and that with circulation down 
to 200,000 and advertising only 25\ of the content of the paper "it would 
be improper for me to remain silent and sit on the sidelines ••• " 
Maxwell then proceeded to detail what he thought to be the present state 
of the SDN: he estimated weekly expenditure as £90,000, and income as 
£57,000 at sales of 200,000. With losses in excess of £30,000 per week, 
and a balance of £500,000, he insisted that unless there was immediate 
drastic action taken to relaunch then the cash resources would be exhausted 
between 15 September and 31 October 1975. Maxwell called for "a 
meeting of our full workforce so as to take them into our confidence 'and 
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to ask for their advice and assistClnce, whilst at the sarne time outlining 
the council's plan on how we propose to save the SDN and the first 
workers co-operative in the newsraper industry from probable total 
collapse well before the end of this year." Maxwell continued: "I knew 
that your immediate reaction will be to accuse me of panic mongering. 
This accusation would be as untrue as it is undeserved. The figures 
I quote are facts as verified with the general manager and anybody with 
a pencil and piece of paper can quickly work out that on our present 
circulation and advertising figures (which unless we take some immediate 
special steps to improve them are likely to fall) this company will, 
within less than six months, be unable to meet its wages and other 
commitments. " 
Maxwell announced some "concrete proposals which may just save the 
situation" which consisted of: 
1. Increasing the editorial staff "to produce a much better and exciting 
newspaper" ••• 
2. Increasing the caseroom staff" to bring about better editionising". 
3. Increasing the circulation representation staff "to get our circulation 
up quickly above 250,000 •••••• " (Whatever the legitimacy of Maxwell's 
claims about the problems of the newspaper, these "concrete proposals" 
seemed to reveal a supe~ficial understanding of the nature of those 
problems and to offer hardly inspired solutions). 
Finally Maxwell concluded with a complaint about the Works Council's "gross 
interference in editorial affairs", the uncompetitive advertising rates, 
and the failure to launch the paper at Sp instead of 6p,"so that the 
Scottish people would have (until Autumn) a monetary incentive to buy 
us rather than the Scottish Daily Express". (McKay and Barr, 1976, pp 75-79). 
The telex ended with a plea to the FoCs to inform their respective 
chapels about its contents. By the next morning people were reeling under 
the impact of a cOnvincing death knell three weeks after the birth. The 
Works Council, who knew exactly what the cash flow was, met that morning 
to express their astonishment: 
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Tough: "Apart from being in any kind of a crisis situation, we 
are exactly on course, as we planned we would be in the forecasts •.•• 
This came in about midnight last night, it's a great pity that Bob 
hadn't phoned me to say look I've. just written this can I run through it 
and see the figures are OK?" 
Mackie: "I can understand his panic if he thought these were genuine 
but if he had checked them he would have known they weren't genuine." 
Tough: "Yes of course, the pity now Allister, is that quite a few 
people have read this alarming report". 
Mackie: "But this is the damage. He has affected the morale of the 
workforce. Because if you say that you're going to be out of business 
by 15 September or 31 October then that must be very alarming to the workforce. 
(BBC2, 10 November i975). 
The Council carefully went through Maxwell's dire predictions and refuted 
them one by one. Firstly the circulation was roughly on target since it 
was expected to build up to 250,000 over three months. On expenditure 
Maxwell had calculated the cost of producing a 16 page paper with a print 
of 300,000 instead of a 14 page paper with a print of 200,000 and had 
therefore overestimated newsprint costs by £15,000. Other wages and 
costs were exaggerated by a total of £8,000. Advertising income, 
based on the amounts of the first two weeks Maxwell underestimated by 
another £8,000. Thus Maxwell had exaggerated expenditure by £23,000 
and underestimated revenue by £8,000, amounting to the losses of over 
£30,000 that he said were going to destroy the SDN. Tough had not 
verified the figures Maxwell employed, that was a misunderstanding based on 
a brief telephone conversation. (McKay and Barr, 1976, pp 80-1). 
The rebuttal was emphatic and impressive, but it remained to persuad~ 
the SDN workers that Maxwell's prophecies were largely fiction of his own 
imagination. The Federated Chapel-~as receptive to the Council's logic 
and the FCC's made it plain that they greatly resented Maxwells intrusion 
10 the affairs o~ the company. But convincing the workforce that the 
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enterprise was still viable when their confidence had been so badly 
undermined proved an altogether more difficult task. A mass meeting 
later in the week accepted Tough's reas,suring figures as accurate, but 
the sense of impending disaste~ could not be entirely dispelled. 
The solidarity of the workforce, never firmly cemented, began to crumble 
quickly under the combined blows of falling sales, increasing losses 
and Maxwell's determined intervention. John Hodgeman, who had been 
drawn to the SON by idealism from a well-paid jo~ with the Daily Record, 
watched the unfolding of events with a particular distress, as he 
observed how "as the situation deteriorated, fear, insecurity and paranoia 
set in. Maxwell nourished and cultivated the darker emotions and his 
support grew." A fear had been instilled which was never to leave ~~e 
Albion ?treet building, and the national press, consistently fed with 
the most pessimistic forecasts, ensured with frequent reports on the 
imminent collapse of the project, that there would be few moments of 
respite for the ~ workers. "Paper Denies Crisis", headlined 
the Guardian, trying to help, but only rubbing salt in the wound in 
attributing any credibility to what were vicious rumours: 
"It had been claimed that sa1e~ had dropped from about 300,000 copies 
with the first issue on 5 May to 120,000. It was also suggested that 
the management was considering evening publication instead of competing 
with established morning papers. Mr. Charles Armstrong, a member of 
the workers council, said there was absolutely no truth in either of 
these claims. The daily publishing fiqure of the paper was more than 
209,000 and it would be "economic suicide" to change to evening 
publication. " (30 May 1975). 
The Times headlined "New paper suffers big drop in Circulation", and 
continued "Several newsagents approached in Glasgow yesterday agreed that 
the early sales success of the paper. had d~inished sharply and that 
the two main competitors, the Scottish Daily Express and the Daily Record 
had recovered much of the ground lost to the Scottish Daily News in the 
first weeks of publication" (30 May 1975'. 
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However, if the national press simply reported pessimistic stories 
without providing adequate explanatory context, Private Eye seemed to 
cruelly enjoy accounting the apparent failure of the paper and reported 
with some accuracy since their ·SQurces were close to the SON that: 
1. The paper was losing E2,OOO per week. 
2. Maxwell had launched a counter-move to take control against the 
existing "appalling management". 
3. Advertising which should be 47% of content, had only ever reached 
25' in any week. 
4. The print order was down to 180,000 and circulation to 150,000. 
5. That if Maxwell's prediction of closure by October was wrong, all 
Eric Tough could offer was that "at the present rate of losses, 
the paper could survive for two years. (30 May 1975) • (private Eye 
likes to think of itself as the scourge of putative press barons such 
as Robert Maxwell, but in satirical stories such as this, exuding 
fatalistic pessimism, they only strengthened his hand by further demoralising 
the SDN workforce.) 
In mid-June when the SDN balance sheet (Table 8) and trading statement 
(Table 9) emerged for the four weeks up to 31 May, they did not support 
the doom laden warnings ~f Maxwell, though they offered little comfort 
to the comparative equanimity of the Council. 
In fact Maxwell had overestimated losses in the first four weeks by 
more than E 100,000; 
Maxwell projections Actual Figures 
Income E207,558 
£ 2,750 
4 @ £57,000 
-
£228,000 £210,308 
Expenditure 
4 @ £90,000 
-
·£360,000 £234,658 
'1'O'l'AL LOSS - '·'£132,000 TOTAL LOSS E 24,350 
TABLE 8 
SCOTTISH NE\,lS ENTERPRISES LIMITED 
~B~A~LAN~~C~E ___ S~H~E~E_T _____ A~S ____ A~.T _____ 3~1~s~t~ __ ~MA~Y ____ ==1975 
FIXED ASSETS 
Land and Building 
Plant and Fittings 
Motor Vehicles 
Issue Expenses 
Pre-paid Advertising 
CURRENI' ASSETS 
Stocks 
Debtors 
Deposits 
Bank 
Cash 
Current Liabilities 
creditors 
· ................ . 
· ................ . 
· ................ . 
· ............... ~ . 
~ 84,239 
E 285,815 
E 590,000 
E 717 
E 1,794 
962,565 
E 183,686 
H.P.Creditor ........................... 
LOANS 
Departmen t of Trade and Industry El, 200,000 
Beaverbrook E 725,000 
NET ASSETS ...................... 
REPRESENTED BY: 
Share Capital 
Cumulative Loss 
............... E628,775 
E 58,866 
• 
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E 900,000 
E 695,172 
E 26,249 
E1,621,421 
E 70,732 
E 42,000 
E1,734,153 
E 778,879 
E2,513,032 
E 18,123 
E2,494,909 
E1,925,000 
E 569,909 
E 569,909 
TABLE 9 
SCOTTISH NEWS ENTERPRISES LIMITED 
TRADING STATEMENT 
FOUR WEEKS TO 31ST MAY 1975 
Advertisement Contribution 
Circulation Contribution 
Editorial Costs f 43,431 
Production Costs £ 158,699 
Administration Costs £ 32,528 
Interest ............................. 
Donations ......................... 
Scrap ......................... 
LO S S FOR P E R I 0 D 
PRE TRADING COSTS ................. 
TOTAL LOS S 
f 
f 
£ 
E 
£ 
£ 
£ 
£ 
E 
£ 
£ 
£ 
ACTUAL 
59,492 
148,066 
207,558 
234,658 
27,100 
2,591 
4 
155 
2,750 
24,350 
34,516 
58,866 
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BUDGET 
E157,912 
E183,848 
E314,760 
£ 43,380 
E195,800 
E 30,020 
E269,200 
£ 72,560 
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Instead of running at over £30,000 per week, the ~ losses in fact 
were only averaging £6,000 per week. (Excluding the £34,516 pre-
trading costs to cover wages and other Costs in the week before the 
first edition was published) •. ln fact in the submission to the Dol the 
SDN cash flow projections had accepted that there would be an average 
monthly deficit of £45,000 in the first three months of full operation, 
and that a trading profit would only be attained after six months. (SNE 
1974,p15). However any consolation that the Council members may have 
felt that circulation income was achieving 90\ of the projected figure, 
must have been shattered by the r!alisation that advertising income was 
attaining only 37' of the figure they had anticipated, and this was 
destroying the viability of the ~ enterprise. If they had achieved 
80' of their advertising target this would have been £126,329 instead of 
£59,492. The extra £66,837 would have meant a profit of £42,487 on 
the first four weeks trading, and an overall profit of £7,971. 
'Therefore in May when he sent the telex, Maxwell's calculations were 
extremely inaccurate and unduly pessimistic; and anyway he failed to 
confront the two central and contradictory problems of the SDN: the 
shallow, inconsistent, and conservative editorial which alienated the 
paper's potential working class readership, and the political antagonism of 
advertisers who could not be convinced of the commercial conventionality 
of the ~. Yet as the months of summer passed and the performance 
of the ~ progressively deteriorated, Maxwells gloomy projections became 
depressingly accurate, due primarily to the reasons he did not recognise, 
and, ironically, due to his own divisive and damaging impact upon the 
fortunes of the co-operati va. For as circulation and advertising 
continued to fall in late May and early June, it became clearly apparent' 
that MaXwell had successfully driven a wedge between the activists on 
the Council and Federated Chapel who still hOped that the paper could 
be rescued by returning to its original principles, and the mass of 
the workforce who were terrified of the dole and were prepared to do 
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whatever Maxwell wanted if they thought this might help to save their 
jobs. 
The Management versus The Council' 
But while 'Maxwell preferred the grand strategy for taking over, 
the SON's own executive management had been quietly chipping away. On 
1 May 1975 there was a meting of the Works Council with all the SON 
executives with the heading: 
"Purpose of the Meeting: to discuss phasing out of the Shop Floor 
elected Members of The Council." 
What the Freudian slip actually meant was that: "It was agreed that 
the shop floor members of the Council would phase out their responsibilities 
and hand over to management any duties outstanding." Eric Tough 
"requested that the Council report at what stage they were still involved 
in any duties they had been allocated over the past twelve months. Be 
recognised that the Shop Floor elected delegates would be responsible 
for Policy Making and must be available for joint consultation on any 
Management problems. He proposed that Management would function as normal 
Management would, with weekly meetings of full Council." The minutes 
of the meeting then recQrd how each shop floor representative in turn, 
went through the duties he had responsibility for and passed on any 
outstanding tasks to the respective management executive present. Having 
formally handed over control of day-to-day management to the general 
manager and his staff the Council retained responsibility simply for staff 
selection, general finance and plant. The willingness and ease with 
which the shop floor representatives, who for a year had handled almost 
all the administrative work at the ~, seemed prepared to give up their 
direct control and involvement was remarkable. 
But the transfer of power was not as smooth or as complete as 
Eric.Tough intended. Council members found that their previous duties' 
business and political engagements made long before, pulled them back into 
the commercial affairs of the SON. 
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After working in the casercom 
for the first couple of weeks, Allister Mackie tired of trying to 
do two demanding jobs at once, an~ took up the position of chairman 
full-time, supposedly just for" three months to clear the backlog of 
administrative work, but in fact, for as long as he remained chairman 
of the SON. (Less defensibly, Allister Blyth occupied himself with 
organizing SON competitions, when this could easily have been done by 
one of the management staff.) More significantly, there was a 
profound reluctance among the politically aware shopfloor members of 
Council to handover their creatiop to management control. They 
distrusted management: in the past they felt Be~verbrook's management 
had exploited them, and then abandoned them, and they were determined 
not to put themselves in a position where this could happen again. 
They realised the need for the exercise of managerial technical skills 
in the SON administration, but were not prepared to accept this as 
legitimation of the power of management to make decisions so well as 
implement them. Later the general manager was to complain frequently 
that the Council was constantly assuming managerial responsibilities, 
even over minor matters: this was caused by the fact that due to 
the shortage of funds even small decisions could have serious consequences, 
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and also by the realisation that it was difficult to separate in 
practice strategic from day-to-day decision making, since the latter 
decisions tend to constrain policy decisions. Certainly the SON 
workers regarded that influence over daily management decisions was 
the first proof of workers' control. 
Furious at being consistently overruled by the shopfloor members of 
Council on what he felt to be 'commercial matters', particularly at what 
he thought was the left-wing bias of the paper which he said was 
upsetting advertisers, Eric Touch was never enamoured to the idea of 
workers self-management. Though Tough worked efficiently and 
unrelentlessly for the success of the business he was general manager of, 
he later revealed the extent of his patronising opposition to the existing 
control structure: 
"The domination of workers on the Executive Council is one of the things 
I would like to have tried to change if we had been able to get round 
to matters like that. I saw a huge educational programme that had to be 
done before these guys would get away from the emotive idea of workers 
control. We might have aspired to that after a year or two,with 
them learning the nuts and bolts of running a business. But to expect 
them to make viable c~rcial decisions straight away was an awful lot 
to hope for. 
The Action Committee said often - they said it to me, they said it in 
the prospectus - 'Oh, no , we won't interfere with management, we'll fix 
policy and we'll leave management to run the day-to-day business! ' 
What they never attempted to find out in their own minds was how they 
separated out policy from day-to-day business. And in fact everything 
became policy. The price of the pies, the design of notepaper, 
everything ••••• They never got past the stage of thinking and acting 
like an Action Committee: it's what I called the 'wooden hut syndrome' 
(the wooden hut occupied by the Action Committee during the thirteen-month 
strugqle to raise money for the newspaper). The trouble was that ~e 
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Action Committee who had worked so hard over all that time to 
keep the thing going were one kind of person, and they did that job 
terribly well. It was just possible they were quite the wrong people 
to go on and run the company. "Initially the six worker directors 
were just six of the Action Committee. That was another emotive 
decision. The workers said, 'Well, they've done so much to keep the 
thing going we can't leave them out now. But they should have. 
The people who had run the campaign had been living, eating and sleeping 
in that hut. They could meet whenever they wanted, and they did. 
But they carried the same thing oyer into the newspaper world: they 
still practically lived in the building so they could - and did- meet 
five times a day, reversing decisions taken earlier in the day, making 
it impossible for the managers to get on with the job. They'd say to 
me over and over again, 'O.K, well look after policy, you look after day-
to-day management!' But if you take away ordering newsprint, ordering 
·letterheads, deciding the layout of the ledger books, hiring a competitions 
manager, fixing salaries, what the hell is day-to-day running? 
left for me to do? 
What's 
If only, you see, they had gone for the middle road, for worker 
participation with a policy making body equally representing workers and 
management, then the two sides could have gone off to implement policy 
through their respective - and entirely different - skills. What the SDN 
failed completely to do was let the professionals get on with implementing 
their part of agreed policy. As Allister Mackie said: 'We distrust 
anyone in a suit ahd white collar'". 
(My emphasis). 
(McKay and Barr, 1976,pp 91-2). 
In suggesting that the workers should have abandoned their leaders, Tough was 
also suqgesting that the SDN should abandon the ideals of class 
struggle which had motivated the leaders of ·the co-operative in the 
first place, and thorQughly emerse themselves in 'commercial realities.' 
What undoubtedly would have resulted would have been a conservative 
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newspaper with a conventional managerial hierarchy. (Yet in response 
to the editorial weaknesses of the newspaper even Allister Mackie 
slipped into similar arguments as Tough: "The editor's chosen executives 
. 
were not experienced in their roles, and were selected more by their 
contribution to the struggle to create the paper, than by their 
individual talents. What was most of all required was an editor who 
had not been part of the struggle and who therefore could be objective 
about his promotions." (Mackie 1976,p 134). 
Tough's desire for the replacement of shopfloor representatives on 
Council by those who would take a'''connnercial view" were soon to be 
achieved, though not in the way he wpuld have chosen. The SDN 
company Scottish News Enterprises Ltd had been formed early in the 
struggle in 1974, and the AGM of the company was due on 4 June 1975. 
This meant at the height of the post-launch crises all of the elected 
members of the Works Council had to offer themselves for re-election. 
The combination of the insistent market pressures which were forCing in 
upon the co-operative, the critical disagreements between the shopfloor 
representatives on Council and the editor and general manager, and the 
ominous warnings and compelling demands of Robert Maxwell, together 
eliminated the possibility of the survival of shopfloor activists in the 
hands of a frightened workforce. In retrospect many of those who were 
actively engaged in the creation of the workers co-operative, were to 
regard its life as the bare two months of April and May, when shop floor 
representatives were in responsible control of the ent~rise, before 
Maxwell and his supporters became ascendant. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 254 
CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 
The Co-operative Structure 
Allister Mackie, the principal idealist behind the design of the 
SDN co-operative, once explained in ·~owing terms the unique position 
that he, as worker chairman, and the other worker directors, enjoyed in 
the authority structure: 
"We are a part of the work force and in this sense we are identified 
as workers. I mean we're in a very strange position actually: r as 
. 
a compositor, am answerable to my foreman, who is answerable to the 
production manager, who is answerable to Mr. Tough as the general manager, 
who is answerable to myself, as chairman, and the Works Council. So 
instead of having a horizontal or vertical structure, our whole relationship 
works within a circle, if you can appreciate it. It is totally 
revolutionary, but it's beautiful." (~2, 10 November 1975). 
How circular the authority structure effectively was, remains to be 
examined, but even Eric Tough, the battle hardened management consultant 
of several hundred assignments, whatever his misgivings about the idea 
of workers control, could recognise significant potential in the co-op~rative 
structure: 
"Here the directors are the workforce, so they take decisions both as 
workforce and as directors, and therefore as a true co-operative where 
the workers run the form of policy, and the workers share profits and 
losses •••• It works extremely well, my first reaction on being asked to 
do this job was one of great doubt. I thought about it for a while, 
and it occurred to me that this kind of structure could have many 
applications. I'm not saying that every single company should become 
a co-operative, clearly if a company i. running well and making profits 
and everyone is happy it should be left that way. But in the situation 
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where there's been prolonged confrontation with no apparent progress 
at all with both sides so deeply dug in and nothing's moving then I 
think that this sort of structure could solve the problem almost overnight." 
(BBC2, 10 November 1975). 
The governing bodies of the SDN company, Scottish News Enterprises 
Limited, were the Works Council and Investors Council. The Works 
Council had the official title of Executive Council, which shopfloor 
members were reluctant to use, and was composed as following: 
Executive Council 
i) The general manager and editor ex officio 
ii) Two members appointed by the investors council from their own number 
iii) Six directors elected by the workforce in the annual general meeting. 
All six worker directors selected by the action committee were to stand 
for re-election at the first AGM on 4 June 1975. Subsequently, shop floer 
representatives would be elected for a three year period, two retiring 
annually though available for re-election, in order to provide continuity 
on the Council. Shopfloor workers ~egarded it as of paramount 
importance that they had a built-in 6-4 majority on the Council, which they 
felt guaranteed their ultimate control. In the original submission . 
to the Dol it stated that the chairman of the Council who had a casting 
vote, should be "nominated by the six directors appointed by the holders 
of the employee shares, from their own number", though this clause was 
later dropped. (SNE, 1974, p 24). The Council enjoyed wide executive 
powers: "The Executive Council has complete control over the management 
of the company subect only to the express powers reserved to the investors 
council •••• " (SNE, 1975,p6). The SDN prospectus and articles of 
association did not pursue the relation of the editor and general manager 
to the Council, though a discussion do~ument attempted to define this area 
of potential conflict more closely: 
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liThe \'lorks Council will be the executive authority of the newspaper. 
It will deal with all matters relating to the newspaper and all 
executives of the company will be answerable to the Council. It is 
intended that the day-to-day runni~g of the paper will be left to the 
General Manager and his staff. The function of the Works Council 
will be to decide on policy, e.g. staff selection, re-planting, areas 
of finance, etc; but not on administration The running of the paper 
will be left to the General Manager and the Editor; the Works Council's 
role will be to decide on general and long-term policy. The Editor will 
assume a traditional role; but his freedom will be exercised within the 
bounds of the policy of the newspaper as outlined •••• The Council will 
appoint top management. Staffing appointments other than those mentioned, 
such as overseers will be made by the General manager, subject to 
approval by the Council. Members of the Council will not be office 
bearers in their chapels, but will be expected to be active members in 
them. The Council will regularly report to the members on their activities 
by way of a news sheet." (SON, DO, 1975). 
The Investors Council was designed to protect the financial interests 
of the wider shareholders who had only a minority representation on the 
Executive Council, and was composed thus: 
Investors Council 
i) The general manager of the company ex officio 
ii) Two members appointed by the Executive Council from their own number 
iii) Five members appointed by the holders of the ordinary shares 
The functions of the Investors Council were to appoint two directors to 
the Executive Council, to report to the ordinary shareholders, and to 
exercise a power of. veto, if considered deSirable, over decisions of the 
Executive Council which would have the following effect: 
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a) raising of capital byond 25% of the existing capital 
b) issuing shares having a nominal value in excess of 25\ of the 
nominal amount of capital of the c~mpany 'already in issue 
c) reducing t~e dividend payabie" to 'the shareholders of the company 
in any financial year below a figure representing 40% of the profit 
available for distribution by the company in the preceding financial 
year 
d) diversifying the company to a material extent in business other than 
that of proprietors, publishers, printers and editors of newspapers, 
periodicals and magazines ••••••• (SNE, 1975, pls). 
In the event, the Investors Council remained a nominal body which met 
infrequently and made no important decisions: there was no chance of the 
~ raising the loans which had been consistently refused by commercial 
institutions before, beyond the meagre funds it had already; another share 
issue was out of the question; the SDN never made any profit to pay 
dividends on (though in the remote circumstance of this occurring, SDN 
workers would have felt a deep resentment at paying a large dividend to 
Beaverbrook); finally, the prospect of the ~ diversifying into other 
activities, within or beyond publishing, was firmly precluded by its 
severe shortage of cash and other resources. 
The share capital of SNE was divided into ordinary shares and employee 
shares, both of 21 each. 
follows: 
i) Ordinary Shares 
The rights attached to the shares were as 
a) The only shares in the company to pay dividends 
b) In the event of winding up the first shares entitled to receive from 
the funds available after the payment of debts, and before the 
,holders of employee shares. 
c) To vote in the appointment of the five ~embers of the Investors Council 
d) Except in respect of a resolution to remove a director nominated 
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by the investors council, or to remove the auditors of the company, 
the holders of ordinary shares will have no voting rights in 
the general meeting of the company. No resolution may be passed 
by the holders of the employee shares altering the rights attaching 
to the ordinary shares without the prior approval in writing of the 
holders of a majority of the ordinary shares. 
e) There are no restrictions on the transfer of ordinary shares. 
ii) Employee Shares 
a) It is intended that each employee of the company will hold 100 
employee shares in the company. All ~ew employees (excluding persons 
engaged in a particul~ category of employment which the directors exclude 
from this requirement) shall be required to purchase from a trust 100 such 
shares at par on entering the employment of the company. 
b) On ceasing employment with the company the shares will revert to 
the trust and the trustees will repay to the former employee a sum representing 
the par value of the shares. 
c) The employee shares will not carry any right to dividends out of the 
profits of the company. 
d) The holders of the employee shares will be the only persons entitled 
to vote in the general meeting of the company. 
e) The employee shares will carry no dividend rights, will have deferred 
rights on the liquidation of the company, and will attract no capital 
appreciation in the period during which they are held. . (SNE, 1975,p14) 
Recognising that new workers might not have £100 to buy their employee 
shares, the company arranged to deduct this over the first year from wages, 
though the indiv~ual would be entitled to hold the shares immediately to 
allow him or her to have full voting rights in the company. Since some 
. 
of the clerical workers were paid as little as £35 per week, this £100 
represented a substantial commitment amounting to almost three weeks wages. 
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Moreover ex-Beaverbrook employees who received redundancy payments 
were expected to purchase at least £300 of ordinary shares as well 
from the money they had deposited in the trust fund, as the prospectus 
maintained, "This obviously constitutes a substantial part of the 
savings and assets of many of the employees involved. As far as 
the Executive Council is aware, the above represents a radical departure 
from traditional methods of capital financing and is evidence of the 
commitment of the employees to the success of the Company." (SNE,l975,p. 7). 
The SON workers in a progressively developing dilemma, were to discover 
all of the disadvantages of being bound to a company not only through 
dependence on a wage, but because their small savings were deposited 
there, and they were to find no benefit in this arrangement for themselves. 
The composition of the loans and share capital of SNE at the close 
of the prospectus on 28 March 1975 is listed in Table 10. The most 
staggering feature of the sources of capital is the tiny percentage 
the 
of/total - 4.4\ - which Robert Maxwell actually~contributed with his 
£114,000 to the establishment of the SON. The media constantly gave 
the impression, which Maxwell was happy to reinforce, that he was the 
major financial backer of the SON, but the Dol, Beaverbrook, the SON 
workers themselves, and the public and unions, contributed 95.6\ of SDN 
funds. Yet it was on the basis of that 4.4' which Maxwell extracted 
his demands on the final day of the prospectus, and was treated by the 
SDN workers in search of their dream of a new newspaper, as, liThe one man 
who could create that reality", in the unforgiveable phrase of McKay 
and Barr (l976,p.4). Furthermore it was o~ the basis of his 4.4\ stake 
that Maxwell was to launch his successful campaign to become the chief 
executive of the SDN. 'Maxwell was to give an object lesson in how an 
executive with a minority shareholding ,can re~dily control a company if the 
major shareholders are relatively passive. In this respect the restraint 
of Beaverbrook is interesting, (thoUgh they had already secured the one 
TABLE 10 
Sources of SNE Capital As At 28 March 1975. 
LOANS 
Department of Industry 
Beaverbrook Limited 
SHARES 
Employee Shares 
Ordinary Shares: 
Workers 
Beaverbrook Limited 
Public and Unions 
R.Maxwe11 
R.Agnew 
TOTAL CAPITAL RAISED 
Settlement 
PUrchase Price of Building 
Cash Balance on Entry to 
Building 
£1,200,000 
£ 725,000 
£ 33,600 
. 
£ 201,000 
£ 141,075 
£ 125,325 
£ 114,000 
£ 10,000 
£2,550,000 . 
£1,600,000 
£ 950,000 
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Percentage of Percentage ~-'-'_ 
Total Share Capital Total Capital. 
47% 
28.4\ 
5.4% 1.4\ 
32.2% 7.9\ 
22.6\ 5.5\ 
20.0\ 5.0\ 
18.2\ 4.4\ 
1.6\ 0.4\ 
100\ 100\ 
(Source: Derived from: SNE, General Managers Report No.1, 21 May 1975). 
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million pounds plus which they hoped for from the sale of the Albion 
Street site): at no point did they attempt to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the SDN through the investors council as a 
shareholder to defend the large loans they had made, and presumably 
Beaverbrook had more or less written off their £500,000 unsecured loan from 
the start. However in the unlikely event of the SDN prospering at 
the expense of the Express, there was a clause in the unsecured loan 
agreement which allowed the loan to be converted irito SDN shares at the 
rate of £2 per share; if Beaverbrook had converted all the loan to shares 
it would have been in a strong position to take over the investors 
council and therefore control the financial future of the SDN: it would 
have been the ultimate irony, if due to the success of the co-operative 
set up because of the Beaverbrook closure, the SDN found itself controlled 
once more by Beaverbrook! (SNE, 1975,p.8). 
Apart from the governing bodies and novel share structure, the SDN 
company was designed along conventional lines. Table n shows the orthodox 
management and departmental structure of the S~ Senior, middle 
and first line management presided over the division of labour into the 
ed~torial, clerical and manual tasks normally found in the newspaper 
industry. Once this structure began to solidify, with traditional 
hierarchical authority relations and restricted job tasks,there was little 
scope for active involvement of shopfloor workers in the general decision 
making at the SDN. The shopfloor members of the Executive Council were to 
attend to the interests of the workforce in their representative capacity, 
but little thought was given to how the Council members would connect 
with and inform their shopfloor constituencies. It was proposed that SON 
~members meetings will be held quarterly or more often as required to keep· 
everyone -informed and everyone involved"; but although mass meetings 
took place more frequently, in fact e~ry few-weeks on an intermittent 
basis in response to rapidly changing events and crises, the workers 
remained inadequ&tely informed and the meetings, in the way they were 
r 
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arranged 
Idid not prove a sufficient means for constructive involvement. 
Intermediate bodies between the Council and the shop floor were necessary 
to disseminate information and allow eff~ctive participation in decisions, 
but the existance of a conventional management precluded this. 
The trade union chapels at the SDN never achieved the central role 
that they may have expected in a workers enterprise. There was not a 
close working relationship between the shop floor Council members and 
the chapels, and as the problems of the ~ developed/distrust grew. 
Allister Mackie was aware of the nature of the problem early in the 
co-operative's life, in June he said, "The Works Council would like to 
meet the workers regularly every six weeks to try to keep up a constant 
flow of communication. So far we have not succeeded in this, and we 
have no formal procedure yet. This has not been deliberate, but we 
have not got around to it. We tell the FOCs everything, but they don't 
communicate back to the workforce in the chapels." In particular 
there was a rift between the more radical Council members and the chapels 
with traditional, and often reactionary, inclinations such as the Scottish 
Graphical Association. However the chapels which supported the shopfloor 
council members, particularly th~ engineers and APEX, were in a slight 
majority on the federated chapel. Potentially the federated chapel 
could have been the arena in which important questions were debated with the 
Council members and decided upon, but though union activists pressed for 
this, it never actually happened. Instead the federated chapel despite 
the rhetoric concerning its importance, was confined to a traditional, 
rest~icted role: 
'l'OCs Committee 
"The role of this body will be vital. It will be to discuss working 
conditions; safety and health; production improvements (subject to 
union co-operation); discussion of in4ividual chapel grievances, functioning 
as part of the disputes procedure, penSions; sick scheme: liaison 
between Works Council and workforce. A member of the Works Council will 
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be available to be ill attendance if requested, at all meetings of the FOCs, 
to report to the FOCs on Council decisions. Meetings ~ill be held 
regularly at a time suitable to all FOCs. 
Chapels making approaches to tHe works council on any issue will do 
so through the FOes committee. The approach eventually will be a joint 
one between the chapel concerned and the FOCs Committee and, if required, 
the appropriate union official. When a chapel seeks to negotiate an 
internal improvement, the approach initially will be made to the department 
overseer. Assuming the overseer agrees with the proposal, the chapel 
will then process the proposal through the FOCs Committee. In the 
event of the overseer not agreeing to the proposal, the chapel may then 
invoke the Disputes Procedure." (SDN, DO, 1975) 
The critical democratic weakness of the ~, in both co-operative 
the lack of 
and trade union terms, was/any facility for the active involvement of 
ordinary rank and file members, so that they could be fully informed about 
and exert control over major decisions. This shopfloor passivity was 
a legacy of the past in that capitalist management discourage any active 
shopfloor involvement in decision making; and the normal pattern of 
trade union organization is an active shop steward bureaucracy and a largely 
inert rank and file. Moreover during the year of unemployment, there was 
an opportunity to break with the tradition which was not taken; the 
Action Committee assumed the responsible decision making role and the 
workers participation was constrained to occasional mass meetings. The 
problem for the Action Committee and later Works Council members was that 
they considered many of the SDN workers to be politically beyond redemption; 
the workers exhibited little socialist or trade union consciousness and 
seemingly were overwhelmed in their vulnerable position, by misconceived 
self-interest. But these weaknesses in the workforce may have been 
more effectively ove~come by a concerted campaign of education and involvement, 
rather than by adopting a paternalistic approach combined with a 
manipulative restriction of sensitive information. Robert Maxwell was 
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quick to identify the split between the SDN workers and their 
representatives on Council and the federated chapel; it was a simple 
matter for someone with his overwhelming powers of persuasion to widen 
the gap, isolating the two groups ~f workers and leaving himself in 
command. 
The Struggle for Control of The Council. 
The Annual General Meeting. 
The crisis which determined the ultimate end df the co-operative 
occurred early in the newspaper's life. 
In the first month of full operation it became clear that the Works 
Council was effectively in control ~f the SDN, and since shop floor 
representatives were in a majority on the Council, it was they who made 
the important decisions, to the frustration of the general manager and 
the fury of Robert Maxwell. However the shopfloor members of Council 
had to submit themselves for re-election at the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) of Scottish News Enterprises on 4 June 1975, and there were grave 
doubts whether the conservative workforce would continue to support them. 
Ronnie Gibson the APEX FOe argued, "The original six shopfloor reps 
on the Works.Council were elected by the 17 man Action Committee, the 
workforce probably wouldn't have electe five of them." The most vulnerable 
were the group around Allister Mackie who most actively opposed Robert 
Maxwell and defended the powers of' Council: James Russell, the astute 
financial journalist; harlie Armstrong a hard-headed and impressive 
member of the NGA, who was the only member of Council who could stand toe-to-toe 
with Maxwell and swap aggression; and Jimmy McNamara of the AUEW, who 
had struggled indefatiquably to achieve the trade union acceptance of the SDN. 
In attacking the Council, Maxwell frequently directed his fierce criticisms 
at these individuals, who had·worked so hard to establish the co-operative. 
As John Hodgeman put it : 
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"The main recipients of the torrent.s of abuse among the directors 
(apart from Mackie) were financial journalist Jim Russell, whose economic 
insight of the firm's affairs led him to .suspect Maxwell; Charlie 
Armstrong, a stereotyper, who freq~ently and earthily expressed his 
distaste for Maxwell; and Jimmy McNamara, an engineer whose practical 
communistic philosophy did not endear him to the man who insisted on 
calling all and sundry 'brother'." 
There was a feeling among some of the more conservative workers that "the 
works council should have handed over to the experts by now", which 
would have inclined these workers to the more management oriented candidates, 
but the bizzare proceedings at the AGM could never have taken place 
without Robert Maxwell's startling intervention. 
At a meeting of 'the Works Conncil an hour before the AGM was to 
commence on the morning of the 4 June, Maxwell took the opportunity to make 
the demands once more that the paper should be relaunched on a 24 hour 
b.asis, or that a separate Glasgow evening paper should be launched. When 
he was once again rebuffed, Maxwell resigned from his co-chairmanship of 
the SDN and from the Council. The resignation may have impressed the 
other Council members more if it. had not occurred at 9.30 a.m, when it was 
understood from the articles of association of the company that resignation 
and re-election to the Council was necessary anyway at the AGM at 10 a.m, 
and that the Chairman would be elected by the new Council. But Maxwell's 
actions then astonished the Council members. He marched to the AGM, 
and at the entrance demanded his employee shares, which were refused. 
Maxwell had tried i~ the past to obtain employee shares, without success 
since although he was a director of the company he was not officially 
~mployed by the.SDN. On the front page of the SNE prospectus it stated 
quite clearly that, "The Employee Shares ••• alone entitle the holders 
to attend and vote "at general meetin(}8 of the Company", and refers to 
the articles of association,where it states "The holders of the Employee 
Shares will be t~e only persons entitled to vote in General Meeting." 
(SNE, 1975,p.l,14). Therefore Maxwell had no right to be at the AGM, 
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let alone to dominate the platform as he proceeded to do. 
The meeting was a constitutional disaster, Charlie Armstrong 
explained: 
"Allister Mackie did not get out h"is first sentence which he began, 
'It has always been considered essential that the Works Councillors 
should be shopfloor representatives .••••• , when Blyth, who had been 
primed by Maxwell, called 'Point of Order', and said that this was not 
in the articles of association which merely stated that Works Councillors 
had to be elected by the shopfloor." Charlie Armstrong was appalled 
at this intervention, he explained 4 "The irony was that" there had been 
long emotional debates on the Action Committee as to whether Works 
Councillors should be shopfloor representatives. Blyth and Goldberg 
insisted that this should be the case, but me and Mackie argued that 
management and editorial staff had the right to be represented on a one 
man one vote basis." 
Having seized control of the business of the meeting, Maxwell announced 
that he was prepared to stand as a shopfloor representative on Council, 
whereupon he was promptly nominated. Mackie and other members of 
the Council angrily protested that "a shopfloor representative should be 
a shopfloor worker" and that nominations had closed, but they were overruled. 
The result was that there were 13 nominations for the 6 shopfloor workers 
seats on Council, including Maxwell,the assistant editor Nathan Goldberg, 
the advertisi~g manager and circulation manager. Maxwell bombarded the 
meeting with rhetoric, "he accused the Works Council of mismanagement 
and declared that the situation could be remedied only by his being involved 
in the company as a shopfloor member of the Council. The meeting was 
constantly interrupted and its business disrupted by points of procedure 
and by Maxwell openly disputing the lawyers interpretation of the Companies 
• 
Act.- (Mackie, 1976,p.l33). -Maxwell told them frequently, forcefully, 
and convincingly, that he and he alone could save the enterprise." 
and Barr, 1976, p.114). 
(MCKay 
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Barely a third of the SDN workers attended the AGM, many were on 
duty or at home after the night shift. There had been little 
preparation for the meeting due to pressure of work during the first month; 
the FOes had agreed to support the existing Council members at the 
AGM, but the NUJ FOC did not even attend. The democratic conduct 
of the AGM was not expedited by a complicated multiple voting procedure 
which few properly understood. Jimmy McNamara stoically recalled the 
sorry affair: 
"I'm being critical of absolutely nobody, when I say that Maxwell took 
control, literally took control of that meeting. He ended up telling 
the workers - 'this is the way you do it.' He made the lawyers look 
fools, he made the workers look fools, he made the Works Council look 
fools. This was the background to it. There was only a minority of 
voters, 180 at the meeting out of 500 workers, and proxies were nae 
pursued. There was an awful lot of work wasnae done by the Works Council, 
we were so naive. The legal voting procedure was strange, because 
we were all trade unionists from the shopfloor, and we'd never seen the 
legal set-up and legal jargon before. And when it was said, 'This is 
how it must. be done, you vote for and against, they retire, and then the 
next nominations and you vote for and against ••• • the workers were confused. 
Maxwell wasnae confused. All the XS went down against X for Maxwell, 
he made sure of that. I think the vote was confused because we wasnae 
used to the legal procedures ••••• But there are occasions when leaving 
it to professionals doesn't work either. Because the lawyers didnae 
know anything more than us, they were experts in law, but they were nae 
experts in workers co-operatives, or what we were doing anymore than we 
were ••••• Maxwell agreed at a Council meeting that he couldn't possibly 
represent the shopfloor. Nobody believed him, and when we went into the 
mass meeting we were proved correct. • Och, morally he couldnae stand 
as a workers representative, but come to the point he did. It was 
beautifully done, you've got to hand it to him he's a master, I sat and 
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I smiled because I was watch in a master at work the way he manoeuvred. 
Sad at the end of the day, but " 
Charlie Armstrong reacted more passionately as he watched the rapid 
disintegration of the workers co-operative they had laboured so long to 
create: 
"At this meeting Maxwell seized control of the microphone and of the 
proceedings. He refused to allow the lawyers present to intervene. On 
the first vote Jimmy McNamara was thrown off the Works Council. We'd 
previously agreed that if anyone was not re~elected onto the Works Council, 
after 14 months hard work on the Action Committee, we'd all resign in 
sympathy and let them stew in it. I asked one of the lawyers present, 
and he said the way the meeting was being conducted was unconstitutional. 
So I turned to Mackie when McNamara was voted out and said 'that's it, 
lets call the whole thing off and have another meeting later, Maxwell's 
obviously done his pressurizing, we'd better do some ourselves.' But 
Mackie wouldn't have it. That's the problem with the Labour Party, 
they're all survivors. If they can they'd rather just survive than fight. 
Mackie let it carry on and was elected himself. Mackie badly let do¥O 
McNamara who had supported him tooth and nail for 14 months, who had 
given everything he had to the co-operative ideal." 
The result of the ballot was that Mackie and Blyth were safely 
elected, Lindsay and Russell had comfortable majorities, Nathan Goldberg, 
with Blyth the principal Maxwell supporter, knocked out Charlie Armstrong, 
and fina\ly Robert Maxwell knocked out Jimmy McNamara, though he scraped 
home last with a majority of seven votes, after a recount, and a net total 
of 68 votes out of a potential 500. The general manager, editor, and two 
outside shareholders were already ex officio members of the Council, thus , 
the six to four majority of shopfloor representatives neatly had been 
reversed to a six to four majority of investor and management representatives. 
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As far as many activists involved in the ~ were concerned, this 
heralded the end of the co-operative, and Charlie Armstrong decided to 
immediately submit his resignation from the newspaper in protest: 
"On 4 June at the AGM Mr. Maxwell regained an executive position in the 
company and I left it. Because, quite frankly, there's no way ~x. Maxwell 
can work as part of a group, collective responsibility means absolutely 
nothing to him. So I decided rather than work for Robert Maxwell I 
would leave the company. People go for the Maxwells of this world, 
because they see him as a success, and they forget what.the struggle was 
all about was for a workers co-operative newspaper. And they're prepared 
to throw all that out of the window for the sake of employment. Not 
that I blame them, because I said when I left - I'm in a position being a 
bachelor, I've got no commitments, I can put the workers co-operative before 
anything else. whereas they must put their wives and families and full 
employment before anything else." (BBC2, 10 November 1975). 
Charlie Armstrong had striven unceasingly for 14 months to help set up 
the co-operative, while living on the dole, at enormous personal sacrifice, 
"I lost my car, I lost my flat, I lost my girlfriend ...... Yet within a 
month of the launch of the paper, he resigned rather than work for Maxwell 
who he felt had taken over control of the co-operative. In contrast to 
Maxwell's mock resignation of that day, which at worse would have necessitated 
another sojourn at Headington Hill Hall in Oxford, Armstrong faced another 
long bout of unemployment in depressed .Glasqow. TO alienate so completely 
one of the most devoted supporters of the ~, at such an early stage, must 
stand as a lasting indictment of Maxwell's role in the affair. But 
Armstrong, if anything, was even more distresse~ about the treatment of 
JiDlDy McNamara: 
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"Maxwell never put a penny into the ~ until 28 f.larch. McNamara 
raised £5,000 for the fighting fund and £5,000 investment for the SDN 
from engineering factories, UCS and other shipyards. He used his 
influence, and gave his word the paper was under workers control. Yet 
he was thrown off the Council because 'he's a communist'. The weakness 
we faced up to from the word 'go' was the workforce. They're rejecting 
the guys who fought to get this newspaper going in favour of an old boss." 
Jimmy McNamara, secure in the knowledge that he enjoyed the solid support 
of the engineers chapel, was determined to fight on to salvage the SDN 
for the labour movement: 
"Charlie's so disgusted, Charlie's leavin. But I think we've a duty 
not to create a monster, and a paper run by Maxwell is a monster. No 
way does trade union money - and thats where we got most of the money, off 
the workers on the shopfloor" and off our own workers - go to make a newspaper 
for him. People throw the question at you, 'You worked for Beaverbrook, 
whats the difference, why won't you work for Maxwell?' There's a big 
difference, I'll tell you what the difference is: 
One: 
Two: 
Three: 
Four: 
I didna help to create Beaverbrook 
I didnae encourage the trade unions to pay money to help set up 
Beaverbrook and promise them it would help them 
I didnae pay £700 for a job off Beaverbrook 
I didnae help to run Beaverbrook." 
The active trade unionists at the ~ were distraught at what they had 
witnessed, John Hodgeman of the NUJ said: 
"To me the frightening aspect of Maxwell's election was that he got on to 
the Works Council directly as a workers representative. This meant 
that the constitution of the co-operative had been effectively destroyed 
since it laid down originally that six out of the ten directors must be 
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elected directly from the shop floor, and Maxwell, of course, was not 
a worker. As an ordinary member of the workforce, I could see absolutely 
no worth that Maxwell brought to the fi~. He continued a campaign 
of villification against Mackie,. Russell and Tough, referring to them 
as 'incompetents' and saying that he could not co-exist with them. At 
two mass meetings in the next month after the AGM, he made it quite clear 
to the workforce - that they had the choice of following Mackie and his 
supporters, or of going the way of Maxwell ••.•• Now he's managed to get 
himself elected as a shopfloor representative, my immediate reaction was 
to resign. I left the Daily Record which- which although it operates in 
the normal capitalist set-up/has a very progressive management for the 
newspaper industry. And I came here for us to have say, to have 
participation, to have workers control. And there's no way I'm going 
to stay with it if I'm going back to a situation that is worse than the 
Daily Record. There's no way I can get my job back" with the Daily Record. 
But y'know if the nice weather continues I'd rather dig roads than work 
for Maxwell." 
At the investors meeting following the AGM, Maxwell stood for the 
Investors Council, was elected, and consolidated his position at the SDN. 
But the press conference.he called immediately after was not as triumphant 
as he may have imagined since Mackie was there to disabuse him of the 
notion that he was still co-chairman, to the satisfaction of the assembled 
press people: 
"Mr. Maxwell whose executive powers and title of publisher have already 
been removed by the Executive CounCil, told the Press conference he 
assumed that he would remain co-chairman if re-elected. But Mr. Mackie 
sitting beside him, said he understood the publisher had reSigned as 
co-chairman and could only be re-elected by the executive council." 
(Scotsman,S June i97S). Despite Maxwell's threat that after removing 
McNamara and Armstrong frau the Council, Mackie was next, the subsequent 
Council meeting re-elected Mackie as chairman, and refused to give Maxwell 
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either executive powers or restore his co-chairmanship. When the 
spectre of Maxwell holding two seats on the Councils through his membership 
of the Investors Council was raised, the. engineers at the SDN threatened 
immediate strike action which b~ought a quick denial from Blyth and 
Goldberg and prompted another story in Private Eye. (13 June 1975). 
The commercial and editorial problems of the SDN were being greatly 
amplified in the external media because of the scandel involved in 
Maxwell's conflict with the Works Council, at the same time as any effort 
to tackle these problems internally was being sabotaged, as the Scotsman 
accurately perceived in the conduct of the AGM, "any discussion and decisions 
. 
that the meeting might have had to try to right the situation were 
swiftly forgotten as interest centre~ on Mr. Maxwell's manoeuvres". 
(5 June ~975). 
"The workers are guaranteed permanent control of the company and 
need have no fears ever of lOSing control",the SDN special edition 
confidently announced to the TUC in September 1974. When they had 
recovered from the shock of what had happened the trade union activists 
at SON, who had collected thousands of pounds from the labour movement on 
the assurance that the enterpris~ was to be run under workers control, felt 
severely compromised, Charlie Armstrong said: 
"I addressed Fleet Street, Rolls Royce, and other big factories, and they 
all asked the same question 'What about Robert Maxwell?' I said, 'There's 
no way he can get control'. I didn't think of our own workforce -
that they would elect him! The Glasgow branch secretary of the NGA 
is on the national executive. I prOmised him seven weeks ago that I 
would reSign if. Maxwell got control. Be rang up after the AGM and 
said, 'Well, what are you going to do?' I said 'I'm going to resign.'" 
Jimmy McNamara, after a lifetime of fighting ~ppressive employers, was 
amazed at what the !E! workers had done: 
"We went out and we assured all those workers that we got money off, 
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that no way could Maxwell take control, which was correct, he couldna 
take control. But I never dreamed for a minute that the workers would 
give him control." 
A lot of emphasis in the explanaation of this political disaster 
has bee placed on the problems of the democratic structure of the SDN: 
that the co-operative, in the poor timing of the AGM 50 soon after the 
launch, "crippled ourselves in observance of the law" as Mackie put it; 
that the articles of association should have read that employee representation 
be elected "by and from" the worke::s, instead of simply "by" the workers; 
and finally, that the democratic procedure itself was an inherent source 
of weakness, as McKay and Barr argue" paradoxically, the very democratic 
structure of the enterprise was Maxwell's strongest card. With the 4 
June election result to reassure him, Maxwell knew that he could go 
directly to the workforce through the device of mass meetings and, by 
presenting the issue in stark terms, guarantee himself a majority of 
supporters at the meeting." (1976,p 116). But the basic reason ~~xwell 
was able to exploit these constitutional arrangements so effectively 
to,his own advantage was the funtlamental lack of political consciousness 
and organization among the ~ workers themselves. One approach would 
have been to provide more powerfu~ leadership, Charlie Armstrong was a 
convincing advocate of this: 
"Allister Mackie is too democratic. If the workforce were not educated 
enoUgh to know what ,was happening, we should have forced them to realise. 
The Council should have resigned and put it ·to a vote but Mackie 
compromised ••• '. Mackie was convenor for 9 years, but he was never 
militant.. Be always had to be pushed from below. The FOes or shopfloor 
used to take action and then he woul~be brought in, he very rarely led 
the disputes. Mackie had to be pushed to fight Maxwell. Once I 
condemned him for what was happening. Later Maxwell joined the meeting 
I., 
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and Mackie really let him have it. He told him 'Why didn't he take 
his money and go, that he was a disgrace to the I~bour Party, that 
he'd be better off in the National Front'. 
laughed." 
Maxwell, as always, just 
Mackie was the most unlikely adversary imaginable for the loud, tough, 
and continual pugnacity of Maxwell. Mackie was an idealist and 
romantic, an avid reader of Burns who lived in a small cottage in Lothian; 
soft spoken, warm and humane, he opposed Maxwell on moral grounds as 
much as political. Mackie was a pluralist who believed implicitly in the 
democratic process, as he put it "I am an ex domine leader - I take the 
consensus and then implement it.' But Mackie was no match for the 
cunning of Maxwell who fully understood that 'democratic procedures' 
could be easily employed as a tool of manipulation as they could for 
gaining and responding to the informed and free expression of the will of 
~ body of people. 
However it is too easy to argue that Mackie and the other Council 
members should have hammered home constantly to the workforce the danger 
to the co-operative presented by. Maxwell's ambitions, though they certainly 
could have done more to alert and educate the workforce. The 
fundamental weakness of the Works Council's position was that what they 
regarded as the gravest danger of all - that Maxwell would take over 
completely and run the paper as his own concern - was regarded by many 
of the workforce, misled by the potential security of Maxwell's millions, 
as quite an accept~le, and even a reassuring fate. This profound weakness 
in the political commitment of the ~ workers was present from the 
.beginning and it was upon this that the layers of contradictions and the 
compromises inherent in the enterprise were built which were to ensure 
that imminently the co-operative woul-d .. come crashing down. Whether a 
co-operative newspaper could function in a capitalist market system and 
remain true to i~s ideals, however strongly motivated, is doubtful. 
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What is certain is that with such a traditional workforce, and with the 
involvement of Robert Maxwell, the survival of the SDN as a co-operative 
was impossible. The sombre conclusion of McKay and Barr 
was that: 
"The initial motivation - and the only motivation for most of the workforce -
was saving jobs; the fact that the jobs were to be in a worker 
controlled enterprise was incidental ••• leaving aside the matter of 
Robert Maxwell, therefore, the Scottish Daily News was very far from being 
a straightforward attempt by politically motivated idealists to create 
a model alternative to capitalist. tontrol of the means of production ••• 
But the dichotomy between those who believed in the workers' co-operative 
as such, and those w~o saw the co-operative merely as a necessary 
expedient to preserving 500 jobs, meant that the project had the seeds 
of conflict in it from the start. The dichotomy showed at all stages of 
the project and in many ways - in Executive Council m~etings, in editorial 
meetings, in the inconsistent content of the paper and in the bitter 
breakdown of relations within the workforce which several times threatened 
to flare into violence." (1976,pp 84-6). 
The Second Maxwell Telex 
After retreating to Oxford for ten days Maxwell chose to castigate 
the Council and offer another bold plan of action in a second 1,200 word 
telex addressed to Allister Mackie and the Council members. It began by 
complaining of the short notice given for the Council meeting of that day 
13 June and insisted, "In view of the lack of proper notice I must ask you 
.to accept that ,this is not a properly convened meeting and is therefore 
not empowered to transact any formal business." He complained that 
he had not been provided with suffici~~t circulation and advertiSing informatior. 
and maintained: 
. ,
• 
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"I warned you and the Council that if you did not allow me to play a 
full part as originally intended by us, all, and you cannot find anybody 
else to take my place with'my publishing' and business talents and contacts, 
then there will be a failure of "the launch strategy and our advertisement 
manager will not be able to get the necessary advertising support on 
his own. To this you replied 'We do not need your help. We can manage 
on our own and we must be allowed to make our own mistakes.' This rather 
cavalier decision is all right if you were dealing with your own money 
but totally wrong when you are dealing with public funds and you have the 
security of 500 jobs as your respo~sibility and when you knew that there 
was nobody else on the Executive Council with the necessary publishing 
and business talents to replace me. 1I 
Maxwell then produced his grand scheme for the recovery of the SON: 
"As promised, I hereby submit for consideration by the Council the 
following plan of action to save the paper and its 500 jobs: 
a) The supreme policy making body is the Executive Council which will 
meet regularly once a month and have special meetings when required to 
deal with major and important matters. The co-chairman and the general 
manager will implement the Executive Council's decisions and report back 
on the results. 
b) We resume the agreed and approved arrangement by both the Executive 
Council and our workforce namely that I as one of the co-chairman will be 
responsible under the control of the executive council for the commercial 
policies of the paper and you as the other co-chairman will be responsible 
for relations with our workforce, trade unions and shareholders. 
c) The general manager to have day-to-day operating control over the 
-business referring major matters for decision to either of us or the 
Executive Council as appropriate. • The editor to be in sole control of 
the editorial contents of the paper. 
In order to increase immediately and dramatically our circulation we 
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should run a regular half page advertisement for the next 7 days 
inviting retired or unemployed teachers, trade unionists, and other 
professional people to become voluntary ambassadors of the SDN in their 
neighbourhood for the purpose of increasing on a sustained basis the 
sale of the paper in their locality and to do this under the control of 
our full-time circulation staff. We would offer to pay by way of expenses 
E5. per week to each volunteer. I am ready to provide the text of the 
advertisement, the terms of appointment of such voluntary agents, and 
to write a one page briefing instruction to them in co-operation with 
our distribution manager of how to. do their. job. 
I am willing to take over immediate policy responsibility for 
increasing with the help of our advertisement manager and his staff the 
sale of advertising space, and I am confident that I can increase the 
sale of advertising space immediately and within the next 4-6 weeks by 
at least fifty per cent of its present volume and to 75\ of this present 
level within ten weeks of being given the 'green light' by the Council 
to go ahead. 
Jointly with the editor and all members of the Council and the editorial 
staff we Will immediately relaunch the paper with a relaunch expenditure not 
to exceed E20,000 and to reduce the price of the paper to 5p under the 
slogan of 'The SDN helps to fight inflation by reducing its price to 5p'. 
I am prepared to devote the bulk of my time for the next three 
months toSDN' affairs in Glasgow, and hope that this will appeal to you 
and all our colleagues on the Executive Council not only as a real and 
positive step towards mending the rift that exists between us but much 
more important as a way to taking positive action to save our paper 
from extinction by slow death over the next six months or so. 
Mr. Dallas and Mr. Tough should beable to confirm to you that our 
• 
present losses are running at between £15/20,000 per week. This 1s orAe 
hell of a sum and far worse when compared to the report issued by Mr. Tough 
to our workforce. You do not need to be a financial genius to understand 
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our present rate of losses if allowed to continue will make our 
survival impossible. 
I ask you again why should we not all work together to save the 
paper and to make it prosperous; the way we once did to get it launched? 
I am ready to do my part. Should not each and everyone of you be 
ready to do the same? 
Regards and Best Wishes 
Robert Maxwell." 
After making allowances for the difficulties in coherence due to telex 
transmission, the bad grammar, use of slang, and poor logical sequence of 
Maxwell's communication seem to indicate that it was hurriedly written, 
or spoken, in a state of some excitement. It was widely interpreted 
at the SDN at the time as another crude attempt to reassert control over 
Mackie and the Council. But although its dire warnings may have been 
sufficient to add to the panic of the workforce, many of whom read it since 
there was free access to the telex machine as Maxwell was aware, the warnings 
and plans did not impress the majority of the Council who had already 
embarked on an emergency strategy to revive the paper. Moreover, even if 
the Council were inclined to, Maxwell's sketchily presented proposals could 
scarcely be considered a serious programme of action. The references to 
advertising were taken to be wild promises, and when Maxwell later was 
qiven the opPOrtunity to carry out his advertising campaign, this opinion 
proved accurate. 
Preparation For The Relaunch. 
Having stumbled badly at the hurdle of the AGM, the ~ Council had 
to-quickly discover some dramatic way to halt.the gradual financial 
haemorrhaging of the newspaper. By ~3 June circulation had levelled out 
at 145,000, advertising had reached a lower base, weekly losses were 
estimated at £15-18,000, and mere survival had become the immediate object. 
I 
I 
~ 
,j 
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Eric Tough pointed out "that even at 150,000 circulation we required 
only 3.25 pages of advertisements to meet fixed current costs. This 
was less than half the figure of 47% mentioned in the prospectus and 
was not so far above our current ~evel of business as to make the 
achievement of break-even very difficult. With hard work we will succeed." 
(WCM, 13 June 1975). A series of competitions were arranged including 
cross the ball, and a car competition, and advertisements publicising 
these booked for radio and television. Also Sys·tem Three Scotland, 
a firm of market researchers, were hired to carry out a readership audit. 
Finally the idea was raised of recruiting large numbers of housewives 
or members of the Supporters Club to sell advertising space to small 
retailers; together with loudspeaker vans and local promotion in holiday 
resorts. . At this meeting, which was the first of the reconstituted 
Council, the trade union support for the paper was forgotten and only purely 
commercial competitive means of increasing circulation considered. 
The following Council meeting on 18 June welcomed the two 
representatives of the Investors Council, William Bargh of the Co-operative 
Society, and James Milne, general-secretary-elect of the Scottish Trade 
Union Congress. (Other members of the Investors Council included 
William Wolfe, chairman of the Scottish National Party; Dennis Canavan, 
the West Stirlingshire Labour MPi"and Robert Maxwell, (who announced at 
this meeting that he was standing down to retain his seat on the Executive 
Council. The articles of association stated clearly that with the 
exceptiDn of the two members of the Investors Council elected from the 
Executive Council, employees of the SDN were ineligible for the Investors 
Council. Mackie, as chairman,and Russell were elected to these positions 
at the Executive Council meeting of 13 June, therefore if Maxwell was to 
preserve his claim to be an employee of SDN he had to take the unusual 
step, for htm, of standing down. Bowe~er should the Investors Council 
assume any importance in the future, Maxwell at least had the power to 
veto any former employees being elected to it, since the articles allowed 
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any shareholder with more than 10% of the shares the power to do this). 
(SNE, 1975,p15). For the first time the full complement of new 
members were present; fortunately ~llister Mackie was reinforced by the 
presence of Milne and Bargh, and a pattern of voting was established 
which endured for several meetings: 
roR AGAINST 
Allister Mackie Robert Maxwell 
James Russell Alister Blyth 
Jimmy Lindsay Nathan Goldberg 
Eric Tough 
Jimmy Milne 
William Bargh 
(Fred Si1lito) 
At first, therefore, there remained a clear majority for the Mackie camp, 
however, this was dependent on the presence of the outside directors, who 
were often absent, and the possibility was opened up, which Maxwell later 
exploited fully, for him to secure a majority vote at poorly attended 
meetings. 
The business of this meeting, as with most of the other Council 
meetings which Maxwell attended, was largely taken up with matters he 
had raised himself. The complaint about inadequate notice 
was repeated by Maxwell, and it was agreed that future 
meetings of the Council be held each Friday at 10.30 a.m though Jimmy 
Milne proposed 24 hours be deemed reasonable notice for additional 
meetings. Then followed a long and heated debate about the recent telex; 
relations with major distributors was raised, and the minutes record how 
"Mr Maxwell questioned the ability of anyone other than himself to arrange 
a meeting with the Chairman of Menzies Limited." Maxwell then put forward 
his proposals for an immediate relaunch with a lp price reduction to Sp. 
I 
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This was countered by Tough pointing out that the market research 
study was examining in detail the style and content of the paper with 
a view to modifications and'would be completed by the end of July, 
when a more convincing relaunch might be possible. Stymied, Maxwell 
turned to another proposal "that he would like to publish, at his own 
risk and expense, an evening newspaper in Glasgow, operating on a tenant 
basis from the premises of the SON at 195 Albion Street, Glasgow. He 
further advised that once the newspaper was established and economically 
viable he envisaged selling it, at cost, to Scottish News Enterprises 
Limited. " The only conclusion that the Council reache<;'i on this was that 
there would have to be considerable study of the idea. Finally, Maxwell 
proposed that there should be regular monthly mass meetings convened 
under the auspices of the federated chapel, and Goldberg that the edited mi:lut",': 
of the Council should be circulated to the workforce. This sudden enthusia~ 
for the merits of mass involvement was a result of their recent success 
at the AGM, and realisation that similar results could be engineered at 
future meetings. How convincing was the conversion was revealed at the 
following Council meeting where Goldberg after repeating the request that 
edited council minutes be circulated to the workforce, asked "that Works 
Councillors not attend chapel meetings", which clearly would have destroyed 
whatever direct communication there was between the two bodies (WCM 2 July,197S) . 
(The erratic and often inconsistent behaviour of Goldberg and Blyth 
during these ~onths can only be explained by their determined support for 
Maxwell in the ruthless Council in-fighting). 
Despite the cumulatively deteriorating finances of the SDN during' 
the month of July, steady progress was made towards the relaunch of the 
newspaper. One important reaSon for the comparative equanimity was the 
absence of Robert Maxwell, who missed the three consecutive Council 
, 
meetings of that month despite the fact that more than a week's notice 
was given for the two later meetings. In fact, this was the typical 
pattern of Maxwell's activity at the ~ - long periods of up to a month of 
I 
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absence, interspersed with bouts of intense activity during a 
few days attendance. The only reason he was able to keep a grip on 
events at SDN frem Oxford, was that he had a handful of avid supporters, 
who were prepared to keep in cons~ant telephone communication, and carry 
out most of his instructions. When Maxwell was away, a relative calm 
and purposefulness descended on the SDN, there was some friction (much of 
which was fuelled by Maxwell's proteges pursuing his policies in his 
absence), but there was little to compare with the" almighty disputes and 
schisms that occurred as a direct consequence of Maxwell's arrival and 
interference. 
At the meeting on 2 July various methods to improve performance were 
considered. However the price reduction suggested by Maxwell was quickly 
dealt with: a report prepared by Mackie showed that a reduction in price 
from 6p to Sp would cost almost £1,000 per day if no increase in circu1atio~ 
resulted, and conversely that an increase of 67,000 per day in circulation 
was needed to recover the current cost at the reduced price. None of 
the Councillors had any interest in taking the unnecessary risk. (WCM, 
2 July 1975). However at the same meeting the far more sensible proposal 
to adjust advertising rates downwards in order to attract more business 
was accepted for consideration. On 11 July it was decided to establish 
two working parties, technical an~ editorial, to assess the feasibility of 
conversion to tabloid which the preliminary information from the market 
survey supported. Also at this meeting Jimmy Milne of the STUC 
maintained that "effort should be made to capitalise on the goodwill which 
was evident before t;he newspaper was launched. In this regard he believed 
conscientious promotion in factory areas would be valuable." The 
COUncil accepted "that a camp~i9n to boost circulation in industrial areas 
should be conducted using established channels for circulation" It was 
agreed that the assistance of FOes wou~d be sought in contacting shop 
stewards asking them to encourage fellow union members to place orders 
for one month's s~scription to the Scottish Daily News". Yet there 
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was little evidence of a committed campaign of this nature in the 
forthcoming months, though occasional reference was made to it. Finally, 
on 21 July 1975 the Council made the momeOntous decision to switch from 
broadsheet publication to tabloid,.having made satisfactory test runs o~ 
the existing SDN equipment. It was confirmed that the tabloid would 
be launched on 18 August and trade and press releases were discussed 
with a director from Struthers Advertising agency who were to handle the 
publicity. 
The press releases, stressing the relaunch as a commercial initiative 
in response to the market survey, did not have much impact on the way 
the story was handled: 
"DAILY NENS CHANGES TO ~ET CRISIS" 
"Facing aO financial and circulation crisis, the government backed SDN is 
to be relaunched next month in small tabloid form, after just 11 weeks on 
the streets •••• The major charge underlines the severity of the problems 
afflicting the 500 ex-Beaverbrook workers who have invested heavily in 
their own jobs. Last night their former employer, Mr. Jocelyn Stevens, 
deputy chairman and managing director of Beaverbrook Newspapers, who 
ar~ the venture's largest sharehOlders, described the relaunch as 'an act 
of desperation, a last throw of the dice.' Mr. Stevens, whose 
Scottish Daily Express, now published from Manchester, is the SDN's 
main rival, added that Beaverbrook were not concerned about losing the 
£600,000 still owed in final payment for the Albion Street printing centre 
in Glasgow. Be said, "We set out with the aim of getting El million 
for the plant and premises from SNE the company running the venture. We 
achieved our aim and regard anything else we might receive as a very 
surprising bonus." While admitting that the venture was making a loss~ 
Mr. Mackie denied a report that Circulation had declined to 84,000. "That 
suggestion is totally inaccurate, dishOnest and unethical. Although we 
are a bit below breakeven point this is not a make or break venture. There 
is no feeling that we have been rejected by the Scottish people. We 
285 
are sharing the problems of an industry where no-one is making any 
money just now." (Scotsman, 22 July 1975). 
The reappearance of Maxwell on the eve of the mass meeting 
arranged for 29 July to discuss th~ technicalities of the tabloid relaunch, 
shattered the peace which had descended on Albion Street. He 
immediately resumed his efforts to persuade the frightened workers: 
"On that evening of 28 July Maxwell did his rounds of the chapels telling 
them that the only solution to the co-operative's problems was the 
injection of £500,000 cash which he committed himself to raise. We needed 
to increase the advertising, which he declared would not be difficult, 
(claiming that he could raise more than the paper could handle) and to get 
rid of Mackie and the other Councillors who opposed him." (Mackie,1976,p.13S),. 
John Hodgeman colourfully recalled the scene of Maxwell circulating through 
the chapels on the night before combat: 
"He smirked and back-slapped his way through internal departmental union 
meetings, where subservient officials introduced him as the veritable 
messiah. Silence invariably fell on raging discussions when Mr. Maxwell 
cleared his throat, opened his jacket and stood up. Many present were 
transfixed at the sight of a real live millionaire in their midst ••• 'as 
if the unbuttoning of the coat revealed rows of hundred pound notes pinned 
to the expensive lining ••••• So when the mass meeting was held the next 
day many of t~e workers had come to the conclusion that Maxwell, with 
his money, his experience of the "business jungle" (as he always referred 
to the world of commerce) and his plans for the tabloid newspaper were 
the only answer." The business of the mass meeting was well under way, 
discussing the technical details of tabloid publication, when Maxwell 
burst open with his unrelated and jarring conb'ibution, which consisted 
of an attack on the Works Council fOF t~e falling circulation and the 
insistence that the position could be remedied only by investing him with 
executive authority. A motion was carried that he be reinstated in an 
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executive position subject to the discretion of Council, and that he 
be invited to assist in the relaunching of the newspaper by the 
margin of 102 votes to 79. 
The OVerlord of the Scottish Daily News 
At the subsequent Council meeting Maxwell was overbearing in his 
newly reclaimed status, as the minutes record: 
"Maxwell expressed concern about 'going tabloid' with particular reference 
to the time allowed to prepare for the changeover. He expressed the 
view that the timing was unfortunate, being in the middle of a holiday 
season, and suggested that publication of a tabloid newspaper be deferred 
to I September. Mr. Maxwell also asked if the purpose of converting 
to tabloid was solely to force the DTI to provide extra time. Mr. Maxwell 
asked that the workforce, through their respective chapels, be asked to 
confirm the conversion date presently established." 
This interjection was based purely on ignorance of the detailed planning 
of the tabloid relaunch due to Maxwell's absence from the SDN for the 
whole of the period when this work was completed. The business of the 
Council therefore was delayed by. Mackie and Tough having to explain the 
sequence of events leading up to the tabloid decision. 
"Mr. Mackie advised that before a.final decision was taken the situation 
was outlined to the Federated Chapel, who agreed unanimously that the 
company should convert as of 18 August ••• Mr. Tough outlined that discussions 
to improve the marketability of our product had been held with our 
advertising agents., In their opinion nothing less than a change in 
size would be sufficient to effect the requtred improvement. As to the 
date, this had been chosen based on the end of the major holiday season in' 
scotland,' the commencement of the football season and the need to publish 
in time to capture autumn advertiSing Schedules ••• the DTI had said that if 
we had not done something so dramatic then the DTIwould have reviewed our 
situation by the end of August. Mr. Tough continued that the 'campaign 
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at this stage is now totally co~nitted from both technical and 
publicity viewpoints." (WCH, 1 August 1975). 
unabashed by his ignorance, and undeterr'ed by the logic of the 
explanations he had been offered,.Maxwell moved that because of the 
complexity of the changeover and the understaffing and inexperience, the 
relaunch be postponed till 1 September. For once his headstrong 
attempts to get his own way, for the flimsiest of reasons, received no 
support, and the motion was not seconded. 
An angry discussion followed concerning Maxwell's future position, 
which after an adjournment, was t~ last most of the day. Maxwell 
claimed that "he had been totally eliminated from business decisions." 
Goldberg suggested that Maxwell be given "executive powers with freedom 
in areas such as 'advertising and circulation'. When Bargh pointed to 
the chaos that would ensue if the general manager and a Council member were 
"working in different directions", Goldberg defined Maxwell's duties in tr.e 
memorable phrase "in effect overlord advertising and circulation". 
"Mr. Maxwell then informed the meetin~ that he was willinq to come to Glasgow 
on a full-time basis for three months, if required. He viewed the 
situation as grave and sought the executive powers which he felt nece~sary 
to save the newspaper. Specifically be believed that Mr. Mackie should 
be responsible for morale, Mr. Tough for day-to-day management with 
Mr. Maxwell to be vested with power to raise cash and sell advertising space. 
Mr. Maxwell advised the meeting that if the Executive Council is at any 
time disappointed in his performance he would withdraw immediately. 
Mr. Maxwell was asked how he would raise cash and responded "I can raise it". 
Be denied he wished control of the company and stated he wished total 
a~hority subject to instant dismissal by Council". 
Maxwell then melodramatically left the meeting to allow them to ponder 
the contradiction between having "total authority" and being "subject to 
instant dismissal". Blyth said "in his opinion the present management 
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does not have the necessary experience to carry the job through. 
Mackie replied that with Mr. Maxwell at the helm there was a serious 
risk that the present management team would be lost in its entirety." 
The Council considered how Maxwe11·s flair for publicity could be harnessed 
to securing the SDN more advertising, but after the adjournment Maxwell 
made it clear he anticipated far more generous powers, he elaborated, 
" In his view there were three areas requiring attention as follows : 
1) 
2) 
3) 
ensuring the tabloid edition is out in good order by 18 August, 
ensuring that the paper is editiona1ised properly, 
improving classified advertising-." 
Russell argued that ~ell's proposal represented such a fundamental change 
that all the investors should be consulted before a decision was reached. 
Mackie then asked members of the Council to present a summary of their views: 
"Mr. Bargh said he found his personal position very difficult: he was 
instinctively against the whole thing and would hate to precipitate a 
crisis, however, he felt bound to accept what the workers wished. 
Mr. Goldberg stated that the fund~ntals of the co-operative had been 
fulfilled. In a situation as grim as this, change is necessary. By 
bringing in Maxwell we have nothing to lose; we can use him to help us off 
the ground. 
Mr. Blyth said that we should use Maxwell to the fullest extent. Be 
continued that he would hate to run counter to trade union principles, and 
that ~is offer should be accepted for a trial period. 
Mr. Maxwell must be here to fulfil his promise. 
He stated that 
Mr. Lindsay voic~d his alarm at the current feeling within the work force; . 
its enthusiasm had waned and there must be a response to the recommendation 
of the workforce. 
Mr. Crossan (The Imperial Father of the Federated Chapel present as an 
observer) stated that anything Mr. Maxwell has suggested has be~n suggested 
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before; Mr. Maxwell can work as an Executive Councillor and could have 
done so before. In Mr. Crossan's view. the workforce was split,and those 
who voted for Mr. Maxwell believe he intends to provide more money and 
that is the only reason for their vote." (WCM, 1 August 1975). 
The meeting then ended in profound disagreement and disarray, with 
the contempt that Mackie and Maxwell had for each other more apparent than 
ever. The debate was resumed on 6 August in Council, with Mackie, Lindsay 
and Milne absent, which meant that Jimmy Russell was alone to challenge 
Maxwell's corporate imperialism. Goldberg opened the discussion by 
saying "in his view the powers to be vested in Mr. Maxwe'll could not be too 
clearly defined. He believed they should be termed as general executive 
powers over circulation and advertising." At last the wraps were now off: 
"Mr. Maxwell stated that it ought to be clear that this, in effect, was the 
whole business." 
Russell coolly replied that "there should be no misunderstanding of the 
effect of vesting executive authority in Maxwell. In Russell's view there 
would be no 'halfway house' and what was being given was not the ability 
to influence but control management and that in effect ~x. Maxwell would have 
management control of the company." (WCM, 6 August 1975). Whereupon 
the meeting was informed of Tough's intention to leave the company, since 
a replacement general manager had been found and was to be installed. 
Goldberg then ~oved that Maxwell be installed with general executive 
powers in areas of advertising and circulation. The motion was seconded 
by Sillito and carried by a majority of 4-1. (Only one shopfloor worker 
Allister Blyth - was at this meeting, plus three senior members of the 
editorial staff, yet the Financial Times was to claim, "The Works Council 
of the SDN - which is dominated by shopfloor representatives - voted to 
restore to Mr Maxwell executive powers l ••• " (7 August 1975). Russell 
protested that the whole affair was conducted undemocratically and informed I 
the meeting that he reserved the right to call an Extraordinary General I 
t 
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Meeting of the company to consider this. 
A few hours after the Council had given him executive authority 
Maxwell moved into Tough's room (thpugh Tough had offered to stay to 
supervise the relaunch), and indulged in a typically expansive press 
conference. The next day the national press responded : 
"MAXWELL 'OVERLORDS' SCOTS NEWSPAPER - AND MANAGER GOES" headlined the 
Financial Times: 
"Mr. Robert Maxwell, chairman of the publishing company Pe~gamon Press, 
has been appointed self-styled 'overlord' of the ailing Scottish Daily News. 
He appears to have been given immediate effective control over the most 
crucial management functions of the Glasgow-based newspaper - launched by 
a workers' co-operative in May with a El.2m Government loan. He gave a 
categorical 'no' to a suggestion that yesterday's decision by the governing 
Works Council endorsed a bid by him to take over the enterprise. 'Nobody 
can take over a workers' co-operative', he said Mr. Maxwell, who described 
his own involvement with the Glasgow project as 'a piece of Socialism, not 
done for commercial motives', added: "I feel utterly confident that the 
whole of this team, with small assistance from me, will be able to make 
the paper viable by the end of the year." (7 August 1975). 
"DAILY NEWS MANAGER LEAVES AS MAXWELL MOVES IN" 
"Disillusioned with the worker-control practices of the Scottish Daily News 
co-operative in Glasgow, their general manager Mr. Eric Tough leaves the 
venture tomorrow after being effectively replaced by Mr. Robert Maxwell ••••• 
It was no secret, however, that the former Scottish operations manager of PA 
did not see eye to eye with Mr. Maxwell's 'autocratic' style of management ••• 
Mr. Tough's departure leaves Mr. Maxwell in virtual control of the 'day-to-
day running of the co-operative, as well as in control of the tabloid 
relaunch. That is a far cry from his position two months ago when he 
was stripped of his executive powers, removed from his post as co-chaipnan, 
I 
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and only narrowly re-e1ected on to the Executive Council after a 
recount. The ex-Labour MPs return to power was opposed by a substantial 
minority of the workers who attended a meeting last week to hear his 
promise to revitalise the venture.: •.•••. (Scotsman, 7 August 1975). 
"MAXWELL MADE SON OVERLORD" 
"Mr. Robert Maxwell, the chairmn of Pergamon Press was yesterday appointed -
in his own word - 'overlord' of circulation and advertising of the SON, the 
newspaper started in May by a workers co-operative of f~rmer Beaverbrook 
employees in Glasgow. Mr. Maxwell said he would instal a bunk bed at 
the newspaper's office in Glasgow and would be working day and night for the 
next two or three months to make a success of the newspaper ••••.•• He said 
"It is going to be the best newspaper in the UK, and certainly in Scotland." 
(Guardian, 7 August 1975). 
On his first day as 'overlord' and chief executive of the SON Maxwell 
called a Works Council meeting at less than six hours notice. Forgetting 
Maxwell's earlier protestations, Blyth glibly dismissed the inadequate 
notice from the chair and "asked those present that in view of the current 
business situation adequate notice be deemed to have been given." At 
such short notice it was certain that there would be a sparse attendance, 
and in fact only half the Council turned up, Maxwell, Blyth, Goldberg, 
Sillito and Russell. With only Russell present to resist, it was obvious 
that Maxwell could push through whatever he wanted. Unfortunately no 
quorum had ever been designated for the Council. The main item on the 
agenda was a "Report by Mr. Robert Maxwell on steps taken to ensure 'on 
time 'launch of the tabloid with good assurance of success." The whole 
-
of this meeting was given over to Maxwell's presentation of what he had 
f 
been doing, presumably in the 24 hours since he had been invested with 
executive authority, and what he proposed to do. The minutes of this 
meeting read like a litany, with each paragraph beginning, "Mr. Maxwell 
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advised ••••• Mr. Maxwell recommended •••. Mr. Maxwell proposed ••.• 
Mr. Maxwell stated," and the other Council members scarcely said anything. 
Among the numerous proposals, two decisions with completely disastrous 
consequences were taken: to cut the price of the paper; and to object 
to the payment of £59,000 in returned VAT demanded by Beaverbrook. Maxwell 
achieved the notable feat of effectively damning the declining SDN within 
a day of assuming office. 
The insistence on a price cut from 6p to 5p injected a totally alien 
concept into the tabloid relaunch strategy. This decision was described 
by Bri~ton, the financial adviser, as "a catastrophe" in the finances of 
the SON, and was based on an elementary misunderstanding of newspaper 
economics. As the Financial Times later chastised: 
"The critical decision, taken on Mr. Maxwell's insistence early in August, 
was to reduce the price of the re-launched tabloid paper by lp when it 
appeared on 18 August. The Works Council had already examined the 
effects of cutting the paper's price, but had decided instead to confine 
itself lowering by as much as one-third, its rates to advertisers as an 
incentive to boost advertising content which had fallen to about l~ per 
cent. Mr. Maxwell prevailed upon the Council, however, to cut the price, 
arguing that the revenue loss it would sustain would be recouped if 
circulation rose by only 16,000 a day. His assumption was that a one-sixth 
price cut from 6p to 5p would be compensated for by a one-sixth rise in 
sales. In fact, internal examinations by the company, conducted in June 
and again in August, showed that there would be a revenue loss of almost 
one third. The crucial calculations show that, on a circulation of 150,000 
a day, and taking newsprint costs and the prevailing 37.8 per cent discount 
to newsagents into account, revenue from circulation would fall from 
E2,649 to El,716 per day. It further demonstrated that, merely to recover 
this loss, the paper would have to raise its sales by 81,000 a day to 
231,000. It was also shown that, if advertising remained static, total 
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sales would have to reach 517,000 before the enterprise would break even." 
(29 October 1975). 
Allister Mackie in a document of 23 June had outlined other important 
reasons why a price cut was foolis~ and dangerous: newsagents return 
from the sale of the same number of copies would be reduced, creating an 
incentive to sell other papers; increases in newspaper costs were 
inevitable and other newspapers were planning a price increase; finally 
there was doubt whether SON readers were price conscious, and the reduction 
followed shortly by an increase, would serve merely to damage the public 
image of the newspaper. Though tqe fallacy of Maxwell~s reasoning was 
cogently presented to the Council by Mackie and the idea of the price cut 
was rejected by the Council on 2 July; Maxwell reversed the decision by a 
4-1 majority at this hastily convened and poorly attended Council meeting 
ten days before the relaunch. For all Maxwells grandiloquent references 
to democracy; on whether to reduce the price or not - one of the most 
critical issues to confront the newspaper even though an issue invented by 
Maxwell himself ~ he was quite happy to overturn the decisicn of a previous 
well attended Council meeting, without a debate, without a mass meeting,and 
without informing the workforce of the idea in advance. Here was proof 
that Maxwell was prepared to 'consult' with the workforce whenever he 
encountered resistance from the Works Councilor elsewhere to what he wanted 
to do. But he was not prepared to consult the workforce - even over crucial 
matters like the price reduction - when he met no resistance elsewhere. 
Maxwell used the mass meetings as a lever for his own policies; when he 
could get these poliCies through the Council unopposed there was no need for 
the lever. The price reduction was a critical commercial error and 
was based on a fixation with prices and markets, when the SON sales were 
clearly based heavily on sympathy, as market researchers had consistently 
• 
reported. A price increase would have been much more sensible than a 
price reduction, and this was certainly the trend of popular newspaper 
pricing policy. 
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The second disastrous decision, was not to pay the £59,000 owed to 
Beaverbrook, the minutes of the meeting accurately capture the extent 
of democratic debate Maxwell was prepared" to tolerate: 
"Mr. Maxwell advised the meeting that he had 'held up' a cheque for some 
£59,000 payable to Beaverbrook in respect of Value Added Tax. Mr. Maxwell 
further advised the meeting that he was promised a cheque for £40,000 
from Beaverbrook and as he had not received it he proposedwe 'sit on' the 
£59,000 for the present. The secretary protested this course stating 
that the cash was in respect of VAT. on plant and machinery purchased from 
Beaverbrook, had not been incurred by SNE Limited and was properly due 
Beaverbrook following receipt by SNE. The secretary also added that he 
was not aware of a debt outstanding against Beaverbrook in favour of SNE 
in the sum of £40,000. Mr. Russell cautioned that each of the 
directors should think carefully about their actions in this regard. 
Mr. Maxwell stated that Jocelyn Stevens of Beaverbrook was aware of the 
agreement to pay SNE £40,000 and he proposed writing him offering to exchange 
cheques, and asked Council for endorsement of his actions subject to 
Beaverbrook's response to this letter. Mr. Russell objected to this 
course of action and aske~ that legal advice be sought before sending 
any letter. 
FUrther discussion ceased when Mr. Maxwell advised that a letter had already 
been sent." (WCM, 7 August 1975). 
This arbitrary decision of Maxwell meant that Beaverbrook would certainly 
institute legal proceedings against the SON to recover the money, dealing 
a severe blow to the financial credibility and public integrity of the SON. 
Yet when Lovell, White and King, Beaverbrook's solicitors telexed Boyd's, 
the SON's solicitor~, they referred to Maxwell's letter refusing to pay 
the VAT as dated 11 August 1975. (Telex 4 September 1975). 
Therefore it is possible that Maxwell deliberately misled the Council 
when he said that the letter had already been sent. 
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The brusque treatment he had received at this meeting, prompted 
the resignation of Ian Bain, the financial controller and company secretary 
since 9 June, who was the third member of the SON senior management to 
resign in two months. Bain declared his resignation with immediate 
effect followed the "major disagreement" with Maxwell over the surprise 
plan to reduce the price of the paper. "It was a decision over which I 
had no say. I was given no prior notice that it was to be brought up at 
a Works Council meeting last week, and although I voiced my opinion 
against it, it was carried although not unanimously. This placed me in 
an invidious position and I felt I had no option but to resign." Bain 
had joined the SON, as did the previo~s company secretary Lawrie Hooper, 
because it was a co-operative. The rapid exit of these men was indicative 
of the effect Maxwell's overlordship would have on the enterprise. Moreover 
the rest of the Council were largely powerless to restrain him, despite the 
earnest assurances he had given just a few days before. At the first 
Council meeting that Maxwell was chief executive at the SDN there was 
instant and emphatic evidence provided in support of the blistering judgment of 
the OTI inspectors in the Pergamon affair: 
"Any report on the conduct of affairs of ILSC must necessarily for the 
reasons already given, amount to a report on Mr. Maxwells stewardship. 
He is a man of great energy, drive and imagination, but unfortunately an 
apparant fixation as to his own abilities causes him to ignore the views 
of others if these are not compatible. This is very evident in the 
recurrent (and frequent) change of personnel in ILSC which were one of the 
factors which contributed to the disaster. Neither his fellow directors, 
his professiona~ advisers, nor his employees were able to sway his views 
and actions. The concept of a Board being responsible for policy was 
alien to him". CHMSO, 1971, p.~~8. My emphasis). 
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Having effectively secured control of the destiny of the SDN Maxwell 
attempted to prevent any challenge to this by cancelling the next 
Council meeting, properly convened for l3'August. Mackie, who had now 
recovered from an illness, demanded what authority Maxwell had to do this? 
"Mr. Blyth informed the meeting that he and Mr. Goldberg, together with 
Mr. Maxwell, agreed to cancel the meeting because of pressure of work in 
connection with the conversion to tabloid. Be stated that they had 
attempted to find other directors to notify them to this effect but were 
unsuccessful. Mr. Blyth went on to say that our first duty was to get 
our newspaper out on time and not t~ go in for a lot of Executive Council 
Meetings which achieve nothing except waste a lot of people's time •••• 
Mr. Goldberg put forward a motion that the meeting be adjourned since 
those members of the Executive Council who have responsibility were extremely 
tied up getting the newspaper out on time and changing over to tabloid. 
The motion was seconded by Mr. Blyth and lost 5-3." (WCM, 13 August 1975). 
The triumvirate of Maxwell, Blyth and Goldberg were guilty of grossly 
oligarchical practice: they were prepared to make crucial decisions 
at an impromptu Council meeting, then hypocritically deny the right 
of the majority of the Council to considerthese decisions at the next 
properly convened meeting. 
Turning to the cover price, Mackie insisted that a 5p cover charge 
required a circulation of 517,000 to break even, and asked that the price 
change be reversed, but Maxwell denied that these figures had any relevance. 
Jtmmy Milne of the ~ and William Wolfe of the SNP (there as a substitute 
from the Investors Council in place of Bargh)" accepted Mackie's 
~guments about,it being a mistake to reduce the cover price to 5p 
but were 9f the opinion that at that time the decision could not be reversed". 
The vote to change the price was lost·5-2. But the main business on 
the agenda was "Review of Management Structure", which was perhaps why 
Maxwell had tried to stop the meeting taking place. Mackie ~tated 
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he felt that Maxwell had taken on powers which were not assigned 
to him by the CounciL.... that since Mr. Maxwell had joined 5 days 
previously both the general manager and financial controller had 
resigned .,. that he had heard f~om Messrs Boyds, our lawyers, and 
Messrs French and Cowan, our accountants, that they no longer wished to 
act on our behal f • Mr. Maxwell replied that he had not heard that 
either the lawyers or the accountants were withdrawing their services." 
A furious row then broke out: 
"The question was asked by Mr. Wolfe what executive powers had been 
granted to Mr. Maxwell by the Executive Council. The minutes of the 
previous 3 meetings were referred to and it was confirmed that Mr. Maxwell 
had been assigned ex~cutive powers in the areas of circulation and 
advertising. Mr. Wolfe then asked why Mr. Maxwell had taken over as general 
manager and company secretary. There was no comment from Mr. Maxwell. 
Mr. Mackie put forward a motion that Mr. Maxwell's executive powers be 
removed. This was seconded by Mr. Russell. 
At this point Mr. Goldberg suggested that Mr. Mackie tender his resignation 
since he had lost the support of "the workforce. The motion was seconded 
by Mr. Blyth but was not pushed to a vote." 
Mackie was persuaded to accept an " amendment to his motion by Wolfe which 
was that Maxwell should have responsibilities in the areas of circulation 
and advertising, but that the remaining responsibilities be assigned to 
a general manager, though for the time being these would be the responsibility 
of Mackie. The mot"ion was carried 5-3. 
Maxwell exploded: 
"Mr. Maxwell stated that he would call a workforce mass meeting as he 
felt the business could not operate under a 'double headed hydra'. 'People 
would not know who to come to for finai decision.' Mr. Russell said 
that the works Council would forbid Mr Maxwell to call this meeting and was 
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generally backed by members of the meeting. At this point 
Mr. Maxwell left the meeting stating that he would be forbidden nothing 
and that the people who finally decided the future of this enterprise 
were the workforce." 
(WCM, 13 August 1975). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Introduction 
The transformed industrial relations of the Scottish Daily News 
were found attractive by even the most trenchant political and 
commercial critics of the co-operative, whilst repelling many active trade 
union supporters. The passive and well-integrated trade a~ion 
organization, low wages and simplified differentials, low manning, 
removal of protective practices, flexible demarcation, binding disputes 
procedure and severe inhibition of industrial conflict, achieved 
instantly at the launch of the SDN what national newspaper management 
--- . 
had been attempting to impose for over a decade with little measurable 
success. During this time proprietors constantly attributed the economic 
problems of their newspapers primarily to the combination of high wage 
costs, over-manning, restrictive practices and recurrent stoppages; 
and frequently official investigations offered support for this assessment. 
The earlier official inquiries into the national newspaper industry 
attempted to place industrial relations problems within a broader economic 
analysis. Thus although the 1961-62 Royal Ca.mission on the Press 
declared that a saving of ~e order of 34\ couLd be achieved in the 
manpower employed on production and distribution, ACAS swmnarized its 
conclusion, that : 
"Despite discovering so many examples of wasted .anpower resources, low 
productivity and weak management in the industry •••• the salvation of 
the industry could not be found in the large potential savings on labour 
costs which seemed possible. Rather, the CClDDlission found that the 
fatal casualties of the industry had received their wounds from the 
competition of their rivals, and had failed on a commercial basis in 
not selling enough newspapers or advertising space." 
• 
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The Economist Intelligence Unit Survey of 1966 maintained that : 
"Earnings did not bear a direct relationship to the work content of 
the job, nor to the skill and effort necessary; the strength and 
militancy of the union or chapel were the decisive factors affecting 
earnings. The payments system, with extras forming a large and 
constantly negotiable part of earnings, was a main weakness of the 
industry." 
But went on to argue that : 
"Like the 1962 Royal Commission they felt that even the substantial 
savings in costs, especially in labour costs, they saw as possible, would 
not on their own make the industry financially viable. They saw the 
crucial problem as one of revenue, decreasing circulation, growing price 
resistance, and an increasing dependence on advertising revenue with 
little potential for growth". 
Finally, the National Board for Prices and Incomes in 1970 commented 
in Report 141 that "the economic problems of the national newspaper 
industry do not arise solely, or even principally, from labour costs or 
trade union resistance to technical innovation", but also said that 
savings in wage costs miqht be the marginal factor which would save a 
newspaper from extinction. c.Rep, 1976a,pp 305-309). 
But recently, in the context of the cumulative financial crises 
of the national press which plunged even the .ost established titles 
into substantial losses; the hightening conflict between newspaper 
management and chapels, and the appearance of the spectre of the new 
technology which offered massive manpower reductions if it could be 
forced through on management's terms; the official analysis of industrial 
relations in the national newspaper industry became more emphatic in 
attributing the primary source of the economic difficulties of the press 
to labour problems. 
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In proposing reforms of the payment system 
and structure, manning levels and work practices, Sisson made it clear 
that he regarded the fact that "earnings are very much higher than in 
manufacturing industry generally", that "gross inefficiencies in the 
production of national newspapers, mainly due to over-manning" and that 
the "highly developed system of chapel bargaining" were a "major 
contributory factor in the desperate economic situation of many national 
newspapers." (l975,pl). In an Interim Report commissioned at the 
behest of panic stricken employers who faced "a crisis of unprecedented 
dimensions and dangers", the third Royal Commission on the Press 
dtamatically asserted that 
"drastic remedies are needed there is no prospect of improving 
revenue sufficiently. Productivity must be increased and costs reduced; 
this can be done on an adequate scale only by lowering manning levels 
and introducing new technology •••• " (1976,p.9). 
and went on to propose swingeing redundancies of over a third of the 
national newspaper industry's labour force. In the Final Report the 
Royal Commission, disillusioned by the failure of the Interim Report 
to achieve any concrete results, returned to the theme of recalcitrant 
labour with a vengeance: 
"One debilitating legacy to national newspapers from the post-war days 
of easy profits and weak management has been the exceptionally high 
earnings of print workers and a disposition among publishers to yield 
easily to threats of unofficial action. Industrial relations in Fleet 
Street have been notoriously bad for a qeneration and their improvement 
has been the regularly falsified hope of everyone who has attempted to 
set the industry on the path of modernisation." (1977 ,p. 5) • 
Although the proposals on voluntary ~undancy, new technology, and 
procedural reform agreed between the newspaper employers and the general 
secretaries of t~e print unions contained in the Programme for Action (1976) 
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had been firmly rejected by the members of all the print unions with 
the exception of the NUJ; the Final Report of the Commission re-
emphasised that: "There is no alternative to root-and-branch change 
in Fleet Street;" and again insisted that these proposals must be 
implemented, suggesting that they were in the best interests of print 
workers, though print workers themselves clearly did not think so. 
(1977, pp 221-226). 
The assumption of orthodox analysis, loudly proclaimed by the 
proprietors in their own editorials, was that the primary ailment of 
the newspaper industry was the responsibility of the print union chapels, 
whose refusal to change was the critical factor in destroying the 
profitability of the national press. Therefore if most of these 
labour problems could be overcome at the Scottish Daily News with the 
willing compliance of the chapels, many commentators argued there was 
no reason why the newspaper should not be a shining commercial success: 
A CRASH COURSE IN NEWSPAPER AILMENTS 
"How is it possible that the Scottish Daily News could succeed where 
Beaverbrook could not, and at a ~ime when the industry as a whole is 
qoinq through a severe economic crisis? The answer is twofold and, to 
someone unversed in the hideously. complicated customs and practices of 
Fleet Street, has a child-like simplicity. First, the new paper will 
operate on realistic manning levels. To begin with it will employ 
only 600 people, a third of those made re~undant by Beaverbrook. 
OVermanning has lonq been the sinqle most debilitatinq feature of the 
national press - even more damaging than, say, the soaring cost of 
newsprint. In 1966 an Economist Intelligence Unit report discovered 
that there could be manpower savinqs of 50 per cent in some Fleet Street 
departments, and that is still true t~~ay. 
• 
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Secondly, the Scottish Daily News will attempt to eliminate the poor 
industrial relations that characterise so many papers. For years 
the ineptitude of some newspaper managements has been rivalled only 
by the needless truculence and militancy of the various unions they 
employ. In the year before Beaverbrook shut down the Glasgow office 
there were 56 stoppages at that centre alone. 
The new paper's Action Committee has attempted to overcome this problem 
by devising a Works Council representing management and men. "Wages 
and conditions of employment will be taken out of the area of controversy", 
says Mr. Denny Macgee, a member of the committee. 'We have evolved 
a procedure of disputes which will be binding on all employees. There 
will be no stoppages on this paper ••••• • • We want a strong, capable 
editor free to edit~ and strong, capable management free to manage,' 
says one of the committee. Is anyone in Fleet Street listening?" 
(Observer, 5 May 1974). 
Yet the transformed industrial relations at the ~ were not primarily 
due to a concern for business efficiency, but were regarded as a necessary 
compromise to launch and sustain the workers co-operative with the 
minimum funding available. Though all the workers enjoyed the sense 
of enthusiasm and commitment the co-operative at first engendered and 
were proud of the substantial improvement in efficiency and productivity 
which resulted, they regretted the low wages and manning. Some workers, 
unimpressed by the co-operative rhetoric, harboured serious misgivings 
about what they were embarking on. Daddy MacKoskill, the NATSOPA FOC, 
had worked in the despatch departments of national newspapers for thirty 
years, was steeped in the print chapel traditions, and was distressed 
at what he saw"happening around him: 
-There are a lot of changes, a lot of problems. There are staffing 
. 
problems, we've cut outselves to the bone staffing-wise. We've accepted 
less money. We've guaranteed no strikes for a year. We've guaranteed 
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we won't ask for a rise for a year. I'm quite sure that big 
business must look at us, and they must say to themselves,' If we 
could have a set-up like this!' Other national newspapers must look 
at us and say, "I wish we could do this , , Because a lot of other 
newspapers are overmanned, maybe I shouldn't say it, but they are 
overmanned, I've worked on these papers. I'm quite sure the bosses 
of the national newspapers are going around saying, 'If they can do this, with 
this sort of staff, a 14 page paper - the equival~nt of 28 pages in 
tabloid.' I'm quite sure there are a lot of newspapers who are 
very envious that we're doing this with so little staff for a start. And 
wages - it must be fantastic for other newspapers to look at us, because 
wages elsewhere are far superior to what we're receiving. 
We've been prepared "to accept this to get us off the ground. That's 
not to say we're satisfied with what we've got. In time we're hoping 
if this is successful that we will receive rises y'know. But we've got 
to make a success of this first before we can ask for a pay rise. At 
the other newspapers, irrespective of whether its a success or not, the 
unions will put in for their rises automatically, and they'll fight for 
these rises ••••• In a year's time if things don't work out for us, are we 
gonna be on this wage, and the cost of living by that time could have 
gone sky high. Y'know really sky high, you could have blokes earning 
£30 a week more than what we're getting. Och they're way above us, 
because we've guaranteed that we won't ask for a rise. Possibly this is 
a monster we've created, I don't know. I think it is a bit of a monster 
that one. I think we conned ourselves there." 
• 
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Trade Union Organization. 
In examining the extent of trade union organization at the ~ 
and the degree of control exercised by the ordinary members, it is 
important to remember the fact that the union chapels in the national 
newspaper industry, through tightly effective organisation, have secured 
a considerable degree of control over the production process. Sisson 
accurately outlined the extent of this development: 
"the chapels have been able to achieve a remarkable degree of control 
over the immediate work situation. The first-line managers, or 
overseers as they are known in Fleet Street, have little executive 
responsibility in most departments. It is often the FOe who recruits 
the labour and allocates it to the different tasks. It is the FOe 
who draws up the overtime and holiday rotas. It is also the FCC 
and chapel committee who are responsible for discipline. In effect, 
then, it is the FOC who is the man-manager ••••• The chapel is seen to be 
body "that makes the important decisions about working arrangements. Its 
authority is legitimate in the eyes of the members ••• "(1975, p 103). 
Stressing the importance of chapel organization and controls to an 
understanding of the industrial relations of the national newspaper 
industry, ACAS defined the comprehensive responsibilities of the chapel: 
"In practice and this applies almost without exception in respect to 
production workers, the chapel is responsible for : 
a} the regulation of the workgroup and the workplace through the 
control and administration of work rotas, discipline and recruitment; 
b) the representation of the chapel members both individually and 
collectively in disputes with management, and through its officers and 
delegates, the representation of chapel interests at branch and national 
level within the union; 
f 
c} the formulation and negotiatioh of in-house claims relating to its 
members I 
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d) the welfare of its members (and to a degree their families), 
through the provision and administration of sickness schemes, the 
payment of grants, superannuation and death benefits, and the granting 
of loans and the giving of general advice and assistance; 
e) the upholding of union rules, the implementation of trade 
agreements, and the effective implementation of union policy decided at 
branch or national level." (1976, pp 80-81). 
Thus relative to other organized workgroups the national newspaper chapels 
enjoy considerable autonomy and are in an extremely strong position in 
their relationship with management: "Chan~es cannot take place without 
the chapel's consent and its independence within the workshop, allied to 
the sensitivity of the product, means that it cannot easily be overriden. 
( RCP, 1976a,p.7). 
Whatever controls and benefits the SDN co-operative provided therefore 
must be placed in the context of an industry in which considerable job 
control and consequential rewards had been attained through trade union 
organization, and conversely whatever infringements the co-operative 
made upon established controls and conc1!tions must be regarded in a 
serious light by trade unionists. 
Formally, the SDN was to maintain full trade union orga nization. 
Manning, wages and other conditions were established in consultation 
with local trade union branches and full-time officers. A conventional 
chapel structure was retained with FOes responsible for their normal 
duties of organizing production, manpower, and work rosters. Though 
a significant element of flexibility was introduced, demarcation of 
traditional job tasks was generally preserved. Though some important 
union concessions had been made to the co-operative form, most of the 
FOCs, perhaps self-defensively, felt that the~were complying with the 
basic union rules. For example, AQ.dyfRiley the SLADE FCC said about 
demarcation: 
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"We don't see any problems, we are working as we would normally work 
under our normal society rules. We don't see any problems. 
I don't know how other unions are.placed that way. I think mainly, 
what makes this paper better, is that we're in a co-op, but we're 
managing to keep within all the society laws. To me this is something. n 
A closed shop was maintained and members were encouraged to play 
an active part in their respective chapels. The chapels were expected 
to fulfil a normal protective and sectional collective bargaining 
function. However, the shopfloor members of the Works Council were 
not e~ected on a departmental basis, but were elected by all the members 
of the co-operative to represent the whole co-operative. Therefore 
although shopfloor representatives on Council were expected to remain 
in close touch with the chapels. they were prevented from holding 
the position of director and FOC simultaneously. Ronnie Gibson, who 
was the APEX FOe and Deputy-Imperial Father of the Federated Chapel 
explained: 
"A director of the co-operative has to represent the interests of 
all the workers, therefore he cannot be a shop steward representing a 
sectional interest. Allister Mackie is a member ·of the SGA, and 
chairman of the co-operative: he can partiCipate in the union, but he 
can't represent it. Alister Blyth wanted to be FOC of the NGA and 
on the Works Council, but it was blocked as impractical. Its the same 
with the overseers and t he FOes - the two argue against each other -
it would be impractical for one man to do this. The position down at the 
KME co-operative is crazy. Jack Spriggs is the director of the company 
and the convenor of the unions, and senior steward of the AUEW. You can't 
have your cake and eat it If a grievance comes up, Jack must take 
the aide of the engineers because he's elected to represent their 
interests." (The AUEW skilled men generally did fare better at KME, 
in access to overtime arid other benefits, and in avoiding lay-offs). 
• 
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Thus, in theory at least, at the ~ there was a strict delineation 
between the directoral and managerial function to advance the commercial 
interests of the co-operative and the trade union function to protect 
and advance the interests of the chapel members. Allister Mackie 
said: "The role of the FOes is to look after the chapels, and to make 
sure their own chapel's interests are not sacrificed in the interests 
of other chapels. Their job is to protect the workers from any stupid 
decisions of the Works Council." And Jimmy McNamara maintained: 
"The job of the Federated Chapel is to protect the mass of the workers 
against the economic forces that will forc~ the company into certain 
decisions against the interests of the shopfloor." 
Yet although a minority of SDN workers retained a clear conception 
of the importance of active trade union organisation, the majority were 
confused by the co-operative structure, which they felt partly dispensed 
with the need for separate union representation. Even people previously 
extremely active in their chapels, were unsure of the relevance of 
trade unions in the SDN. "Any management-worker conflict would just 
be mirror boxing", declared Denny Macgee, the scourge of management 
when FOe of the NOJ in the days of Beaverbrook. Nathan Goldberg, who 
prided himself on his political perception, was more thoughtful on the 
question, but almost as ambivalent: 
"Trade unions are a means to an end. Where this is by no means the 
end, it certainly does take away the 'them and us' situation, on which the 
raison d'etre of trade unionism was formed - y'know to fight the capitalist 
system. Obviously, we don't have that type of thing here. It did 
take a bit of getting used to. Obviously its still trade union oriented 
this - it's a closed shop. We have good relationships with all 
branch secretaries. But really, unless you"'ve something to fight 
f 
against, unless you've something to crib against, and as long as your 
wages and your conditions are well above the trade union minimum, then 
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you're OK. There really should not be aggro - as opposed to 
the normal trade union working - there shouldn't be an awful lot of 
scope for that. Obviously there are things that FOes do, working 
out rotas and so on. But generally speaking - the aggro side of 
it was more or less obliterated y'know. Although the FOCs are 
watchdogs to see that the Works Council doesn't overstep the mark, there's 
an entirely different set-up. It took quite a few quys who had been 
FOCs before a while to adjust to this. In that we have this ye~ had 
to adjust a lot of these concepts so that the guys on the workforce 
have the correct philosophy. It's been a natural development from a 
co-operative. We've been very careful not to break any demarcation 
lines and so on. Very careful to uphold all the trade union rules, though 
some people may put a case 'You need not do that, because we're on 
our own now - these rules don't apply. A lot of the rules are there 
to ensure that the worker is not taken advantage of by the boss, and 
as, strictly speaking, there are no bosses in the old traditional sense, 
why carry on with these demarcation lines and all the rest of it?' But 
we've got a duty to the trade union movement, and recognise that, and 
even though something may only be symbolic - it still has to be done." 
The belief that trade union organization within the SON was largely 
of symbolic significance, was a feature of the undermining of trade 
union consciousness and organization caused by the co-operative: 
"On this island of'industrial democracy such historically sacred 
institutions were an irrelevance - they were all bosses now; the only 
constraint on the total disintegration of the union fabric within Albion 
Street was the awareness that their island was not self-sufficient and 
that their brother trade unionists still had to survive in the turtulent, 
commercial ocean." (McKay and Barr, 1976, p. 58). 
Of course the SON had to survive in the same capitalist market system, 
in competition with other newspapers. Compulsive pressures ,were 
• 
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exerted from the start to keep manning to a minimum, reduce costs, 
including labour costs, and increase output per man. Only nominal 
resistance to these press~res was offered by most of the shopfloor 
representatives on the Council, who were in fact absorbed with the 
commercial problems of the enterprise. Hence there was a need for 
proper trade union defenses for smilar reasons as they exist in private 
industry - to protect workers against excessive and unacceptable demands. 
Doddy MacKoskil1, in particular, was deeply opposed to the dismantling 
of the chapel organization: 
"At present we're bending over backwards to get the th~ng going. But 
once we become viable, I'm quite sure that although this is a workers 
co-operative, that we will start to bring back trade union methods, to go 
back to our national agreements. At present we're forgetting about 
the union, just at present, that's not to say we've tossed it over, 
because basically I'm a trade unionist and alwayshave been and always 
will be. At present we're holding ourselves to see how it works out, 
if it works good, we'll still incorporate the trade union method, we'll 
always have that in here. You must nave rules and regulations imposed 
by the union, I'll always stand by my union, although I'm agreeing to this 
at present, I dinna mean to say that I'd forget my union, by no means~ 
No chance o'that at any time. The unions as far as I'm concerned, 
throughout the years have done more good, have done me more good; and 
what I'm finqing in this workers co-operative here, to be very honest 
with you, is that there are too many people who don't ·know enough about 
the unions, and don't know enough about procedure. OK maybe some 
of these people have to learn, but they don't know, I'm finding this 
out. If more people knew about the unions you could base a good 
wOrkers co-operative on the unions, incorporate a bit of union method into 
it ••••• But here, in the prospec~us~t was agreed that the day 
we started printing, we'd revert back to all national agreements, this was 
agreed upon. 
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Yet I've done things I'm afraid if my union finds 
out about them ••• I'm steering clear of my branch secretary, if he 
knew some of the things we were doing, we'd be annihilated. We're doing 
things against all the principles of.a proper union shop. I'm 
governed by these rules, although I'm in a workers enterprise. 
some people in here don't seem to realise this." 
There's 
Ronnie Gibson, the APEX FOC, broadly concurred with these criticisms, 
but was a great deal more optimistiC about the potential for the 
development of trade union control in the co-operative: 
"The Federated Chapel, the federation of shop stewards, is very young, 
but I maintain that in this set-up, the unions through the shop stewards 
will be the power. They're not at the moment, but they will be the 
power. Make quite sure, we will dictate to the management, to the 
Works Council, as far as the running of this company.and the policies 
of this company are concerned. I'm quite sure about this. Although 
we're forgetting about it at the present time. I'm dismissing national 
agreements of my own union, as far as sick schemes are concerned, 
pensions, benevolent funds. Everything. You could name them - 10 
agreements that I've dismissed. Demarcation lines, all sorts of things. 
But in the future they will come, in the future the unions will have 
control of this workers co-operative." 
A generally recognised weakness in the chapel organization at the SON 
was the inexperience of the FOCs: the Beaverbrook FOCs had formed 
the Action Committee, and several had continued with the Works Council, 
while others had assumed executive editorial or other positions, such 
as Nathan Goldberg and Denny Macgee. It was believed that as the new 
FOes acquired experience, there would be a gradual reassertion of trade 
union practices and controls, but a consecutive series of early disasters 
undermined this effort. In thelast resort, it was realised by the 
people who remained active trade unionists in the ~, that it would be 
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the responsibility of the broader trade union movement at the branch 
and national level to uphold minimum conditions within the SDN, and 
to prevent any dramatic de~erioration, even if industrial action was 
necessary to achieve this. 
Wages 
A great deal of the complex industrial relations activity in the 
national newspaper industry revolves around the issue of wage bargaining. 
Sisson goes as far as to suggest that an investigation into pay 
structure could provide an adequate explanation of most of the 
characteristics of industrial relations in Fleet Street since it is a 
major source of ~nflict. (1975, p.4). Due to the competitiveness 
of the product market in the newspaper industry, the perishability of the 
product, and technology of production, the chapels are in a position to 
constantly bargain over pay: 
"Because of the many changes in the product and fluctuations in the 
level of activity in the product market, discontinuities in production 
are extremely frequent in every department. Indeed, there can be few 
industries in which discontinuities in production are so many and varied 
each issue of the newspaper is a different product. Then there are a 
number of editions in each issue, a number of page changes in each 
edition, and so on Changes in the product and fluctuations in the 
level of activity in the product market are such that workers are 
obliged to seek some control over the payment system; for without this 
control the management sould be free to determine what constitutes a 
fair day's work. Yet these changes and fluctuations also provide 
workers with the opportunity to gain control, simply and effectively, 
by forcing the managements to negotiate their co-operation whenever 
there is a need to alter working arrangements~ The result is a system 
• 
of payment by task. As one industrial relations manager has put it: 
'We pay the basic rate to get the men to come to the office. Then we 
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have to pay them for everything they do ! n (Sisson, 1975, pp 60,115). 
Through chapel bargaining a wide range of components have been added 
to the basic wage, and by aggressive bargaining over these, big 
improvements have been achieved in weekly earnings on industry basic 
rates. This process has accounted for the high earnings of print 
workers in the newspaper industry. In the provincial newspaper 
industry ACAS noted the management complaint that production workers 
earned more than the people who supervised their work, and that the 
gap between the earnings of clerical and administrative employees and 
those of production workers was too wide. In most houses skilled 
production workers earned more than any of the administrative and 
editorial workers and frequently this applied to semi-skilled and unskilled 
production workers as well. The differential between skilled 
production workers average earnings and those of journalists was £1,000 
or more, though production workers pay included shift bonus and overtime. 
(Cmnd 6810-2, p36). Complex differentials have been a further 
source of frequ"ent inter-union tension. in the industry, and have 
contributed to industrial relations conflict. 
In total contrast, it was intended at the ~ that, miraculously; 
"wages and conditions of employment will be taken outside the area of 
controversy." The first amazing step in this process, was the voluntary 
acceptance o~ a 12 month wage freeze in the first year of operation 
agreed at a mass meeting on 1 January 1975. There were only two 
dissenters to this proposal, thouqh at the time both inflation and pay 
awards were running at above 20\ per annum. At a mass meeting attended 
by 210 workers on the 25 February 1975, Robert Maxwell explained that 
"It is a requirement of the prospectus that YQu submit cash flow 
projections for two consecutive ye~s ~nd still bearing in mind the 
prospectus has to be attractive to the potential investor ••• • the 
workers were asked, and unanimously agreed, to accept the following 
conditions published in the SNE prospectus: 
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"(i) that no demands should be made fer 
1) any increase in the salary payable to employees of the Company 
in respect of the period to 1 January 1976, or, 
2) any increase in excess of 10 per cent of the initial salary in 
respect of the period from 1 January 1976 to 1 January 1977 •••• 
(ii) that voluntary assistance without payment should be 
(iii) 
given by such persons to help with the preparation for the launch 
of the newspaper 
that the principle that the Company cannot pay more 
in salaries to employees than the Company's earnings permit be 
accepted." (1975,p.8). 
More tersely in the guide to the prospectus it stated, "As a sign 
of their intentions, the workers have agreed to a mor"atorium on wage 
increases for the rest of the year and a 10 per cent maximum in increases 
in 1976." This agreement was secured in an industry typified by the 
most militant forms of wage bargaining, well before the implications of 
the Labour Government Social Contract of 1975-78 were to emerge. The 
terms of the voluntary SDN agreement were more severe than those of 
the Social Contract, which allowed £6 increases in July 1975 to J~ly 1976, 
and the Social Contract was successfully imposed only because workers 
had recently received substantial awards, whereas the SDN workers had 
only a low basic wage decided upon early in 1974 and then supplemented 
by a modest 8~ national"increase in the basic rate negotiated in 1974. 
(SNE 1974, pp 8-9). The clause on compulsory 'voluntary' work would 
have horrified even the most accommodating trade union official. 
Moreover any attempt by workers who may not have been party to the original 
agreement, to escape from its provisions, was firmly precluded by 
including the agreement as a condition in prospective workers contracts of 
employment. (SHE; 1975, pp2,8). In addition new workers had to 
purchase £100 of employee shares, and former Beaverbrook employees a 
further £300 of ordinary shares. Investment of their earnings would bind 
• 
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workers ·to the SDN, but it was highly unlikely that such small 
shareholdings would ever yield a significant supplement to their income, 
and workers remained entirely dependent upon their wages. 
A highly simplified wages and differentials structure in 
comparison to the rest of the newspaper industry, was regarded as a 
master stroke of Allister Macki~who was primarily responsible for 
constructing it, in eliminating the rivalry and resentment compounded 
by the enormous complexity of wage structures elsewhere. 
In contrast to the conspiratorial secrecy maintained by both management 
and chapels over pay information in the national newspaper industry, 
at the ~ the pay scales were published and utter frankness maintained. 
Allister Mackie explained: 
"I've always worked in newspapers, and I've never met anyone who 
liked demarcation, it is imposed on the chapels as much as the 
proprietors. Most differences occur because of the differentials 
in wages. When everyone knows everyone else's wages, there is less 
basis for aggro." 
Although simplified, the pay structur~, as Table 12 shows, was 
undoubtedly hierarchical, and preserved many conventional features: nine 
different rates of pay for workers, and eleven if first line managem~nt 
are included; a differential of 130\ between experienced clerical 
workers on £30, and journalists on £69; and of 76\ between night 
shift production workers on £60 and clerical shift workers on £34; with 
a relatively highly paid management team, the general manager earning 
12x the salary of the lowest paid worker. In reducing down by half the 
twenty-plus differentials that exist in the newspaper industry between 
departments and different crafts,the basic differential which prevails 
~ the industry between craft and non-craft of l2~' was essentially 
preserved in the 11\ differential between the tradesmen and NATSOPA at the 
f 
500. (ReP, 1976a, pp. 50-51). Yet it was still a major achievement to 
get engineers and compositers, stereotypers and machine minders, on the 
same basic rate rather than competing with each other. 
• 
Table 12 SDN Basic Weekly Wage Structure in 1975. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Management 
General Manager £240 
Senior Managers £150 
Editor £150 
Assistant Editors £110 
Journalists 
Senior Journalists 
Journalists 
£ 60 + 30\ - £78 
£ 60 + 15\ - £69 
First Line Management 
Nightshift Production Overseers 
Clerical Departmental Heads 
£60 + 15\ 
£40 + 25\ 
Production WGrkers 
Night Shift Tradesmen 
NATSOPA 
The Works Wage Rate 
Day Shift Tradesmen 
£60 
£60 
Clerical Workers 
= 
= 
= £69 
= £50 
= E60 
£53.40 
£48 
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8. Experienced With Special Responsibilities £60 - 33.l/3rd\ = £40 
9. Experienced Workers 
10. Engaged on Shift Basis 
11. Juniors and Beginners 
£40 - 25\ 
£40 - 15\ 
£40 - 50\ 
= £30 
= £34 
- £20 
• 
A high basic rate was paid at the ~ in order to eliminate 
the competitive demand by the chapels for bonuses, merit money, 
allowances and overtime which have come to compose almost half of 
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weekly earnings in the provincial newspaper industry, and over two-thirds 
of earnings in the national newspaper industry. (Rep, 197(a, p.25l). 
Supplements to pay were frowned upon at the SDN and only secured for 
a few individuals with some difficulty. Equally overtime payments were 
severely restricted, and people were actually expected to work extra 
hours without pay when necessary. The result as seen in Table 13 
was that although the basic wage at the ~ compared very favourably 
with other establishments, gross earnings at the SDN, due to the absence 
of any form of extra payment, were substantially lower than in other 
provincial newspaper offices. Of course, earnings in the London 
national newspaper offices were much higher still. 
Though the ex-Beaverbrook workers had been used to earning a good deal 
'more than other provincial newspaper houses, because they worked on a 
national newspaper in the Express, and had a closer relationship with 
the high rates of pay of Fleet Street, at the SDN workers found that 
their pay was uniformly lower than the other provincial houses. For 
example in the ACAS sample of companies in Table 13, compositors and 
readers on average earned £78.27 "in the provincial houses, and 30\ 
less at the SDN. This differential of 30\+ between ~ earnings 
and those in the other provincial offices applied to almost all 
of the occupations, with the exception of the journalists at theSDN 
as Table 14 shows. Thus whereas production workers earnings were as 
much as £1,000 below many of their colleagues in other offices, the 
journalists earned over E150 more than the average salary of £3,422 for 
journalists in the ACAS sample. To an extent this anomoly was a relic 
• 
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Table 13: House Minimum Rates and Average Gross Weekly Wage As At October 1975 For Various 
= Production Job Categories in the SDN and Six Provincial Newspaper Houses • 
.... 
t"') I I -.. -----
!Job SDN ICompany 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4 Company 5 Company 6 
Cate 0 9 ry IBouse ~stimated House Ave. House Ave House Ave Bou.. Ave House Av. House Ave 
min Gross min gross min gross min gross min gross min gross min gros~ 
rate wage rate wage rate wage rate wage rate wage rate wage rate wage 
Compositor E E £ E E E £ £ £ E E E E E 
& or 75.56 78.92 
Reader 60.00 60.00 45.55 75.68 48.50 85.09 55.39 103.63 51.90 72.091 51.00 I 65.00 
50.47 67.51 
I . 
Stereotyper 60.00 60.00' 44.28 100.50 55.88 87.92 71.84 73.06 61.24 92.26 51.90 67.62 51.00 65.00 
I 
Process 
employees 60.00 60.00 46.40 65.76 72.00 101.40 57.94 74.56 - - 52.75 78.92 47.00 72.00 
r,lachine Room 
~inder 60.00 60.00 44.28 76.00 49.88 92.88 72.02 73.19 51.39 75.37 51.90 77.47 68.00 74.00 
Machine Room 
rSsistant 53.40 53.40 37.91 71.03 44.34 85.34 63.79 66.37 47.19 76.47 45.97 65.31 60.00 64.00 
~iniShing 
Department 153.401 53.40 1 37.911 76.23 1 39.61 1 67.61 I 39.61 I 67.61 I 47.54 I 76.29 I - I - I - I -
Source: ACAS, Industrial Relations In The Provincial Newspaper and Periodical Industries, Research Series.2, 
Cmnd 6810-2. Derived from Table 2, Appendix 6,pl09. ~ figures fran SON Discussion 'Document. 
I 
0\ 
.-4 
M 
I 
• 
Table 1+: Comparison of Annual Average Salaries of Journalists, Clerical and Production 
Workers in the SDN and Six Provincial Newspaper Houses As At October 1975. 
Job Category SDN Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4 Company 5 
Journalist 3,588 3,495 3,178 4,050 2,902 2,500 
Clerical 1,768 2,221 2,018 2,250 2,256 1,500 
Overseers '3,588 3,826 4,043 - 3,944 2,500 
Compositor 3,000 4,091 4,424 5,389 3,748 3,380 
Sterotyper 3,000 5,226 4,572 4,858 3,516 3,380 
-
Process 
Employee 3,000 3,419 5,272 - 4,104 3,744 
Machine Room 
Minder 3,000 3,952 4,829 3,919 4,028 3,848 
Machine Room 
Assistant 2,776 3,953 4,437 3,976 3,396 3,328 
Finishing 
Department 2,776 3,962 3,512 3,967 - -
-.--
Company 6 
4,408 
2',509 
4,113 
3,95'2 
. 
4,706 
3,952 
4,264 
3,536 
3,614 
Source: ACAS, Derived from Table 7, Appendix 6, P 115. SON figures estimated fran SON Discussion Document. 
• 
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of the Beaverbrook days when highly paid journalists had earned 
more than the production workers, but it was also a result of an 
attempt by those who devised the ~ wages structure to restore 
differentials to the order which they felt to be proper - that is that 
production workers should earn less than journalists. There was much 
resentment of this elevation of the journalists, particularly among 
the low-paid clerical workers who felt that they possessed very similar 
skills; and it seemed further proof that the journalists were least 
prepared to make sacrifices for the co-operative. 
Perhaps the most startling feature of the payment system at the ~ 
was the amount of voluntary work undertaken. This began with the 
preparation for the launch whenthe SON workforce intensively laboured for 
two weeks to get the newspaper out on time without any payment whatsoever. 
Payment of wages commenced in the week prior to the launch, but due to 
teething problems frequent overtime was worked in most departments without 
·any extra pay. When the changeover from broadsheet to tabloid was 
made the caseroom staff and engineers again worked voluntarily to ensure 
its success. 
coDllli tmen t: 
Joe McGowan the SGA FOC, indicated the extent of the 
"The boys were out - on their days off in many cases - to try and bring 
advertising in, or to get people.to read the paper, anything at all they 
could do on their day off - to help. It's a thing that's never been 
known before y' know. The FOes have to spend all their time in their 
departments, I spend up to 15 hours some days, because we have to do a 
"full shift, and any union business we have to do in our own time, so if there's 
anything to be done internally, we can't afford men to go off the 
. line, we have to do it in our own time. n 
Tom, an NUJ member, described the change in attitude: 
"Everyone here pulls their weight, it~s not a 'them and us' situation. 
Though possibly the de,:"elopments with Maxwell have created a version of 
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that situation. In the Express people worked for money, but here 
they work for the paper, its ~ paper. Guys last thing at night will 
put the lights out, before they would have just left them. People take 
more care, there is less waste, they ,look after the property. - People 
were not like that in the Express." 
Doddy MacKo skill of NATSOPA summed up the changes which left him slightly 
aghast: 
"Previously, under the Beaverbrook set-up, we had the machinery 
and the despatch, these were the two production sides, and we stuck 
strictly to what was laid down. What they could do, and what they 
couldn't do. And if we were asked to do anything more, we were looking 
for payment for it. In the old days, when we were asked to do a wee 
bit extra, we'd say, 'How much is in it for me?'. This was it. 
Whenever the management came to us, we'd look into it, and say, 'extra 
men or extra money ! ' That's all gone now. Now we have a set-up 
of flexibility, working for one another. Now the men from the despatch 
department are prepared to go into the machine room to help out, just as 
the machine men are prepared to come into the despatch department and 
help out if needed. No payment involved, nothing. We've now got 
people here prepared to work overtime, no payment involved in this 
either. To work extra hours but no look for extra money. In the 
old days this could never have happened, if we went a minute over time 
we were looking for an hour." 
Finally, Joe McGowan. the SGA FOe produced the kind of COlJlllent management 
must pray for from a shopfloor union leader: 
"There's no management as such, its not as if its a 'them and us' 
situation. We've the Federated Chapel, and they're the Works Council. 
They're looking af~er the company, and we're looking after the union 
section of it. At the same time, it's all for the company at heart, 
everything we do is for the company. There's no bartering for wages 
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or conditions or anything like that. We're more interested in how 
smoothly we can get each department working. This is the liaison 
between the Works Council and the Federated Chapel - how much we can 
do to get a better and more efficient company." 
However everything concerning wages and effort was not quite 
so idyllic from the management point of view at the SDN. Most workers 
accepted the prevailing pay and conditions merely as a temporary 
sacrifice until the co--operative got on its feet, when they expected 
a significant improvement all round, and would undoubtedly press for this 
through the chapels. The Council recognized this wage pressure would 
come, and decided before the launch that if the profit projections for 
the first year were realised they would pay a 10 per cent dividend to 
shareholders and a flat rate bonus to employees. (Guardian, 7 March, 
1975). The chairman of the co-operative Allister Mackie, was well 
aware of the problem of low wages: 
"We're not going to live in perpetuity in a halcyon condition, but I dont 
think that problems with the staff are going to be very serious. 
I'm going to push for higher wages, as I'm only on E60 a week, and I 
can't live on it." 
Others were less sanguine about the SDN pay rates. Local full time 
union officials were very sceptical about the wages and conditions at 
the SDN, and the suggestion of a 24 hour newspaper prompted a letter 
from Ken Morgan, general secretary of the NUJ, seeking a negotiated 
agreement covering wages and conditions for the 91 journalists at 
"Albion Street, since the NUJ was unhappy with the SDN wages relative 
to other Scottish newspapers, and disliked the undertaking not to ask 
for a wage increase before January 1976. (Glasgow Herald, 11 April, 1975). 
Within the ~ some workers had grievances against the pay structure. 
Ronnie Gibson, the APEX FOe was angry about the size of the journalists 
differential: 
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"APEX have no dispute with the craftsmen, the journeymen printers, but 
with the journalists, The journalists are on E69, 15\ more than the 
craftsmen, but there are at least 15 journalists on over E100 a week. 
The journalists believe they are doing a job more important than 
anyone else. Some are talented - but the others ?" 
At the mass meetings prior to the launch it was agreed that 
there would be no overtime payments for late stories in the first three 
months, and this was emphasised by the Council to heads of departments. 
(WCM, 30 April 1975). 
place: 
Yet within two months the following exchange took 
"Mr. Goldberg stated that there was a general belief amongst editorial 
staff that payment would be made for additional shifts worked. 
Consequently they experienced surprise and disappointment when compensation 
had not been made in the period ending 28 June. He complained of 
poor communication. Mr. Goldberg further advised the meeting that 
there was now considerable danger that, in the absence of payment, such 
work would now cease. This would result in considerable diffic~lty in 
producing the newspaper. 
Mr. Mackie expressed sympathy but asked that the financial situation 
be recoqnised, po in ting out that very many people had worked addi tionOal 
shifts over a long period of time without payment." (WCM, 2 July 1975). 
In fact the journalists began to claim, and sometimes receive, payment 
for overtime,expenses, and additional editorial contributions. This 
breakdown of the spirit of self-sacrifice was bound to influence the 
. other departments, and by 1 August a review of payment policy by the Council 
was necessary. 
"Mr. Mackie advised the meeting that with the gradual erosion of present 
pOlicy not to pay for casual shifts and overtime, the question of casual 
payments must be addressed in the ~eat future. 
Mr. Goldberg stated that until the tabloid launch the workforce should 
be asked to agree to a moratorhl1l on all payments for casual and overtime 
shiftwork •• 
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It was moved by Mr. Maxwell and seconded by Mr. Mackie that such an 
appeal be made to the workforce in the spirit that obtained prior 
to the original publication." 
other important terms of employment had been neglected at the SDN 
in the rush to get the newspaper published on a shoe-string. Both a 
sick scheme and pension scheme had been planned and budgeted for in 
the submission to the Dol, but neither became operational at the launch. 
This omission was not deliberate but due to the total absorption 
of both the management and trade union representatives in the editorial 
production and marketing problems of the newspaper. John Hodgeman, 
who as the Glasgow NUJ branch secretary bore a special responsibility 
to ensure that the ~ maintained national agreements, argued in June: 
"A lot of us are working anti-trade union shifts. A lot of us without 
overtime. We haven't got anything like pensions and sickness clarified 
as yet, there's a lot of these things put to the background that we're 
going to have to get down to pretty soon. But we haven't done this 
purely and simply because we haven't had the time." 
When a few workers began to fall ill and have accidents though, it was 
real~sed that there could not be further delay. The need for a scheme 
was discussed at the 21 July Council meeting, the general manager 
approached insurance agents but ~as advised that in the SDN's present 
position a scheme could be financed more economically internally. It 
was agreed that 66\ of normal wages less Social Security benefits 
would be paid for a period not exceeding six weeks to those off work 
through sickness, and thereafter cases would be subject to review by the 
Council. Yet, "an effective date for the commencement of the scheme 
was not established." (WCM, 1 August 1975). Despite this delay 
in implementing standard employment provisions there was a remarkable 
absence of protest from the chapels. . 
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Serious problems concerning wages and conditions did begin to 
appear on the horizon at the ~, which threatened to erupt in conflict. 
Eric Tough the general manager pointed out in his third report of the 
2 July that: 
"We may face, sooner than we had expected, wages pressures since 
imminent awards in the print industry will make our employees very poor 
relations. We may have to face losses of staff with a waqe structure 
which, even now, is making recruitment difficult." 
The looming dilemma the newspaper faced was that people simply looking 
for work were put off by the low pay at the ~, whereas those attracted 
by idealism to the co-operative, even to the point of giving up much 
better paid jobs elsewhere to join the ~'. were repelled by Robert 
Maxwell's assumption of control, which drove a number of idealists to 
early resignations. Thus Maxwell could proudly declare: 
" ••••• Miracles have been performed in doing what ha"s been done. Very 
little has been said about the incredible spirit of the workforce. 
These people are working for virtually nothing on frozen wages out of 
idealism. " (Scotsman, 5 June 1975). 
But the point was that the self-sacrifice was for a co-operative ~ewspaper, 
James Russell 
not for him. The financial journalist,/having resigned from the ~ 
in September and secured a job with a rival newspaper the Glasgow Herald, 
accurately expressed the sentiment of many of the ~ workers thoroughly 
disenchanted with what had become of their enterprise: 
"As a newspaper the Daily News could survive, but the conditions under 
-which people work will become harsher, bordering on a non-union shop, 
even if still unionized. It can succeed in some form with Maxwell, 
but not as a co-operative. No one can work with Maxwell, only under 
him. I was prepared to drop two thousand for a co-operative. But not 
for Maxwell. That·would be just a change of bosses. As inflation bites 
into people's wages, they will be working for half the wage they worked 
for under Beaverbrook. There will be trouble, and the talented 
workers will drift away." 
• 
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Manning and Demarcation. 
In the national newspaper industry the aim of chapel bargaining 
to maximise earnings is siqnificantly tempered by the aim to maximise 
employment. (Sisson, 1975, pp 112-3). To defend and extend 
employment the chapels have sought to control the supply of labour, and 
to carefully delineate the boundaries of job tasks: 
"From the unions' point of view, the overriding objectives were to 
protect employment in the industry from outside incursion, to maximise 
(and at least retain) their individual claims on jobs within the 
industry, and especially latterly, to ensure that job opportunities were 
fairly distributed among their own members. These objectives have given 
rise to strict controls on entry into the industry, fine definition 
of demarcation lines, the often fierce struggles over job'ownership', and 
the increasing regulation by unions of working patterns of members." 
(ACAS, 1976, p.27). 
~e desire to preserve employment provoked hostility to productivity deals, 
or 'comprehensive agreements', which involved considerable job 
reductions. "Some chapels refused under any circumstances to negotiate 
comprehensive agreements involv~g a reduction in the number of jobs. 
Most refused to negotiate comprehensive agreements involving such reductions 
in the latter part of the period. (the 1960s) because of the unemployment 
in the printing industry." <Sisson, 1975, p.112). 
Because of its low manning, the SON was often portrayed in the 
media as essentially a job-cutting exercise, although the SDN workers 
themselves, primarily looked upon it as an endeavour to create jobs. 
Andy Riley said: "We re-employed all the SLADE men who were still 
. unemployed (frOID the Express closure), plus we've managed to create 
three new jobs. To me this is one of the best things about the co-operative, 
that we are starting to create jobs for men who have absolutely no 
chance of qetting a jo~ elsewhere." Of course both views were accurate: 
in recruiting labour to start up the ~, unemployed workers were given 
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employment, at the same time as the appearance of the SDN threatened 
the jobs of workers in rival newspapers that were experiencing 
difficulties, and potentially undermined the manning levels attained 
by the chapels in all newspaper offices. Many SDN workers, intheir 
total commitment to the newspaper, remained oblivious to the contradiction 
that it resembled a self-imposed productivity deal: Joe McGowan argued 
"As far as I'm concerned we've trimmed the staffing - agreed of course 
by the trade unions before we even started - down to the barest minimum, 
on the surmise of course, that it's easier to start staff than it is 
to fire them. And this has worked very well, because we were originally 
understaffed in certain departments yet were still coping. It means an 
extra pullout for the boys - but then this is what we're talking about 
with the workers co-operative spirit, you know, because the boys that 
have been pulling out find it difficult in some departments. So far 
as the trade unions are concerned, we're not breaking any national 
agreements, and the flexibility gained is mostly in house agreements. 
The unions are prepared to settle for this to a certain extent, to see 
how this experiment works. There's no time limit on it - but I daresay 
that if it went on too long, and things started to happen, then 
demarcation lines would:soon come in. 
pretty good." 
But so far the unions have been 
It was acknowledged, though, that NATSOPA was particularly under-staffed, 
and Ooddy MacKoskill, a veteran of numerous campaigns against productivity 
schemes, was conscious of the dilemma the co-operative faced: 
"Can I take you right back? I worked in the trade years ago. When we 
used to fight for ~ not money. At one time when we went to 
manaqement we used to fight for jobs. We went for jobs all the time. 
Manpower. To get the men employment. Now we've come on 30 years, 
we've done well out of this, and the union is strong, very strong. The 
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minute we started comprehensive schemes, the minute comprehensive and 
productivity schemes came into it, what happened then? Y'know, the 
time and motion men came in. It was a case of then - r don't know if 
you can blame the workers for this - ,greed came into it, money came into it. 
And it was a case of doing away with the conditions we'd fought for over 
years and years - getting employment for men, good working conditions, 
good wages. It took donkeys years of struggle and strife to get this. 
I mean donkeys years - long before I ever started this game. And 
comprehensive schemes came in more or less overnight. Once it happened, 
what people had fought and strived for all their lives, just went like 
that - bang ! Whether it was a form of brainwa~ing into this attitude 
of greed I don't know, all of a sudden, men started to say - 'You can do 
away with so many jobs here, this puts X amount of pounds on our wages.' 
If you consider, for arguments sake, you've got 50 men in a department, 
and a year later there's 30. OK, they're earning more, but they're working 
harder - a lot harder. It's got to the stage, when you come into work, you're 
working straight through, with; an hour mealbreak, and then work straight 
through till the evening. I've worked on newspapers where it was a job 
even getting to the toilet. I mean that. Everything people had'fought 
for over the years - wage~ and conditions - were tossed out of the window. 
So we'll take it a step further. This place closes. Beaverbrook throws 
the workforce onto the streets. This is a workforce, the majority of which 
never knew what it was like to be unemployed. Well all of a sudden they 
realise what its all about. They realise it's not easy to get jobs, in 
some cases it was age against them, in some cases they weren't competent 
in other fields, anyway they realised they couldn't get other work. 
. So some banded together and decided to start this set-up. We were told 
this would never get off the ground - an impossible dream. Yet the dream 
came true. It started up. What I want to know - is it a good thing in 
the way we've tied our wages down? Y'know this is something I canna really 
answer, I don't know who could answer it. Because we've cut ourselves', 
• 
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staffing wise, the conditions we used to enjoy, they're no longer 
there. We've plenty of flexibility that we've never known before." 
An interesting paradox at the SDN was that despite the under-
manning, because of the shortage of funds, traditional labour-intensive 
forms of technology were employed. Daddy MacKoskill was appreciative 
of this point, and pesstmistic about the future for labour in the 
industry: 
"We're starting men, when every other newspaper in the country is 
automating. The Daily Record is one of the most glaring examples, 
they've web-offset. The Record is automating to such an extent that 
you don't have a case room as such, there are no crowd of men like we've got 
in the case room up here over at the Record office. The different 
departments that we have in this building ars obsolete over there, and 
throughout the nation. And they're bringing in new machines that are 
going to slash the machine men and the despatch. The despatchers don't have 
to touch anything in their hand at all. The days coming, through 
automation, when the majority of people in this trade are gonna be obsolete. 
We're in the fortunate position being a workers' enterprise, thae we 
don't have the money to involve ourselves in any of this, wedon't'~~ve it. 
As our circulation rises., we'll employ more people. But if we were 
a millionaire outfit, one of the multi-millionaire outfits, we'd be 
bringing automation in. This is the different method - we're employing 
people, they're doing away with people, that is the difference. I went 
round OUtram's despatch department, I saw six girls and seven machines. 
I said, 'Where is your depsatch department?' They said, 'That's it!'. 
Six girls pressing buttons, that was your despatch. Everything was 
automated. Everything. Six girls pressing buttons. The machines 
are French, they have a oomputer code, and you stick the programme in, 
and the machines do everything for you. The copies are bundled and tied 
and come out ready for delivery.- (Needless to say that institutionalized 
sexism pervades the newspaper industry, and in the past, practically .no 
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women have been employed in production areas). (Cockburn, 1983) 
The SDN had no policy on computerized production technology and 
given its financial position, it certainly was a remote question, 
but there would have been considerable resistance to any redundancies 
accompanying such development. Ronnie Gibson insisted: 
"We would never be concerned to cut men's livelihoods, to cut their jobs 
through automation. If we were making a profit, and if other newspapers 
were interested in making a bigger profit by doing away with men's jobs, 
and men's livelihoods,and men's families, fair enough they'd go for 
automation, they'd do that. But as long as we're making a profit, and able 
to sell the newspaper as a good newspaper, with the content in it, then 
there's no reason to do awaywith dispatchers . or do away with machine 
men, or do away with van drivers. They have to satisfy big business, we 
don't. We satisfy ourselves. That's the difference. We're trying to 
make a living, if we can produce a newspaper that's viable, that's selling 
over 200,OOO~pies, then we've nothing to worry about you know. 
If it ever comes to the point that we're having to do away with guys then 
I won't be here to see it. Not in a workers co-op. No way. Because 
then we wouldn't be a workers co-op." 
Daddy MacKoskill agreed: 
"Where big business steps in, capitalism steps in, they're only interested 
in profits for them, not for the workers. But we're interested in giving 
workers a job. Giving x amount of workers a standard of living, a job, 
something for them to take home to their wife and bring up their family. 
This is what we're trying to do. Big business - they're trying to do 
without people, a couple of robots would do them, a couple of computers. 
It will happen in our li·fetime. Because the changes I've seen in the 
newspaper trade since the ttme I- star~ed at ~4 years of age, have been 
fantastic, especially in the last few years. It's been fantastic." 
• 
In the context of such unstable and insecure employment, 
demarcation potentially was an explosive issue at the SON, as it 
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consistently is in the rest of the national press. The fact that it 
never became a problem was a result firstly of the co-operative spirit 
of flexibility, which allowed 'diplomatic demarcation' to extend 
to the temporary performance of related duties when necessary due to staff 
shortages. But secondly, and probably more importantly, was the 
fact that the traditional demarcation was so instilled in the SON 
workers, that they would never have dreamt of seriously breaching it, 
as Jimny McNamara put it, "Demarcation was never a real problem, because 
in the print industry, the lives are so defined. And they're still 
defined to a certain extent." Whilst allowing journalists to use the 
library when no librarians were on duty, and allowing despatch workers 
to help out in the machine room when necessary were regarded as revolutionar/ 
by many SON workers, and would have greatly surprised fellow print 
workers, they did not amount to a serious dismantling of demarcation in 
the interests of co-operative development. 
Disputes Procedure and Industrial Conflict. 
Both the national newspaper industry and the provincial industry 
have elaborate formal disputes procedures. Most procedures have 
several stages through which a grievance travels in search of resolution, 
beginning with the chapel FCC and the overseer, then chapel representation 
to more senior management, culminating in a reference to a joint committee 
appointed by management and unions, which ultimately has the power to 
appQint a referee w~se decision is final. Normally hostile action 
by either side is forbidden with the status quo to prevail until a 
decision is reached or the procedure is exhausted. Stoppages or other 
forms of. industrial action are therefore formally prevented without 
recourse to the disputes machinery. . . .<ACAS, 1976, pp 298-301; ACAS, 
amnd 6810-2, p.49). In practice disptes procedures are frequently 
ignored in the n~tional newspaper industry, and occasionally in the 
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provinces. Most disputes occur suddenly in response to a change 
in production or work organization~ as such the disputes are highly 
perishable in nature, status quo clauses are ineffective in the face 
of a determine~ management, and if industrial action was not taken 
immediately then the case would be lost. Thus most industrial action 
takes place quickly after a grievance arises in the national industry, 
usually wi thin 24 hours, or at the most seven days. (ACAS, 1976, p. 297). 
Under Beaverbrook at Albion Streetthe conflict between the chapels 
and management had been intense and more or less continuous, without 
regard to procedural formalities. 
FOe at the time, said laughing: 
As Jimmy McNamara the engineers 
"There wasnae a disputes procedure previously. You screwed Beaverbrook 
for as much as you could get ! There was no disputes procedure. 
Beaverbrook management was. so weak, er, you just told them what you wanted, 
threatened not to produce the paper, and you got it There was no 
disputes procedure There may have been one laid down in national 
agreements, but we didnae bother with that y'know." 
Therefore there was a particular pride at the SDN in the comprehensive 
disputes procedure adopted, which was pointed out to potential investors 
as another guarantee of "the harmony and efficiency of the enterprise. 
The SDN Discussion Document claimed: 
"An analysis of disputes indicates that most disputes arise from grievances 
over wages, whether it be for an increase for the establishment of a 
differential, reducing the differential, or quite simply keeping one 
chapel's wage rates up with the other chapels. 
In the ~, therefore, with an agreed and universally understood wages 
structure, the areas of dispute would appear to be minimal. However, 
with the best intent in the world, itis still conceivable that disputes 
will arise occasionally either between the individual and management or 
the chapel and the manag.ement. It is for such occasions that the 
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following disputes procedure has beenadopted. 
The underlying principles behind the procedure are that the individual 
or chapel must have every facility open to him to defend himself or 
to present his case, yet at the same time ensure that production, as 
is so often the case, will not be the first casualty in the event of a 
dispute." 
In fact· : many of the disputes in the national newspaper industry, 
as in most other industries, are not over payor differentials, but over 
work organization, manning, physical conditions of work or other 
matters on which there was at least as great a likelihood of grievances 
arising at the SDN as at other newsp~per offices. 1976 p.296). 
The procedure itself was conventional in appearance but contained a 
unique feature that was a result of the workers co-operative status of the 
enterprise: 
1. In the first instance the dispute will hopefully be resolved at 
shop-floor level. 
2. In the event of there being no solution at this level, the case will 
be referred to the Works Manager. 
3. Aqain, failing satisfaction at this level, the representatives of 
the member or chapel may take the case for consideration to the 
FCC's Committee. The committee will then make a decision either to 
lend its support to the claim or grievance, or to reject it. If 
necessary a special meeting of theFOC's Committee will be concerned 
within 48 hours to discuss the grievance. 
4. The next move is for the representatives of the FOes Committee and 
chapel to refer the matter tote Works Council. 
5. If unresolved, the chapel can invite their union official to 
intervene by a further approach_~o the Works Council. 
6. Failing satisfaction, the case will then be referred to an 
Advisory Council comprising of union branch secretaries. 
• 
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7. It is hoped that the findings of the Advisory Council will be 
binding on both committee and chapel. But a member or chapel, 
if still unsatisfied; has the right thereafter to process the 
matter through normal trade union machinery. 
S. It is understood there will be no hold-ups in production during 
the course of these proceedings. 
9. Chapel meetings held during the hours of production will not 
interfere with the production of the paper. 
10. In the event of a national union calling for a stoppage, the 
Disputes Procedure will not apply. 
11. Where there is a demarcation dispute, such a dispute will be 
resolved between the unions concerned. 
12. Acceptance of this procedure will be a condition of employment on 
all employees." 
The remarkable aspect of the disputes procedure was that after the 
second stage the management of the co-operative, except in their minority 
representation,on the Works Council, were formally excluded from any 
influence over the resolution of grievances. The chapel officials and 
the union branch secretaries were given the power to settle disputes 
at the SON without reference to management. It would have been 
fascinating to discover how this procedure worked in practice, but amid 
the crises which afflicted the SDN, in another testimony to the 
inevitability of informality, the procedure was never used: 
nIn the event, of course, the disputes procedure waS never put to the 
test, the workforce were always far too busy producing the newspaper, 
attending meetings or wheeling and dealing to think ofpursuing internal 
disputes through this cumbersome procedure. II (McKay and Barr, 1976, pp.S7-S). 
In the six months that the newspaper was published there was not 
. 
a single incident of conventional industrial action carried out, though 
on several occasions it was threatened. Thebasic reason for this was 
that the circulation and finances of the !E! were so precarious that 
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the shortest stoppage could have proved critical. Another reason 
was that the democratic management structure made conventional 
industrial action seem inappropriate, as the chairman,Allister Mackie put 
it with deceptive simplicity: 
"When we meet the FOes they know that we are 
a) sympathetic 
b) subject to the opinions of the workforce, and, 
c) will be removed from office if we make decisions against the 
interests of the workforce. 
There will be aggro only if the paper does not go well, in which case 
they can get rid of the Works Council. ~ey need not bother going on 
strike, just remove the people running the company and change the company 
policy." 
Andy Riley, the SLADE FOe endorsed the view that close communication 
existed between the Works Council and Federated Chapel. 
"There are going to be wee problems but these can be ironed out long 
before anything really tragic happens: The Federated Chapel can get 
round the table and hammer all these points out. We've had quite a few 
meetings and quite a lot of agreement, and some disagreement. But to 
me this is where the co-operative can't fail, because we get to the hub 
of a matter immediately. You can have all the FOes, Works Councillors 
and management round a table and they can iron out any problems practically 
there and then. To me this makes the running of the place 100% easier." 
Yet the democratic organization and channels of communication at 
the SON were not, in the event, adequate to the pressures that the 
enterprise encountered, and in the course of tackling these problems 
~e democratic structure all but disintegrated. The insistent and 
unpredictable pressures of market forces and proprietoral and managerial 
f 
intervention which primarily determine outbreaks of industrial conflict 
when they encounter entrenched chapel resistance in the national newspaper 
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industry, were channeled into the Works Council at the SON where the 
few shopfloor representatives met them head on. The intense struggle 
which normally takes place on the shopfloor between management and 
chapels, temporarily at least at the ~, was displaced upwards into 
the Council. In particular the almighty rows and acute bitterness 
accompanying Robert Maxwell's interventions in the Council wreaked havoc 
with industrial relations. Whatever benefits there were in the 
transformed industrial relations of the SON were eradicated in this 
conflict, and the conclusion of McKay and Barr must be endorsed: "One 
thing at least can be said with utter confidence - the intervention of 
Maxwell in the Scottish Oaily News effectively ruined the project as a 
test-bed for new industrial relations in the newspaper industry, or in 
industry in general" (1976, p.l20). 
Management 
Writing about the SON in the Observer, Robert Heller, the editor of 
Management Today argued: 
" ••••• No conflict need arise between the Bennite ideal of co-operation, 
participation, and industrial democracy and entrusting decisions to a 
potent, in some respects omnipotent, management." (22 June 1975). 
This is a view with which Eric Tough,the general manager of the SON 
would have happily concurred, the problem was SON workers did not see 
it that way. Thus Heller continued: 
••••• "The managed, given the opportunity, insist that managers must 
manage them. Nor is this some atavistic touching of the forelock; 
merely realistic appreciation that business must draw on many skills 
which include those of tactical and strategic direction and that any 
manager who dodges his clear duty isn't worth a groat of pay." 
That this analysis'was rooted firmly in managerial rationalization was 
clearly revealed at the ~ where close constraints were put on the 
power of independent decision making by management. Though workers 
• 
337 
representatives on the Council and in the chapels were prepared to 
acknowledge the need for management skills, they were not prepared to 
allow the management to use the possession of these skills as the 
means of seizing control of the direction of the enterprise. 
The small SON management team that, however painfully for them, had 
to learn to work within these constraints, at least until they could erode 
them, was headed by Eric Tough who had taken a year's sabbatical from 
PA Management Consultants Limited. Tough, with a background in 
engineering and the Royal Navy, was a veteran of over 200 assignments covering 
24 years, including 'streamlining' more than 30 printing and publishing 
houses. Yet the SDN held a special. attraction for him: 
"As a consultant, I've worked on about two hundred and thirty assignments 
over twenty-odd years. It's one of the few places where I stay late 
at night, not because I have to, I find it extremely hard to drag myself 
away when all the magic begins to happen at a o"clock at night." 
O(BBC2, 10 November 1975). 
Tough had little ideological commitment to a workers co-operative 
newspaper, rather, what interested him was the technical challenge of 
making the enterprise work effiCiently and profitably, while in the 
process proving his managerial skills in a difficult environment: 
"I'm not a Socialist, quite frankly. But I've become terribly 
emotionally involved. I came here on sabbatical leave because I 
believe that a workers' co-operative can solve many problems. But 
politically I'm neutral, a political atheist, if you like, a pragmatist." 
(Sunday Times, 11 May 1975). 
other members of senior management included Jimmy Galt, advertisement 
manager; Douglas Ferquson, c iremlation manage~ and Jimmy Roy, 
production manager; all of whom were drawn from the ex-Beaverbrook 
management. In addition there was a stream of people who held the post 
of company secretary, inciuding Lawrie Hooper and lain Bain, and others, 
• 
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including Bain and Rankin Durnin who were financial controller. 
Some of these managers had a greater dependence on the SDN than Tough 
as the source of their employment; others held idealistic or nationalist 
views; and all avoided the direct clash with the Council that Tough 
almost daily experienced. However, although they were given much 
greater freedom to attend to their respective duties than was the 
general manager, since the Council's directives were channelled through 
TOugh, there was some evidence that they were uncomfortable with the 
workers control structure of the SDN and sympathised greatly with Tough's 
predicament. 
Whatever his misgivings about t~e control of the SDN Eric Tough 
adopted an enthusiastic approach to managing the enterprise. He 
prepared detailed and comprehensive monthly reports for the Council and 
workforce which not only contained much vital information, but also could 
perform an important educative function. In his first lengthy report of 
21 May 1975 TOugh provided a breakdown of sources of capital 
(Table 11); expenditure from settlement day to launch day (Table 8); 
and, in anticipation of the production of monthly trading statements, a 
helpful explanation of the economics of newspaper production presented in 
Table 
Table The Economics of New.spaper Production: 
SDN General Manager's Report Number 1 - 21 May 1975. 
How to calculate the main items of revenue and expenditure and show how 
they affect SON viability. 
REVENUE 
Two main sources of revenue: 
CIRCULATION 
ADVERl'ISEMENTS 
• 
CIRCULATION REVENUE 
Cover Charge per copy = 6p 
Gross Revenue per 1,000 = 6,OOOp 
= £60. 
Discount to Distributor = 37.8% = 
Thus, Gross Circulation Revenue 
Less Discount 
Gives Income per 1,000 of 
And at 300,000 per day Gross Circulation 
Revenue would be 300 x 37.32 
ADVERTISEMENT REVENUE 
Standard Rate 
,Average Pages in Paper 
Target Percentage of 
Space for Adverts 
Therefore Revenue 
= 
= 
-
-
= 
After Allowing for ~ad Debt = 
FORECAST OF TC7I'AL DAILY REVENUE 
El,230 per full page 
16 per day 
44% = 7 Pages 
7 x El,230 per day 
E8,610 per day 
E8,5oo per day 
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E22.68 
= E60.00 
= E22.68 
E37.32 
= Ell,196 
per day. 
Assuming circulation of 300,000 per day with 44\ allocated to 
advertisements. 
Circulation Revenue 
-
£11,196 
Advertisements 
-
£ 8,500 
'l'OTAL INCOME = £19,696 per day 
EXPENDITURE 
Two main eateqories of Expenditure 
WAGES 
NEWSPRINT 
Remaininq expenditure called 'Other Expenditure'. 
• 
WAGES EXPENDITURE 
Pay of around 500 people (including employers 
share of National Health Insurance). 
Production = £17,244 
Editorial = £ 7,144 
Advertisements = £ 1,269 
Circulation = £ 1,441 
Financial and 
Administration = £ 1,750 
Total Payroll = £28,848 
or = £ 4,808 
NEWSPRINT EXPENDITURE 
CUrrently paying with exchange variances around 
At 16 pages, usage = 
340 
per week. 
per day 
£155.00 per tonne 
6,500 copies per reel 
of \ tonne 
At 300,000 per day usage = 34.6 tonne 
- £5,899 per day. 
OTHER EXPENDITURE 
ITEM PER WEEK 
Ink and Metal E 1,500 
Plant Hire E 750 
Plant Repair~ E 961 
Editorial Travel E 918 
Editorial Contributions E 1,185 
Agency Costs E 948 
Electricity E 540 
Gis and Water E 280 
Rates f E 770 
Property Repairs E 195 
Telephone E 400 
• 
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ITEM PER WEEK 
Interest - Dept. of Tra4e & Industry E2,2oo 
Interest - Beaverbrook E 750 
Continuing Promotion El,ooo 
Distribution E2,832 
Circulation Costs E 200 
Advertising Costs E 67 
Depreciation of Cars E 120· 
Other Office Costs E 150 
Professional Fees E 200 
Stationery E 350 
Plant Depreciation El,683 
Insurance E 400 
PER WEEK E18,399 
PER DAY E3,067 
* (DTI interest charges will not commence until May 1977) 
CONTINGENCIES 
Whilst we can accurately forecast most costs we must allow for 
costs which we cannot at present determine and for increased prices which 
we cannot pass on. 
These contingencies we take at E833 per day. 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE PER DAY 
WAGES E4,808 (Fixed) 
NEWSPRINT E5,899 (Variable) 
orHER COSTS E3,067 (Fixed) 
Can'INGENCIES E· 833 (Fixed) 
E14,607 
.per day 
. 
• 
COMPARISON OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL DAILY REVENUE 
TOTAL DAILY EXPENDITURE 
SURPLUS 
ECONOMICS OF NEWSPAPER PRODUCTION 
= 
= 
= 
£19,696 
£14,607 
£ 5,089 
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Many people ask, "What is our break-even point?". There is no 
single break-even point since our revenue is part circulation, part 
advertisement. 
I have prepared, therefore, a table showing which combinations 
of daily circulation and daily advertisements we need to meet our 
Fixed Daily Costs. But first, an explanation of how this is prepared 
Newsprint is not a fixed cost since its usage varies with circulation. 
Therefore if we deduct both discount to distributor and the cost of 
newsprint from the cover charge of 6p, we will get the net revenue to us 
of each newspaper. 
At 6p Cover Charge ; 
Gross Revenue per 1,000 
Less Discount at 37.8\ 
Newsprint 
Net Revenue per 1,000 
Fixed daily costs 
WAGES 
0'1'HER 
can'INGENCIES 
== 
£4,808 
£3,067 
£ 833 
£8,708 
1,000 x 6p 
£22.68 
£19.66 
per day 
== 
== 
£60.00 
£42.34 
£17.66 
Knowing that our fixed costs are £8,708, we can draw up the followinq 
table to show the minimum Advertising Revenue' we require at any level of 
Circulation to meet our, fixed cost - i.e. To BREAK-EVEN. 
• 
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Composite Revenue/Expenditure Table for Break-Even Conditions. 
NET DAILY MINIMUM TOTAL ACTUAL 
CIRCULATION ADVERTISEMENT REVENUE CASH 
CIRCULATION REVENUE/PER . REVENUE DAILY COSTS 
DAILY @ £17.66/ DAILY 
1,000 
175,000 £ 3,091 £ 5,617 £ 8,708 £ 8,708 
200,000 E 3,532 E 5,176 .£ 8,708 E 8,708 
225,000 £ 3,973 £ 4,735 £ 8,708 E 8,708 
250,000 £ 4,414 £ 4,294 E 8,&08 E 8,708 
275,000 E 4,855 £ 3,853 .£ 8,708 E 8,708 
300,000 £ 5,296 £ 3,41 £ 8,708 £ 8,708 
325,000 E 5,737 E 2,971 E 8,708 E 8,708 
This kind of educative material which the general manager provided 
for the workforce would certainly assist an understanding of the finances 
of newspaper operations, though in an orthodox and uncritical way. 
The basic econoQlic structure of· the newspaper, particularly the 
dependence on advertising aonsi"stently was presented as incontrovertible: 
something to which the workers newspaper would have to adapt rather than 
overcome. Whilst financial information wasnecessaryif workers were to 
understand and control the enterprise; since it was essentially a 
conventional commercial undertaking, operating in a market system, the 
information presented was clearly intended to make the workers into better 
capitalists, rather than more enlightened socialists or trade unionists. 
Thus the general manager hoped that in acquiring the information in the 
reports, the Council members and workforce would acquire the 
underlying values; as he emphasized in the introduction to the first report: 
"The fact that we are a Co-operative, poses the problem of how to keep 
f 
you, the Workers-Shareholders, fully infol:med witho1:t publishing information 
which is of vital interest to our competitors. I have included in this 
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Report, therefore, general background statistics which you can 
then relate to more confidential data which will be released to you 
in a more security oriented manne+, e.g. By limited display on notice 
boards or ret~able leaflets passed' round the departments. 
May I please stress that we are in business, a fiercely competitive 
business in which our competitors know every trick in the game. Everything 
that happens in this building must be regarded as confidential. It is 
YOUR COMPANY, YOUR MONEY, YOUR JOB. Do not disuss in Public anything 
which will endanger your interests. Success brings success. 
Whatever happens to cause you concern, discuss it in the Building and 
present the shining face of success to the OUtside World." 
If the SDN workers had absorbed much of this secretive, competitive 
enterprise consciousness, then not only would their relationship with 
their working class readership be damaged, but also their links with 
fellow print unionsts would be severed. 
In addressing the commercial problems of the ~,Tough, supported 
by the rest of the management team, concentrated purely upon a restricted 
market conception of these prob1ems( and devised appropriate solutions 
on this basis. The critical position of advertiSing revenue was never 
adequately recognised, t~nding to beconcea1ed by shallow optimism about 
'slight improvements'; but when the shortfall in advertising revenue 
was discussed by management it was treated as the predictable result of 
'left-wing bias' in the newspaper which they felt must be corrected, 
though this view was initially rebuffed by the shopfloor Council members: 
"When he (~ough) suggested that the content of the paper in the first 
month had a left-wing bias which was having a disastrous effect on 
advertising prospects he was told, sharply, that the Scottish Daily News 
was more than just. a commercial enterprise, and if principle conflicted 
with commercial expediency, principle would take precedence. It was 
a frustrating position for Tough, finding himself overruled in 
• 
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commercial matters by men who had no experience of the commercial 
world." (McKay and B~rr, 1976, pp 90-91). 
Though the management did not explain fully what they regarded as 
the right direction in the "commercial matter" of editorial policy, it 
was obvious that they wanted the ~ to conform to the pre-established 
limited pattern of the existing popular newspapers, without even the 
slight excursions into more radical or adventurous journalism that the SON 
attempted. Similarly, in promoting the newspaper, instead of 
considering any special characteristics the SON displayed, and attempting to 
build up readership through the labour movement, the management simply 
resorted to standard promotional techniques including television and radio 
advertising, football ground signs, posters and competitions. In its 
brief life the ~ ran over 12 competitions, ranging from spot-the-ball 
to recipes: there could be no finer indication of the competitive and 
individualistic orientation the newspaper was taking • 
. Propelling the ~ as rapidly .. as possible in a commercial direction, 
editorially as well as organizationally, the SON management team nevertheless 
were prepared, in the last analysis, to accept the authority of the 
Council and to work within that. authority until they could gradually 
change it. Though they were strongly opposed to the idea of workers 
control, they could see the advantages of a system a worker participation 
in a co-operative structure, which they were eager to develop. Therefore 
the SDNmanaqement, particularly Eric Tough, resented the overbearing 
intrusions of Robert Maxwell, almost as much as the shopfloor Council 
members. For example when it was suggested to the executives that 
Robert Maxwell be informed of the need for national advertising from 
the South, the. suggestion was not supported as it was thought the 
existinq advertising team could cope. (WCM, I May 1975). Successive 
interventions by Maxwell promptly bro~ght a ~tring of executive 
resignations, and when Eric Tough himself resigned upon Maxwell's 
assumption of executive powers he declared, "It was impossibl~ to 
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reconcile this with my position as reporting directly to a democratically-
elected committee. I am not disillusioned with the workers' co-operatives, 
although I am disillusioned with worker control as practiced in the 
Scottish Daily News." 
Production. 
(Scotsman, 7 August 1975). 
The actual production of the SDN was extremely efficient. Though 
he had experience of many other printing and publishing houses, Eric Tough 
often commented that the Daily News was the best printed paper he had 
ever known, the only problem for him was the editorial content. This 
production success was achieved in the face of unusually difficult 
conditions: staff shortages, the absence of modern machinery, and the 
constant attention to economy could never have been overcome without 
considerable effort from the workers. 
proud of this achievement: 
Allister Mackie was singularly 
"The amount of effort put into the newspapers was hitherto 
missing in the Scottish Daily Express. The standard of printing 
was higher than ever in the Express,and the machinery was in 
much better condition. The workforce are now experimenting 
with colour printing, which they refused to do under the Express. 
We had to dig out the colour prints which had not been used for 
eight years!" 
In his first general manager's report, TOugh maintained, 
"Since the bulk of our workforce are employed in production 
departments, most people will be aware of our progress. Workforce, 
overseers and department heads have done a magnificent job in 
tackling and overcoming what other people had regarded as 
insurmountable problems. There remain only the normal 
irritations one finds in any enterprise and we must continue to 
cope ~ith these with understanding and effectiveness. The great 
problems will always be - Good Copy; Copy On Time, Pages Away on Time; 
• 
~ .. , 
Distribution According to Plan." (21 May 1975). 
There were many examples of time and cost savings in the normal commercial 
production of the SON. One of the more spectacular cases of this was 
that 'sheeting up' the presses to begin printing had taken 200 working 
hours under Beaverbrook, and now took three hours. Major tasks, which 
might have taken months, or even years to complete in a conventional 
newspaper, primarily due to the lengthy negotiations necessary before 
anything could be done, and which would entail paying substantial amounts 
to a reluctant workforce, could be achieved at the ~ quickly and with 
little cost. This was proven in the mammoth overhaul of the building 
and plant necessary to launch the newspaper, which was completed in a 
matter of weeks, with people working 12 hour, unpaid shifts. Again it 
was shown in the conversion from broadsheet to tabloid: engineers and 
machine managers could complete a normal shift and then start the 
conversion work without extra pay. What was generally assumed to be a 
complicated and expensive process in the newspaper industry, was proven 
by the ~ to be a relatively simple operation, which probably was one 
of the factors which later influenced ~ther newspapers, including the 
Daily Express itself, to convert to tabloid. The high standards of 
production which were maintained at the ~, made it doubly unfortuna~e 
that this was not matched by the standards of journalism achieved in 
the newspaper. 
Although primarily proof of the superiority of the co-operative 
form of organisation to capitalist control, unfortunately the 
productivity achieved at the ~ was also an embarassment to other 
print workers, in that it undermined their case when negotiating changes 
in production and manning with their own management. 'Ilhe life of the 
.!E! was too brief for embarassing comparisons to be a serious problem, 
but potentially they could have become so, particularly for other 
• 
scottish newspaper workers, which was the irony at the heart of the 
!E!!. experience. 
CHAPTER NINE 
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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
The Vulnerability of Worker Directors. 
In the discussion of the advantages of the ~ company structure 
the prospectus maintained: 
"For a number of years there has been a growing interest, both 
in the United Kingdom and in the European Economic Community, 
in the subject of employee participation in the management of 
businesses. Although there are differences with regard to the 
quality and degree of such participation, as can be seen on 
examination of the series of draft directives on this topic 
issued in recent years by the Commission of the European Economic 
Community and the various proposals put forward in recent years 
by the major political parties in the United Kingdom, it is clear 
that some form of employee participation is likely to become 
part of the corporate structure of companies in ·the United 
Kingdom." (SNE,l975,p.7). 
The EEC proposals intended to make a common legal framework for a 
'European Company', were based on the idea of supervisory company boards, 
with one third of the members elected by shareholders, one third ~y 
employees, and the rest of the board representing outside interests; 
together with WOrks Councils intended to elicit the involvement of all 
workers. (EEC, 1975). Influenced particularly by the EEC proposals, 
the TOC was persuaded to abandon its previous scepticism towards the 
idea of worker directors, and came to embrace the idea of worker directors 
.!:!!. ~ public and private industry, despite the resistance of major 
trade unions to becoming embroiled in the directoral affairs of capitalist 
companies. The TUC recommended supervisory boards (though this was 
later changed to management boards), with fifty per cent worker 
representatives elected through the Trade Union machinery. (TUC,l974.Clarke,l977' 
The experiment in worker directors at the Scottish Daily News therefore 
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occurred at a critical moment in the development of the debate on 
industrial democracy in Britain. Shortly afterwards, the debate reached 
a climax with the publication of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
on Industrial Democracy, appointed by the Labour Government, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Bullock, to examine how worker directors could 
best be achieved in the light of the proposals of the TUC. (Cmnd 6706,1977) • 
The central recommendation of the majority Report was for the establishment 
of management boards with equal representation of ~rker and shareholder 
representatives, plus a third group of co-opted 'independent' directors. 
A major emphasis of the Report was that worker directors should 
complement, rather than rival, trade union collective bargaining: 
"Since trade unions are necessary to ensure that employees have 
an effective voice in decision-making both within the company and 
within the wider society, we wish tOl~ensure that board level 
representation is designed in such a way that it does not 
undermine the unions' representative capacity. There are also 
other reasons why employee representatives on the board should 
be based on a single channel of representation through trade 
union machinery. Such machinery would provide the expertise 
and independent strength necessary to support employee representatives 
and to enable them to play a~ effective role in decision-making 
on the board. It would also provide an established and trusted 
channel of communication to and from the shopfloor through which 
employee representatives could keep in touch with their constituents • 
. Perhaps most important, integrating employee representatives 
into a wider system of representation based on trade union 
machinery would be the most effective way of ensuring that board 
level representation did not conflict with collective bargaining 
but that the two processes operat~ in a.mutually supportive way." 
(p.lll) 
• 
350 
The fundamental conditions which would provide for a "radical extension 
of industrial democracy" .were therefore regarded as firstly, "parity" 
of worker representation ~nd shareholder representatio~ on boards, and 
secondly, a "single channel of representation through trade union 
machinery" • It is interesting to examine how the experiences at the 
SON compared with the expectations of the Bullock Report. 
On the ~ board, worker representatives had more than parity, 
they had a 6:4 majority. This was decided on principle, to ensure 
that ~ workers, through their representatives on the board, would retain 
control of all major decisions, and that while management and shareholder 
representatives were present in an advisory capacity, they would not 
have the power to control the board. To an extent, this decision was 
legitimated by the faet that the ~ workers were themselves the major 
shareholders in the enterprise with a total of 37.6\ of shares, including 
employee and ordinary shares. But it seemed obvious to most of the 
ac:tive trade unionists at the ~ that if they were to control the 
company, they needed to be in a majority on the board and conceptions of 
"parity" seemed weak in comparison. 
The initial experience at theSDN, particularly during the month 
spent setting up the enterprise, was that the majority of worker 
representatives were able to direct decision making and place close 
restraints upon the discretion of management, much to their resentment. 
However, upon commencing trading, a process of attrition of the power 
of the worker representatives began. The demands of the ~ management, 
and sometimes the demands of Robert Maxwell, were backed by insistent 
commercial market pressures which the worker directors found increasingly 
difficult to res~st as the fortunes of the!!!!. plummeted. The 
independent orientation of the worker directors was weakened, which 
lends support to Batstone's criticism,-s~mitted in a research paper 
to the Bullock Committee that: 
"There is pressure to change the views of the worker directors 
351 
rather than the policies of management. The worker director is 
used both directly and indirectly as a lever in the hands of 
management ••• Parity of representation appears to be an 
important condition to ensure that worker representatives become 
integrated into the informal processes of debate and information 
exchange. But in doing so they tend to become even more 
integrated into a managerial perspective". (1976,pp 25,40). 
The result of the erosion of the worker directors' influence was a 
reassertion of the primacy of commercial considerations in the pursuit 
of profitability, and a neglect of workers own interests where they 
extended beyond this, which is the common outcome of co-determination. 
(Davies, 1976, pp.6S-66). 
The attrition of'workers power at the ~ was abruptly accelerated 
with the AGM which removed two of the most determined worker directors 
and replaced them with Maxwell, the major individual shareholder, and 
Go,ldberg, the assistant editor. From this point the worker directors 
were dependent upon the outside directors elected through the Investors 
Council for a majority. Maxwell's repeated and ultimately successful 
bids for power at the SDN were reinforced both at the board level, and 
more dramatically still at the mass meetings, by the market forces which 
pressed in upon the enterprise, which he vigorously interpretted as 
meaning that the ~ must abandon the policies of the Council, place 
control in his hands, and produce a thoroughly conventional and commercial 
popular newspaper. Maxwell, in a matter of a few months was able to 
overturn a worker dir~ctor majority on the ~ board and take full 
control himself. Though Robert Maxwell possessed many unique qualities 
o~ entrepreneural aggression, in attaining his position he did not have 
the help ot the"parity" management representation which the Bullock 
proposals allow. Be enlisted the suppo.rt of two ambitious shopfloor 
members of the Council, without whose services he could not have succeeded 
so quickly, but M~ell's ascendancy essentially was not the work of 
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a management team but of one man. In fact the normal pattern of control 
of capitalist company boards is to have a strong and often omnipotent, 
managing director, supported by a small group of senior managers, whom 
he himself has appointed. (Davies, 1976, pp.57-62). There is little 
in the Bullock Report, or in the experience of the SDN, to suggest that 
this pattern of oligarchical managerial control could readily be broken 
merely by "parity" representation of worker directors at the board 
level. Management domination, of course, would be powerfully buttressed 
further by the retention of private ownership which Bullock envisaged. 
The Remoteness of Worker Directors From Shopfloor Constituencies. 
The greatest weakness of democratic organisation at the SDN was 
the dislocation of the worker directors from the rank and file workers 
organised in the union chapels, and the failure to adequately involve 
shopfloor workers in what their representatives were attempting to 
achieve at board level. This is a generally recognised problem of 
worker director schemes: "Defined as a limited-purpose instrument, 
co-determination simply waives its claim to involve the workers at the 
grass-roots, which is said to be hard to achieve in mass organisation 
anyhow~" (Herding,l972,p.320). The crucial division between the worker 
directors and shopfloor workers, which Maxwell freely exploited, reveals 
the importance of basing worker directors firmly within the shopfloor 
constituencies from which they are delegated, as Davies has maintained: 
"European experience suggests that the employee representatives 
will be unable to stand out against the prevailing ideology of 
the shareholder/management representatives if they themselves are 
not firmly grounded in the constituency whose interests they are 
to promote." (l976,pp.82-3). 
The Bullock Report ,itself was open on how worker directors should be 
selected and the constituencies they should represent, beyond insisting 
that election should be through trade union machinery: 
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" ••• The law should close none of the options. It should merely 
lay on the recognised trade unions in the company the responsibility 
to devise whatever method of selection seems most appropriate. 
They could agree, for example, that there should be a strict 
division of seats according to the relative strength of each trade 
union in the company and leave each trade union to decide how it 
would fill its seats. Alternatively, they might decide that the 
employee representatives should be chosen by and from the joint 
shop steward committee or its equivalent in the company. Or, they 
might decide to allocate the seats to constituenci~s in the firm -
to blue - and white-collar ,workers, to management, to subsidiaries 
of the parent, or to different plants - and then hold elections 
by secret ballot to choose a representative from each constituency. 
Or, they might hold a secret ballot of all employees in the 
company, presumably restricting the right of nomination to 
recognised trade unions." (Cmnd 6706,p.118). 
There were two elections for the Council at the SDN: in March 1975 
an election by and from the Action Committee; and in June 1975 an election 
by secret ballot for all ~ employees at the AGM for the six worker 
representatives; though nomination was allowed by individuals rather 
than by trade unions, partly because all ~ workers were union members. 
The effect of allowing the election by the whole workforce of each 
shopfloor rep~esentative was that Works Councillors became free to 
address other chapels, which was unknown in the print industry; but a 
damaging corollary of this position was that their relationship with 
their own chapel became tenuous, the result being almost the same 
as having two channels of representation, which Bullock recoqnised was 
imPortant to avoid. Moreover, as Table 17 shows, representation was 
concentrated in the larger craft ch~pe1s, and the smaller craft chapels 
and non-craft chapels did not secure the election of a single COuncil 
representative. 
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Table 16 SDN WOrks Council Shopfloor Representation. 
Approximate Chapel Membership 1975 
CRAF1' NON - CRAFT 
NtJJ SGA AUEW NGA EEPTU SLADE APEX NATSOPA SOGAT TGWU 
100 90 22 25 18 30 71 105 16 20 
Election By and From Action Committee March 1975 
NUl SGA AUEW NGA EEPTU SLADE APEX NATSOPA SOGAT TGWU 
131 1 o o o 0 0 0 
Election by Workforce At AGM June 1975 
NUJ SGA AUEW NGA EEPTU SLADE APEX NATSOPA SOGAT TGWU 
2 3 0 0 o o 0 0 0 0 
In the March election from the Action Committee, chapels representing 
260 workers or 52% of the total, failed to obtain a representative; 
at the AGM chapels representing 307 workers or 61% of the total, failed 
to obtain a·representative. It seems obvious that this pattern of 
domination of an election for worker directors by the professional 
white collar, craft, and larger trade unions, would be replicated 
wherever a shopfloor election without carefully defined constituencies 
took place, and Bullock was certainly remiss in 1eavinq the question so 
open. However, there is no simple resolution to the matter, and for 
example, allowing each union one seat on the Council as occurred at the 
KME co-operative, merely skews the misrepresentation in another direction. 
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Yet if the ~ shopfloor Council members had been based on union 
constituencies, then Maxwell and Goldberg would never have been 
elected shopfloor representatives, (though Maxwell would have remained 
on the Council as a shareholder member), the management and editorial 
staff could not have stood in their attempt to dominate the Council, and 
the Council members would have more fairly represented the shopfloor unions 
and potentially could have created closer links with the chapels. If, 
however, Council representatives had been chapel representatives also, 
then it is quite possible that union representation would have suffered 
even more, as it did at the KME co-operative, with the integration of 
shop stewards into conventional directoral roles. 
The profound contradiction of worker director industrial democracy 
schemes is therefore, that if any other than trade union channels and 
trade union representatives are employed to represent the shopfloor, 
then this creates a rival source of representation and serves to undermine 
trade unionism. But if trade union representatives are used directly 
and shop stewards become worker directors, then given the systematic 
market pressures they encounter and the eXisting weaknesses in 
consciousness and organisation among the shopfloor workers they represent, 
steward worker directors, to a lesser or greater degree, become subject 
to management concerns which again serves to undermine trade unionism 
rather than extend democratic control. 
Yet whatever formal constitutional arrangements concerning Council 
representation had existed at the~, it is almost certain that the 
enterprise would have succumbed eventually to Maxwell's advances, for 
the critical democratic weakness at the ~ lay much deeper, in the 
political disorganisation of the shopfloor. In fact it could be 
reasonably argued that, since the shopfloor Council members at the SDN 
were more resilient to the demands of Maxwell than were the rank and 
file members, if they had not been so distant from each other, then 
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Maxwell would have taken control sooner. But an enlightened elite 
acting for an uninformed mass provides no lasting solution to the 
fundamental problems of de~ocratic organisation. 
The Political Disorganisation of the Shopfloor. 
The ineffectiveness of the SDN union chapels, the general political 
disorganisation on the shopfloor, and the conservatism of the SDN 
workers despite their long struggle, remain a central enigma to be 
examined. The inexperience of the workers in democratic involvement 
in the control of their enterprise and the consequent failure to achieve 
this at the ~ must be explained. Strang'ely enough, academic analyses 
democratic participation achieved relative to other unions; indeed one 
major study, Union Democracy, conducted in the United States, has been 
criticised for dichotomizing democratic unions into the International 
Typographical Union and the rest. (Lipset, Trow and Coleman, 1956). 
Lipset et al complimented print workers on the high standards of skill 
and literacy which they possessed, that,· ';;:", was felt to be an 
important pre-requisite of democratic participation; and also praised 
the party system of uni n government which was unique to the print 
workers. In this country, Turner commented on the high levels of 
membership participation in union affairs and management attained in 
the printing craft unions and defined them as 'exclusive democracies' 
to be distinguished from unions typified by 'aristocracies' or 'popular 
bossdoms' • (l962,p.289). The considerable extent of job control 
enjoyed by print chapels has already been detailed. 
Print union chapels normally adhere rigorously to formal 
procedures of chapel democracy: 
"Meetings of the chapel usually take place quarterly, and it is 
• 
obliqatory for members to attend on pain of a fine. These 
meetinqs are extremely formal. Motions must be in the hands of 
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clerk or secretary well in advance and the agenda is circulated 
two or three days before the meeting. The meetings begin 
with the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting; this 
is followed by the financial statement and the FOCs report. 
Questions are tabled and motions discussed. The chapel or 
management committee usually meets weekly, calling emergency 
meetings of the chapel when necessary." (Sisson,1975,p.1OO). 
ACAS noted further that FOC elections are normally held annually in the 
chapels. (Although prior to January 1976, elections of the FOCs in 
NATSOPA were held quarterly, which management claimed caused bargaining 
difficulties since the frequency of elections imposed pressures on FOCs 
to gain quick results in order to remain in office! (1976,p.8l.) 
'lhis formal tradition of chapel democracy at the ~ proved 
incapable of taking the additional strain of close involvement in the 
direction of the enterprise. However impressed liberal commentators 
were "by the level of democratic activity in print chapels, and the 
degree of control exercised over manpower and the production process, they 
usually failed to notice how this activity and control was confined 
within constraints, that left management free to make the strategic 
decisions concerning newspapers. No print chapel in a national 
newspaper has any involvement in deciding financial, editorial, 
advertising and administrative matters, as existed at the SON; on the 
contrary, almost all chapel activity is devoted to neqotiatinq sectional 
issues of control and reward. Indeed Goodrich in his analysis of 
labour militancy earlier in the century, indicated the contradictory 
implications of craft controls: 
·Craftsmanship is still a force, though a diminishinq one. 
In relation to the control demand it cuts two ways. It 
is a conservative factor in the resistance of the old 
crafts aqainst "encroachments" upon their ancient forms of 
control. It moreover is an element in stiffenlnq the demand not !=O be 
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controlled. The true craftsman will stand very little supervision 
in regard to his own technique ••• But craftsmanship seems to cut 
just the other way in relation to the positive side of the control 
demand. The old craft unions are completely indifferent to the 
newer "political" demands. The craftsman may be quick to resent 
interference with his own work, but he is not likely to bother 
about organising activities very far outside that work ••• 
Craftsmanship has no direct connection with representative 
government. By its concentration on the immediate and highly 
individual skill it runs counter to the general organising interest 
which makes up the positive side of the demand to exercise control, 
but by the very pride in that individual skill it stiffens the 
refusal to be controlled." (l975,pp.4l-43 ). 
The tradition of craft autonomy at Albion Street was not therefore so 
readily adaptable to extending to control the whole business of the SON 
as optimistiC commentators assumed: in fact conservative, competitive 
and elitist aspects of this tradition were an obstacle to the 
achievement of democratic control and egalitarian conditions in the 
enterprise. 
An important result of the sectional economism of print chapels 
which reflects competitive market conditions is the weakness of the 
Federated House Chapel. One pessimistic appraisal suggests, 
"In most of the newspaper offices in Fleet Street there 1s 
a Federated House Chapel to which all the chapels belong. 
This, however, has very little authority and only negotiates with 
the management on such matters as company pensions and car parking 
arrangements ••• Chapels are competitors for scarce economic 
resources and status. There is little or no co-operation between 
• 
chapels in the same office. 
. The Federated House Chapel has 
limited authority and rarely negotiates with management." 
(Sisson, 1975, pp.1OO,107). 
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Sectional rivalry survived at the ~, particularly in 
the elitism of the NUJ, and the conservative isolationism of the 
intensely traditional Scottish Graphical Association, which prevented 
the development of a united and powerful FRe. The chapels at the SON 
concerned themselves mainly with the normal, restricted questions; 
there were no other bodies through which workers could become involved 
or informed; and the result was that the SON workforce was frequently 
an amorphous mass which could be easily swayd by oratory, particularly 
in mass meetings. 
The biggest democratic disaster at the SON was the conduct of 
the later mass meetings, in which proper procedures were forgotten, 
and Robert Maxwell was completely dominant. MCKay and Barr have argued: 
"Worker control necessarily requires a higher degree of 
democracy and shop-floor involvement than capitalist company 
organisation; if not, the leading workers become bosses 
(in organisation, if not in financial terms). But this makes 
the isolated worker-controlled enterprise highly vulnerable 
to demagogues from within or without." (l976,p.l59). 
In fact the very reason why SON workers were so vulnerable to 
denagoguery was that they were not involved in decision making at the" 
~ except in the infrequent mass meetings ill-prepared to influence 
major decisions. 
James Russell maintained that a system of representative government 
had always been envisaged for the SON: 
"Under the original constitution there was no intention of having 
mass meetings to decide policy. The shopfloor representatives 
would be picked democratically and then would be legally responsible 
for decisions, and could be removed if necessary. Maxwell saw 
the weakness in the system. H~ could appeal more effectively to 
mass meetings because people were trained for years to believe 
that millionaires can best take decisions. Most workers believed 
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they faced the choice of backing Maxwell and ensuring their 
jobs, or else gOing along with the workers representatives and 
possibly failing. The workers had the best possible management 
in the PA management. But Maxwell was able to destroy the 
workmans' faith in both the shopfloor representatives and the PA 
management. Maxwell campaigned against Tough, saying that he 
was unfit to attract the advertising that Maxwell could do. He 
got rid of the PA management and then the workers had the choice 
of Maxwell or no-one. Maxwell thinks he makes the law, that it's 
the law that's wrong not him. The stress on the workers is 
immense, they were asked by Maxwell to hold up their hands to give 
, 
up their jobs. Senior executives' jobs were in danger unless 
they voted for Maxwell, they could be singled out. They are working 
for Maxwell in their eyes and not for the co-operative. People are 
saying "yes" to decisions because they are afraid." 
Allister Mackie agreed, "We had a majority on the Executive Committee 
but the workforce allowed thenselves to be intimidated". He was severely 
distressed at the dilemma he faced r "~ have always believed in mass 
meetings, and yet I found that I was opposing having them". 
Potentially profound democratic defects in the conduct of mass 
meetings have long been recognised in the experience of the labour movement. 
Whilst ideally providing the opportunity for all workers to participate 
in major decisions, they can readily be reduced to manipulatory devices 
unless they are part of an extensive and continuous process of involvement 
and information exchange. The Webbs in their classiC study Industrial 
Democracy, outlined some of the serious shortcomings of the referendum 
as an instrument for defining trade union policy in the last century, 
w~ich bear an uncanny resemblance to the weaknesses of the mass meetings 
held at the§.!!!. Firstly there was the prOblen of suddenly submitting 
• 
a critical proposal which overturned previous policy, the Webbs termed 
this an 'initiative': 
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" That it is to say, the right of a section of 
the community to insist on its proposals being submitted 
to the vote of the whole electorate. As a representative 
assembly formed no part of the earlier Trade Union consultations, 
both the Referendum and the Initiative took with them the crudest 
shape. Any new rule or amendment of a rule, any proposed line of 
policy or particular application of it, might be straighway submitted 
to the vote of all the members. Nor was this practice of consulting 
the members confined to the central executive. Any branch might 
equally have any proposition put to the vote through the medium of 
the society's official circular. And however imperfectly the 
question was framed, however inconsistent the result might be with 
the society's rules and past practice, the answer returned by the 
members' votes was final and instantly operative. Those who believe 
that pure democracy implies the direct decision, by the mass of the 
people, of every question as it arises, will find this ideal realised 
without check or limit in the history of the larger Trade Unions 
between 1834 and 1870." (190l,pp.2l-2). 
But the referendums which produced chaotic administration when freely 
called, took on altogether more sinister implications as the power to 
call them was arrogated upwards: 
"When the right of putting questions to the vote came practically 
to be confined to the executive, the Referendum ceased to provide 
the members with any effective control. If the executive could 
choose the issues to be submitted, the occasion on which the question 
should be put,' and the fom in which it should be couched, the 
Referendum, far from supplying any counterpoise to the executive, was 
soon found to be an immense addition to its power. Any change 
whiCh the executive desired could be stated in the most plausible 
terms and supported by convincin~ arguments, which almost invariably 
secured its adoption by a large majority. Any executive resolution 
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could, when occasion required, thus be given the powerful moral 
backing of a plebiscitary vote. The reliance of Trade Union 
democrats on the Referendum resulted, in fact, in the virtual 
exclusion of the general body of members from all real share in 
the government." 
(The Webbs then quote the comment of Lecky that in France, "Successive 
Governments soon learned how easily a plebiscite vote could be secured 
and directed by a strong executive, and how useful it might become to 
1 
screen or justify usurpation.") (l90l,p.27). Dismissing what they 
defined as 'Primitive Democracy' the Webbs maintained: 
"If, therefore democracy means that everything which 'concerns 
all should be decided by alll,.and that each citizen should enjoy 
an equal and i~entical share in the government, Trade Union history 
indicates clearly the inevitable result. Government by such 
contrivances as Rotation of Office, the Mass Meeting, the Referendum 
. and Initiative, or the Delegate restricted by his Imperial Mandate, 
leads straight either to inefficiency and disintegration or to 
the uncontrolled dominance of a personal dictator or an expert 
bureaucracy." (190l,p. 36) • 
In their search for "administrative efficiency and popular control", 
the Webbs placed their faith in elitist representative institutions, 
praising highly the constitution·of the cottonspinners: 
1. (The manipulative potentialities of referenda have recently been 
appreciated by governments in Britain, in the heavily loaded vote on 
remaining in the EEC in June 1975. More sinisterly, the Thatcher government 
has realised that given threatening economic conditions, and an ideological 
barrage, workers can be convinced to vote for almost any suitably worded 
single question. This was dramatically revealed in the vote of 150,000 
British Leyland workers on the management plan for restructuring the 
company involving 25,000 redundancies, in which 87.2\ voted to accept the 
plan in an eo\ poll. (Guardian, 2 November 1979). On the basis of this . 
surprising result, theCBI hopes to employ similar votes to sidestep union 
resistance. But in reality, as argued by Derek Robinson, the British Leyland 
Longbridge convenor, such manipulateq votes do not secure, by any means, 
the full committment of workers, and the pOssibility of worker resistance 
remains when the true implications of management plans are realised. 
Shortly afterwards, RQbinson was sacked for bis part in the attempt to 
organise oPposi~ion to the management plan.) 
n The association is a fully-equipped democratic 
state of the modern type. It has an elected parliament, 
exercising supreme and uncontrolled power. It has a cabinet 
appointed by and responsible only to that parliament. And 
its chief executive officer, appointed once and for all on 
grounds of efficiency, enjoys the civil service permanence 
of tenure. We have watched the working of this remarkable 
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constitution for years, and we can testify ~ the success with 
which both efficiency and popular control are secured." (l901,pp.4o-l). 
Despi te their apparent concern for 'popular control', the Webbs' 
advocacy of representative forms of trade union government embraces 
the 'modern' theory of democracy wh~ch is a foundation of liberal 
pluralism: the acc~ptance of elite control of organisations and relative 
membership inactivity in the interests of 'administrative efficiency' • 
Though they were aware that they existed, the Webbs failed to appreciate 
the significance of the degenerative tendencies of representative forms 
of government, and in particular the dislocation which occurs between the 
professional bureaucracy and the formally passive and uninformed mass. 
Indeed the· 'modern' form of democracy, to which the Webbs were so enamoured, 
defined out of existence the active and informed involvement of ordinary 
people in political decision making: no active partiCipation on the part 
of the governed was expected or encouraged beyond a periodic demonstration 
of consent or disagreement with the policies of the government. 
(Pateman, 1970; Macpherson, 1962). 
This elitist redefinition of democracy may be strongly challenged 
in terms of the traditional meaning, which undoubtedly was: 
·popular power, the active involvement in decision making of 
the ordinary members of a community, or institution or organisation. 
By derivation, the existence o~ positive control by the rank 
and file is inherent in the language of democracy." (Byman,1975,p.76). 
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TO reduce active involvement of the rank and file to periodic 
elections for remote officials, assuming tacit consent in the long 
intervals between elections, is completely inadequate, and clearly 
serves to induce indifference towards the formal political process, 
(A position which many elected officials are not entirely unhappy with, 
since it greatly diminishes the check upon their authority or decisions, 
as well as eliminating the threat to re-election). The 'administrative 
efficiency' which expert control in representative government supposedly 
provides is equally questionable, since little attention is normally 
directed to the meaning of 'efficiency'. Conventionally this is 
defined as the conduct of an organisation as it is presently structured 
within the existing political economy of capitalism: any policy which 
challenged this conservative acceptance of the status quo usually would 
be considered unconducive to organisational 'efficiency'. But 
fundamental policy cannot be assumed in this restricted way, leaving a clear 
·path for technocratic implementation 
"If unions are agencies of power for the working class, elements 
in a strategy for exerting control over a hostile work 
environment, it follows that their purposes must be defined 
in terms of the members own aspirations. Whether or not union 
democracy is an efficient method of achieving union objectives, 
it is subversive of the very rationale of unionism to divorce 
democracy from the for.mulation of these objectives." (Hyman,l975,p.84). 
At the ~ the control structure moved in the opposite direction 
to ·the trend the Webbs identified in the labour movement: that is from 
a representative fo~ under the Action Committee and Works Council towards 
. a more direct "form under Maxwell's influence with more frequent mass 
meetings at which major deCisions were taken or endorsed. The Webbs' 
description of the chaos and dictabdrship resulting from 'primitive 
democracy' accurately ~picts what took place at the SDN in the later days. 
But what the Webbs' analysis fails to explain convincingly is why 
• 
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primitive democracy does not work, and why representative forms 
of government are superior? If the experiences of the early 
trade unions were similar to those at the SDN, then the following 
explanaation can be offered. Workers with little or no knowledge of 
democratic organisation or participation due to the lack of effective 
democratic structures in the state, industry or the community, were 
suddenly presented with the opportunity to become involved in one critical 
aspect of their life - the control of their work organisation. Without 
experience, preparation, or even adequate information or warning, they 
were abruptly confronted with complex issues and demanded to come to 
an immediate decision in a vote. This demand occurred within a 
structure of economic power which seemingly threatened to extinguish 
the enterprise unless decisions were taken in line with the economic 
pressures imposed. The result was a quick breakdown into disorder, and 
a total vulnerability to manipulation • 
. AlthoU9'h the later mass meetings were a destructive sham, the 
democratic solution could not be simply to concentrate power upwards 
in the shopfloor members of the Council who could be trusted to represent 
the interests of the workers better than the workers could themselves. 
Advocates of representative government who have suggested that this form 
would have been the most appropriate for the SDN to adopt, often implied 
that they would have been content to exclude the rank and file from 
anything but an intermittent, highly formal, and increasingly nominal 
control in the direction of the enterprise. What was necessary, was to 
prepare the rank and file for responsible involvement in major decisions 
by continuous participation at a lower level, and the trade union 
chapels could have been crucial in developinq this. There was also 
obviously a need for a formal democratic constitution to prevent the gross 
manipulation pos~ible at ad hoc meetings governed by ad hoc rules called 
to discuss ad hoc motions as occurred at the SDN. DeSigning democratic 
constitutions which permit continuous rank and file control yet avoid 
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the damaging consequences emphasised by the Webbs, remains a major 
taSk for those concerned with the struggle for democracy in the 
labour movement. The elitist, hierarchical, and representative 
forms of government of the kind the Webbs approved, and which have 
been adopted throughout the labour movement in both trade unions 
and co-operatives, do not solve the problem of democratic participation, 
but merely evade the problem by formally removing partiCipation and 
power from the great mass of the membership and investing control in 
a small, informed bureaucracy. 
Democratic participation is therefore both a means of arriving 
at satisfactory objectives, and an end in" itself - stimulating the 
knowledge and skill with which higher objectives may be attained. 
Yet democratic partiCipation in organisations cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the political and economic structure of the society 
in which the organisation is situated, as Pateman tends to do (1970). 
For such structural factors will determine the scope for partiCipation, 
and the likelihood that whatever potential opportunities for participation 
exist will be-successfully taken up. 
Thus to an extent the debate about participation at the SDN is 
largely an academic one, since the efforts that were made after the ~ 
was founded to organise and involve the workers more effectively, 
whether through their respective union chapels, or more informally, 
consistently were wrecked by the conservative, deferential and 
economistic consciousness which predominated among them. The origins 
of this consciousness stretched back beyond experience at the ~,to the 
formative influences of the autocratic employer control and economistic 
union tradition in the decades that most of the workers had spent 
in Beaverbrook's Albion Street office. Moreover any inclination towards 
developing an alternative consciousness was heavily discouraged by the 
• 
vulnerability of the newspaper to·the market forces to which it was 
cruelly exposed. 
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The Constrictions on the Political Consciousness of SDN Workers. 
"The print unions didn't trust the ~ workforce, and they 
were right. The SDN workers sold out the principle of 
workers control after five weeks when they elected Maxwell 
in place of a shopfloor representative. As long as trade 
unionists think with their heart there is no way they will 
beat people like Maxwell who think with their head. After 
13 months on the dole they still didn't realise what this was 
all about, they just thought they were going back to another job. 
The engineers knew what a co-operative ,was about, they have 
been marvellous. But Mr. Average is not educated enough to cope 
wi th a co-op. There is so much pressure. Most people thought 
they would be doing the same job and with the same conditions 
as they had under Beaverbrook. The workforce is just looking 
for another boss. Surely people can educate themselves in a 
whole year ?" 
In typically powerful language, Charlie Armstrong condemned the political 
conservatism of the !E! workers, a view that other ~ union activists 
found depressingly accurate. But McKay and Barr have suqgested that it 
was optimistic to expect anything more: 
"Most of the participants had no broad political interest in 
proving that orthodox capitalist ownership and management could 
be replaced within a capitalist society by what would, in effect, 
be an island of industrial democracy in a hostile commercial 
ocean •••• Certainly, once the decision to try to launch a 
co-operatively owned paper had been taken, many members of the 
workforce took up the broad cause of workers' control with gusto ••• 
For some, this represented a genuine conversion from political 
• 
apathy under Beaverbrook to a certain radical idealism; for others 
it was a wholly cynical expedient to create jobs for themselves 
~s is one reason why the Scottish Daily News was never a pure 
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experiment in worker control. Even the financial structure 
of the enterprise made it clear that the participants were 
ambivalent about why'they were setting off on this unprecedented 
advanture. The 500 workers were, it could be argued, mini-
capitalists embarking on a project of mutual financial benefit, 
not attempting to offer an alternative to the orthodox capitalist 
funding of an enterprise." (1976,pp.84-S) • 
What remains to be properly explained is why the majority of 
the SDN workers, all life long trade unionists, exhibited such a 
conservative consciousness, and why this conservatism endured through 
such a protracted and bitter struggle to establish the SDN in opposition 
to conventional business interests? Prolonged socialization into 
authoritarian patterns of control is a major explanatory factor: the 
experience of working for years under paternalistic but autocratic 
management, and organising in trade unions that aspired only towards the 
most limited levels of democratic participation and control, both in 
the union itself, and the enterprise. The chains of such intensive 
socialization, heavily reinforced in people's non-work lives, are not 
easily broken, and a sudden apparent release tends to promote confusion 
or cynicism rather than a dash for freedom. "Employees conditioned 
to expect and accept authoritarian rule were as likely to be bewildered 
as gratified if the style suddenly changed." (Fox,1974,p.IOS). Jimmy 
MCNamara incredulously asked: 
"Bow can people be involved in a 13 month struggle, 13 -months 
of working class struggle, and at the end of it still be a Tory? 
I'm amazed, but that is a fact. Because they've been so 
conditioned previously ,·there is a total lack of political 
background in the print industry in newspapers in Scotland 
WOrkers tend to have a wee bit lack of confidence in their own 
ability. They see. people making money, and who are ruthless 
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in making money for tbemselves, and see it as a sign of 
success. It's a lack of confidence, an inferiority complex 
But political consciousness, ~wareness, is lacking generally 
in the print industry. I've got a wee bit of experience 
outside the print industry, I've no doubt if I'd lived in the 
print industry all my life I probably wouldna noticed it, 
but there is a political awareness in the engineering factories 
and shipyards. The Industrial Relations Act was fought 
in the factories and shipyards because there was a political 
awareness, not necessarily among the masses, but certainly 
among the leadership. It's no there among ,the leadership 
in the print industry." 
The influence of prior socialization was particularly severe at 
the SDN because of the high proportion of older workers who joined 
the co-operative. When Beaverbrook closed, younger workers stood a 
better chance of securing new employment, whether in the print industry, 
in other industries, or by migration. It was often only when they 
could not find other work that many older workers became interested in 
the co-operative. Thus according to a survey of one third of tne ex-SDN 
workers, conducted in 1977 by Bradley and Gelb, almost 50\ of the SON 
workers were over 50 years of age, over 75\ were over 40 years of age: 
only 25\ were under 40; and only 5\ under 30 years old. (l979b pp.7-8) • 
The newspaper industry has a tradition of employing older workers but 
the ~ workforce was quite untypical, the New Earnings Survey of 1975 
recorded that over 50\ of workers were under 40, and over 30\ under 30 
in the printing and publishing industry. Not only would this majority 
of older workers at the ~ have experienced a longer duration of 
involuntary unemployment after the Beaverbrook closure; (the median 
duration of unemployment for workers over 50 was about 40 weeks, whereas 
for those under 30 it was less than 20 weeks in 1978-, Department of 
Employment Gazette, September 1978) ~ but they were faced with the . 
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certain threat of a further long bout of unemployment if the SON 
failed. In fact, whilst 35% of the Bradley and Gelb sample of 
workers under 50 remained unemployed for a year after the SDN 
. -
closure, 63% of, workers aged over 50 remained unemployed for a year 
or more, (1979b,p.7). In many respects this age division was 
related to a dichotomy emphasised by Bradley and Gelb, between those 
who held the principle of the co-operative to be most important, and 
those who simply wanted to preserve their jobs by whatever means: a 
substantial majority of workers under 50 disapproved of Maxwell's role, 
whereas a majority of workers over 50 approved of Maxwell's role. 
(Bradley and Gelb, 1979b). (Since their survey,. a postal questionnaire, 
was conducted two years after the event and consisted of simple, 
structured, closed questions, the results on controversial issues such as 
this may be treated with some scepticism.) 
Bradley and Gelb focus much attention on the consciousness of 
the SON workers, but when the academicist excrescences of their analysis 
are finally penetrated, the essence of their approach is that the 
SOO workers' motivation was not "radical" but was governed by "pragmatic 
acceptance": "It is clear that the overwhelming majority of SON 
workers were more concerned for their jobs than for ideology." (1979b,p.15). 
To arrive at this profoundly absurd conclusion Bradley and Gelb limit 
their investigation of the political processes at the ~ to a cursory 
examination of the voting at mass meetings, attributing to this an 
unchallengeable indication of the real interests of the ~ workers, as 
interpreted by themselves. This one-dimensional and behaviouralist 
focus ignores the possibility of a false or manipulated consensus which 
is produced by the most insidious exercise of political power. 
(Lukes,l974,pp.24,34) Bradley and Gelb's approach distorts the SOO 
struggle almost beyond recognition. It is a common and deceptive 
practice of bourgeOis economists to explain the coerced actions of workers 
in terms of their pursuit of enlightened, individual self-interest. 
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It was not "the rational, self-interested postulates of pragmatic 
acceptance" (l979b,p.5), which motivated the SDN workers, but fear 
and insecurity which made many of the workers respond in the way that 
they did. (Thus economic historians' in explaining 
the development of the factory system conventionally have stressed the 
creation of a 'free labour force' attracted by economic reward to 
factory work, whereas Pollard has pointed to the coercive origins of 
capitalist industrial management: "the modern industrial proletariat 
was introduced to its role not so much by attraction or monetary reward 
but by compulsion, force and fear." (1965,p.207)) • It is quite wrong 
to attribute crudely an "ideological" orientation to those who held the 
principle of the co-operative to be of greatest importance, since they 
saw the co-operative also as the best economic guarantee of maintaining 
jobs. It is equally wrong to attribute simply a "rational" economic 
orientation to those most concerned with jobs, since the acceptance of 
Maxwell as a dominant proprietor was due to an entrenched ideology of 
conservative deference. 
The simplistic dichotomy of 'the co-operative v jobs' arose 
at the height of the struggle for control of the ~ and was propagated 
~ the Maxwell camp as a 4efence of their position. Bradley explained 
the view of Maxwell and Blyth at the time: 
-Jimmy ~CNamara is regarded as a threat, since he seems to hold 
the principle of the co-operative higher than the 500 jobs. It 
is believed that he and the others have a naive and dangerous 
commitment to the co-operative principle which will jeopardize 
the jobs of others ••• I would call this operation more an 
eXercise in workers partiCipation than a co-operative They 
(Maxwell and Blyth) see two alternatives: either the survival of 
the paper undeor their control, with worker participation, in 
whatever form, an evening edition etc, that is thought necessary, 
and with whatever sacrifices in pay, conditions and union practi~es 
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that are demanded; or the commercial collapse of the paper induced 
by those dissatisfied with the involvement of l-1axwell and the 
infringement of the co-operative principle." 
It would be wrong to accept this rationalization of the control of 
Maxwell and Blyth at face value. The opponents of Maxwell in the 
co-operative felt that he was not only destroying the co-operative, 
but that he was not in a position to save the paper, which would soon 
collapse under his control, since the financial problems of the newspaper 
would be increased by internal and external union resistance. Jimmy 
McNamara was justifiably sceptical of Maxwell's claim that only he 
could. save the enterprise: 
"If Maxwell was not here then our struggle would be a lot easier. 
Unfortunately he's here, and the workers see him as some sort 
of little saviour. But it is na true. It is na true, it's 
a myth. Maxwell will only save his self, because at the end of 
.the day he is a black oak. He's that class of people that 
saves his self, looks after his self. We've learned this .••• 
But people don't change overnight from working for Beaverbrook to 
working for a co-operative, not by a long shot. The average worker 
just wants a job, leave him alone and he's happy, and as long 
as he's got enough to live on,he's contented. This is one of 
the weaknesses of the working class that has got to be overcome." 
The sociological inadequacy of Bradley and Gelb's analysis is 
that they recognise the conservative economism of the SDN workers, and 
draw wide ranging conclusions from this about the durability of capitalism; 
yet they do not attempt to explain the structural, organizational and 
ideological constraints upon the achievement of 'radical consciousness'. , 
they are simply satisfied that in the case of the SDN it was not generated 
among the majority of workers: 
-The most definite snapping of the cash nexus in the present order 
is probably associa·ted with bankruptcy. As has been noted bankruptcy 
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is liable to be followed by pressure for radical organizational 
structures such as co-operatives. Superficially this provides 
some validation for the cash nexus hypothesis. However, as we 
have shown, co-operative organizations can plausibly evolve 
out of pragmatic accommodative responses designed to restore 
the cash nexus within the present system. Viewed in this 
light such phenomena tend to strengthen the pragmatic acceptance 
hypothesis by extending it to circumstances of economic decline. 
The real point of issue is not whether the actions in 
response to cash nexus breaks will generate radicalism. In the 
long run declining capitalism might prove to be unstable. However, 
the link between the breaking of the caSh nexus and the generation 
of radical consciousness is not mechanical and should be examined 
carefully with an appreciation of the position of the individuals 
concerned. A consideration of the way in which cash nexus breaks 
tend to occur in capitalist SOCiety has, when viewed from this 
point, interesting implications for the durability, if not the 
ultimate stability of the current political and social order." 
(l979b,p.l2) • 
Whilst it is accepted th~t co-operatives such as the SDN are not a 
radical departure, as they are often presented, it is important to 
examine how and why workers' radicalism was diverted and suppressed 
which Bradley and Gelb fail to attempt: they do not explore the sources 
of working class conservatism, they merely identify its existence. 
Bradley and Gelb are right to emphasise that the attainment of • radical 
consciousness' is not a mechanical process, but they do not explain how 
such consciousness is achieved or contained, and they are content with 
a mechanical explanation of working class conservatism. 
A popular post-war view on the left was that full employment and 
relatively high wages served as an anaesthetic to working class awareness 
of, discontent with, and organisation against, the fundamental irrationality 
. 
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and injustice of the capitalist system. However, when workers are 
directly confronted with this injustice or irrationality in the refusal 
of a legitimate wage claim, or the sudden imposition of redundancy, and 
they take some form of collective action in resistance, it is a fundamental 
Marxist tenet that such struggle will create the conditions in which 
abrupt transformations of consciousness become possible: 
"When engaged in collective struggle, workers are most susceptible 
to the appeal of new world views; the 'deviant' elements in 
working class attitudes are thrust to the fore, while conventional 
assumptions of 'official' sociey momentarily lose their hold. As 
the development of capital itself forces more frequent industrial 
struggles, so the opportunities for a heightening of consciousness 
are multiplied'." (Byman,1975,p.177). 
Though an instant assumption of proletarian consciousness could not be 
expected, after over a year of struggle at the SDN some significant 
shift in consciousness could reasonably have been assumed: "You'd think 
14 months on the burroo would make them realise:", as one worker said 
in despair. But little change in political consciousness occurred. 
Why? The critical point about collective struggle raising consciousness 
is that you have to be engaged in struggle, not observing from the side-lir.es. 
The great majority of the ~ workers were not active in the political 
struggle to establish the paper in any way beyond a brief attendance 
at a few mass meetings. The 17 member Action Committee completed the 
difficult organizational tasks themselves, all the actively interested 
workers were asked to do was take part in fund raising drives, John BodgeI:la::. 
recalled; 
"It was a hard and somettmes heroic struggle, but it was waged 
by, a minority. The others filled in on part-time jobs, or simply 
sat at home or in the pub, and·waited for work to be created for 
them. Several of the least brilliant journalists earmarked themselves 
for jobs OJ:1 the paper. The battle lasted 14 months, embittering 
the most reasonable of men, but never totally dismaying 
the Action Committee, whose resolve seldom wavered and whose 
optimism succoured the potential workforce and cushioned them 
against one bodyblow after another." 
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Attendance at the monthly mass meetings averaged only about 200, until 
a few weeks before the SDN launch when it dramatically increased. 
At the time of the Prospectus launch in March 1975, there were only 300 
ready to take employee shares. CSNE, 1975.,p. 5) • Therefore a majority of 
the people who were later employed in the ~ had only a tenuous 
association with the struggle to create it, and from the start this was 
recognised as a problem. One FOe maintained; 
"The biggest problem I would say are the people who have come 
from outside, rather than the people who have fought for over a 
year. These people who have fought over the year have a better idea 
of the workers co-operative spirit. The people that are coming 
from outside are keen, but they don't have the same philosophy 
as the rest of us that have had it hammered into us over a period of ~~~. 
The paradox of the devoted committment of the Action Committee and 
th~ immediate supporters of the'SDN campaign, was that this allowed the 
majority of workers to remain excluded from the activity which would 
have developed their political awareness. This pattern of organizational 
activity by a small minority is typical of not only the normal functioning 
of trade unions, but often of the conduct of the major, protracted, and 
most celebrated strikes and occupations. (Clarke,1979). It is the 
major weakness in the political organization of industrial conflict and 
frequently has disastrous consequences. (A dramatic illustration of this 
weakness was that in the 16 week strike preceding the closure of British 
Leyland Speke No.2 plant in Liverpool in 1978, just two mass meetings 
were held: -the first which voted to ·serike and the second which voted 
to return to work to fight the closure ••• Whatever the reasons (and 
people still argue over it), what remains a fact is that there' were no 
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mass meetings held during the strike, and that this did haye an 
effect upon the members' attitude toward fighting the closure,") 
(Beynon,l978,pp.37-8). Workers are systematically prevented from 
developing their political ideas, and knowledge generally,by the 
stultifying and repetitive work most are forced to perform, and little 
opportunity exists in the community to compensate for this deficiency. 
The opportunities afforded during strikes and occupations for the 
development of political activity and consciousness are therefore doubly 
precious, and yet these opportunities are rarely exploited. 
Strikes potentially can be 'schools of war' in Lenin's phrase, 
but only if they are utilized for political discussion, education, and 
activity. Otherwise they leave the worker isolated at home, and even 
more subject than usual to the ideological distortion of the capitalise 
mass media. Antonio Gramsci had considerable experience of sustaining 
collective activity and stimulating class consciousness in the industrial 
struggles in Italy during the revolutionary wave of 1919, and insisted that: 
"The concrete and complete solution to the problems of socialist 
living can only arise from communist practice: collective 
discussion which sympathetically alters men's consciousness, unifies 
-them and inspires them to industrious enthusiasm. To tell the 
truth, is a communist and revolutionary act." (1977,p.68). 
That all workers should be encouraged to be involved in collective 
struggles is obviously important, but what kind of struggle they are 
to be involved in, is also of central significance. Hence the SDN 
experience highlights some of the significant limitations of 'spontaneity'. 
Firstly, the 'spontaneous' action of occupation was actually forced upon 
a basically conservative workforce by the closure and withdrawal of 
capital. Secondly, despite the exhaUsting efforts of a few individuals, 
there was little systematic attempt to stimulate socialist consciousness 
among the redundant workers. This allowed whatever spontaneous 
militancy existed to be easily contaminated, and practical activity to 
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be readily diverted towards creating a commercial enterprise to 
operate conventionally in a market system. 
A developed socialist theory and practice was the critical 
ingredient absent in the SON struggle, and neither craft unionism, 
contaminated spontaneity, co-operative idealism, nor worker directors, 
could provide a substitute for it. 
Conclusions 
Radical proposals for industrial democracy, including worker 
directors and workers co-operatives, are often viewed as a means of 
transforming, however gradually, the eXisting political economy of 
capitalism. But beyond the social shock for both sides of the arrival 
of workers in the boardroom, the SON experience reveals how difficult it 
is to achieve substantial changes in single, isolated enterprises. 
For, as Batstone has indicated, it is not simply who takes decisions, 
whether workers or management, that is important, but "how the parameters 
of decisions are created; how proposals are initiated and shaped and 
choices made between alternatives; and how far decisions are actually 
implemented in practice." (l976,p.l9). At the SON the basic parameters 
in which decisions were made continued to be set by market forces and 
by the state. Worker directors, as indeed collective bargaining, do 
not in themselves normally represent an attempt to force back these 
parameters, but rather, as Bullock recognised, represent a mutual 
accommodation to these constraints: 
"We see no necessary contradictions between board level representation 
and collective bargaining. Rather, we believe that they are 
similar and complementary processes. Both contain elements of 
oo-operation and conflict, ha~ony and discord. Both by their 
very natures involve the mutual dependence of union and management." 
(cmnd 6706,p.l24) 
It cannot therefore be assumed that the arrival of worker directors 
will make a substantial contribution to a fundamental change in the 
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organisation and control of industry. On the contrary, the 
integration of shopfloor leaders into a management outlook may 
serve to undermine worker resistance to the existing capitalist 
control of industry. (Clarke, 1977). 
Cressey and MacInnes have criticised the pessimistic implications 
of the incorporation approach to industrial democracy, maintaining that: 
"The attribution of primacy to market forces and external 
relations of production means that any offensive by labour in 
the workplace is predicated by the very revolution in productive 
relations that such a strategy should create rather than result 
from." (l979,p.2) 
Certainly workers struggles to transform the relations of production, 
in whatever form, should be supported. But despite the hopes of the 
idealistic advocates of industrial democracy, it is by no means clear 
that present industrial democracy proposals are generally an "offensive 
by labour" rather than a manipulative offensive by the corporatist state, 
enlightened management, or ambitious trade union leaders, to incorporate 
and suppress worker resistance. Even in the case of the SON where an 
element of spontaneity did exist, this was expressed in an opportunist 
way which failed to achieve the involvement of more than a small section 
of the SDN workers. 
In his extensive study of the 'countervailing power' of collective 
bargaining compared to worker director co-determination, Richard Herding 
was sceptical of excessive attention to institutional forms of 
representation, suggesting an alternative focus: 
"This analysis would place the cleavageof incompatability 
at the line of substantively collusive versus militant union 
policies; neither jOint management or countervailing power would 
necessarily fall in line with this distinction ••• Given the 
inclination of union leadership when isolated from shopfloor 
control, toward co-option by employment patterns reconciled to 
capitalist interests, given also the problems of distortion by 
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representation, the pOint is that intra-orqanizational 
countervailing powers are needed within the 'countervailing 
powers' in society. From the viewpoint of effective and 
progressive labour control of the workplace the abstinent 
separation between joint management and countervailing power 
may be no more than an institutional facade to conceal the 
real contradictions of union behaviour under capitalism." 
(l972,pp.335-6). 
Worker director schemes could be part of an "offensive by labour", 
but this would rest upon the achievement of political organization 
and consciousness among shopfloor workers that worker director schemes 
themselves would not provide, and indeed might divert workers from. There 
are no short cuts to socialism and the fundamental problems remain the same 
whether discussing the limitations of collective bargaining or industrial 
democracy: how to achieve autonomous rank and file organisation and political 
consciousness in order to promote the structural transformation of the 
social and economic relations of capitalism through self-activity. 
(Hyman,l974). 
A tremendous barrier to the achievement of working class consciousness 
and militancy is the sys~ematicallydisor~entating and deadening impact of 
the capitalist mass media which constantly press in upon workers. 
The failure of the Scottish Daily News to overcome this barrier in 
its editorial had damaging consequences, not simply for the SDN workers 
themselves, but for the whole of the working class readership of the 
newspaper who had hoped to see for the first time their interests 
publicly defended in print. 
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A Whip For the Backs of The Working Class 
"Mick McGahey the Scottish miners leader, and other militant 
trade unionists, refused any formal help to the newspaper. He said, 
'I'm not interested in creating another whip for the backs of the 
working class.' McGahey distrusted Maxwell, but also the reactionary 
elements of the workforce and the print unions. "He would not believe 
the paper would be totally sympathetic to working class interests until 
he saw it. So far to some extent he has been proved right in all of 
his suspicions." 
Charlie Armstrong was one of the few people within the SON who glimpsed 
the substance of the socialist critique of the newspaper: that given 
the commercial structure and orientation it had adopted and the assumption 
of control by careerists, that idealistic intentions and pious pronouncements 
would not prevent the newspaper responding to the economic forces that 
would insist the editorial should criticize and attack the working class 
people and organisations the paper had promised to defend. 
Evidence of an enforced anti-labour stance was frequently found 
in the ~ editorial. On just one day, 14 June 1975, the front page 
headlines were "Shell Shock For Uqions: Oil Boss Takes A Swipe At 
Scottish Workers"; and "The Peace Invitation: Wilson Will Urge Against 
Rail Strike". In the first story accusations of Sir Frank McFadzean 
at a Scottish Business School seminar were reported that Scottish workers 
exhibited amateurism, a lack of coumercial awareness or interest, a low 
work-rate and a lack of flexibility. Some" reply by trade union 
representatives" was included, "This man sounds like one of those people who 
have never done a day's work in their lives, but expect everyone else to 
graft". But the overall impression was a resounding indictment of 
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Scottish labour. The second story presented the political and 
economic case of Downing Street against strike action as sympathetically 
as it would be dealt with in any capitalist newspaper. Thus 
newspapers under private ownership and dependent upon advertising revenue 
for their survival of necessity project an unsympathetic and frequently 
hostile view of working class interests and the labour movement, to the 
extent that these represent a challenge to the interests of capital. 
Those newspapers, particularly the Daily Mirror and Daily Record, which 
make the shallow pretence of representing labour, do so to capture 
a mass market, and continue the masquerade in order to manipulate the working 
class readership more effectively, as Westergaard has maintained: 
"The commercial formula for mass circulation newspapers 
with a labour appeal is one - and as a matter of market necessity 
one - which both reduces any function of socio-political 'enlightenment' 
to a small place among editorial aims, and takes a 'radical' 
editorial orientation no further than to a blend of vacuous populism 
with support for political moderation and social compromise within 
the current order •••• Their labour loyalties are firmly behind 
'moderation', their acceptance of conventional political wisdQro -
the need for wage re~traint today, for 'partnership' of labour 
with capital always - unquestioning and loud." (1977,pp 102-3). 
The claim is often made that if press coverage of the labour movement 
is frequently antagonistic, that television news, legally bound to be 
neutral and balanced, compensates by providing neutral comment and pictures 
in what is now the major news medium. Yet in the only extensive research 
project on television news, the Glasgow University Media Group demonstrate 
how television news systematically inhibits in its method of interpretation 
and presentation any explanation of the normal activities of trade unions, 
or the underlying causes of industrial conflict: "The result is that in 
the absence of essential background information the activities of strikers, 
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which might otherwise appear quite rational and reasonable, are 
presented to the public as sensational." (1976,p244). 
is clearly revealed in two .stories examined by the GUMG. 
This process 
In a strike 
of Glasgow Corporation Heavy Goods Vehicle drivers which lasted from 
January 1975 till April, the television news bulletins focused immediately 
on the 'health hazard' caused by the fact that half the strikers were 
drivers of dustcarts, and upon the army's role in the dispute, and ignored 
the reasons for the strike. Though 10 people were interviewed and 
shown in 20 news bulletins, including Fire Brigade Officers, local 
politicians and MPs, Army Officers, and trade union officials (not 
directly concerned in an unofficial dispute), "during the whole of the 
strike, not one of the strikers was interviewed on the national news. 
Only from the day that the strike ended were the drivers allowed to comment 
on their lost cause." (GUMG, 1976,p.2S0). In a second example the 
BBC and ITN' news were shown to edit out of a report on a speech made by 
Harold Wilson, any reference to the failures of management or private 
capital in the predicament of British Leyland. Strikes were presented 
as the main problem facing the car industry, and the lack of investment and 
work organization problems, which were the responsibility of management 
were ignored. Counter arguments were fleeting, and sandwiched between 
'evidence' which would undermine them. Thus in TV news bulletins there 
were 42 references linking Wilson's speech to the level of strike activity, 
whilst only 6 references were made to Jack Jones' criticism of management 
incompetence, though official reports showed that half of lost production 
at Leyland had nothing to do with strikes. As the researchers conclude: 
-OUr analysis goes beyond saying merely that the television 
news 'favour' certain individuals and institutions by giving 
them more time and status. Such criticisms are crude. The 
nature of our analysis is deeper '-han this: in the end it 
relates to the picture of society in general and industrial 
society in particular, that television constructs. This at its 
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most damaging includes, as in these case studies, the laying 
of blame for society's industrial and economic problems at 
the door of the workforce. This is done in the face of 
contradictory evidence which, when it appears, is either ignored, 
smothered, or at worst, is treated as if it supports the 
inferential frameworks utilised by the producers of news." 
(GUMG, 1976, pp 267-8). 
The most serious consequence of the concentration of newspaper 
ownership under private control subsidized by advertising has been the 
elimination of any genuine or committed national voice for labour. A 
working paper prepared for the Royal Commission on the Press in 1977 
accepted the fact that 
"Britain has one of the strongest trade union movements in 
Western Europe, but it is unusual in Europe in lacking any 
significant press owned or controlled either by the trade 
unions or by a related political party or co-operative movement." 
(Boyd-Barrett, Seymour-Ure, Tunstall, 1977,p.347). 
Many of the trade union activists at the ~ were painfully aware of 
the total lack of a national trade union or socialist paper in Britain, 
and were therefore all the more determined to ensure that the Scottish Daily 
!!!! compensated for this critical deficiency, thouqh they appreciated 
the difficulty of the task, as Jimmy McNamara argued: 
"Here we have a labour movement that has not had a voice since 
1926, I know the Daily Herald didna close till the 1960s, but 
it has not had "a voice since Odhams took over the Daily Herald. 
And here we have this great labour movei.ent in this country with 
no new~aper, absolutely none •••• Even if the Scottish Daily News 
could be a raging success, even if we could be, I think we'd be 
in great difficulty, because of the field we're in, the field of 
ideas •••• We're facing different proble.s to the Meriden lads. 
• 
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We're in a real dangerous area when we're in a newspaper. 
We could affect the masses of the people with a newspaper, you 
canny affect them with a motorbike! If you're ridin a motorbike 
down the M6 it certainly doesna convert you to socialism! But 
the SDN could contribute to converting you to socialism, its 
that type of paper." 
Despite the aspirations of Jimmy McNamara and many others, the SON 
from the beginning never wholeheartedly responded to the urgent social 
need to provide a mass circulation newspaper committed to the labour 
movement, and instead vacillated between a vague trade pnion sympathy 
and a thoroughgoing commercial populism. This political oscillation was 
a source of constant tension in the life of the newspaper. 
submission to the Department of Industry it was claimed that 
In the 
"The committee has agreed that the paper should be politically independent 
and should reflect all shades of opinion." (SNE, 1974,p.34). 
How 'all shades of opinion' could be catered for without simultaneously 
offending 'all shades of opinion' or giving the appearance of total moral 
and intellectual ambivalence was never'properly explained, or demonstrated 
in the ~ editorial. The practical dilemma involved in this editorial 
vacuity was revealed in the guide for SDN workers to the prospectus 
of the newspaper: among the list of "salient selling features" the 
editorial stance was presented in this way: 
-The new~paper will be bright and commercial in its content. 
It will reflect a wide variety of interests in news, features 
and sport. It will also reflect a variety of opinions, even 
if these contradict the policy of the Scottish Daily News. It is 
in this spirit of independence that the News will not be tied 
to any political party, although it will be Left of centre in 
philosophy, i.e. support issuelii irt Scotland which are fundamental 
to the welfare of the working class and underprivileged sections of 
our coDllluni ty • IN OTHER ~RDS, A NEWSPAPER WITH A SOCIAL CONSCIENCE.· 
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However, the guide stated that "as regards Wlion officials a 
different emphasis will apply... The following points should be made 
when approaching Wlion officials. They do not alter the facts, 
but simply switch the emphasis:" 
"The News will be a lively, commercial newspaper but, 
within that context, will reflect the aspirations of the 
working class with a philosophy Left of centre. Although 
it will be independent of any political party" and reserve the 
right to critize, it will operate from a base of sympathy to 
trade unionists, as opposed to that of blind bias against them 
exercised by the Right-wing Press monopoly in this country. 
We believe that if this attitude can come across in a popular 
newspaper, as opposed to a minority selling publication, then 
it can only help the movement." 
Publicity statements such as this, did not reassure those who expected 
more convincing expressions of political commitment. The Morning Star 
posed a series of highly pertinent questions for which the SDN was to 
find no answer: 
"Can such a venture survive" without a clear political position 
which will command the support and enthusiasm df a substantial 
number of readers? Is it ~ot necessary for the paper to 
take a clear and categorical stand on the side of the unions and 
the labour movement in order to achieve such support? Isn't 
the point of workers control that it should be expressed in 
support of workers organisations? Would there not be a better 
chance of getting trade union money if there was an unequivocal 
statement of support for the unions, rather than vague statements 
of being left of centre and appealing to the middle market?" 
(12 August 1974). 
Other radical newspapers were more caustic in their attack upon the 
editorial ambiguities inherent in the SDN: 
• 
"Cut through the high-sounding phrases of the committee 
of former Express workers and what is likely to hit the 
newstands next month is an all-Scottish version of the 
Daily Mail...... Although the market for the Daily News 
3~ 
will be predominantly disaffected ~~ readers, the strident 
right wing views of the Express would clearly have to be moderated. 
After all a paper with heavy backing from the trade union movement, 
could not go in for Express-style union bashing. On the other 
hand, the backing of private capital, along with the neutral 
politics of most of the former Expressmen, will ensure that the 
Daily News will not step to the left of the narrow, self-imposed 
limits of the commercial press." (Glasgow News, April 1975). 
Fundamental debate about SDN editorial policy constantly raged at 
every level within the organization. Active trade unionists were 
appalled at the failure of the paper to consistently or emphatically 
represent the ideas and interests of organized labour. Ronnie Gibson 
the young APEX FOC in particular tried hard to impress upon others the 
importance of maintaining a labour stand, though frequently he was 
rebuffed by those who sought primarily to brighten the papers general 
appeal. For example N~than Goldberg, the assistant editor, in the 
following exchange offered plausible reasons why the paper should moderate 
its approach: 
R.G."We don't have a duty to produce a 'popular newspaper', whatever 
that is, we have a duty to produce a working class newspaper, that is 
directed solely by the interests of the working class.~... We should 
be able to publish things and have them put up on trade union noticeboards, 
and we should be able to sell the paper in factories, and get over to the 
working class people, which no other newspaper can do. " 
N.G."Well we could be doing that. But there is another school that says -
if yo~selling a popular newspaper, you don't want to be that closely 
• 
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identified with one area of the community, such as the shopfloor'. 
My feeling is that I'd rather not be so closely identified really, 
even though I'm a Marxist. Because I feel we should try and get 
broad circulation, and we don't want to get ourselves identified as 
a one-dimensional newspaper, which we're not really. It's a difficult 
one that. I'd rather see us going round the housing schemes in the 
vans, speaking to the community leaders right across the board •••• I've 
spoken to shop convenors, I've been involved in the trade union movement 
since I was a kid, and I know a lot of people in it, and the first thing 
they ask you about the paper is, 'What's your racing section going to 
be like? If they want to find out about the trade union movement 
in detail, they're going to want a left of centre beavy, and they've got 
a great paper to buy, that's the Morning ~, there's no way we can 
emulate the Morning Star - and survive. But what we can do as a popular 
newspaper is to convert an awful lot of people who might say, 'I never thought 
of it like that before~' Like, 'I never thought that Tony Benn was 
a human being! ' There's no need to shout that, if you say it quietly 
they take the point. If you shout it perhaps they might react. If 
you say it quietly perhaps that, 'Tony Benn's a decent bloke, the guys 
done an awful lot of good. OK he may be a bit of a boy scout in his 
. wilder moments, but he's a great politician, he's got tremendous vision. 
He may speak like an Express editorial at times but he's OK'. Then 
people say 'Tony Benn's OK' when they read it, and they think, 'Well, 
maybe he's not that bad! ' That's good. And if they read it in a 
paper thats reasonably independent, then they'll accept it, but if they're 
reading a paper which they think is totally committed to the Communist 
Party or the labour movement, then they might not accept that. You may 
call it a bit of camouflage, but I think it works. I mean if your too 
totally committed ~hen people will pigeon-hole the newspaper. I mean I'm 
not interested in converting trade unionists, frankly. Because I 
• 
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know they are there in any event. What we're interested in 
converting are people that don't know us, and you don't do that by 
knocking it down their throat. I mean from us they'll graduate later 
on to the Morning ~ or Tribune. We're not going to ram it down 
their throats, we're a lot more subtle,the rest of the press are a lot 
more suble, why should we alienate a lot of people we might get into the 
fold?". 
The coherence of Goldberg's argument was never born out in practice: 
the papers limp and inconsistent editorial failed to attract many new 
readers whilst distressing the trade union ~eadership: . and though the 
capitalist popular press have been rightly accused of many manipulative 
methods, subtlety is certainly not one of them. Yet Goldberg was in 
the centre ·of editorial opinion at the ~, and was responsible himself 
for several of the few left wing stories that found their way into the 
paper. There were many journalists and print workers who had a far 
more limited and traditional view of what the paper should cover. 
Daddy MacKoskill the NATSOPA FOC, was typical of the older workers in 
having rooted ideas about what a popular newspaper should contain which 
dismayed those hoping for new departures, as the following exchange, again 
with Ronnie Gibson, acutely illustrates: 
R.G. "This paper not only has obligations to people working within 
this newspaper. I think we have greater obligations to the people 
outside, and ·that is the trade union movement that supported us, that is the 
guys down at UCS, the guys in Govan, the people in Boneywells, people in 
British Steel, people in the collieries. The peple who supported us. 
Not anyone in general, but the people who supported us, we've got an 
obligation to them. To see that we don't create a whip for the working 
class back. As long as we don't create that, as long as we're not 
f 
another newspaper, a right wing newspaper that's going to give a biased 
report, on strikes, or on grievances, or on withdrawals of labour ,or 
anything else." 
D.M. "We're trying to be 'left of centre'. 
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Now let's be 
honest that's a very hard thing for a newspaper to do". 
R.G. "It's a very broad term, 'left of centre' of what? What 
do you think of 'left of centre?' 
D.M. "What'I think, and what they say to me is this: liberal with 
a small 'I'. Well, that's what I've been told all the time, liberal 
with a small '1'. The point is we're trying to sell this newspaper 
to every shape, irrespective of whether they're Conservative, Liberal, 
you name it, SNP, Communist, you name any party you like. We're 
trying to do a paper, a Scottish paper, that will please Scotsmen and 
scotswomen, irrespective of what party they support, makes no difference. 
This is the paper I want to put out. A paper that anyone can buy and 
lift up and say 'This is worth reading'. Y'know this is the sort of 
paper we've got to try and put out. This is what w~'re trying to 
do. Otherwi se we're dead. II 
F.G. . "This is very philosophical Doddy, but, I'll ask you: why can't 
we put out a newspaper that is left of centre, that we can guarantee 
to sell 200,000 copies to the trade union movement? By producing a 
newspaper that is really left of centre, I'm not just talking about left 
of Roy Jenkins, or left or Dennis Healey, I'm talking about left of Tony Benn. 
How do we know that we cannot sell this newspaper to the guys in the yards, 
and other people we mentioned? We've never tried it. We're 
producing a newspaper that we think will be a popular newspaper, and yet 
at the moment its not paying off. How do we know we canna sell as 
a left wing newspaper, not as what the prospectus says a 'left of centre' 
newspaper, which could mean anything. It could mean left of centre 
of Ted Heath, or it could mean left of centre of the Labour Party." 
D.M. "If we wanted to produce a newspaper that would go to the 
unions, then we'd sell it. But at present the unions are not buying 
this newspaper, that's pretty obvious, they're definitely not buying it. 
There is something lacking in the paper." 
• 
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R.G. "00 you ask yourself, 'Should ''Ie go more left?' On the 
Common Market, on Tony B'enn, on the Wilson Government? '00 we say 
that Tony Benn should resign because he has been done by Harold Wilson? 
And rely on the support of Benn and the Labour Movement? We're not 
relying on them at the moment. We're relying on the support of 
everybody. We're iying straight in the middle of the road, Doddy, and 
we've got heavy traffic to go through." 
D.M. "But then again, if we go one side or the other its harder. 
We're going to be hit by the Government and the DTI and all these people. 
If we go one way, irrespective of the way, it's impossible to sell and 
do a bomb." 
R.G. "I would say to go more left would do us no harm whatsoever. A 
lot of people in this workforce and outside, over a majority of the 
workforce, would say that we're too far left. This is absolute bullshit, 
because you sell a newspaper not on its political content, but by its 
general content as a newspaper. That's a fact. Why do the majority 
of people buy the Scottish Daily Express? Because of its content, not 
its political content. Because its a popular paper. I'm opening up 
two levels of argument, one that we can go more left, and try to get more 
trade unionists to buy the paper; and the other that it doesn't really 
matter which way you go, though I maintain we lose circulation as we go 
right." 
D.M. "If you took the Record, the Reco~ is turning out 672,000 
papers per morning, and to me who has worked on a newspaper since 14, 
it's a trade paper.. So the only thing I can assume is that this is what 
the people want, a trade newspaper. 
·R.G. "TheY'want spot-the~balls ••••• " 
D.M. . "They want spot-the-balls, they want cartoons, and decent 
cartoons - not just the junk we've got, they 'want the stars, the horoscope, 
some people buy a paper sheerly for that. Other people buy it sheerly 
• 
for racing, horse racing, good tipsters. 
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Other ones buy it for 
sport, there's others just look at the dolly birds, I know people 
who buy the Daily Record or the Sun, the Sun's worse than the Daily Record 
in the sense that the ~ is the nearest approach to a full frontal of 
any woman. Whereas in the Record its no just as bad. When people 
first buy the ~, here's a queer thing, those that used to first turn 
to the back page and look at the sports page, automatically turn to page 
3, now, before they look at the sport. Now is this what they want? 
The editorial in here, tells us 'they want to produce a good 
newspaper', editorially that might be OK from their point of view. That 
might be the right idea as well, they can go home to their bed and say 
'We put out a good newspaper'. But if that good newspaper they put out 
doesna selli this is the end product, does it sell? If that doesna sell, 
what good is it? NOW there's the Daily Record, which most people, even 
the people who buy it will tell you, is junk. But they buy it. Now 
why do they buy it? At the present moment, we're dOing a 14 page 
paper, and the majority of that 14 pages is all reading. There's no 
adverts, just reading. People don't seem to want this, they want the 
likes of the Record, ~ adverts and few pages of reading. Just a few wee 
snippets and the horoscope." 
Though the debate continued through the life of the ~ about whether 
the paper should canmit itself to the labour movement and build up a 
politically sympathetic readership, or whether it should aim at the centre 
of the popular newspaper.market with an emphasis on entertainment, 
the battle essentially was lost in the initial editorial concept and 
construction which was determinedly imitative of the mainstream capitalist 
populars. The result was a profound disillusionment and bewilderment 
for all those who opened the paper for the first time hoping to learn what 
a newspaper produced by and for workers had to say, a similar experience 
392 
to that of Bruce Glasier, a board member of the Daily Citizen 
set up in 1912 by the TUC,modelled on the existing mass-circulation 
dailies and designed by Fleet Street journalists, who recorded 
that he opened the first edition "With trembling and glanced hastily 
over its pages", but "felt no thrill of joy, no sense of satisfaction 
a decided feeling of disappointment grew on meo No it will not 
do - unless it is greatly improved. It is not distinctive, its Labour 
and Socialist news is scrappy. 
A d'etre." (Holton, 1974,p.363). 
It has no grip. It has no raison 
The SDN Discussion Document issued to the press in 1974 idealistically 
claimed, "The layout of the paper will differ from that of the Daily Express, 
as certainly the philosophy and content will". (1974,p.l) • 
Regrettably when the Daily ~ finally emerged, both the appearance 
and the content projected the ambiance of the Express, within which 
philosophical conversion was scarcely discernible. "A mutation of the 
Express and the Sunday Express", was how two print workers described it. 
TheSDNs most devoted supporters felt a sense of rejection, and even 
Tony Benn, some ·years later was to admit at an ICOM meeting that all the SDN 
editorial achieved was It!h!, Express without the malice". (2 October 1979). 
·Editorial Freedom and Control. 
Editorial control of the ~ was something of an enigma for most of 
those involved in the newspaper, they knew that controls were being 
applied, but .by who and what they were not quite sure. The Action 
Committee had established a broad editorial outline for the newspaper, 
and the Works Council was supposedly to retain control of general 
editorial strategy, but although IDU had questioned "the willingness of 
the proposed Executive Council to allow the essential freedom of action 
toO the •••• Editor", in practice, as the Prospectus itself stated it was 
, 
the editor who had "responsibility Ior the editorial policy and content 
of the newspaper." (SNE, 1975,pp 23,7). Fred Sillito himself later 
maintained, "I doubt if any editor has ever been freer of pressures from 
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non-editorial sources thCin I was." (Bradley and Gelb ,1979b,p.ll). 
The worker chairman of the~, Allister Mackie was in favour of 
preserving the traditional prerogatives of the editor: 
"Major issues are decided on in the Works Council, we decided 
that the newspaper was against entry into the Common Market, 
(though I'm for the Common Market by the way), we decided that 
the Scottish Assembly should have more economic teeth. But 
the workforce should not interfere with day to day editorial 
policy. The paper must have an identity, and must be predictable 
in its political and social philosophies. We cannot do that 
if we are run by a committee. 
the predictability we need." 
It needs an individual to give 
It Cbuld be argued that investing control in the hands of one man, whose 
views were ha%dly representative, was a poor solution to the editorial 
41fferences which divided the SDN workers. But in the event it proved 
no solution at all, since Fred Sillito,quiet and introspective, was 
personally not capable of imposing editorial domination. Mackie quickly 
recognised this, "Sillito did nQt want a heavy news coverage in the 
first edition, which caused editorial disputes from the start. Be was 
a weak editor." Ironically for the ~, saddled with an orthodox 
editorial control structure but no editorial direction, "The editors 
indecision was final". 
The vagueness of the editorial orientation was obvious in the 
Prospectus: 
"First and foremost it will be a newspaper - telling it straight, simply 
and objectively; bright but not trivial, responsible but never pompous. 
It will present the latest in local, national and world events with style 
and vigour - but without seeking to make the.humdrum or routine seem 
sensational. A newspaper with a sense of value and proportion. 
• 
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It will be a sporting paper that caters for as many interests 
as possible, including minority activities. It will remain 
unconvinced that a footballer with a sore toe has first claim upon the 
Nation's sympathy. But it will view the sports scene with enthusiasm 
and proper respect for the gifted and heroic without forgetting that 
basically sport is supposed to be fun and not the most important thing 
in life. 
It will be a political paper seeking to mirror as closely as 
possible the feelings of the people of Scotland - with a philosophy left 
of centre. It will provide an open forum for discussion on conflicting 
policies and viewpoints. 
Above all it will not bore its readers with turgid polemics but will 
speak out with candour and gusto in the space reserved for the paper's 
own comments. 
The fresh air of freedom will blow through its pages. It will aim 
to provide something for all age groups, from school children to 
pensioners - and no one will have to hide it from the family. But the 
interests and aspirations of youth on whom the future of our country 
depends, will receive special attention. 
The intention is that everyone will find it entertaining and readable -
and that they will buy it and go on hlyinq it beause they like it •••• 
and trust it." (SNE, 1975,pp.5-6). Though written perhaps in 
order to disarm critics, who saw the ~ as a dangerous political 
vehicle, as much as to declare what the editorial intentions of the 
newspaper really were, this Madison Avenue blurb clearly indicated 
Sillito's preference for entertainment rather than information - with 2 
lines on politics, 4 lines on sport, and 7 on style. It was not simply 
heavy political analysis which Sillito esche~ed, but a detailed and critical 
f 
approach to other sUbjects. For-example James Russell insisted that 
to provide a satisfactory City Page anything less than 30 column inches 
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of prices and 10 column inches of comment would be inadequate, yet 
the Council minutes record how "Mr. F'-Sillito, Editor, was in favour 
of carrying a small amount of City News, but despite arguments about 
possible effect upon advertising the Council conceded to Mr. Russell's 
request." (25 April 1975). To expect a different approach from 
Fred Sillito though was unfair, he was diligently pursuing the only 
concept of a popular newspaper he was aware of, having served 25 years 
with Beaverbrook, including 17 years on the Scottish Sunday Express, 
the most defiantly reactionary in the archaic Beaverbrook stable. 
An apparent consequence of the lack of editorial control was that 
individually journalists at the ~ had more editorial freedom than they 
had ever experienced before to select and write stories and then see 
them printed without massive sub-editorial alteration. Editorial control 
in the capitalist press, contrary to popular legend about 'fearless 
journalism', is both hierarchical and systematically distorting in a 
particular direction, as Beckett maintains, 
"Newspapers decide by the process of news selection what is 
important ••• when we say 'newspapers decide 'we do not mean 
that those who produce newspapers decide. We mean that 
newspaper editors and proprietors decide. Journalists use 
their professional techniques to implement these decisions." (1977,p.4S). 
One ~ reporter commented that 
"When you covered a story on the Express with political overtones, 
you had to write it the way they wanted it. If you wrote 
it the way you wanted, the subs would simply change it back. 
Bere there is a lot more freedom when writing a story." 
At·the ~ there was a more informal co-opera~ive relationship between 
the reporters and sub-editors than had-previously existed, and less 
arbitrary impoSition of editorial authority. 
as a sub-editor explained: 
John Bodgeman who worked 
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"There are no laid down departmental meetings, but there 
is an open-ended structure: anybody that questions 
anything is entitled to, and will have it discussed. If 
I'm working on page one, and I'm putting a certain story 
in, and someone turns to me and says 'Oh I wouldn't put that, 
there! ' well I don't say, 'Well, fuck off! " I say, 
'Well, why not?' and I turn to somebody else and I say, 'Well 
what do you think about what he said?' And he says, 'What about 
that guy over there, he was on the story last night'. We 
get involved in that way. Whereas in every other newspaper 
I've worked on there have been very strict formal lines 
between those who work and those who have people working for them. 
There were very strict areas which you couldn't cross over. 
You couldn't go to a night editor on any other newspaper and 
say, 'You've made a right balls up of that, we'd better get that 
changed quickly". You couldn't say that, or you'd face the 
risk of losing your job. In this paper you can do that. But 
you'd better be right, because we just don't have the time to 
mess around." 
But the lack of clear, collective editorial guidelines meant that 
journalists were operating in a vacuum which created confusion and 
accentuated individual conflict in interpretation, rather than allowing 
expression o~ coherent, different opinions, as McKay and Barr convincingly 
argue: 
"Since the Oaily News had no prepared policy and a total 
lack of political and editorial guidance, the selection of 
news, its prominence and the way it was treated depended 
- on the whim and prejudice of the individual journalist. 
Ironically, the creative freedo~ which the journalists 
enjoyed - a unique opportunity to produce a newspaper of 
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their own style and reflecting their own convictions - resulted 
merely in an inconsistent newspaper, an unhappy rag-bag of 
spurious and eccentric stories. The editorial hierarchy 
never managed to harness the conflicting forces under firm 
guidelines, never created a policy and a treatment of news 
which was fresh or radical or even consistent." (l976,p.99) • 
Careful preparatory definition of editorial policy and approach 
by collective discussion of the journalists could have alleviated the 
problem of editorial anarchy. Yet the question arises - should 
journalists alone be involved in defining editorial strategy? Mackie 
maintained, "They were being given a chance no other group of journalists 
had ever previously been offered - the right to determine the editorial 
content of their own newspaper." (1976b.,p13l) • But in a workers 
co-operative newspaper, should not all workers have the right to participate 
in the control of editorial policy, as in management policy generally? 
Though the workers at the SDN took a keen interest in the editorial 
of their newspaper, as one said, "This is the only workers co-operative 
where the workers can afford the product", they were deprived of any 
formal means of exerting influence upon it. 
workers frustration: 
Mackie was· aware of the, 
"The expectations of the members of the workforce during the 
first week or so had to be witnessed to be believed. Daily 
the paper's contents were analysed in every department. 
The attitlXie was one of "this is our paper, how can we improve 
it?" Sadly the editorial content did not rise to meet the 
aspirations either of the workforce or of the Works Council." 
(1976,p.132). 
Most journalists on the ~ jealously,quarded their professional autonomy, 
and would have resented the intervention of print workers in editorial 
direction as much as journalists on any conventional newspaper would, 
• 
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where the division between intellectual and manual labour is 
sacred. John Hodgeman was one of a handful of ~ journalists who 
could see the legitimacy of the print workers involvement: 
"You've got to allow every worker in the building authority 
and responsibility over the editorial, not just the journalists. 
Like the Benn conundrum that the straightpress jumped on so 
heavily when he said the lift man at 
Thomson House had as much right to say what went into The Times 
as the editor. Whether that's practical or not, and I don't think 
it is practical to have 500 editors discussing everything that 
goes into the paper, if the lift'man - we don't have a lift man, 
but we will have. a lift man - if the lift man comes up the stairs 
and says, 'Look, I strongly disagree with your angle on that1 
then I think the attitude of whoever put the story in the paper 
should be, 'Well how many are there of you protesting?' Let's 
talk about it in democratic numbers because we obviously can't 
cater for every point of view in the bulding.' 
The great majority of the SON journalists did not share Hodgeman's 
radicalism, and were far more concerned with carving out for themselves 
influential positions than in worrying about the absence of democratic 
involvement or accountabili ty in editorial construction. Again, 
older journalists predominated, they had received larger redundancy 
payments than the younger journalists which ~elped them to survive the 
yea%' of unemployment while the SON was set up, but many had experienced 
great difficulty in finding other jobs, McKay and Barr, themselves 
journalists, c~ented acidly -
"There was •••• doubt about the calibre of the editorial staff 
who were to produce the paper. _ ,The fee.ling among other 
journalists was that those left in Albion Street after the 
• 
Beaverbrook departure were those who could not get jobs 
in the industry: as they were functionally unemployable 
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they had to create their own employment. It was said by one 
senior journalist, that the devotion of the Albion Street 
journalists to the co-operative ideal was in inverse proportion 
to their talents." (1976,p.58) • 
Another Scottish journalist Neil Ascherson of The Scotsman also 
attributed the "miserable editorial quality of the Scottish Daily News" 
to the "mediocre journalists" left behind after the closure who could 
not find other jobs. (l978,p.136) • There were some journalists 
though, such as James Russell, who could readily have found other work, 
who stayed with the co-operative out of loyaltY1 and others who left 
better paid jobs on other newspapers such as James Fyfe, Rusty Steele, 
John Hodgeman and Mike Buckingham, to join the ~ out of idealism. 
But though they struggled to make some lasting impression upon the 
newspaper, they were persistently overwhelmed by those who had more 
complacent editorial ideas. (Ron McKay, previously editor of the 
Glasgow News, was persuaded to join the paper to provide the original 
investigative reports the ~ sorely lacked. But he quickly became 
disillusioned with the uninspired editorial quality, the complacency, 
and the political degeneration. Soon he was reduced to muttering 
exasperated oaths about how awful the paper was) • As Ronnie Gibson 
later sadly insisted, "There were good left wing journalists in the 
Daily News, but they were never allowed to use their talents." 
It was among the conservative ranks of the older journalists, who had 
never been happy with the workers control structure at the ~, that 
Robert Maxwell derived his most vocal support. Charlie Armstrong 
diagnosed another reason for this support: 
• 
"There are a number of people in the editorial department 
who are incompetent. They knew the Works Council was 
aware of this and would be restructuring the department 
so they decided their self-interest lay in Maxwell running 
the company." 
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The political ambivalence and personal opportunism of the journalists 
prompted another explanation· from Jimmy MacNamara: 
"Even at the lower echelons editorially, there's a lot of reactionaries. 
There's an awful lot of good blokes too. But I've made this point 
repeatedly: most espionage spies and double agents in the world come 
from the journalists' class. I don't know if you're a journalist or 
not? But it's not an accident you know, read any spy story - the bloke 
starts as a journalist. Why does he start as a journalist? Because 
that's a mode of employment that creates the attitude of sussing out 
information, picking away, and telling lies without turning a hair, and 
double dealing and all that. Well we've got our share here! " 
The experience of writing for the proprietorial press has certainly 
exerted a more powerfully distorting conditioning upon journalists than 
other print workers: the treatment of information as a saleable 
commodity, the consequent comforts of professional privilege, and a 
familiarity with constant editorial prejudice and manipulation, has 
invested in most journalists a remote and tenuous connection with the truth, 
as it would be interpreted by the majority of people. 
provides an illuminating example: 
Francis Beckett 
"A journalist now working for the Daily Mirror, with twenty-five 
years of Fleet Street reporting behind him, describes himself 
and his colleagues as 'willing whores'. It's not, he says, 
that news desks, news editors or editors say to their reporters: 
Go away and write a lie, go away and distort the truth. It's 
just that reporters know what is expected of them. 
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He tells the story of which he is still ashamed. In 1956 
he WSG working for the Daily Mail, and was put on to the General 
Election coverage. So one day he found himself in a large, drafty 
hall in Watford listening to Aneurin Bevan. It was a brilliant speech, 
he says. But at the end of the meeting, he knew what was expected 
of him. He sought out a woman in the audience who had shouted 
sanething at Bevan. His report, the next morning in the Daily Mail bega=: 
'A lone old age pensioner dared to challenge the might of Aneurin Bevan 
yesterday ••••• • He was congratulated by his news editor. 
The question to ask journalists is not: when did your news desk 
instruct you to give stories a misleading slant? It is: how often have 
you given stories a misleading slant because you are a good enough 
professional to know what your news desk wanted? It is journalists who 
have to provide the propaganda copy that, in the old days, the great 
crusading newspaper magnates provided themselves." (1977 ,pp.43-4) • 
External Editorial Influence I: The Readers 
The ~ journalists having lived with proprietorial pressures for years, 
and adapted to them, could hardly be expected to suddenly transform when 
left to their own devices. The tragedy was that neither the print 
workers in the ~, or the working class readership, were able to exert 
any significant influence to make the journalists change. Instead of 
experiencing the impact of the active representation of the mass of 
readers ideas and views, the journalists composed their stories in as 
splendid isolation at the ~, as in any other large newspaper, which was 
relieved only by the occasional article by some established public figure. 
An elitist, and potentially exploitative separation was maintained 
between those who pronounce and propagate Ldeas and those who merely 
. 
receive them. Once again, John Hodqeman's high expectations were 
f 
completely dashed: 
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liThe columns of the Scottish Daily News are open to the lift 
man, to the editor, to me and to you, and to any member 
of the public. Not in the letters page where your letter 
will be cut to ribbons, but in an article - a major article -
to say, 'I disagree, why I disagree, what I would have done 
instead. And y'know this is a healthy aspect of it. 
Unfortunately, at the moment, we're filling it with that 
crud Teddy Taylor every other week. And y'know this is some 
kind of gentleman's agreement that the editor has with the 
foregoing Tory MP for Cathcart. It's bad enough being my MP,for 
the constituency . I live in,without having to read him in the 
bloody paper I ~ork in as well. And I'd like to see this 
gentleman's agreement put up against quite a lot of agreements -
y'know ungentlemen's agreements - about saving 500 people's 
.jobs. We're driving trade unionists away in droves each time 
1 they see the name of Teddy Taylor in print." 
In fact it was an article by the Conservative MP in which he critizec 
the plan to nationalize shipbuilding that led to the only significant 
iftstance of trade union readers of the Daily News securing a right of 
reply with a major article supporting their case. Nathan Goldberg, 
the deputy editor, dismissed the' incident in a rather patronising manner: 
·We made a blunder in a story we carried about Govan shipbuilders. 
We sorted out that, they accepted that we were doing it in their 
best interests - but it was a bit too subtle for the union leaders 
to understand, so I went down and spoke to them, the convenors, 
1. After briefly flourishing as the Conservative Party opposition spoke~ 
on Scottish affairs, Teddy Taylor lost in the May 1979 election, when 
his predominantly working class constituency reverted from the radical 
right to the radical left by electing .. as Labour MP the son of James Maxton 
the Clydeside militant during the first world war, and later Independent 
Labour Party MP. 
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the other day. They were great, they accepted the apology, 
and they said right we're going to make sure all our guys 
buy the paper. Whereas a week ago they were tearing the 
bloody thing up. Because they expect more from us." 
The convenor of Govan Shipbuilders, Sam Barr, for whom the SON 
position was "too subtle", sent to the newspaper a stunning article 
presenting a powerful case for shipbuilding nationalization: 
THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
I work in the shipbuilding industry. It is going through its 
worst crisis for decades: the world market has been deteriorating, it 
continues to do so and the recessionary process shows no signs of 
improving in the near future. Cancellations have taken place in the 
building and provision of large cil"tankers. Dangers of non-tanker 
orders following the same slipway to disaster cannot be exaggerated -
there I s a very real threat that these contracts face random scrapping. 
Maritime governments elsewhere in the world are becoming increasingly aware 
of the situation and are acting accordingly. They are taking firm steps 
to protect their shipbuilding interests by ploughing heavy subsidies 
into the industry. Japan was first off the mark, slashing 60 to 80 
per cent off the sales tag on new orders, thereby undercutting the 
corresponding price in the British yards by the same margin. Unless the 
British Government acts now and introduces similar measures, the industry 
will be le£t out in the cold and its workers and the country will face 
social and economic disaster. 
Most of our shipyards have order books at present that should ensure 
full employment until 1977/8 •••• as long as there are no more cancellations. 
So the time is right for legislating, to safeguard the present orders 
and to attract new business. This cannot be done without nationalization. 
Cash must be injected to. allow for fair competition in the world market. 
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And to allow British shipyards to be modernised. OVer the years 
the shipbuilding industry has suffered and deteriorated through the 
lack of investment by employers. In the last decade the Government 
has given these bosses grants to tIle tune of E150 million when they 
found themselves in financial trouble. Now some of these same 
employers, happy and complacent about their new-found security, don't 
want to know about subsidies and are strong opponents of the industry 
being nationalized. Others, aware of the very real difficulties 
that lie ahead see nationalization as the means of survival - hoping, of 
co~se, that they will still retain control of the business 
"There are certainly serious problems ahead for the industry. 
If the Government acts now, the tragedy can be averted. It 
must demand that British shipowners place their new ship orders 
in British shipyards. In 1964, one-fifth of our vessels 
were constructed and delivered from foreign yards. Last 
year the percentage had risen to a frightening three-quarters. 
Nationalization of tbe yards will not fully solve the problems 
of the shipbuilding industry, but. it will be a giant step 
in the right direction. All industries in capitalist countries 
suffer through a lack of an overall economic plan. They are 
too dependent on fluctuating free markets and this, naturally, 
leads to booms and slumps. The experience we gain and the 
lessons we learn in making a nationalized shipbuilding industry 
a viable project will be good for workers, good for industry 
and good for the whole country." 
Regrettably, the ~ never sought to develop a dialogue with its 
n 
working class readership, which could have resulted in many other 
stimulating articles such as Sam Barr's, and promoted the identification 
of the paper with working class conce~ns. 
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External Editorial Influence II: The Advertisers. 
If the influence of readers upon the ~ was minimal, the 
opinion of advertisers remained of central significance in determining 
editorial policy: whatever ideals the newspaper professed, having 
accepted that almost half of revenue would come from commercial 
advertisements, the editorial could not afford to offend basic 
business interests: 
"The Daily News might take a left posture, it might profess 
itself to be on the side of'the wronged individual •••• 
fearless in its views' but it could never be anti7business 
or capital. More important to the success of the 
co-operative than the goodwill and support of the public 
would be the approval, tacit or otherwise of big business. 
Newspaper economics dictate that news - 'the grey stuff 
between the advertisements' as Lord Thomson called it - is 
brought to reader by courtesy of the advertiser and entrepreneur. 
One subsidises the cost of it, the other disseminates and 
evaluates the usefulness of it." . (McKay and Barr, 1976,p.59). 
Two post-war Royal Commissions on the Press have naively claimed that 
the receipt of advertising revenue by newspapers "creates a relationship 
both remote and impersonal". (RCP, 1949,p.l43; RCP,196l,p.87). 
The absurdity of this view would be amusing, if it were not so 
systematical~y destructive of the democratic flow of information through 
the press. James Curran has provided formidable evidence of the 
severe censorship exercised by the influence of advertising revenue 
upon newspaper editorial. (1977; 1978). The relationship of 
advertisers with the ~ was not "remote and impersonal", it was iumediate. 
personal,and profoundly discriminatory. The qeneral manager, Eric Tough, 
constantly stressed the importance.of'advertisers for the survival of 
the paper: 
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"I was continually trying to tell the Daily ~ board ••• 
that the balancing factor was advertisin2. 'You must 
remember that you must write newspapers not just to get 
circulation but to get advertising.' I don't believe 
there was any bias against the newspaper from advertisers -
they'll advertise in any paper that's going to get them sales. 
They said, 'We suspect what's going to happen, we know 
you're full of communists but we're prepared to see a good 
paper and if it is we'll advertise. But if your going 
to have the thing run by the handful of guys who p,ushed 
Beaverbrook into the ditch then you've had it •••• Advertisers 
saw the Daily Record as a much more responsible paper, it had 
a management, therefore it had people who breathe the same 
kind of air as other managers. So they trusted it not to go 
too far. They could talk to the management over lunch in 
the right kind of clubs. They had no idea what the hell we 
would do when Nat Goldberg went off on one of his wilder 
coumunistic flights of fancy. They just didn't trust us." 
(MCKay and Barr, 1976,pp 10B-9). (My emphasis). 
In normal circumstances the duress of advertisers interests upon 
editorial content is not revealed, because in the past it has been so 
effective that it has eliminated any newspaper that would consider 
directly cha~lenging the general commercial interests of business 
advertisers in such matters as profit levels, monopoly, government 
intervention or union militancy. Whatever specific criticisms are 
made in newspaper stories, are made within a framework of a basic 
acceptance of private ownership and control, managerial prerogative, the 
l&gitimacy of the profit motive, and the nec~sity for labour diSCipline 
and compliance. Thus as CUrran has lrgued, in the commercial press 
advertising influence has been internalized in editorial policy: 
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"This process of influence is essentially an impersonal one 
that is inherent in the system of advertising finance of 
the press rather than 'abuse' that can be attributed to 'rogue' 
advertisers. The image of the predatory advertiser 
threatening the editorial integrity of the press is itself 
profoundly misleading. For advertising influence is not 
imposed upon the press so much as internalised by newspaper 
managements in strategies designed to maximise revenue. 
It is an integral part of the economic system in which the press 
serves the clients - advertisers and readers." (l978,p.232) • 
The reason though, why advertising influence may be impersonal in this 
sense, is that it has been so systematically applied that editorial 
orientation is already suitably moulded, and no direct threat is 
necessary. In the case of the ~ which occasionally showed signs 
of breaking out of this hegemonic suppression of criticism, the reaction 
of advertisers was brutal. 
Not only did advertisers stronglyinfluence what the ~ said, but 
they also influenced who the SDN said it to. Eric Tough attempted 
to hammer into the Council and·workforce the importance of appealing 
to those people who the advertisers found a valuable market: 
WI have to ••••• remind you .that not only must our paper 
appeal to readers, it must appeal also to the requisite 
number of readers in those demographic groups which are 
required by our advertisers. Half our revenue ~ 
come from adve~tisers who will be mightily influenced by 
what we say and how we behave." 
No.1, 21 May 1975,p.13) • 
(General Managers Report 
• ~ customers preferences are more important than our own 
in every respect. OUr custom~ are advertisers and readers. 
OUr Advertisers will depend on who our readers are, how many 
there are, ~d where they are". (General Managers Report,' No. 3, 
2 July 1975,p.5). 
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An advertising dominated circulation strategy would dictate that 
the SDN should neglect whole social groups, including active trade 
unionists, commited socialists, the unemployed, the poor, the sick 
and disabled,pensioners and others,who did not have the inclination, 
or mcans,to respond to the blandishments of advertisers: so much 
for a 'newspaper with a social conscience.' 
A final, bitter irony was that the discrimination of advertisers 
was responsible for one of the few distinguishing features of the SDN 
editorial - the variety and detail of the stories. Because of 
the lack of advertising, the journalists were forced to fill the 
gaps in the newspaper with more edi~oria1 and information than would 
normally be presen~ed in a popular newspaper. Hence: "The 
determining factor in the size of a newspaper is the amount of 
advertising: and the amount of news expands and contracts proportionately 
to match the fluctuations in this quantity." (Murphy, 1978,p.178). 
Inconsistent Editorial and Isolated Campaigns. 
The maintenance of an indiyidua1istic professional autonomy 
among journalists who held conflicting political orientations, the 
prevention of any significant readership involvement, and the insistent 
pressure to secure advertisement revenue, resulted in an editorial 
content which could only be described as schizophrenic. In the first 
months of the broadsheet, when an occasional left-wing stance was 
mo~e emphatiC, there were strong industrial stories, with condemnation 
of the mass redundancies announced at British Steel, Chrysler and at other 
Scottish plan~s; committed defences of the Industry Bill's proposals 
for the regeneration of the British economy; and outraged criticism 
of the seeming renewal of United Sta~es military aggression in South East 
Asia in the Mayaguez naval incident. Politicized stories though, 
were overwhelmed and lost amid a mass of trivial non-stories, used as 
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an excuse to include large photographs of attractive women; inflated 
sensationalist accounts of salacious crinle, violence and disaster; 
public relations features on such subjects as Scottish tourism; 
silly and sarcastic "womens" commentaries; fatuous show business 
gossip; television choice (intruding on to the front page); and 
above all an obsession with the personal minutiae of professional sport. 
(If a footballer with a sore toe was not featured, a footballer who 
almost caught the wrong plane home from London was given headline 
treatment). (SDN, 12 June 1975). 
Personal and political struggle over ~ntent and ~nterpretation 
was a daily experience on the editorial floor, and though the 
conservative majority invariably won during the day, the left wing made 
surprise guerilla counter attacks at night: 
ROne characteristic of the Scottish Daily News which was 
consistent throughout the first two weeks was the way 
that it changed, visibly and politically, with different 
editions during the night. The first edition, for the 
North of Scotland, was presided over by Fred Sillito who 
usually left with the first edition at 10 p.m. Nathan 
Goldberg, night editor Jack Wills, and John Hodgeman took 
the paper through until the morning, usually gutting and 
remaking the front page for the second and succeeding editions 
which served the greater part of circulation." (McKay and Barr, 
1976,p.107). 
Thus the red hordes sweeping through South Vietnam of the evening 
edition would by morning be the victorious army of Viet-Cong liberators. 
The political inconSistency of the paper was obvious to journalists, 
-print workers, and readers, and damaged the eredibility of the newspaper • 
• The colIDDitment of the paper was never clear or durable, though there 
would be surprising outbursts on particular issues. The editorial 
would have been more convincing if it was at least consistent; and 
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since it was supposedly a workers controlled newspper, a concerted 
support for the labour movement was a reasonable expectation which 
was never satisfied. Instead expressions of political commitment 
were fragmented and isolated: 
"The left of centre politics of the Scottish Daily News 
were sectionalized neatly into the top left of the leader 
and front pages, never being allowed to intrude into 
the features or sports pages where, it could scarcely be 
disputed, the examination of a football club which 
discriminates against Catholics, or the influence of 
entertainment entrepreneurs in shaping television, are 
intensely poli~ical and strongly interesting topics. This 
schizophrenic approach failed to appeal to the political 
reader, who resented the trivialization of ideas and ideals, 
. or to the apolitical, who saw the paper as weak-kneed and 
gauche. The much heralded breath of fresh air blowing 
through its pages had turned out to be a stale draught. 
The one section of the workforce which failed glaringly was 
the editorial. Never perhaps in British newspaper history 
have journalists been given unbridled freedom to come up 
with exactly the kind of new~aper they believed in written 
in a style to suit!h!! rather than a proprietor or the 
notional admass reader. What was produced was a blurred 
stereotype, tokenly including all the ingredients,but 
without the panache or moral fervour of its rivals." 
(MCKay and Barr, 1976, pp 163-4). 
The!E!presentedits conception of a campaigning newspaper in 
consumer protection: the tired 0f~ formula of following up indiv~ual 
readers grievances about products or services they had purchased. 
• 
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Sometimes the SDN achieved a successful resolution of the grievance 
from businessmen unwilling to face adverse publicity, however, 
rather than demonstrating the political efficacy of the newspaper it 
was a reminder of its impotence in affecting more general and critical 
issues such as industrial investment, housing, land ownership and 
poverty; and highlighted the feeble unwillingness of the editorial 
to report or engage in discussion on these issues. A traditional 
concern with individual consumer protection, was complemented by other 
'safe' humanitarian concerns such as animal welfare; for example in 
a highly emotive story on animal experiments at a Scottish research 
centre which dominated the front page of 16 June 1975. The torture 
of monkeys was certainly a legitimate focus for moral outrage, but it 
is regrettable that the SDN rarely managed to project such a confident 
sense of unbridled anger and condemnation ~hen considering the many 
tragic social and economic problems which afflicted people in Scotland. 
The ~ however, did have sufficient conviction to engage in 
some isolated political campaigns. The most significant perhaps, 
was the campaign against the European Economic Community. Launched 
exactly one month before the EEC referendum on 5 June 1975, the· 
Scottish Daily News was the only mass circulation newspaper in Britain 
to campaign vigorously for a 'no' vote. Almost the whole of the 
capitalist press, popular and quality, national and local, was solidly 
and uncritically~in favour of remaining in the market: 
"The whole press, with the exception of the Beaverbrook 
newspapers which hankered after the ghost of Empire Free 
Trade, was in favour of entry. Without a committed anti-
market quality paper, respectable and serious objections 
to the common market were limited to private discussions, 
academic seminars, Whitehall committee rooms and the 
activities of a few pamphleteers. So for all the millions 
of wor~s it attracted, the issue was not given a full public 
airing." (Hirsch and Gordon, 1975,p.18). 
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What dictated this uniformity of view on the EEC? Hirsch and Gordon 
convincingly argue that it was the commercial interests of the 
newspaper companies themselves, which decided their advocacy of 
the common market. The quality papers in particular saw the 
prospect of extending their readership to the English speaking mLddle 
class of Europe, and securing further lucrative advertising from the 
European based multi-national companies; thus advertisements placed 
by the FinanCial Times soliciting European readers and advertisers in 
1971, began: "The Financial Times has always been in favour of Britain 
joining the European Economic Community.'" As Hirsch "and Gordon 
conclude, "Much puzzlement has been expressed about the near unanimity c= 
the British press in favour of the common market even though public 
opinion at large was hostile ••••• But surely the interests of the 
newspaper business as such were important. Newspapers that sail their 
own prosperity bound up with common market entry doubtless found it 
easier to believe the same was true for everyone else." (l975,p.54) • 
A more immediate reason why the press was so enthusiastic about 
the EEC, was the amount of advertising revenue the pro-EEC referendUl"l 
campaign itself generated. The 'Britain in Europe' campaign had 
eleven times as much money to use for propaganda purposes as the 
'National Referendum' anti-market campaign. When the government 
grant of E125,000 to both sides is subtracted, the pro-marketeers 
had more than 100 times as much declared finance to use as the anti's. 
And the pro-marketeers money did not come from little old ladies, but 
from large private companies1 the majority in contributions of up to 
E25,000 from multi-national corporations, who privately conducted 
their own campaigns also. Shell, ICI, and GKN each gave E25,000 
to 'Britain in Europe'. Ford, Reed, IBM and Rank each gave E20,000 • 
• 
Interestingly, even a nationalised company Rolls Royce 1972 gave ElO,ooo 
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though the AUEW and the TGWU, who represented the majority of 
the companies' workforce were strongly opposed to the market. 
"They spent our money on their causes. And they will do it again, 
and again, as long as we let them." The pro-marketeers received 
£996,508 in contributions, the anti's £8,611. (Worker s Control, 
November 1975, pp5-7). As for the SDN, not only did it suffer by 
not attracting pro-market advertisements; but because it did not have 
audited circulation figures, since it had only just been launched, it 
was deprived of government funded advertising concerning the referendum. 
(Guardian, 5 June 1975). 
~h$ Daily News therefore bore a great responsibility as the only 
major British newspaper which advocated leaving the EEC, but the 
political editor, Andrew Hargrave, (previously Scottish correspondent 
of the Financial ~imes), often seemed to be fighting a solitary 
battle. Though he marshalled powerful arguments in favour of leavi~g 
the market, his stand was rarely supported in the rest of the paper. 
Stressing the importance of the Scottish Development Agency, he. 
maintained that Scotland's trade was far less EEC oriented than the 
rest of Britain's1 and that assistance in the regeneration of 
Scottish industry would not stem from the EEe which emphasised rules 
of competition and restricted regional and industrial aid. With the 
announcement of the majority vote in favour of remaining in the market, 
Bargreave provided some disconcerting predictions for the future of 
Scotland under the EEC: 
itA further concentration of wealth, political and economic 
power in the "Golden ~riangle" of London-Brussels-Frankiurt. 
This would only be mitigated but not reversed· by fringe 
moves such as regional aid and.social benefits. 
. . . 
A tendency 
by the UK Government to manipulate oil and gas revenues 
solely to wipe out foreign debts rather than use the proceeds 
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to revive the economies of the oil and gas-rich areas such 
as Scotland. An equally strong pull by the rest of the 
EEC to use North Sea oil and gas in support of a Community 
energy policy (including less dependence on Arab oil) 
rather than just the UK's". (16 June 1975). 
Therefore Hargrave concluded, it was vital that Scottish representatives 
exert what influence they could in Brussels, to prevent further 
decline of the Scottish economy. 
Just three days later, ~ policy on the Common Market seemed 
to undergo a profound shift. In an enthusiastic article Ted Whitehead 
proclaimed the benefits and opportunities of EEC membership: 
"From out of Europe in the past·24 hours since we made our 
decision to remain in the Common Market there have been 
expressions of satisfaction, relief, and unrestrained elation 
1 from the other eight member States. No wonder Britain's 
·contribution to the EEC is invaluable in the present 
international climate of economic, political and strategic 
uncertainty. As far as Europe is concerned, our decision 
could not come at a more opportune time. We can bring 
the solidarity, the political and social experience, our 
know-how and our sense of compromise and tolerance that 
could consolidate Europe into a third world Power." (19 June 1975). 
There followed a fawning and uncritical article which paid no attention 
to the previous anti-EEC stand of the ~,the undemocratic nature of 
the referendum capaign, or the strength of the arguments against membership 
which remained valid. The story read like a public relations report 
for the EEC. (Perhaps it was a public relations report of the EEC). 
1. (If the member states realised then that Britain was to subsidize 
the EEC budget by £1,000 per ann.~, there was good reason for 
elation.) . (Sunday Times, 25 November 1979). 
In ~~o days spent in Brussels, Mlitehead clearly had self-indulgently 
succumbed to the expensive and sophisticated EEC public relations 
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techniques. But the worst feature of the story was a pompous and absurd 
claim of the amount of influence Scottish politicians could exert 
upon the massive and immovable EEC establishment, and the role the 
~ could play: 
"This paper will keep a close watch, through our contacts, 
correspondents and myself in Brussels and Strasbourg on the 
workings of the Community as a whole. In this way we can 
alert the various agencies, industrialists and commercial 
interests here in Scotland to take full advantage of whatever 
situation will arise, and make sure that Scotland's interests 
are to the forefront." 
Andrew Hargrave quietly left the SDN, but Eric Tough was delighted by 
this conversion to the merits of the common market and warmly supported 
Whitehead's suggestion of a II 'European Action Desk' aimed at alerting 
Scottish Industry to the advantages of the EEC. II (General Managers 
Report, 2 July 1975,p.3). 
Another campaign the SDN mounted, was in defense of the Ladbrokes 
bookmakers office staff in Scotland, who took strike action in the summer 
of 1975 to secure recognition of the TGWU. John Hodgeman was pleased 
with this representation of workers fighting for fundamental trade union 
rights, "I'm glad with the coverage we're giving to trade union a~ects 
of stories, though we do give a hearing to other points of view. Other 
newspapers claim to do so, but I know from working on them that trade 
unionists comments are scythed out - they're allowed a maximum of one 
quote, whereas the bosses are allowed many". But a problem with presenting 
workers views instead of systematically censoring them, is that employers 
retaliate vehemently, as the ~ was soon to discover. As Nathan Goldberg 
said, "A lot of people think we bias stories because we're not afraid of 
the truth. Because we say 'the strikers said •••• something ••••• ' then 
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we're inciting them. Because we give a wee bit more to the union 
side then we're absolutely biased in our stories." Thus Ladbrokes 
threatened legal action over an article in the SDN which quoted strikers 
as saying that the firm were planning to bring in strike breakers from 
England. (A month before workers from England had been turned back 
by Scots pickets.) Surprisingly, the ~ proudly stood its ground: 
"We are happy to announce that Ladbrokes claim they have no 
intention of bringing in strike breakers. We are not publishing 
this because the company has threatened us with the law. This 
newspaper has always maintained that our readership comes 
first and any story in the public interest will be printed. It 
is in the interests of fairness that we report Ladbrokes comments. 
But we are still unhappy as are the Transport Union, many MPs 
and councillors at the way 300 workers are being treated. 
These men and women are still out on the streets 'fighting to 
defend what is a basic right in this society •••• to fo~ a trade 
union. This disgraceful situation is not simply a matter 
of labour relations. It is a case of defending the dignity 
of people at work. Ladbrokes can wring their hands in London~ 
claiming that these people are technically no longer on strike 
because they are sacked. But we say that Ladbrokes must realise 
that they cannot turn the clock back to before the Tolpuddle 
Martyrs and that the people of this country will not tolerate 
such treatment whether it comes from London or Glasgow." 
(17 July 1975). Though this campaign may be regarded as the 
SON's finest hour, defending the right to join a trade union 
1s hardly at the forefront of political radicalism, and yet the 
response of advertisers was swift and severe. Under intense 
pressure, Eric Tough despaired at what· were in fact solitary 
attempts to protect workers interests by the SON: 
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"I offered free half-pages to major advertisers. And the 
reaction \'1as "If I want to kill my bloody product I'll 
advertise in your newspaper." We gained a reputation very 
fast. In our first six weeks we had nine dud front pages. 
Highly emotive, left-wing front pages. And then the 
Ladbroke's thing. That killed us, crucified us. Two 
national advertisers phoned me and said that their industries 
were extremely sensltive to strikes. One said, "If your 
newspaper is going to back strikers just because they're 
strikers then the sooner your paper's dead the better. I'm 
not going to keep alive a newspaper which, the first time I 
get a strike, will back the strikers irrespective of my 
problems." (McKay and Barr, 1976,p.I08). 
A final campaign of the "SON was to consistently back Tony Benn 
in the struggle to preserve the Wilson government's commitment to the 
Labour manifesto of 1974. Many of the radical stands of theSDN on 
the EEC, on industry, and other government policies, were influenced 
by the position which Benn adopted, though there is not a trace of 
evidence that Benn ever attempted to suggest editorial policy to ~e 
newspaper. When Benn was forced to move from the Industry Department 
to Energy in June 1975, the"~ was deeply distressed, and reported on 
the front page the reasons for the move, including the explanation of 
Judith Hart who had also been sacked: 
wThe City, the CBI and the Conservative Party have served 
notice on the Government that it must sacrifice the industrial 
policies upon which it was elected, in the shaping of which 
I played some part within my party. It is a radical policy, 
but it is a relevant policy. Socialism must always be relevant 
to the problems of our nation and our people. If the 
Government seeks to solve them by capitalist methods, and 
abandons its SOCialist policies, it will fail to solve the 
economic crisis and it will betray the Labour Movement. 
Every Minister involved at every stage of the work on the 
Industry Bill has been displaced. I cannot disregard the 
significance of that." (12 June 1975). 
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For some at the ~ the experience of the economic and social decline 
of Scotland had convinced them of the need for radical intervention 
to regenerate industry as advocated in the original proposals of the 
Industry Bill. For many others, support for Benn's policies jarred 
with their more conservative views on most other issues, and seemed to 
be largely a gesture of gratitude for Benn's rescue of the newspaper, 
and a transference of deferential loyalty from the mighty Beaverbrook 
to Benn; which was readily switched to Robert Maxwell in the last 
months of the paper, when he appeared a potential saviour. 
The Greatest Stories Never Told. 
The muted and inconsistent politics of the ~ editorial, and 
few critical stories that emerged, gave the impression that there was 
little to write about besides trivia.· In the long hot summer of 1975 
particularly, the ~ succumbed to the editorial doldrums that seem to 
affect all of the contemporary commercial press. This lack of 
inspiration about what to say was not only an insult to the struggle 
to create the paper, but, more seriously, was a rejection of the 
responsibility to reveal the true dimensions of Scotland's social and 
economic problems, to explore the causes of these problems, and to assist 
those who were trying to fight them. The SDN wasted the chance to 
break out of the enormous complacency, institutionalized ignorance, 
moral ambivalence and systematic inhibition of radical editorial which 
buried the insight of the capitalist press, and to publish the stories 
that were never told. f 
419 
Scotland has a sad history, which rivals its Celtic neighbour 
Ireland, in the depths of human tragedy its people have endured. 
Colonization and clearances, the empire and emigration, the depopulation 
of the highlands and the decline of industry, have left a bitter legacy 
of acute social and economic inequality, poverty and unemployment: 
the vast privilege of a few, contrasting with widespread social 
despair and destitution - a land still stamped heavily with the mark 
of feudalism. The SDN journalists had eyes to see this all around 
them, but if their own imaginations failed, there was available a 
growing body of radical literature, which they could h~ve used to build 
their stories from. In 1973 and 1974 Scottish theatre had been set 
alight by the work of the 7:84 theatre company, particularly by their 
performances of John McGrath's play, The Cheviot, The Stag, and the 
Black, Black Oil (1974), which described in the form of a Highland 
ceilidh the exploitation of the Highlands by the Scottish aristocracy 
and wealthy English, and the oppression of the crofters. In the 
summer of 1975 a socialist symposium, The Red Paper on Scotland was 
published, edited by Gordon Brown, the' Edinburgh University student 
rector. This work soon hit the best-seller lists, and contained twenty-
eight forceful articles on economicand.social problems, industry, oil~ 
and land, written by academics, but also trade unionists and political 
activists. In particular the article of John McEwen on land ownership, 
which was later followed by a book, Who Owns Scotland? (n.d.), was 
rivetting reading. This symposium could have stimulated dozens of 
colourful and relevant stories in the ~ on the plight of Scotland, but was 
almost ignored by the newspaper. Finally, during these years, there 
had been a mushrooming of critical literature and thought in Scotland, 
reflected in journals such as Calgacus and Ne~ Edinburgh Review, which 
covered politics, current affairs, history and the arts; and in a 
flurry of alternative grassroots newspapers, especially the impressive 
west Highlands Free Press. The ~ could have been a channel through 
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which such literature was made accessible to an infinitely wider 
audience than was reached by academic journals; and the SDN 
could have used the alternative press as a source of important 
investigative stories, to which it could have added the impact of 
national coverage. As Brown insisted, "The early Scottish 
socialists believed that the bridge between their ut09ian ideals and 
the practical politics under which people suffered must be built in a 
massive programme of education and propaganda. Today in Scotland 
we have no daily or weekly specifically Scottish political newspapers, no 
socialist bookclub, no socialist labour college, no workers university, 
and only a handful of socialist magazines and pamphlets. We need all 
of these now." The Scottish Daily News could have provided a major 
contribution to bridging this critical separation between socialist ideas 
and workers experiences. Instead, the ~ concerned itself with 
showbiz and sporting gossip, and other mindless irrelevancies. 
TO argue that the readers of a popular newspaper want to be entertainec, 
not educated, want to be amused and made to feel comfortable, not aroused 
into discontent and struggle, is the stock answer of the capitalist 
press to complaints about the shallowness of their editorial. This 
argument ignores that wo~kers papers in the past have rivalled the quality 
press in their depth of analysis (and that this is by no means incompatible 
with humour); is a calculated insult to the intelligence and literacy 
of workers; a manipulative effort to divert and undermine protest; and 
greatly underestimates the depth of commitment of workers to alleviate 
the problems they are faced with, and how the achievement of improvements 
might present a more significant and enduring contribution to the 
happiness of workers than the entertainment offered by the popular press. 
It might help to show this by briefly examining some of the issues the 
SON badly neglected. 
In an industry in which yesterdaY'snews is obsolete and worthless, 
history is not highly regarded: except for occasional nostalgic 
• 
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excursions into the glory of the Empire, or stirring accounts of 
heroism in the First and Second World Wars, capitalist newspapers 
prefer to forget about history. And- yet it is only by considering 
Scotland's past, that the contemporary predicament of an abused 
country can be properly understood. For the bloody colonization of 
Scotland by England was achieved with the willing compliance of the 
Scottish aristocracy and the emerging scottish capitalist class: 
"During the prolonged era of Anglo-Scots imperialist expansion, the 
Scottish ruling order found that it had given up statehood for a hugely 
profitable junior partnership in the New Rome." (Nairn,l975,p.24). 
The bitter irony of the English military occupation of Scotland, was 
that Scotland itself served as a major source of the regiments which were 
used to suppress the peoples of the growing British Empire. Prebble 
has accounted in heart-rending detail the betrayal of the Highland foot 
soldiers by their chiefs, who sold them off for service in distant lands: 
"In the years following the last Jacobite rebellion the 
Government had raised ten marching regiments in the mountains, 
twelve thousand men, and had deplo~ed them bloodily in Europe, 
India and North America. Between 1757 and 1763 more 
Highlanders wore the King's red coat and the King's black tartan 
than ever followed the last Stuart prince. This early exercise 
in the military use of a subjected people, to be consciously 
or unconsciously copied later in the similar employment of 
defeated Sikhs or Baluchis, had diverted the warrior zeal 
of the clans into the service of an authority they had 
instintively resisted for centuries, and while their spirits 
were still numb with despair. The young men of these regiments 
were also hostages for the good behaviour of their kinsmen, and 
their valour on distant battlefields had solaced their fathers' 
f 
bitterness. The use that might be made of Highlanders in 
the King's wars had been recognised by some English officers 
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who faced their furious charge at Falkirk or Culloden. 
Soldiers must die in battles, and where else in the kingdom 
were there men whose courage could be better employed, and 
whose death would be the least regretted? An early 
enthusiast was Major James Wolfe he said, "They are 
hardy, intrepid, accustom'd to a rough Country, and no 
great mischief if they fall. How can you better employ 
a secret enemy than by making his end conducive to the 
common good?" (1977,pp 93-4). 
The social and economic structure of t~e Highlands.was systematically 
torn apart by the enforced dispersal of the clans, the continuous 
bleeding of the population for soldiers and emigrants, and the establishment 
of a rack-renting crofting system without security of tenure, by 
which the chiefs attempted to increase their income to English 
standards. (Foster, 1975,p.147). But the explOitation and depopulaeion 
of the Highlands was savagely accelerated during the Clearances which 
began at the end of the eighteenth century when the Scottish peasantry 
were brutally evicted from their crofts by the landlords, to make 
place for the more profitable Cheviot sheep: "Once cleared of men, 
a laird's land could be leased to Lowland graziers and his fortunes 
assured, his debts paid and his southern fancies indulged." 
(Prebble,l977,p.263). Under the name of 'Improvement', hundreds of 
thousands of.people were stripped of both their homes and their livelihoods 
and forced out of the mountains and valleys and into the manufacturing 
towns. Later in the nineteenth century, the vicious process was 
repeated, motivated by destructive and irresponsible greed, to lay the 
land waste for the stag. (McGrath, 1974). Humanity was driven from 
-the Highlands. 
f 
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Karl Marx in a chapter of Capital on 'The Expropriation of the 
Agricultural Population from the Land', examined the Highland 
clearances as the extreme instance of expropriation of communal land 
by aristocratic embezzlement: 
"The Highland Celts were organized in clans, each of 
which was the owner of the land on which it was settled. 
The representative of the clan, its chief or 'great man', 
was only the titular owner of this property, just as the 
Queen of England is the titular owner of all the national 
soil. When the English government succeeded in suppressing 
the intestine wars of these 'great men', and their constant 
incursions into the Lowland plains, the chiefs of the clans 
by no means gave up their time-honoured trade as robbers; 
they merely changed its form. On their own authority, they 
transformed their nominal right to the land into a right of 
private property, and as this came up against resistance on 
the part of their clansmen, they resolved to drive them out 
openly, and by force. 'A king of England might as well claim 
to drive his subjects into the sea.'" (1976,p.890). 
Marx pointed to the example of the Duchess of Sutherland, who between 
1814 and 1820 'hunted and rooted out' the 15,000 inhabitants of the 
county of Sutherland, to replace them with13l,000 sheep roaming a desert: 
"All the~r villages were destroyed and burnt, all their fields 
turned into pasturage. British soldiers enforced this mass 
of evictions, and came to blows with the inhabitants. One 
old woman was burnt to death in the flames of the hut she 
refused to leave. It was in this manner that this fine lady 
(the Duchess) appropriated 794,000 acres of land which had 
belonged to the clan from time ~mm~oria1. She assigned to 
the expelled inhabitants some 6,000 acres on the sea-shore -
2 acres per family. The 6,000 acres had until this time lain 
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waste, and brought in no income to their owners. The Duchess, 
in the nobility of her heart, actually went so far as to let 
these waste lands at an average rent of 2s 6d per acre to the 
clansmen, who for centuries had shed their blood for her 
family." (1976,pp 891-2). 
(When the new Duchess of Sutherland lavishly entertained the author of 
Uncle Tom's Cabin to show her sympathy for the bl~ck slaves in 
North America, Marx sent the details of the 'Sutherland slaves' to the 
New York Tribune; the article was reprinted in a Scottish newspaper 
and began a polemic between the newspaper and the sycophants of the 
Suther lands) ! 
The legacy of this expropriation is the present desolation of 
the Scottish Highlands. A combination of neglect and deliberate 
misuse of land by the landlords has reduced both crofting and farming 
counties into a barren wilderness. John McEwen spent sixty years as 
a working forester, in the effort to restore the forests of Scotland 
in the face of aristocratic negligence, and has provided a catalogue of 
the landlords misdeeds: 
"First, the inadequate husbandry in agriculture sticks 
out a mile, particularly in the huge area of their 10,000,000 
acres of rough grazings - it always has been so and still is. 
Secondly, in forestry with their 200/300 years practice I 
have not seen a single private estate with well managed 
woodlands: so very different from the excellent silviculture 
found allover Scotland in our state forests with only 50 
odd years experience behind them. Thirdly, the sadistic 
obsession with game resulting in the almost complete degradation 
of millions of acres of land." _~n.d.,p.7). 
The scale of this problem is only appreciated when it is realised that 
large private estates own most of Scottish land: in a population of 
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5 million, only 1,739 estates account for two thirds of the total 
land area. 
Scottish Land. 
Private Estates Down to 1,000 1,739 Estates 
Private Estates Under 1,000 
State Owned Land (Forestry Commission, Dept. of 
Agriculture, etc.) 
Total Land Area of Scotland ... 
(Source: McEwen n.d., pp 17,88). 
12,030,300 acres 
4,500,000 acres 
2,500,000 acres 
19,068,807 acres. 
Feudal lairds, earls and dukes, multi-national companies, tobacco, 
beer and whisky magnates, financiers, retired generals, Tory politians 
foreign businessmen, and others who are scarcely a representative 
sample of the Scottish people have control of vast areas of Scottish land 
which they use to indulge their own pleasures. To look just at the 
pinnacle of this rotten privilege: 
Table 17 Landlordism in Scotland: The Top 15 Landowners. (1970). 
owners Estates ' 'Acres 
I 
Duke of Buccleuch Buccleuch Estates 277,000 
Wills Family Wills Estates 263,000 
Lord Seafield Seafield Estates 185,000 
Countess of Sutherland Sutherland Estates 158,000 
Duke of Atholl Atholl Estates 130,000 
Capt. A.A.C. Far~arson Invercauld Estates 119,000 
Duke of Wes~nster Westminster Estates 113,000 
British Aluminium Ltd British Aluminium Estates 110,000 
Lord Stair Stair Estates 110,000 
Sir D. Cameron Lochiel E~tates 98,000 
Duke of Roxburgh Roxburgh Estates 96,000 
OWners 
E.H.Vestey 
S.Vist Estates Ltd 
j~rd Cowdr ay 
Liberton Properties 
Ltd. 
. Estates 
vestey Estates 
S.Vist Estates 
Cowdray Estates 
Big House Estates 
Vig Crofters Estates. 
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Acres 
93,000 
92,000 
88,000 
85,000 
It would be difficult to exaggerate t.he remoteness of the landlord class: 
for example, six major estates own 45% of the land on the island of 
Mull, "Superimposed on the island's remants of Gaelic-speaking people 
is an· upper-class social hierarchy: the titled, landowning and officer 
class". The principal private landlord is Viscount Masserene, whose 
precise identity was unknown to some of the islanders, since he seldom 
visited the island: "John Glotworthy Talbot Foster Whyte-Melville 
Skeffington, of Chiltham Castle, Kent; Clotworthy House, County Antrim; 
and Knock, Isle of Mulliis no ordinary mortal. An Old Etonian, ex-officer 
in the Blackwatch, a Freeman of the City of London, a member of the 
Worshipful Company of Shipwrights and a director of several public and privatl 
companies, a former Whip of the Tory Peers in the House of Lords and the 
man who introduced the 1963 Deer Act" Another laird Lord Strathcona 
is the sole employer on the island of Colonsay, and in 1966 decided 
to sack all of his 14 employees. Four years later he tried to ban all 
campers from the island.. Lord and Lady Strathcona have a home in Bath, 
11 Somerset, yet on Colonsay ..... apart from the church, the tiny school 
and the county council pier, the rest is theirs: every acre, every croft, 
the island faxm, the island store, the island inn - the lot." 
(Calqacus, Summer 1975, pp 40-41) • 
Confined to infertile patches of land the crofters numbers gradually 
depleted, until in desperation they revolted against their servile 
status. In 1882 the Highland Land League was formed, and in 1884 the 
Scottish Land Restoration League. In 1885 five crofters MP's were 
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elected to Parliament and a year later the Crofters Commission was 
set up, rents and arrears were reduced, and tenure guaranteed. The 
Landlords retaliated with writs ~or eviction, and 
crofters leaders were hunted like game. In a continuing struggle 
the crofters carried out land raids in the effort to stave off total 
extinction of the human population: a fate which befell many of the 
islands which are now uninhabited, and large tracts of the northern 
crofting counties. 
Private landlords in the Highlands neglect their land so badly 
that two thirds is entirely unproductive, whilst the one third that is 
productive is badly managed. The important contribution the Highlands 
could make to the British timber industry is squandered, and the 
Forestry Gommission had to be set up after the First World War when ships,whic~ 
could have been used to import grain for the hungry population of Britain, 
were diverted for importing timber. Yet much of the Forestry Commission's 
work consists of providing public incentives to private landlords, which 
combined with tax concessions, is the only way the landlords can be 
induced to plant anything: in April 1977 planting grants were more than 
doubled from·E18 per acre to E40.50 per acre, with the added inducement 
of E3 per acre per annum management grant. (McEwen, n.d., pp 90-95). 
Landlords stop crofters from developing the potential of the land with 
the threat of eviction: they prevent hill ploughing, or any increase 
in crops or husbandry; while themselves fencing off good grass to allow 
the return of the heather to encourage game. Land which could support 
thriv.inq communities is made waste for the grouse and the stag. Even 
some landlords are embarassed by this systematic vandalism, one body, the 
'Highland Forum', admitted, n •••• it was thought undesirable that so 
many owners still looked upon their land as a sporting playground for 
their own selfish amusement, and that this often meant misuse of the land 
itself in order to make it a better wilderness for wild life. 
ownership should b~ deemed a trust and where the owner cannot see this, the 
Government should forcibly intervene". (McEwen, n.d., pp 104-112). 
• 
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Yet the Highlands and Islands Development Board established 
in 1965 to restore the economy of the north of Scotland, has chosen 
not to exercise the limited powers it possessed, but to work within 
the constraints of the existing ownership of land: "By thus 
accepting the extraordinarily inequitable landholding structure of 
the Highlands the HIDB has reinforced the political and economic 
power of the great capitalist landlords who form the Highland bourgeoisie". 
(Carter, 1975, p.251). Socialists in the Highlands realise the urgent 
importance of public ownership and control: 
"We assert that the land of Scotland is the natural inheritance 
of the people of Scotland. Private ownership of land is 
a medieval concept, designed to ensure the dominance of a 
self-perpetuating oligarchy. It is an affront to reason 
for a private individual to claim ownership of mountains, 
lochs, and rivers." (McEwen, n.d., p.127). 
The·Scottish Daily News could have played a vital part in 
publicising in graphic detail the eno~mity of the social injustice 
and economic waste entailed in the present Highland landlordism. Yet 
the paper relegated the problem to a few small articles, as did other. 
newspapers. Probably editorial staff at the SON would have regarded 
it as somewhat disreputable to attack the pillars of the Scottish 
establishment, (some of whom they had circulated, completely in vain, 
with requests for investment in the·SDN), though no other authority 
than Ramsay MacDonald had eloquently beseeched just such an injunction: 
·Show the people that our Old Nobility is not noble, that 
its lands are stolen lands - stolen whether by force or 
fraud; show people that the title deeds are rapine, murder, 
massacre, cheating or Court Harlotry; 
f 
dissolve the halo 
of divinity that surrounds the hereditary title, let the 
people clearly understand that our present House of Lords 
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is composed largely of descendents of successful 
pirates and rogues; do these things and you shatter 
the Romance that keeps the nation numb and spellbound 
while privilege picks its pockets." (Foreword to 
T. Johnston, Our Scots Noble Families, 1913). 
The feudal exploitation of Scotland's past was the foundation 
of the contemporary problems of a ravaged country and people. Feudal 
interests were central to the early industrialization of Scotland: the 
Clearances were intended not stmply to clear the land but to provide 
labour for the mills and factories. "In the eighteenth"century the Gaels 
were both driven from the land and forbidden to emigrate with a view 
to driving them forcibly to Glasgow and other manufacturing towns." 
(Marx, 1976,pp 890-1). The coal reserves of the great private estates 
of Fife and Lanark and other countries of the central industrial area 
were recklessly plundered by their aristocratic owners who left behind 
slag heaps of human misery and environmental decay, while the Balfours, 
Weymss, Morays, Buccleuchs, Hamiltons and Homes used their enhanced 
wealth to ensure they remained at the heart of the British ruling class. 
(McEwen, n.d., pp 62-72). The development of Scottish industry, 
to compensate for its disadvantage in the internal market, was geared 
to production for the empire, and its success was therefore based on 
the expansion of British tmperialism and militarism, as Gollan maintained: 
"When textiles ••• started to give way, first to coal and 
iron and then later to steel, shipbuilding, engineering and 
railways, the pattern of modern Scotland was laid. 
part and parcel of the British imperialist system. 
It was 
Scotsmen 
were enlisted as lieutenants in the exploitation of the 
colonies and returned with their share of- the booty. OUt 
of all this came the Midland industrial belt, the tenements, 
the slums, the squalid towns •••• " (Quoted in Foster,l975,p.l48). 
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The Scottish people evicted from the Highlands, and the Irish 
fleeing from famine in their native country were thro~~ together in 
this process but were not passive recipients of their own and 
others' oppression, as the Land Leaguers fought the lairds, workers 
organized in resistance to the capitalists. From the beginning there 
was an emphasis on heavy industry in Scotland, with large mines, forges, 
factories and shipyards employing thousands of workers, and creating the 
classic conditions for socialist revolution presented in the Manifesto 
of the communist party by Marx and Engels: large concentrations of 
capital collecting together huge numbers of wage labourers, in order 
to further augment capital, but in the process involuntarily promoting 
the revolutionary combination that would ultimately lead to the political 
downfall of capitalism. Thus the industrial belt of Scotland was 
at the forefront of the development of trade unionism and socialism in 
Britain. The Scottish working class produced many socialist leaders 
who possessed a unique combination of intellectual training and ability, 
revolutionary passion and industrial experience. Though Scottish 
workers remained, for most of the time, captured by the Liberal Party 
and later the Labour Party, when the occasion demanded - despite the 
hurdle of deep religious differences - they showed a capacity to 
mobilize massive political dissent. Successive governments reasonably 
feared the possibility of revolt On Red Clydeside, since if revolution 
was to come to Britain, it would begin there. 
The climax of this struggle on the Clyde occurred in the decade 
1910-20. The doctrines of industrial unionism and revolutionary 
syndicalism were widely propagated by the SOCialist Labour Party 
'and the British Socialist Party, and ignited with the industrial militancY 
of engineering workshop craft unionism. (Hinton,1973) • With the 
onslaught of the First World War it w~s the Clyde shop stewards movement 
that first practicallY,challenged the employers profiteering from the 
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industrial war effort at the expense of working people. The 
Clyde Workers Connnittee w.as born out of a strike for a two pence 
per hour increase in 1915, and developed with the rent strikes in 
the tenements of Glasgow later in that year, as munitions workers 
joined with housewives in protest at the rent increases imposed by the 
slum landlords. In July 1915 the government passed the Munitions 
Act which'erected the scaffolding of industrial slavery' by making 
industrial action illegal in the war industries; but Lloyd George's 
effort to persuade Clyde workers of the virtues of dilution of labour 
in December 1915 failed when he was met with open derision, demands 
for nationalization and a rousing chorus of the Red Flag. A Conscription 
Bill early in 1916 failed to halt the opposition to dilution expressed 
in a wave of strikes and solidarity action throughout Clydeside. In 
March the leading shop stewards in the Clyde Workers Committee were 
arrested and some were imprisoned, while others deported to engineering 
districts in England, which served to extend the shop stewards movement, 
and helped to organize the May 1917 strike of 200,000 engineering workers. 
The Russian revolution reverberated through Clydeside, and John MacLean 
two months after he was appointed Soviet Consul for Scotland, was 
arrested for disseminating anti-war sentiment and advocating revolution. 
As workers demonstrated outside for his release, MacLean made an 
impassioned denouncement of capitalism in court. (1978). Finally at the 
end of January 1919, in an attempt to prevent post-war mass unemployment, 
Glasgow shop stewar~s called a general strike to fight for a reduction 
in the working week to forty hours. The response to the call was 
.overwhelming, but as thirty thousand workers awaited a reply from the 
government in George Square, they received a response in a brutal attack 
by the police, and the armed occupati~n of Glasgow by the military. In 
the face of state repression, and victimization by the national engineering 
union leadership., the strike collapsed. Though Scottish socialists had 
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failed to achieve revolutionary change in Scotland, they continued 
to play a central role in the British labour movement in the defensive 
struggles of the inter-war years, in the formation of the Communist 
Party (Gallacher,l978); and in National Unemployed Workers Movement. 
(McShane, 1978). Until the present day Clydeside has remained a 
socialist stronghold, almost regardless of the political complexion 
and variability of most of Britain. 
The economic decline following the First World War weakened the 
labour movement, and sharply revealed the imbalance of the Scottish 
economy. As overseas markets for heavy engineering dried up, new 
industries and technologies were sited in the Midlands and South East of 
England, and Scotland's heavy industry was sustained merely at the 
level to permit a rapid rearmament programme, which if based further south 
may have disrupted the labour supply of the flourishing consumer goods 
industries. Nor did Scotland fare any better with the introduction of 
state capitalist planning after 1945: 
"This now operated in near full employment conditions 
through direct investment subsidies and the manipulation of 
consumer demand in favour of big monopoly producers. As 
such, the new system positively needed a periphery of 
unemployment regions to enable the monopolies to escape from 
the overheating pressures at the centre (and the persistence 
with which post-war governments have resisted demands for 
effective regional policies - that is the establishment of 
new, state owned industry - would seem to indicate that they 
were quite aware of this). (Foster,1975,p.l49). 
The result is that Scotland has become a peripheral, colonized, economy. 
As domestic industries have withered, the only solution attempted has been 
the encouragement of foreign capital, that provides merely temporary 
support and creates a dependent and highly vulnerable relationship. 
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The most startling feature of the colonization of the Scottish 
economy is the extent of external control: in 1973 almost sixty per 
cent of employment in manufacturing industry was in plants where 
ultimate control lay outside Scotland. Scotland had the largest 
amount of united States investment per capita of any country in the 
world after Canada in the 1970s (and double that of the rest of the UK) • 
Large plants dominate the Scottish economy, 110 enterprises accounted 
for 46\ of total manufacturing employment in 1973, and the larger 
the enterprise the more likely it was to be controlled externally, often 
as a subsidiary branch of a multi-national corporation. Finally, 
in the fastest growing sectors of the economy there was the lowest 
participation of Scottish capital, and in the five fastest growing 
sectors - including instrument engineering, chemicals, and electrical 
engineering - Scottish capital accounted for only l3~5\ of total 
employment. (Firn,l975,pp l53-l63) • Whilst the arrival of large 
amounts of capital from England, the United States, and other countries, 
created much needed employment in Scotland, often in new industries, it 
was accompanied by conditions which imposed a dependent status upon 
the Scottish economy. Subsidiary branches of large companies are 
dependent upon the central administration for allocation of investment, 
markets and products, research and development is centralized and 
the newest technologies adopted at the major plants, subsidiaries being 
confined to routine manufacturing. Administrative and technical 
speCialists have to leave regional subsidiaries, and semi-skilled 
assembly work arrives in return. Most damagingly of all, multi-national 
corporations trade within themselves to the disadvantage of regional 
subsidiaries: thus raw materials and plant are purchased outside 
Scotland, product~ manufactured at the subsidiary sold in Scotland, and 
then the balance remited to the parent company in the form of interest, 
profit and dividends. (Firn,1975,pp 164-5). Finally it is easier to 
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expand or contract regional branch plants than it is the parent 
company, in response to competitive pressures, so employment proves 
highly volatile as world demand, or the companies market share, increases 
or decreases, (a process illustrated by the closure of Albion Street 
itself by Beaverbrook) • (Niven,l975,p.2l5-6). Due to its dependent 
position the Scottish economy, as with the other regions, is the first 
to suffer and the last to recover, as multi-nationals subordinate their 
operations in peripheral areas like Scotland to central corporate 
strategies: 
-Indeed, it is becoming difficult to talk meaningfully of a 
distinct 'Scottish Economy' except in a strict geographical 
sense ••••• the eld trading ties between Scottish companies 
and their overseas customers are steadily being replaced 
by more sophisticated and largely unchartered relationships 
lying within multi-national companies. This in turn 
raises very substantial problems for those trying to produce 
estimates of the Scottish balances of trade and payments, 
in that intra-company flows. of goods, services and payments -
e~cially if accompanied by such as transfer pricinq of 
imports and exports - may well distort the actual flows.-
(Firn,l975,p.l65). 
Whilst multi-national capital made serious inroads into the 
Scottish economy, Scottish capital made excursions in the opposite 
dir.ection. The financial institutions in Scotland are even more powerful 
than in other economies, and a small hiqhly inter-connected number of 
executives and directors, drawn from the ranks of accountants and 
solicitors, and representative of the Scottish upper class, dominate 
the •• institutions. There are in~te links between the directors 
of the Scottish financial institutions, and English, foreign, and 
multi-national firms: 
-Scotland's interior bourgeoisie is in a nte11ite 
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position with respect to metropolitan capital and this structure of 
relations determines the direction and purpose of 'autonomous' 
scottish capital.- (Scott and Hughes, 1975,p.l78). Thus the 
prevailing economic structure determines that Scottish capital will 
be allocated in accordance with the requirements of international 
capital as opposed to 'national' interests. It is at this point 
that what John McGrath terms the 'intellectual woolliness and moral 
evasiveness' of the Scottish National Party becomes most transparent, 
for "it is evident that a more autonomous Scottish region or nation 
state would remain in a dependent relationship with England - since the 
purely Scottish element of the economy is dominated by internationalized 
capital,. which recognizes no mere political or territorial lines drawn on 
a map." (Scott and Hughes, 1975,p.183). 
If devolution occurred Scotland would remain a capitalist society which 
would perpetuate the existing chronic social, political and economic 
inequalities. 
Indeed the oil-fired enthusiasm for the Scottish National Party 
in the early 1970s was particularly shallow since it rested upon 
controlling the North Sea oil business: "the largest, most aggressive, 
and most international form of capitalism in the world," (Nairn,1975,p.22); 
something which the British government itself had proved singularly 
incapable of doing. By 1975 it was clear that due to the failure 
to develop oil related industries in Scotland, at peak expansion the 
Oil. industry would only employ 30,000 people, the equivalent of the 
average yearly loss of jobs in primary and manufacturing industries; which 
meant that 250,000 new jobs would have to be found by the mid-1980s. 
(Brown,1975,p.12). Moreover the persuasive tactics of the oil 
multinationals meant that huge tax c9~cessions, incredible tax loopholes, 
and ludicrously cheap offshore oil concessions were engineered from 
auccessive naive and willing governments, which destroyed the potential 
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contribution the oil industry could have made to state sponsored 
industrial development. (Taylor, 1975, p.272). The result was 
that the reduced revenue from oil would be short sightedly used to help 
balance existing public deficits. Though motivated by a heady 
combination of idealism and avarice, it was highly unlikely that 
the disaffected petty bourgeois leadership of the SNP would be capable 
of securing better terms from the oil companies; a view perhaps 
endorsed by the collapse of the SNP vote in the general election of 1979, 
when the disappointing realities of the 'oil boom' became apparent. 
If the SNP could offer only hollow promises, the interventionist 
regional policies of successive Labour Governments in practice have 
failed to overcome the disastrous effects of the uneven and uncontrolled 
deve1opmen.t of capitalism. Unemployment in Scotland has persistently 
reached twice the national average in the post-war period. Mass 
emigration and migration, amounting to a net loss of 380,000 people 
during this period, has disguised the real level of unemployment. At 
a time of world recession, in Scotland, even the 'growth' industries are 
declining. (Niven,l97S). And yet due to the extent of nationalized 
industry in Scotland, a disproportionately high number of workers are 
dependent on the public sector for a job. Far from providing more 
secure and meaningful employment, the state industries have disillusioned 
workers by subjecting them to the vagaries of market forces, and making 
workers pay the penalty for the previous lack of investment and 
management incompetence. Workers in the rail, coal, steel, shipbuilding, 
and ~ar industry have been victims of a spiral of decline which has 
seriously weakened their confidence in public ownership. Nor has 
reformist intervention halted the steady decline in other basic resources 
in Scotland, in housing, schools, health and social services. 
has accurately depicted the dilemma: 
Brown 
• 
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"the long standing paradox of Scottish politics has been 
the surging forward of working class industrial and 
political pressure (and in particular the loyal support 
given to Labour) and its containment through the accumulative 
failures of successive Labour Governments. More than 
fifty years ago socialism was a qualitative concept, an 
urgently felt moral imperative, about social control (and 
not merely state control or more or less equality). Today 
for many it means little more than a scheme for compensating 
the least fortunate in an unequal society." (1975,p.8) • 
The capitalist press has made no sustained attempt to consider 
the seriousness of the economic and social problems which confront 
the Scottish working class. An important part of the explana tion 
for this dereliction of responsibility is that the capitalist press 
is owned by the very companies whose activities have undermined 
systematic ally the Scottish economy. This sybiotic relationship 
is particularly crucial in the case of the oil industry: "Oil is 
at the same time the most significant contemporary development in the 
British economy and the main source of spare wealth which proprietors 
may be prepared to spend on newspapers. There is a danger that the 
exploitation of Britain's oil reserves will become the most important 
story which ,cannot be told. Oil companies'motives for involving 
themselves in ailing British newspapers may not be as philanthropically 
disinterested as they appear, and there is no reason why the problem 
should stop with oil." (Elliot, 1978,p 163). As Hirsch and Gordon 
point out, the acquisition of corporate interests in oil is not a basis 
for critical analysis, as in the case of the.Thomson Organization 
which owns The Times, The Sunday Times~ and The Scotsman: 
• 
"In 1974, 
Thomson Scottish Associates borrowed the vast sum of E50 million to 
pay for its share of the explOitation of the oil. The main security 
438 
given to the bankers was the oil itself, but if everything went 
disastrously wrong, the bankers would have call on Thomson Scottish 
Associates' other asset - The Thomson Organization. Thus, indirectly, 
The Times and The Sunday Times are pledged to North Sea oil. If 
the oil is duly profitable, then the newspapers will have a guaranteed 
cross-subsidy; if it is a disaster, then they would in theory be 
liable to be put up for sale by the bankers. Not exactly conducive 
to a clear-sighted editorial view on North Sea Oil." (l975,p.80). 
In contrast the Scottish Dailr News, briefly at least, had a 
unique opportunity to be the champion of the interests of the Scottish 
worki"ng class; to record the lessons of the years of struggle by 
the labour movement against capital; to present a penetrating 
economic analysis, unencumbered by corporate dependency; and to offer 
challenging political policies, free of the vested interests and privilege 
of the Labour establishment. But tragically, the SDN absorbed 
itself with sentimental reminiscences about tramcars, devoted pieces on 
gardening, and cliche-ridden reaction on 'law and order'. 
The Tabloid Relaunch 
As sales of the Scottish Daily News steadily declined through the 
summer of 1975 it was clear that the tired old broadsheet editorial, 
which owed a great deal more to the tradition of Lord Beaverbrook than 
Keir Hardie, had failed to sustain readers interest. The tabloid 
relaunch, planned for 18 August, provided a last opportunity to explore 
fresh editorial horizons. Preliminary investigations by System Three, 
the market research team commissioned by the Works Council, showed that 
regular readers were sympathetic to the SON struggle against redundancy 
and said "they felt almost morally obliged to buy the News instead of 
the Express" •••• but •••• "There was strong criticism of the practice 
of having 'trivial' human interest stories on the front page of the News. 
Front page lead stories should be serious and important matters of 
• 
439 
national interest." (General Managers Report, Number 3, 2 July 1975). 
Combined with the widespread profound disappointment of trade 
unionists at the SDN's lack of editorial commitment to the labour 
movement, such findings indicated that thenew tabloid should attempt 
to honour the promise to "reflect the aspirations of the working 
class ...... (Though the market researchers resorted to the adman's 
politics in recommending the paper should be 'independent'.) If a 
fundamental editorial reorientation was to take place, some fresh 
stimulUS was certainly needed. Yet during the preparation for relaunch 
no attempt was made to consult trade union representatives who were SON 
readers to discover what improvements they wanted to see in the tabloid. 
Having ignored the possibility of e~ternal stimulus, it remained for the 
~ journalists themselves to produce something new. Hopefully, 
the editor Fred Sillito, and Eric Tough, without discussion appointed 
Ralph Saunders from outside, who was experienced in tabloid editorial, 
as Editorial adviser. Predictably piqued, Nathan Goldbert objected 
in Council to both the status and the salary offered Saunders, - and 
though he had already been appointed and had worked for several days, -
both were lowered, and underst~dably Saunders immediately resigned. 
(WCM, 4 August 1975). 
Left to their own imaginations, the SDN journalists looked 
nervously around for something to emulate and seized upon the shining 
example of the S~ The ~ was the only newspaper to defy 
pessimistic predictions of the decline of the popular newspaper market, 
and from Rupert Murdoch's takeover in 1969 had embarked on a meteoric 
growth pushing forward the frontiers of bad taste. In 1975 the Sun 
was the only pational newspaper to record a small increase in circulation, 
though .this may have had something to do with over one million pounds 
of promotional advertising that wa~psed in, the effort to boost 
circulation. (Economist, 15 November 1975). There was a strong 
inclination towards the example of the Sun on the part of those sm 
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people, including the executives and senior journalists, who 
simply wanted to sell a newspaper, rather than sell a particular 
kind of newspaper. At an early mass meeting, Ray Chard who was 
to become managing editor, proposed,the comparison in an illuminating 
exchange: 
"Ray Chard, NUJ, had one point to make in ans,,,er to the 
critics be they City Editors or whoever, about viability 
and possible success. Quoting as an example the 
inquiries done on the introduction of the Sun. Robert 
Maxwell snatched on this point as being very, very 
important, since he, himself, had been the one involved 
in that project and he would bear it in mind. 1I 
(MMM, 25 February 1975). 
(Presumably by being "involved in that projectll , Maxwell meant simply 
that he had been defeated in his takeover bid for the News of the World 
organization by Rupert Murdoch, and similarly failed to secure the 
Daily Herald or Sun). Chard's comparison proved an accurate 
prediction, not that the SDN was to achieve the commercial success of 
the ~, but that, despite the original political principle of the SON, 
in the vain pursuit of <?irculation it was to degererate to resemble the 
vacuous commercialism of the Sun. 
When the new tabloid Scottish Daily News emerged,the paper 
seemed to have shrunk in every way. Detailed news stories and feature 
articles had disappeared to be replaced by snippets of news, overwhelmed 
by large photographs, advertisements, and bits of personal columns. 
Sport with 8 pages and entertainment with 5 pages, more than rivalled 
the news. In the headlines, the search for cheap sensation had 
replaced any concern with pOlitical commitment, and a similar shallowness 
was displayed in the treatment of other stories. The dilution of 
political principle was emphasised in the Scottish Television 
advertisements for the tabloid SDN: 
• 
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"Thousands of people have changed to the new handy size 
Scottish Daily News - the only Scottish National Daily 
newspaper still at Sp - buy the new Scottish Daily News 
tomorrow - it's first value for your money." 
A concern with the purely commercial consideration of price 
competitiveness had replaced other claims of distinctiveness. 
The metamorphosis was complete. The Scottish Daily News 
began life looking like the Daily Express but reading like a rather 
schizophrenic Daily Mirror. With the change to tabloid, the SON 
came to resemble the Daily Mirror, though having jettisoned much 
of its political thrust, it read rather like the Daily Express. 
Under the stewardship of Maxwell,with the decimation of the original 
Works Council, and directed by the singularly imprecise editorial 
poliCY of being a "brash, bright and breezy" publication, the SDN 
arrived at its final destination: a self-abused Scottish Sun. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
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ECONOMICS 
Circulation. 
By the time of the tabloid relaunch on 18th August 1975 
circulation had slipped to about 80,000 copies a day, advertising 
almost disappeared, and losses disastrously mounted to over £30,000 
per week. The publicity and activity surrounding the relaunch was 
intensified by the awareness among the ~ workers- that if the tabloid 
did not effectively stop this sustained financial haemorrhage, the paper 
would be bankrupt within a matter of weeks. Flagging spirits revived 
when the first few editions of the paper sold out the full print run of 
240,000 copies. Circulation hovered briefly at 160,000 copies, and 
advertising picked up considerably. Despite this substantial improvement, 
though losses had been reduced, they were still dangerously high at 
£17,000 per week. The members of the Works Council who had opposed 
Maxwell's suggestion of a price reduction, were quick to pOint out 
that if the tabloid sold at the original six pence, the additional revenue 
would bring the paper close to break-even point. The fears of many 
experiencedSDN workers concerning the bizarre price reduction had proved 
right. John Hodgeman insisted: 
"Having worked in newspapers for several years,I felt that this 
was an incredibly stupid and dangerous decision •••• OIr main 
competitor, the Daily Record, which had been selling at 
Sp, all the time we were publishing, had already announced in 
. print that on ~S August it was raising its cover price to 6p. 
Therefore, not only was it a financially suicidal move, but 
also compl~tely unnecessary. In fact, the following week 
when the Record did go up in price, we did not gain one single 
copy. There is, therefore, n~reason to believe that had 
we published at our existing price of 6p in our new tabloid 
form, that w~ would have sold any less than we did. The 
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circulation and advertising doubled in the new paper. 
However because of the price cut we were still losing a 
massive amount of money every week." 
Maxwell's decision to lower the price was both misconceived and 
damaging in many ways: that he could get experienced newspaper people 
to do what was patently absurd was a measure of the hold Maxwell had 
upon the SON. At the time the decision was taken to charge 6p for 
the ~, in February 1975, when the Express itself went up to 6p 
Maxwell accepted that, "Although he did not like the idea of a two COin 
purchase, he didn't foresee any insurmountable problems, and the 
advantage was, with a cover charge of 6p, if the projected circulation 
figures were met, th~ company could expect a profit in the first year 
of £4,000." (MMM, 25 February 1975). In abandoning this view, 
Maxwell was responding to the conventional market wisdom that concentrates 
on price, as for example in the view of the 1962 Royal Commission that 
"it would be madness for any newspaper other than the market leader to 
increase its retail price unilaterally." (Sisson, 1975, p 91). But 
by mid-1975 all of the national popular papers were selling at the SON's 
original price of 6p, with the exception of the Sun. In attempting 
to emulate the aggressive capture of circulation achieved by the Sun, 
adopting a price reduction was le~s than half a strategy: the Sun 
had achieved a huge increase in circulation p!:'imarilyby a massive 
advertising campaign which the SON could not begin to afford; the SON 
-
was left with the enormous losses incurred by the price reduction, 
without the means to build further cirCUlation to compensate for these 
losses. The irony was that market researchers themselves had shown 
that ~ sales were based largely on loyalty, and therefore the 
newspaper could have sustained a Sim~lar readership with a higher price 
than its rivals. (McKay and Barr, 1975, pp 118-9). 
The Works Council of2 JUly 1975 had accepted Mackie's 
calculations that due to the serious effect on net circulation revenue 
of a one pence price reduction, potential losses would increase by 
almost £1,000 per day, and an increase of 67,000 copies would be 
necessary to achieve the same income. Yet Maxwell persisted in 
arguing that an increase of 16,000 copies would compensate for the 
444 
revenue loss of the price reduction (WCM 7 August 1975; WCM 5 September 1975) 
Though treating the SDN purely as a market commodity, he misunderstood 
its most basic element: "The newspaper as a commodity is extremely 
sensitive to minor fluctuations in price and operated on extremely 
small profit margins per copy." (Smith, 1977, P 190). Furthermore 
Maxwell neglected the increasing contribution at that time of cover price 
to newspaper revenue with the reduction in advert~sing revenue: "Cover 
price increases of the popular press by 1975 had generated enough income 
to give more profit than in the previous two years." (RCP, 1976 
Interim Report, p4l). "In fact, cover prices have been increasing 
even faster than costs, because publishers have tended to recover a 
greater proportion of costs from cover prices." (RCP, 1977, Final Report, 
p.6S) • Finally, if Maxwell's reckless gamble at increasing revenue 
by a price reduction had the remotest chance of success this was immediately 
eliminated by offending the newsagents whose support was essential: 
·Scotland's 3,000 newsagents have been told not to support 
the relaunch on Monday of the tabloid 'Scottish Daily News'. 
This has been decided by Scottish officials of the National 
Federation of Retail Newsagents because of the reduction 
in price of the new paper from 6p to 5p, which also reduces 
newsagents takings on each copy sold. Mr. Neil Kidd, the 
federation's Scottish secretary, said yesterday they had 
originally agreed terms with Mr Maxwell for increased profits 
for newsagents based on a 6p'price for the tabloid. However, 
a few hours after the meeting with Mr Maxwell the federation 
were suddenly told ~he price was gOing down to Sp. While 
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the agents share of this would be boosted for the tabloid's 
first four weeks, it would thereafter drop. Mr. Kidd 
commented: "We are rather disappointed that Mr. Maxwell 
has taken this decision to reduce the price of the paper. 
The Scottish Daily News is now offering the least return of 
any paper, which is a bit unfortunate." (Scotsman, 15 August 1975). 
A few days of euphoria followed the relaunch, with the paper 
carrying inflated, and unintentially ambiguous, public relations messages: 
"SELL OUT ~" 
"A happy and confident Mr. Robe~t Maxwell, chief executive 
of the Scottish Daily News, announced last night that for 
the second day running the paper, in its new tabloid form, 
costing 5p, was a sellout. In a message to the staff of 
the paper Mr Maxwell stated that the paper had sold around 
250,000 copies and that all the indications were that the 
public liked what they bought. Mr Maxwell, revealing that 
the paper is to continue its TV and radio advertising campaign 
for yet another week, said: "There is no doubt in my mind that 
the paper is here to stay. ow we have the correct formula 
it will go from strength to strength •••• By producing a lively 
paper and reducing the price to Sp to help fight inflation, we 
have caught the public's mood. From Monday we will be the only 
Scottish national paper selling at Sp ••••• The message is loud 
and clear. The ~ is alive and kicking." 
20 August 1975). 
(Scottish Daily News, 
Maxwell's optimism had weak foundations: though the drop in circulation 
following the tabloid was not as rapid as after the initial launch, it 
was still critical, and within a month" was down by 100,000 copies. As 
Table 18 shows, the tabloid relaunch, far from reSCUing the ~, after a 
short burst of interest merely slowed the rate of decline. 
Table 18 
Month 
May 
June 
July 
Circulation of the Scottish Daily News 
May - November 1975. 
Circulation Per 
195,000 
134,000 
95,000 
August (Relaunch 18th) 145,000 
September 153,000 
October 136,000 
November (First week). 107,000 
Average Circulation approx. 140,000 
Day 
(Source: ~General Managers Reports; Works Council Minutes). 
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An important reason why a high circulation could not be sustained 
was the difficulty experienced in distributing the newspaper. Having 
dropped any claim to editorial distinctiveness, the SDN lacked the 
marketing and sales manpower and resources to promote the circulation of 
what was essentially a commercial product by commercial means. 
Underfunding had left the newspaper critically short of sales representatives, 
as the general manager reported: 
"We have 17 representatives serving 17 districts in Scotland 
and North England. In addition to working in their own 
areas, they have blitzed South and North Glasgow. Our 17 
representatives have a formidable task. There are probably 
. 
5,000 outlets in Scotland giving an average of 300 newsagents 
f 
per sales rep. Even if each rep covered 20 agents per day 
(and that is only possible in the densely populated areas) 
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that would allow him at the most only 10 minutes with each 
agent once in three weeks. So, it is not surprising that 
some of you came across newsagents who, during our first two 
weeks, appeared not to have our paper. During Douglas 
Ferguson's 'blitz' on South Glasgow, out of 121 agents visited 
between 11.00 am and 1.00 pm, only 9 were sold out, with 
similar results next day in North Glasgow. Some of you have 
noticed that some agents are not giving our paper enough 
prominence. Remember that we are of necessity giving sale 
or return terms. until we have an established readership 
we cannot afford to do otherwise. But in the meantime, the 
agent does not have to sell our paper - he has to sell the others 
because they are not on sale or return." (Report, 21 May 1975). 
A further problem was wholesale distribution of ·the newspaper: 
"In many parts of the United Kingdom, one wholesaler has a monopoly; in 
SCotland the monopoly of John Menzies is almost complete". 
(RCP, Final Report p 67). Many ~ supporters felt the paper was 
being unfairly discriminated against by Menzies outlets, but investigating 
this, Mackie maintained that the paper received due prominence at major 
stalls such as in Glasgow and Edinburgh railway stations, and that that 
local managers of the wholesaler were co-operative: 
"The conclusion is inevitably, that there is no evidence 
whatever of a Company policy on the part of John Menzies; 
either to discourage the sale of the Scottish Daily News, 
or to hinder its distribution. On the contrary, there is 
evidence that our paper has been very sympathetically treated 
in its distribution to some of the more remote parts of 
Scotland; areas where we are at the complete mercy of our 
distributing agents." (Memo, 23 June 1975). 
It was still thought necessary to organize a meeting with Menzies to 
448 
press for further co-operation in solving the distribution problems 
of the SDN. As always in these situations, Robert Maxwell provided 
an instant, but utterly inappropriate solution: the recruitment 
of a volunteer army of part-time circulation representatives to 
promote interest by canvassing homes and newsagents. He advertised 
on his own initiative in the broadsheet: liOn Monday 18 August the 
Scottish Daily News is changing its shape to the size over 1 million 
people in Scotland want. The new Scottish Daily News will fight for 
you! Fight inflation! Fight for employment and prosperity in 
Scotland! Become a News man and help fight for Scotland. We 
want 1,000 ~ supporters to help us launch the new Scottish Daily News 
throughout Scotland." (SDN, 8 August, 1975). It is likely that any 
volunteers would have become rapidly disaffected, either by the 
disappointing editorial of the tabloid, or the miserly expenses offered 
for their efforts. In the event, the idea was dropped after the 
Federated Chapel angrily accused Maxwell of interfering with the work of 
the full-time circulation representatives. 
A final barrier which the ~ faced in maintaining circulation of 
the ~ was the force of habit of the newspaper reading public. 
Andy Riley of SLADE recounted a story popular in the SDN: "This fellow 
saw his mate reading the Daily Record in work, so he went up to him and 
said: 
'Why are you .reading the Daily Record?' 
'I always read the Daily Record! ' 
'But you bought shares in the Scottish Daily News, why don't you read that?' 
'Oh Christ, I forgot:'" 
TO overcome ingrained reading habits, the ~ needed considerable 
promotional advertising which it could not afford; a compelling editorial 
, 
which it could not attain; but most of all time, which it had very little 
of indeed. 
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If the circulation of the ~ rapidly eroded during its short 
life, this should be placed in context: the total circulation of 
the popular daily newspapers had qeclined consistently for the 
previous 20 years. In the period July - December 1975 circulation 
of the popular daily papers fell by 5.2% (RCP, Interim Report, pp 31-3). 
The SDN's average circulation was 100,000 copies more than the average 
circulation of the other recently launched newspapers, as Golding and 
Murdock point out: 
"The only new provincial daily launched in the last 15 years 
was the Scottish Daily News. Twelve new evening papers 
were established in this period, but five o~ these were from 
the Thomson stable. The new launches had average circulations 
of 40,000 by 1975, well below the average for their class 
of publication. They survive not because of demonstrable 
demand, but because of the financial resources of their ultimate 
owner." (1978,p 92). 
Moreover the Scottish Daily News' circulation was considerably larger 
than that of the Aberdeen Press and Journal, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 
Edinburgh Scotsman, and Glasgow Herald, all of which were well~established 
Scottish newspapers. [n spite of the unforeseen and 
terrible internal disasters that afflicted the newspaper, the mean 
circulation of almost 140,000 was still 20,000 copies per day more than 
the Wlfavourable Chesters prediction which was endorsed by the IDU 
of the Department of Industry. At this level of circulation the 
Scottish Daily News could have survived into the late Spring of 1976, 
long enough to attempt other efforts at reviving the paper. But the 
circulation revenue had to be matched by advertising revenue which did 
not arrive. It was the shortfall in advertising, not in circulation, 
which precipitated the early financial disaster of the Scottish Daily News. 
Advertising 
"Without exception, every single national paper in the 
period since 1920 has made a loss on its sales alone .••. n 
(Curran, 1977, P 224). Therefore, in the absence of 
any alternative second source of revenue, it seemed 
obvious from the beginning that the Scottish Daily News 
would have to depend upon advertising revenue: liThe men 
realise that for the News to succeed, its costing must be 
realistic, and that means a realistic cover price, manning 
levels and ad rates, and eight pages out of 16 devoted 
to advertising." (Campaign, 26, April 1974). 
Jimmy McNamara, of the AUEW appreciated the frustrating 
dilemma of an interdependent dual supply of revenue: 
"I think the Western world is moving towards subsidies 
of the press, it happens on the Continent - Left-wing 
newspapers are subsidized according to circulation and 
other factors. It's coming, it must come, because of the 
economics of the industry: to depend on circulation and 
-advertising; and advertising to depend on circulation, 
but also to depend on editorial policy, is crackers ! 
There is no other industry, barring us whose profitability 
is based on so many factors that are interlinked. II 
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Hirsch and Gordon, as economists, provide a more technical explanation 
of the cruel economics of the press, which have killed off many popular 
newspapers and left only monopolies: 
"The peculiar economics of the press have three main 
characterists. First~ newspapers are a very special case 
of 'joint supply' ••• The two demands that a simple 
newspaper has to meet are the demands of the reader for a 
qood and satisfying product and of the advertiser for a 
readership that he wants to reach. But one depends 
very much on the other. The advertiser buys space, but 
the value to him of that space depends on the number of 
readers who see it, and on the purchasing power at their 
command •.•• Second, high overheads are unavoidable for 
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the production of newspapers. Before the first copy can 
be printed, a newspaper has to have its plant, offices, staff 
and distribution network. Then with each successive 
copy, the cost per copy falls dramatically until very high 
,circulations are reached. In technical economic terms, 
newspaper production enjoys increasing returns to scale ••• 
Third, the cost advantage of the big battalions is compounded 
by the advertising advantage. As sales go up, not only are 
average unit costs reduced by the spreading of overheads 
referred to above, but also the newspaper can charge a higher 
rate to advertisers who can reach more readers with each insert, 
at little extra cost to itself." (1975, pp 41-2). 
Winning circulation proved a difficult task at the SON, but 
acquiring advertising proved almost impossible. The cycle of advertising 
revenue peaked in 1973,'and the SDN arrived in the middle of a serious adver~' 
ising recessio~ in 1975. The percentage of total revenue fro~ advertising 
for the popular daily ~ress had critically declined from 45% in 19~0, to 
27\ in 1975. (Rep, Interim Report p.99). (Though the proportion of 
advertising revenue was twice as high in the provincial press.) "In 1975 ••• 
competition for advertising had reached such suicidal proportions 
that some papers were accepting advertisements at bargain rates that did 
not cover costs." (CUrran, 1978, p.233). The dearth of advertising 
pcesented a formidable problem for the SDN: 
452 
"We hear other papers are offering space at give-away prices and 
commercial TV is offering extremely low rates to fill space." 
(WCM, 13 June, 1975). In the affluent world of the advertising 
industry, the SON did not have the resources to be lavish, though 
expensive presentations were given in London, Glasgow and Edinburgh, in 
the vain effort to entice advertisers. Oue to the rush to publish 
the paper in May, advertising rate cards were distributed late, and 
advertising representatives appointed after the launch. Convincing 
advertisers of the size and stability of ~~e SON's circulation was a 
major problem, as indeed was convincing th~ that the SDN's readership 
were the kind of people advertisers wanted to reach. Further the 
paper was launched in the Summer, a traditionally slack time for advertisir.g, 
and the major accounts had already been arranged for the season. 
Finally, having to wait three months for verified circulation figures 
before the paper received any government advertising was damaging, and 
afterwards it seemed that the government and other public bodies 
were not very enthusiastic about advertising in the News. 
Fears were often expressed within the ~ that advertisers 
were deliberately discriminating against the newspaper, at one Council 
meeting: "Mr. Goldberg asked if there was evidence of Wljustifiable 
resistance to our paper amongst. advertising agencies. Mr. Galt, 
in response stated that it was his opinion that agencies accorded our 
newspaper fair treatment. In so doing agencies considered cost benefit 
analysis." (2 July, 1975). Jimmy Galt the advertisement manager was 
a past chairman of the Glasgow Publicity Club, and Glasgow branch of the 
Institute of Marketing, and therefore was keen to defend the virtues 
of his profession. In a report on the depressed advertising trend, he 
maintained: 
f 
"Whilst other papers are reduced in paging they are still 
holding onto the regulars; we, as a new paper, are not 
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being considered in the first instance because of the three 
following factors: 
1) The rate structure is too high in relation to 
other newspapers. 
2) Circulation is far too low and makes our cost 
effectiveness per 1,000 copies too expensive. 
3) We are still an unknown quantity and cannot at 
this stage sell even on the type of readership." 
(Memo, 25 June 1975). 
The decision was made to cut advertising rates; Galt first proposed 
an 18% cut, but later Maxwell increased this to a 33% cut, which was 
necessary due to the almost total collapse of advertising revenue by 
late July. Yet an examination of Table 19 shows that whilst the SON 
rates were high during the first two broadsheet months, given that 
the paper was intended to overcome the dichotomy between the quality 
papers (Scotsman, Glasgow Journal) ,and the down-market papers (Express, 
Record), the rates were not exorbitantly high, considering the circulation. 
With the 33\ reduction in rates of the tabloid, the rates became quite 
competitive, yet advertisers continued to avoid the SDN~ masse. 
In the last analysis, after taking the many other factors into 
account, the profound reluctance of advertisers can only be explained 
by their dislike of the co-operative, and hostility towards the News 
editorial. Upon the announcement of the government loan, Aims of Indust..-y 
called upon employers to ignore commercial interests and to refuse to 
advertise in the SDN, stating that, "This is the first and dangerous step 
towards the destruction of press freedom." (Glasgow Herald, 26 July 1974). 
Though major advertisers were considerably more restrained in their 
attitude, they were probably not immune to this interpretation. 
f 
The British Advertising Association in evidence to the Royal Commission 
on the Press trenchantly criticized the "commercial and managerial 
"'" In 
"'" 
NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION STANDARD RATE COST PER 1000 ClASS DISPLAY COST PER 1000 
~erdeen s.c.c. s.c.c. 
Press and Journal 110,151 E1.60 1.45 E2.70 2.45 
Dundee 
Courier and Advt. 128,374 El.04 0~8l E1.04 0.81 
Scotsman 87,231 E2.l5 2.46 £2.64 3.02 
. 
Daily Record 639,947 £3.51 0.54 £3.51 0.54 
Glasgow Herald 95,657 £2.00 2.09 £2.50 2.06 
Scottish Daily Express est. 380,000 E3.50 0.92 £4.50 1.18 
Evening Times 235,775 £2.60 1.10 £2.85 1.20 
I jScottish Daily News 1 161,000 £2.75 1.70 £3.25 2.00 
iBroadsheet May/June 
: 
. 
. 
SDN Proposed Reduced Rates 161,000 £2.25 1.39 £2.50 1.55 
I 
SDN Adopted Reduced Rates 145,000 £2.00 1.30 £2.00 • 1.30 [Tabloid August/October 1 : I 
. 
Source: Advertisement Managers Report, and Works Council Minutes. 
1. In the month of July circula~ fell to 95,000, but advertising di~peared almost completely, at 5% of the budget 
proJecti.on. ' 
..4 
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ineptitude of considerable degree" displayed at the SDN. Perhaps 
the most important example of "commercial ineptitude" in the opinion 
of advertisers and of the SDN's own management, was the adamant refusal 
of the Council to edit out all stories which supported the labour movement 
and which might upset advertisers. McKay and Barr amusingly record 
how this drove Eric Tough, the general manager, to complete distraction: 
"Dougie Ferguson, the circulation manager" would come to me 
either almost in tears or screeching blind fury because he had 
to sell the paper. 'Look at it,' he'd say, showing me yesterday's 
paper. 'How can I try to sell a paper like that?'.' Jimmy Galt, 
the advertising manager, would come in with his head in his hands 
saying, 'I'm frightened to phone agencies to try to get adverts.' 
The three of us sat day after day in that office of mine talking 
that way. And we'd tackle Nat Goldberg or wee Jimmy McNamara 
and say, 'You know, this is commercial, it's not for fun, it 
isn't for kicks. You're not selling this paper to readers only, 
you're selling it to advertisers too: ' 
'And JUnmy McNamara would say, 'Well, Eric, if it comes to 
principle or profit I know which we'll choose every time." 
(1976, pp 108-9). 
Tony Benn in a remarkably naive statement issued from the Department of 
Industry, welcomed the new co-operative: "It will be the first national 
newspaper to b~ run by its workers free from political pressures and 
commercial interests, and constitutes a general victory for the people it 
seeks to serve." (Scotsman, 29 March 1975). 'In fact the paper was 
absolutely vulnerable to the pressure of big advertisers who could decide 
the survival of the paper by their support or neglect. Most major 
advertisers simply ignored the paper, those that did not, but offered 
f 
accounts or showed interest such as Johny Walker scotch, Curries TV, 
Canada Life Insurance, C & A, and W.O. , B.O. Wills tobacco, were earnestly 
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courted, usually with little result. Despite the impressions of 
Tough and Galt, even the most determined trade unionist on the Works 
Council was aware of the necessity to make concessions to the 
advertisers, thus Jimmy McNamara argued: 
"Advertising can govern you to a certain extent, it depends 
how far you are prepared to compromise. Well we compromised 
enough to be able to have a reasonable circulation and at 
the same time attract advertisers, without sacrificing what 
we believe in too much. This is what we have got to 
learn. The paper is swinging like a pendulum 9n two 
things, circulation and advertising. We'll sacrifice some 
editorial policy, we'll let a Tory in the paper now and 
again if it appeases advertisers, provided our policy 70% of 
the time puts forward a reasonable working class point of 
view. Can this happen? This is what we have got to 
find out. I'm beginning to suspect not." 
The raw point of whether the newspaper should accept advertisements it 
disagreed with, or ads from companies it disapproved of, was never actually 
forced: because so few advertisements were received they were eagerly 
seized. In the only recorded instance of the problem, after heated 
discussion on the question of selectivity in accepting advertisements, 
"Mr. Mackie maintained that provided advertisements were not in 
themselves illegal, then the newspaper should not be selective in 
accepting advertisements - the question of editorial response to any 
situation was a matter for the newspaper." (WCM, 2 July 1975). 
The final deeply ironic contradiction was that !! the ~ had ever 
attempted to consistently project socialist valuesl and if the full 
50:50 advertising content had ever been attaLnedi then the 8 pages of 
, 
editorial defending the virtues o~ fraternal equality, collectivism, 
and social justice, would have been neatly counterbalanced by 8 pages 
upholding the pursuit of materialism, individualism and consumption. 
But of course this never happened. 
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Was the ~'s expectation of advertising revenue over-optimistic? 
In the SUN Prospectus it was projected that the normal ratio between 
editorial content and advertising content of the newspaper should be 
50:50, and at a circulation of 250,000 the sales revenue/advertising 
revenue ratio was projected as 1:0.97. However, during weeks 3 to 10 
of publication it was expected that circulation would fall to 220,000; 
and during weeks 4-26 it was expected that advertising revenue would 
fall to 70%. The Chesters report and IDU adjusted the SDN's 
figure for the ratio of circulation/advertising revenue downward to 
a permanent level of 1:0.7. (SNE, 1975, pp 10,21-2). Chesters 
made reference to the average circulation/advertising revenue ratio 
in the national press in 1973 of 1:0.82; but this conceals the 
fact that whilst the quality newspapers derive more than 60% of their 
revenue from advertising, the national popular press derives less than 
40% of its revenue from advertising. The provincial press secures 
a similar amount of revenue from advertising as the quality newspapers: 
in 1975 provincial newspapers obtained only 39.7% of revenue from 
sales, and 60.3% of revenue from advertising,a ratio of 0.65:1 
(RCP, Concentration of Ownership of the Provincial Press, 1977, pp 18-20, 
Tables 5.2 and 5.4). In that" the Scottish Daily News would closely 
resemble the provincial press in orientation and distribution, the 
projected 50% of revenue from advertising does not seem unduly optimistic, 
and the reduction in advertising revenue anticipated in the first 
six months seems suffiCiently cautious. 
An inspection of Graph 1 reveals, none of these projections 
and precautions prepared the SDN people for the disaster that occurred. 
100% 
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Graph 1. SDN Projected Circulation and Projected Advertising Compared 
with Circulation Achieved and Advertising Achieved May-November 1975. 
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(Source: ~General Managers Reports, Trading Statements, and Works Council Minutes.) 
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It was projected that the proportion of total revenue from 
advertising would eventually be 50%, though only 40% in the first 
six months: in fact advertising slumped so badly that it provided 
only 20% of total revenue. The paper was being strangled by the 
lack of advertising revenue and yet it was powerless to complain: 
blaiming the advertising companies for their discrimination would 
only invite further punishment. There was no recognition whatsoever 
in the IOU report of the possibility of this critical problem, which 
simply stated, "provided the Scottish Daily News could demonstrate 
readership by a similar group to that which buys the Scottish Daily Express 
it would attract advertising business." (SNE, 1975, p.2l). McKay and 
Barr underestimated the importance of the problem of discrimination by 
advertisers in their study of the SON, and focus upon managerial, 
editorial and circulation weaknesses. 
Bradley and Gelb ignored the problem of discrimination by 
advertisers entirely, and smugly stated, "The project was obviously not 
viable ••• The Action Committee's Submission for Assistance had been 
assessed as unviable by the IOU. With hindsight, even the IDU report 
seems optimistic, especially as regards advertising revenue," 
(1979a,pp 11-12), before they turned their well-honed analytical minds 
to a range of obscure academic problems of their own invention. John 
Whale simply voiced the popular impression that: "The experiment lasted 
from May to November 1975 before the dearth of readers destroyed it." 
(1977, p65). But as Graph 1 shows, circulation averaged 60\ of 
projections, whereas advertising achieved less than 20% of projections. 
(Table 20 shows the detailed figures'for the first three months of 
operation). It was lack of advertising revenue that brought the 
premature end of the Scottish Daily News. The entire experience of the 
SON lends powerful support to James CUrran's theory that advertisers 
have now acquired a de facto licencing authority since, without their 
support, newspapers are simply not economically viable. (1977,p.2l7): 
o 
\0 
...,. 
Table 2 SDN Actual and BudgetAdve~t~singand circulation Revenue in the First Three 
Months of Operation. 
MAY JUNE JULY CUMULATIVE 
TOTAL 
ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL 
ACTUAL BUDGET AS \ ACTUAL BUDGET AS % ACTUAL BUDGET AS , ACTUAL BUDGET 
OF OF OF 
BUDGET BUDGET Bu1J'.s.l:.J. 
ADVERTISING 
CONTRIBUTION 59,492 157,912 37% 14,654 125,152 12% 4,252 91,436 5% 78,398 374,500 
ICIRCULATION 
CONTRIBUTION 148,066 183,848 80% 87,137 170,528 51% 51,421 183,888 28% 286,624 538,264 
!cUMULATIVE 2 207,558 314,760 66% 101,791 295,680 34% 55,673 275,324 20% 365,162 912,844 
larAL 
I ; I 
Source: Derived from SDN Trading statements prepared by general manager. 
1. With the resignation of the general manager Eric Tough, and financial controller lain Bain, in August, 
such detailed financial information was no longer available. Prior to the relaunch, circulation 
ACTUAL 
AS % 
OF 
BUDGET 
21\ 
53% 
40\ 
deteriorated further and advertising almost collapsed completely. After the relaunch, circulation tmproved 
considerably and advertising improved a little. The final percentage of actual advertising revenue compared 
with the budget was 20%, and actual circulation revenue compared with budget 60% 
2. Total losses were not as great as these totals imply, because costs of newsprint and other materials were 
also considerably reduced. 
L'" ~!' 
i 
! 
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Of course the Scottish Daily News was seriously hit by 
the advertising slump which effected other newspapers in 1975. 
But as Table 21 reveals, while the national popular press received 
in 1975 approximately 20% less advertising revenue than in 1974, 
taking inflation into account; and the quality press received 15% 
less advertising revenue than expected; the provincial press received 
only 10\ less advertising than anticipated. The SDN received 80% 
less advertising revenue than expected during its six month life. 
In the very worst month of all at the SDN, July, there was an average 
circulation of 95,000 copies a day and the paper received the miserable 
revenue of £4,252 in advertising, 95% less advertising than anticipated, 
which amounted to the princely sum of £157 per day (Table 21). In a 
business employing ~oo people, what was supposed to contribute almost 
half of total revenue came to £157 per day: the wage bill alone 
was nearly £5,000 per day. One month's advertising was not enough to pay 
one day's wages. The advertising received was not even enough to pay for ~~ 
ink used in printing the paper. In July the SDN earned in a month 
less than half the advertising revenue that the SDN had hoped, once 
established·, to earn in a day! The paper was carrying just a quarter 
page of paid advertisements a day, (disguised by large ads for the S~~'s 
own competitions, and by free advertisements) • With a circulation of 
almost 100,000 on purely market considerations the paper should have 
been earning at least ten times more in advertising revenue in July. 
The absurdly low advertising revenue of the ~ can, in the last analysis, 
only be explained by the resolute refusal of advertisers to have anything 
to do with the newspaper: to their desire to see it quickly disappear. 
In a final twist, it could be argued that not only did advertisers 
kill the SON, but that they set the SON up to be killed. In the 
twentieth century, the expansion of ~:wspapers, in editorial, plant, 
and other resources has largely been funded by the expansion of advertising 
revenue. Thus the SCottish Daily News financial structure, editorial, 
pagination, manpower, and capital expenditure, was determined on the 
~ 
Table 21 
Advertising Revenue as a Percentage of Budget Advertising 
Revenue in the National Quality and Popular Press, and 
Provincial Press'in 1975. 1 
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£,000 
NATIONAL QUALITY NEWSPAPERS NATIONAL POPULAR AND PROVINCIAL PRESS 
LONDON EVENING NEWSPAPERS 
! 
I 
ACTUAL BUDGET ACTUAL AS ACTUAL BUDGET ACTUAL AS ACTUAL BUDGET ACTU.4U. r-=:;~ 
REVENUE REVENUE % OF REVENUE REVENUE % OF REVENUE REVENUE % OF 
BUDGET BUDGET BUI>G2':' 
1974 47,600 - - 68,969 - - 273,000 - --
P.975 46,708 54,740 85.3% 64,533 79,304 81.3% 282,000 314,000 89.S~ 
Source: Derived from Table E.7 RCP, Interim Report, 1976, p 98; and 
Table 4.3, RCP, Concentration of OWnership in the Provincial Press, 
Cmnd 68l0-5,p15. 
1. The Table assumes an anticipated increase of 15% in advertisement revenue in 
1975. It should be remembered that 1973 was a boom year for advertising 
which only fell off gradually in 1974. 
\ 
, 
, 
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assumption of getting as much revenue from advertising as 
from circulation. But the proportion of advertising revenue 
absorbed, by advertising costs has gradually increased, (i.e. the 
administrative, production, newsprint, ink, and other costs of 
carrying advertisements) from 60% in 1960, to 85% in 197), and 100% 
in 1975 for national popular dailies. (Popular Sunday papers made 
a loss from carrying advertisements in 1975). (RCP, Final Report,p39). 
Thus advertising, by making newspapers bigger and costlier has created 
another major barrier to entry into the newspaper market. (Golding 
and Murdock, 1977, paa). 
Finances 
In the financial projections the Action Committee submitted to 
the Department of Industry in 1974, it was anticipated that the newspaper 
would make a cumulative monthly loss until the middle of the fourth 
month of operation when a short term peak in working capital required of 
£630,000 would be reached. At that point, a significant and accelerating 
increase in advertising revenue would transform a monthly deficit into 
a monthly surplus and quickly lift the newspaper into profit after just 
over a year of operatio~. As Graph 2 clearly shows, at the moment 
when advertising revenue was to come to the rescue of the newspaper, it 
did not. Even the massive effort of the tabloid relaunch only marginally 
slowed the rate of loss: despite commencing with £950,000 working 
capital, instead of the projected £800,000, the paper's finances hurtled 
uncontrollably downwards towards bankruptcy. 
The SON was completely without the capital reserves necessary to 
survive any early difficulties experienced in becoming established in 
the market, and from the beginning it was assumed that the paper would 
sink or swim in the first three months: "The Scottish Daily News is 
likely to have a period of three months grace which is the traditional 
proving time of a publication and in that time they will have to rap~dly 
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establish themselves." (Crisp, 1975 ,p. 21). \'lith a normal product, in normal 
ma:t'ket conditions, perhaps three Months would be sufficient to test the 
viability of a commercial newspaper: but in 1975 market conditions 
were particularly severe, and the SDN had the critical problem to 
overcome of advertiser resistance. Substantial reserves should have 
been built into the capital requirements of the newspaper; but if this 
had been attempted, government support would probably not have been 
forthcoming because of the expense of the project. As it was, the SDN 
had to be instantly successful or paniC was inevitable. 
, In the frantic effort to resuscitate the newspaper, the banks 
... 
maintained the sceptical hostility they had exhibited towards the venture 
from the, start: "The lubricators of the market system are bankers, 
and these staid and ultra-conservative financiers refused to provide 
liquidity, either in loan or overdraft, throughout the short, unhappy 
life of the paper." (McKay and Barr, 1976, p 60). The funds of the SON 
had originally been deposited with Glasgow Corporation, and when they 
began to run out, the Corporation was constitutionally unable to lend any 
further moriey. Robert Maxwell later condemned this decision of the 
Works Council, and insisted that if the funds had been deposited with , 
, 
a commercial bank then overdraft facilities would have been available 
with the SDN's assets as security. (WCM, 19 September 1975). But 
the assets were already secured against the government loan, and without 
security, it is exceedingly unlikely that any bank would have contemplated 
extending a loan to the SON. The only real chance of resusatating the 
paper through the workers own efforts was the tabloid relaunch, which 
was wasted by ~he price reduction, a judgement with which McKay and 
Barr concur: "It is clear that the only realistic hope of saving 
the Scottish Daily News was to hold xpe price at 6p - or increase it -
and, therefore, if one decision can be identified as the final fatal 
mistake it was Maxwell's decision to lower the price. II (1976,p 119). 
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Yet the financial disaster of the SDN must be compared with 
the performance of its commercial rivals, since 1975 was no ordinary 
year for the newspaper industry. 
In the summer of 1975 anxiety in Fleet Street concerning the 
immediate financial prospects of national newspapers reached fever 
pitch. Though the Newspaper Publishers Association had previously 
been reluctant about the work of the Royal Commission on the Press, 
established in 1974; the Chairman of the NPA, Lord Goodman, wrote to 
Peter Shore the Secretary of State for Trade, calling for an interim 
inquiry of the Commission, referring to a "fully representative meeting 
of the national newspapers" which had accorded "total agreement that, 
independent of the deep-seated and fundamental difficulties into which 
the commission is enquiring, the newspaper industry is currently facing 
a crisis of unprecedented dimensions and dangers." lRCP, Interim 
Report, 1976,p16). The decline in readership and advertising had 
combined with an abrupt increase in newsprint costs, and other costs, 
including wages, to undermine considerably the profitability of the 
national press. By 1975 the financial position of the national press 
, had become so precarious that most national newspapers were making 
.. 
heavy losses, as the Royal Commission recorded sombrely: "Four of the 
eight national daily titles considered were in loss in 1975, and six out 
of seven national Sundays. The provincial mornings were in a similar 
situation with eight out of the 15 titles for which we saw figures 
making losses on the basis of the publishers' own allocation of these 
costs shared with other publications." (Final Report, 1977,p31) 
The quality daily and Sunday newspapers made a combined trading 
loss of E6.8 million in 1975, and suffered an adverse cash flow of E10.l 
million on a turnQver of El16 million. If several of these newspapers 
had losses larger than those of the Scottish Daily News, how then did 
they survive? The answer is that these newspapers were owned by 
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companies which were subsidiaries of large conglomerates, often multi-
national concerns with interests in North Sea Oil, property, finance, 
television, and other industries. Such highly profitable activities 
enabled the conglomerates to subsIdize their failing newspapers, which 
in return, understandably, were editorially extremely grateful. To 
sustain their lives in 1975 the sum of £7.9 million was injected into 
the quality newspapers from group resources. (RCP, Interim Report, 1976,p97l 
Therefore what distinguished the SON from other newspapers, was not 
that it made a loss: in 1975 the majority of newspapers with which it was 
directly comparable - the nationals and the provincial mornings - made 
losses. What distinguished the ~ was firstly the particular reason for 
its losses - the deliberate embargo placed upon it by advertisers; 
and secondly the fact that as ~n independent newspaper publishing 
co-operative with no other concerns, the SON did not have huge capital 
-resources to ca~~ upon from profitable activities pursued in other 
industries. 
CHAPTER TNELVE 
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THE COLLAPSE OF THE CO-OPERATIVE 
The Final Confrontation 
The solution to th.e fatal weakness of the SDN, some of the 
workers thought, was Robert Maxwell: he was the connection with big 
capital, without which the newspaper would not survive. It was 
widely assumed within the ~, that the more Maxwell became involved 
in the enterprise, the more likely it was that he would contribute 
another capital investment, several times larger than his original 
£114,000, and he did nothing to dispel these illusions. It was presumed 
that Maxwell had the personal and corporate resources to readily make 
such an additional investment himself; and, furthermore, that he had 
links with other sources of investment capital should it be needed. 
Finally Maxwell's aggressive expertise in the competitive market now 
was scen as an indispensable asset, as one NUJ member tersely put it "In 
'the commercial jungle'you need an animal". In contrast the talents 
of Mackie, and of the other political idealists on the original Action 
Committee, who had contributed so much to the successful creation of the 
co-operative, were now seen by some "as being irrelevant, if not actually 
damaging to cOmmercial survival. "So long as the commercial prospects 
, 
., 
of the Scottish Daily News grew bleaker, Robert Maxwell's claim to be 
the only possible saviour grew stronger." (McKay and Barr, 1976,p 116). 
By August it was clear that Maxwell was only interested in total 
control. He had adopted publicly the title of 'Chief Executive' of 
the Scottish Daily News, though there was no provision for any such 
position in the co-operative constitution, simply for a general manager. 
He insisted upon absolute direction of the rest of executive management, 
which understandably drove most of them away in despair, as lain Bain, 
the ex-financial ~ontroller declared, "I think his management style is 
autocratic. I think Mr Maxwell believes when he's made up his mind, 
that mind will not be changed. I'm not used to functioning in that fashion, 
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I can be persuaded by argument, but I certainly won't be persuaded 
when something is, in effect, rammed down my throat." (BBC2, 10 November 
1975) • Similarly, in his relati.omhipwith the Works Council, Max-well 
attempted to impose a concept of an Executive Board, with him as Chief 
Executive. When this repeatedly failed, he tried to evade and undermine 
the Council, whilst preserving a shallow pretence at democratic 
participation, as illustrated in the following exchange in a television 
interview: 
Barr: "Now the decision to go tabloid was, I think, a decision 
by aUthe workforce, and the Works Council, the Executive Council. The 
decision to drop to 5p I think was your own decision." 
Maxwell: "That is so, yes ••• my decision." 
Barr: "In what way then is it a workers co-operative?" 
Maxwell: "Well I'm the manager, the workers have invested me with 
executive power and if I feel that we need, in order to ensure our viability 
in the market place and commercial success that the price go up to 5p, 
I took that decision. But being a democrat I took it to the Executive 
Council, the Executive Council approved it, and therefore I acted totally 
and properly constitutionally within the procedures laid down in the 
workers co-operative. " {BBC2, 10 November 1975). 
Of course Maxwell's assertion ignored that a previous council had rejected 
the price reduction; that the meeting he referred to was attended 
by only half the Council due to inadequate notice; and that he was to 
adamantly resist and obstruct. the efforts of both the Investors Council 
and the Works Council to restore the original price. 
The GUardian cautiously put it, "Mr Maxwell's relationship with 
the ~rkers' Council at the Scottish Daily News might be described as 
effervescent. There are times when he seems to move of his own volition 
and mo·re quickly than might be consistent with co-operative democracy." 
(15 August 1975). But Professor Richard Briston was more explicit: 
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"I feel that there is a great deal of truth in the things that are said 
about his managerial style. The way be behaved at Executive Council 
meetings where, if, for example, a vote went against him he would say on 
occasion, 'Well, I don't care how you vote, I'm going to do things my 
way. ' Or even if he didn't say that, he would take steps which would 
canmit the paper to the course of action which he wanted." 
1976,p 147). 
(McKay and Barr, 
It was indicative of the astounding nerve of Maxwell, and the 
remarkable awe in which many people regarded his abilities, that he could la~~ 
claim credit for the tabloid relaunch ~ which he had had practically nothincr 
I to do with in the planning stages. In the three Council meetings in July wr.e~ -, 
critical decisions concerning the tabloid relaunch were taken, Maxwell was 
absent. At the 1 August meeting he attempted to postpone the relaunch 
to 1 September, and yet when the 18 August relaunch proved briefly a 
resounding success in sales, Maxwell was then to grab all the credit 
in personal tannoy announcements about how well the relaunch had gone: 
"Attention, attention, attention, this is Robert Maxwell speaking. Many 
of you have expressed the desire that during the next week or so when our 
battle for success is being waged at the news vendors kiosks that I 
report to you on a daily basis how goes the hattie. On Day Three I'm happy 
to tell you that our sales are holding up well. Once more it's a sell-out 
of between 24.0 and 250 thousand copies. There is only one item 
that I have to report to you which disappoints me - namely that once 
again we have missed the edition time - yesterday by 40 minutes. This is 
impermissible and I ask all concerned to co-operate and assist to make this 
impossible in the future. After careful consideration of what could be 
done I have ordered certain measures, and have notified heads of 
department and FOes of the caseroom, process, and editorial. And I 
urge them to do the necessary that this paper is out on time tonight 
and every night because that's what the public wants. 
(BBC2, 10 November 1975. 
Thank you" I 
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Robert Maxwell was open in his condemnation of members of the 
Council 'interfering', as he put it, in decisions which he felt could 
only properly be made by him; but he always professed to be responsive 
to the wishes of the workforce. In· fact he dominated and manipulated 
the workers, and often commanded them to do things in these dreadful 
tannoy broadcasts with the interminable use of the personal pronoun 
"I". Maxwell repeatedly got th!! SON workers to agree to his demands, 
and then dressed this up as, 'The Workers have volunteered , • • •• I 
'The workers have requested' •••••• , 'Being a good democrat the workers 
have insisted ••• ' He wielded this crude and obvious deception 
quite convincingly, perhaps because he was convinced that he was the best 
judge of the workers own interests. The attempts to emotionally 
harangue SON workers into greater output and efficiency by abusive 
tannoy messages was bitterly resented amongst them, and the Federated 
Chapel banned Maxwell from using the tannoy, which he simply ignored. 
In August the members of the APEX chapel unanimously passed a motion of 
no confidence in Maxwell as a director, ~~\~h haalso ignored. 
(Scotsman, 16 August 1975) • As R9nnie Gibson the APEX FOe dryly put it, 
"Maxwell thinks workers control is far too important to be left to the 
workers." 
The people who bore the brunt of the attack in Maxwell's tannoy 
broadcasts were the Council members and FOes who opposed him, and they 
seemed to offer little public resistance, as John Hodgeman sadly recalled: 
-Those of us who knew Mackie and Russell, and knew how 
principled and honest were their efforts - not only to save 
the jobs, not only to save the newspaper, but also the 
the co-operative - were sad that they refused to enter into 
the confront~tion with Maxwell, that could perhaps have 
awoken the workforce to his insidious campaign. Be 
frequently used the broadcast system to say that Mackie and 
company were 'fools' and 'knaves' and 
'enemies in our midst', and he often accused 
them of running down the company and trying to 
put their fellow colleagues out of work." 
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The problem was that both Mackie and Russell were mild and genial people, 
who though they unflinchingly resisted Max\,lell' s efforts to dominate 
the Council, were incapable of competing with the obsessive and 
overwhelming populist oratory of Maxwell in public, even if they had 
wished to stoop to that level. As it was they simply assumed that 
the workforce was intelligent and principled enough to disbelieve the 
more outrageous claims of Maxwell, without mountihg sufficient effort to 
disprove those claims. Mackie was later to maintain, "This was the 
basic weakness of the co-operative. Maxwell had conditioned the members 
into believing that their only chance of survival was to give him absolute 
authority •••• " (1976, p.136). But Mackie and his supporters bear 
a good deal of the responsibility for permitting this conditioning process 
to take place unchecked. 
In Breach of the Companies Act. 
By now the paper was functioning essentially with two managements 
acting in a separate and contradictory fashion. Normally Maxwell would 
force through his decisions, but when he was away they would be reversed 
by the Council. In the last week in August Maxwell left for a business 
trip in America. The Investors Council, having received a report on 
the tabloid relaunch, responded with the following unanimous motion: 
liThe Investors' Council regards the decision of the Executive 
Council to reduce the cover price from six pence to five pence 
as having bee~ totally unjustified and irresponsible with very 
serious effects on the 'future of the Company. The Investors' 
Council is particularly alarmed that the decision to reduce the 
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price was made after the Executive Council had received 
a detailed report on the financial situation and projections 
of circulation and advertising revenue, which showed that 
the decision to make the price reduction was quite unjustified. 
The Investors' Council earnestly asks the Executive Council to 
fill immediately with full-time appointments, the two key posts 
of General Manager and Financial Controller, because a continued 
vacuum in these executive posts has very serious implications 
for the paper. 
In addition, the Investors' Council suggests that the post of 
Company Secretary, at present vacant, should be filled forthwith, 
by a full-time or part-time appointment." 
There followed an important Works Council meeting on 1 September, 
called at the instigation of Boyds, the ~'s lawyers, because they were 
in breach of Section 212 of the 1948 Companies Act by not having a 
company secretary. In the absence of any other candidate for the post 
it was decided to appoint William Wolfe, who was attending the meeting 
as a replacement for Jimmy Milne. William Bargh presented the report 
of the Investors Council, commenting that "if we intended to drive the 
paper into the ground the first step had been taken with the decision to 
reduce the cover charge, as this meant that we were losing valuable 
revenue at a time when it is badly needed. He stated that the Investors 
Council felt that most people do not bother about the difference between 
Sp and 6p and therefore they felt that the decision to reduce the cover 
charge had been wrong, and that they wished the decision reversed." 
Rankin Durnin, the financial controller revealed that despite the 
increase in circulation and advertising with the relaunch, losses were 
continuing at E20,000 per week. ~en in response to the question of 
how long the paper could continue at that rate of loss, he ominously 
replied -that we could exist for 10 weeks from a financial point of view, 
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but the legal position under Section 332 of the 1948 Companies Act 
would have to be considered .. in that a company making a loss wit.~ no 
forseeable return to profitability is duty bound to appoint a 
voluntary liqUidator. Due to the DTI monitoring the company on 
a daily basis, should this occasion ever arise, they would advise us." 
(~lCM, 1 September 1975). After a discussion of the effect of the price 
reduction on circulation, Mr Bargh put the motion that the price be 
reversed to six pence from 22 September. But Mr Maxwell's influence 
was not so easily shaken off: "At this point Mr Durnin raised the fact 
that £47,000 had been spent on advertising the 5p price, with great 
emphasis on the fact that we were t~ying to beat inflation. He then 
asked how we were going to present to the public that the price would 
have to be raised." By stressingthe price reduction as the main 
message of the SDN TV advertisements, Maxwell had made it virtually 
impossible for anyone to reverse his decision, though he knew there was 
f\.U'ldamental opposition to it. The COuncil though, decided that they 
had to act, to save the paper, and the vote to increase the price was 5 to 
1 in favour. Disingenuously, the way out of the embarassment, was seen 
as to blame the DTI, "to wait until the DTI had examined us on 18 
September and then announce to the public that we were very sorry that 
although we had tried to beat in~lation, the DTI had decreed otherwise." 
There was then a brief discussion of the £59,000, due to Beaverhrook, 
and of a counter claim Robert Maxwell had made to Jocelyn Stevens for 
£40,000. It was decided to treat the matters as separate entities and 
pay Beaverhrook the money before they issued a writ they had threatened. 
Finally Allister Mackie gave notice to the meeting that he intended to 
call a vote of no confidence in the stewardship of Robert Maxwell. 
Arriving back in Glasgow, Maxwell could not contain his fury that 
so many of his plans had been thwarted in his absence. His anger 
exploded through the tannoy at six p. m on 3 September : 
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"Attention. 
circulation. 
This is Hobert Maxwell speaking. We have doubled our 
What a time to pick by those terrible people, the enemy 
in our midst, to destroy our courage and our reputation. I want you to 
reflect carefully on what I have said. Now is the time when you have 
got to stand up and make up your mind - either you want the management 
and leadership I have provided, or else you can take the situation which 
J.1ackie and Russell and their ilk have brought abqut. The DTI has asked 
me to go to a meeting on Tuesday. I cannot go to that meeting with 
a divided voice. I think that you ought to know that Mr. Mackie, 
without notice to me, has taken a decision to increase the price of our 
newspaper to 6p from 22 September. . This increase would be suicidal to 
our credit and our.livelihood. I held up a cheque of Beaverbrook for 
£59,000 because they have not fulfilled their promise on machinery. In 
addition Beaverbrook owe this company £40,000. Mackie insists that 
it be sent, and signed the cheque without my permission. 
I am sorry to give you this dreadul news. This is Mackie and 
Russell, for reasons of their OWO, who wish to play politics with the 
safety of your job. Now is t~e time to let your feelings be kno~n. 
I have ordered the caseroom management to tell Allister Mackie that he 
should do a full day's work for the money he gets. It is therefore up 
to you. I want to hear from your chapel representatives what you want 
to do to save your jobs. 
1976,pp 130-31). 
Thank you and goodnight." (McKay and Barr, 
Mo~t people in the Albion Street building felt Maxwell had gone over 
the top with this announcement, but not the caseroom where "Maxwell's 
support was strongest in the composing room, where the committee seemed 
almost to 90 out of their way to interpret Maxwell's wishes and then to 
implement them." (Mackie, 1976, p~~37). Here the announcement was 
an instant success, for the caseroom met immediately and passed a motion 
of no confidence in Mackie - Maxwell then proceeded to do everything in 
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his power to block the decisions made by the Council on 1st September. 
The next morning he rang the deputy managing director of 
Beaverbrook and told them that he would not be paying the £59,000 agreed 
by Mackie. Though they must have been stunned by this development, 
the predictable reaction of the Beaverbrook management was swift 
and punitive. In a telex later that day from Beaverbrooks solicitors 
to the SDN's solicitors, the authority conflict at the SDN was revealed 
in high relief: 
"Boydslaw Glasgow 
Attention Mr Dorman 
"As you know Scottish News Enterprises have agreed to pay 
. 
Beaverbrook Newspapers Limited pounds 59,680 in respect of 
VAT recovered on the sale of the plant and machinery. As a 
result of a letter sent to my clients by Maxwell on 11 August 
in which he sought to repudiate the agreement reached between 
Hethrington and your clients on this point, my clients stated 
that they would commence proceedings if payment had not been 
received by Friday 29 August. Following a telephone 
conversation between Mackie and my clients on Monday they 
agreed not to start proceedings and Mackie agreed to make 
payment without delay. Maxwell telephoned Beaverbrook this 
morning to say that he would not pay untilhe had a meeting 
with Jocelyn Stevens about a further payment of pounds 
40,000 allegedly due by Beaverbrook to Scottish News 
Enterprises Limited. Maxwell said that you would deal 
with the matter on behalf of Scottish News Enterprises Limited. 
My clients again reject as preposterous the 
suggestion that any liability exists for any further payment to 
• Scottish News Enterprises and unless a cheque for pounds 59,680 
is received by Messrs. Carruthers, Gammill and McKillop by 
3.00 p.m. tomorrow, Friday 5 September, drawn in their favour, 
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in payment of the amount due to my clients, I am instructed 
to authorise Carruthers, Gammill and McKillop to institute 
proceedings without delay." 
Regards 
Bullimore 
Lovell White and King." 
In the same day, Maxwell had written a letter to_Mr Dyer the deputy 
managing editor of Beaverbrook, that was by no means a model of 
commercial and legal discretion: 
Without Prejudice 
4 September 1975. 
Dear Mr Dyer 
"I confirm our telephone conversation this morning, as follows: 
1) That I will not release the cheque for £59,680 due to your Company 
until Jocelyn Stevens and I have met face to face to dispose of the 
. promised £40,000 additional payment from Beaverbrook to this co-operative. 
It was because of this understanding that I agreed to make the additional 
investment necessary to enable the deal to go through, under which 
your Company obtained the sum close to £900,000. 
2) I enclose herewith a list of items which remain uncompleted or 
undelivered under your Company's warrenty in connection with our purchase 
from you of the plant and equipment at Albion Street. 
You will agree, I am sure, that a great deal of water has flowed 
down the Clyde since completion and we are forced to ask that these 
outstanding matters be dealt with promptly. 
I repeat I am not looking for any fights with Beaverbrook, all I 
want is for this co-operative to receive its fair due. I am ready 
to meet Jocelyn Stevens at any time and Sir Max Aitken to dispose of the 
matter promptly, and in a friendly way. 
I look forward to hearing from you." 
Yours Sincerely, 
Robert Maxwell, Chief Executive. 
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(Allister Mackie bitterly pointed out that beginning the letter 
"I will not release the cheque for £59,680 due to your compa~ .•. " 
was not exactly a prudent choice of words in the circumstances. It 
was in instances like this, that some members of the Council and 
management felt they might do rather better without the assistance 
of the business talents of Robert Maxwell.) 
A further part of Maxwell's strategy of counter attack, was a 
memorandum he submitted to the Works Council on 5 September 1975. 
This was markedly different from the memos submitted previously by the 
general manager, which had been informative but restrainedJ since 
accompanying the extremely grim figures was an emotive appeal for support 
for Maxwell's own recovery plan which flatly contradicted the decisions 
taken in the last Council. It was noted that losses to 30 August 
last year were £374,356, and that the remaining cash was £205,000, which 
left enough money to pay wages for 12 weeks. The memo continued, 
perhaps unnecessarily labouring a pOint the workers already pain fully 
realised: "The Directors and workforce must face the fact that owing 
to the disastrous losses incurred since the original launch their 
money of approximately £200,000 has been lost; my investment of £114,000 
has been lost; and within the next 10-12 weeks the balance of the 
shareholders' equity will have been eroded and lost." Referring to 
the forthcoming meeting with DTI at which the Minister of State at the 
Scottish Office, Bruce Millan, (who was the Minister responsible for 
industry in Scotland), would be present, Maxwell maintained: 
"I am sure he will point out to us that under Section 332 
of the Companies Act 1948 as amended in 1967 unless the 
directors have a business plan which they are confident will 
reverse the.losses of the company within a reasonable time 
and that they have the necessary cash resources not only to 
pay wages but to meet the bills of suppliers as they fall due, 
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the Directors are legally bound to put the business into 
voluntary liquidation, because if the Directors do not 
do it, it may not be very long before some creditor does 
it whose account has not been paid on time, and he would 
take proceedings for the compulsory winding up of the 
company. 
Our current business plan, involving the price reduction 
to Sp and the doubling of sales and the doubling of our 
advertising, if continued with - and if the increase in 
sales and advertising is maintained, as I believe it will 
be - gives us confidence to continue in business with a good 
chance of success." 
Here Maxwell acknowledged the reality of the prospect of liquidation, whic~ 
he was later to condemn Mackie, Russell and Wolfe for dOing; and 
refuted the plans of the Council, insisting upon his own as the only 
alternative for the company. Finally in the memo, having done so much 
himself to disturb the continuity of management at the ~, Maxwell 
insisted, with breathtaking audacity, that there should be "no hiatus 
in management, no loss of confidence by the public and our advertisers." 
At the ensuing Council meeting Maxwell successfully slammed home 
his attempt to reverse all the decisions taken just five days earlier. 
He questioned the right of the Investors Council to submit their report 
on the price reduction and argued that "they should not interfere in 
management decisions." Milne replied "that decisions which affected 
the life of the paper were areas in which the Investors Council was duty 
bound to protect the investors." Though still adamant that the price 
increase should occur the Council was constrained because "despite the 
Works Council decision to alter the price to 6p, advertising on TV and 
radio had continued USing the Sp paper as its main selling feature." 
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It was therefore decided to stop all advertising using the 5p price 
as the major selling po'int, and reluctantly defer consideration of 
the price increase until the end of September. On the question 
of the Beaverbrook payment, the events of the previous day were 
recounted, and the ~ lawyer stated that the verbal contract between 
Stevens and Maxwell regarding the Stun of £40,000 "WOUld be difficult 
to prove and that the onus was on the creditor to prove his case. 
As this could be a lengthy process he felt the £59,000 should be paid 
and the contract between Mr Stevens and Mr Maxwell be taken up as a 
separate issue." A compromise was finally agreed that £40,000 
should be paid to the Auditor of Court, to show that the money was 
available but being withheld until settlement with Beaverbrook was 
reached, and the balance owing to Beaverbrook should be paid. The 
final item of business was that : 
nMr J. Russell complained to the Executive Council that whilst he and 
the Chairman were absent from the building on Wednesday night 3 September, 
Mr Maxwell had made a tannoy broadcast during which he stated that 
-Mr Russell and Mr Mackie were calling in liqUidators to wind up the 
company and that he would prevent this happening. Mr Russell and 
Mr Mackie strongly objected to·this message as it was completely untrue. 
Mr Maxwell replied that he had been misinformed and tendered his 
apologies which were accepted." Baving had all his plans restored, 
Maxwell could afford a faint - and frankly insulting - apology for the 
attacks he was to viciously escalate in a weeks' time •••••••. 
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The Department of Industry Meeting 
During the preparations for the meeting at the Department of 
Industry, William Wolfe, in his capacity as company secretary, was 
informed by the EDN's lawyers that due to the critical state of 
the finances of the companY,a provisional liquidation statement on 
the financial assets of the company would have to be drawn up. 
did this in a report which offered three clear alternatives: 
Wolfe 
1) An additional government loan of at least £250,000, to sustain 
the recovery of the paper. 
2) That the government relinquish part of its security on the Albion 
Street premises, which might then be used as collateral in raising 
a loan of at least £250,000 from normal commercial sources. 
3) The liquidation of Scottish News Enterprises Limited under 
Section 332 of the 1948 Companies Act. 
(Financial Times, 29 October 1975). 
The second option was the central proposal of the report~ the first 
optimistic option was to allow the government to say 'no~ and 
the final option there to show the dire consequences if the go~ernment 
refused the assistance of releasing security on the building: the 
idea was to embarrass and force the government into offering this 
minimum assistance. Mackie showed the draft of the report to seven 
of the remaining nine directors, either in preliminary or final form, thougr. 
there was no Council meeting to discuss the report. When the report 
was presented to Maxwell he agreed with the figures, and the final 
conclusion that they had to raise further capital or liquidate the 
company. But Mackie did not tell Maxwell that the report was to be 
submitted to the Minister at the forthcoming meeting, because he feared 
that Maxwell would prevent this happening without offering a valid 
alternative approach. 
Mackie. 
This evasion proved to be a fatal mistake by 
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At the meeting at the Department of Industry on Saturday 
13 September the Minister of State, Bruce Millan, agreed that the 
paper had improved, and listened ~o the argument that more time was 
needed to achieve a good product. However he was aware that the 
SON was in danger of violating the Comprulies Act and trading illegally. 
The SDN team accepted that something had to be done or the company 
faced liquidation, and at this point Mackie offered Millan the report 
prepared by Wolfe for consideration. Suddenly Maxwell erupted, 
incensed that the desperate plight of the company had been revealed to 
outsiders, contrary to his own optimistic pronouncements. (Though the 
DTI had the daily balance sheet of the~, so they knew anyway). In 
an amazing allegation he accused Wolfe of working for Sir Hugh Fraser, , 
the owner of the rival Glasgow Herald and Evening Times, and he condemned 
Mackie for wanting to close down the newspaper. S~aggered at this 
intervention, Millan passed the unconsidered report back to Mackie, and 
the meeting broke down with Maxwell promising to return within a week 
with firm proposals of a fresh injection of capital. In the street 
outside, Mackie and Maxwell indulged in a pavement slanging match, which 
did little to support the collapsing public image of the newspaper. 
Since there was no·Sunday edition of the newspaper there was little 
Maxwell could do in retaliation for 24 hours; but as soon as the SDN 
workers were assembled again on Sunday. night to prepare Monday mornings 
edition, he made his most furious assault ever upon his opponents in 
the Council through the tannoy. John Hodgeman vividly remembered 
the ugly event: 
"His voice was cracking with emotion, and he said that Mackie, Russell 
and Wolfe were trying to 'liquidate' the company. Maxwell ordered 
the workforce to ~ssemble the following day at noon at an unconstitutional 
meeting at which he said he would ask them to "rid themselves of these 
terrible people! My lasting impression of that tannoy message was of 
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Robert Maxwell choking on his words,mixing them up, and towards the end 
becoming complet4y incoherent. Those around me, including even 
the strongest of Maxwell"s supporters, were deafened and disgusted. 
All the journalists present, no matter whether they sided with 
Maxwell, or Mackie, or neither, concluded that Maxwell had made a very 
grave error in using the tannoy in this way. Maxwell's consistently 
strongest supporter on the editorial, Allister McCallum, described this 
as 'a hell of a stupid thing to do' • Apparently, some of his 
supporters went to Maxwell the next day and told him that this sort of 
behaviour would have to stop." 
To reinforce the tannoy broadcast Maxwell distributed a confidential 
memorandum to the workforce, which after claiming for himself 
responsibility for the success of the relaunch, continued: "Our 
projections for increases in advertising revenue and inco~e from other 
sources lead me to project our losses for the last quarter of this year 
will be reduced to average between £10,000 and £12,500 per week and 
during the first quarter of 1976 I am confident that we will be at break 
even point. We have a substantial six-figure cash balance and are 
paying our bills as they fall due. Our company is fully solvent." 
Then among the final clauses of the memo Maxwell turned from blind 
optimism to vitriol: 
"The attempts by Mr Wolfe, Mr Mackie, Mr Russell, Mr 
McNamara and some others to push this company into 
liquidation is as unnecessary as it is des~icable. If 
these irresponsible elements are allowed to continue 
to hold any position of authority in this company then 
it can only result in one thing - the closure of the paper 
. 
and the loss of your jobs. I am sure that 99' of you want 
f 
no such thing and will take the necessary steps at this 
meeting to stop it and to make it clear that you will no 
longer tolerate anyone in our midst playing 'politics' or 
irresponsible games with the security of our paper and 
its 500 jobs. 
No newspaper in the present economic climate can expect 
to be profitable within its first year. In spite of all 
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the hard ,.,ork by you the workforce since last May in getting 
the paper out, the company has lost a great deal of money, 
a lot more than it should have done had it been effectively 
managed. Equally had it had a proper strategy and effective 
support to get advertising, the volume of advertising would 
not have been as abysmally low as it was. The responsibility 
for this disaster belongs to the Executive Council and not to 
the hard-working advertising sales force. These matters, as 
you know, are being put right successfully and will improve 
substantially over the next two to six months. 
At today's mass meeting you must decide whether you are going 
to clear those people out who are in favour of liquidating and 
give your authority to me and those members of the Executive 
Council who are for continuing the paper in business and for 
doing their utmost to make a success of it. The following 
members of the Executive Council are against liquidation: 
Mr •. A. Blyth, Mr. N. Goldberg, Mr. R. Maxwell, Mr. F. Sillito. 
If that is your decision I assure you we will have no difficulty 
in preventing this calamity 
I am sure that once we have ended the internal squabbles and 
got Mr Mackie· and his friends off the Executive Council and 
back to doing a job of work for which they are paid to do (sic) 
all will·be well. Finally, I am optimistic that we shall have 
no· difficulty in getting support from the Government and other 
sources to enable us to get the 'additional financial reserves 
should it be requir.ed. II 
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This memo, riddled with distortions of the actions and intentions 
of others, and overwhelming in sheer ,arrogance, is an accurate 
indication of the approach of Robert Maxwell to his executive position 
at the SDN. Two aspects of this approach stand out clearly: 
firstly the contempt for anyone who questioned his decisions, which he 
dismissed as 'playing politics'; this was part of a rejection of 
the principle of democratic collective decision making, which Maxwell 
defined as 'internal squabbles'; and a disdain for the involvement of 
workers in executive decision making, whom he preferred back on the 
shop floor (if, that is, they contested his ideas) •. Secondly, in 
blaming the Council for the shortfall in advertising, rather than the 
advertisers themselves, Maxwell indicated how the paper would be more 
accommodating to advertisers in future. 
The Mass Meeting That Killed the Co-operative. 
The ensuing mass meeting was in many ways a democratic farce: 
there was inadequate notice; inadequate publicity (the chair~~n of the 
co-operative, Allister Mackie, was one of many who did not hear of the 
meeting until it was in progress); an inadequate agenda with a highly 
manipulative wording; and an unconstitutional motion calling for the 
resignation and re-election of members of the Council, which could only 
be properly carried out at a formally convened AGM or EGM. The agenda 
itself was ~ small masterpiece of malpractice: 
Meeting of the workforce to be held on Monday 15 September 1975 at 12 oncloc~. 
AGENDA. 
1. Motion by show of hands of the members approving the holding of 
this meeting. 
2. Nomination of Chairman for the meeting. Members of the Executive 
council cannot be nominated. 
3. Endorsement of SGA's vote of no confidence in A.A.Mackie and the 
resignation of the Directors, en-block (sic), who may seek re-election if 
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they wish. This motion to be moved by K. Grant, seconded by 
G. Smith. The motion is supported by Machine Room Chapel and some 
members of SLADE Chapel. 
4. R. axwell's proposals for additional capital injection by 
himself and others in order that an application can be made to the 
Government to provide further capital of up to £250,000 to enable us to 
have an additional reserve in case advertising and circulation revenues 
do not live up to projections in 1976. 
The agenda notice was unsigned and undated, and it was by no means clear 
who it was from. The references to the trade union chapels would imply 
that it was to be a mass meeting of the chapels .in which case the 
Imperial Father of the Federated Chapel should have been in the chair. 
Yet it was clearly intended to be also a meeting of the employee members 
of the co-operative, therefore Mackie as co-operative chairman or 
Wolfe as company secretary, should have signed the agenda, which they 
could not do as they did not know the meeting was taking place. 
Whoever wrote the agenda, was cavalier in the notion that the mass 
meeting could simply by majority V9te decide to go ahead with an 
unconstitutional meeting, and arrogant in proposing who could - and who 
could not - be chairman of the meeting. In item 3, the motion in 
question is not fully set out as it should be, although the support for 
the motion certainly is. But how the backing of "some members of 
SLADE chapel" could be put forward as a serious proposition is quite 
amazing. When the SGA motion. finally emerged, it consisted of the 
following: 
RAt a recent SGA c~pel meeting we expressed our confidence in 
Robert Maxwell's proven economic expertise, to guide and 
assist our enterprise. 
In view of the repeating pattern of events which occur in the 
WOrks Council in Robert Maxwell's absence, this SGA Chapel 
records a vote of No Confidence in Allister Mackie's continuance 
as Chairman and invites him accordingly to resign at 
this stage and seek re-election. 
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This meeting today endorses the SGA motion and also 
expresses a vote of No Confidence in Mr James Russell's 
continuance as a director and also a vote of No Confidence 
iN W. Wolfe's position as Secretary and invites them to 
resign their positions and if they wish thy can stand for 
re-election at a meeting to be convened at an early date". 
Thus, contrary to the agenda summary of the motion, the directors 
were not to resign .!!!. bloc, but only Mackie and Russell. (The other 
directors did ~ resign nor was there a proper meeting later to elect 
replacement directors.) 
Most of the opponents of Maxwell who knew about the meeting, stayed 
away in disgust,one ~rou~ assemblin~,in the Express bar next door; 
and only a few were prepared to attend the meeting with Maxwells 
supporters to witness the - by now - inevitable victory of Maxwell. 
John Hodgeman through, made a deliberate point of attending the meeting, 
to record for himself the manner of the demise of the ideal he had 
fought for: 
"It is necessary to outline briefly what the normal procedure 
was at a mass meeting, so that it can be seen how irregular 
this meeting was. Normally, the Works Council would be 
ranged together, whatever their views, in front of the 
assembled workforce. The chairman of the meeting, who 
would normally be the Imperial Father of the Federated Chapel, 
that is the leader of the Shop Stewards, would sit in the 
middle of the Works Council and take any points or comments 
f%Om the floor in an orderly manner. This time everything 
was different. Half of the Works Council were not present. 
Those councillors, who were present did not take up their 
usual positions, but stood around the back of the meeting, anq 
. . .'; 
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mingled among the rest of the workforce. Where there would normally 
have been a dozen people in the central point of the meeting, therefore, 
now there was only Robert Maxwell. 
Mr. Ma~'ell said that he wanted to conduct a properly organized 
meeting and he therefore said that he intended to have a chairman elected. 
On a show of hands, the head printer, Alec Munro, was elected. He 
had been nominated by the case room, not by Maxwell, and did his best 
to conduct a proper meeting, but Maxwell railroaded the show. The 
motion to get rid of Mackie, Russell and Wolfe had not only been 
prepared many days in advance, but Maxwell also had a copy of this 
motion, which supposedly came from the floor independently. He 
referred to this motion, which the mover, KennethGrant, admitted had 
been prepared several days in advance. While Grant was reading the 
long and complicated motion, Maxwell was scrutinizing his copy, and at 
one point raised for discussion a part of it with which he was unha?py. 
This was a paragraph that the case room had added without reference 
to Maxwell, investing him with the power and authority to remove from 
the Board. any Works Councillor who disagreed withhim on any matter 
whatsoever. This paragraph had to be deleted or the pretence of the 
firm remaining a workers co-operative could no longer be sustained. 
Maxwell stood up and said that his reason for disagreeing with 
this part of the motion was that he did not want so much power. 
About a dozen of us among the 3lS.present gave an ironi~ ctieer at this 
news: the rest of the workforce seemed to swallow this latest price 
of nonsense. The case room happily agreed to this deletion, and 
the tactic of seemingly having two opposed views (case room versus 
Maxwell) served to successfully thwart anyone putting a view which 
was contrary to both the case roan and Maxwell arguments. Mr. Monro, 
the chairman of the meeting, then hUrried on to a vote. However, 
before this could be·taken Allister Mackie arrived. There was much 
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shouting and booing, and much smirking from Mr. Maxwell. When 
Allister Mackie stood up to address the workforce Maxwell kept 
making dismissive gestures with his hands. Mackie told the 
workforce that they were holding an unconstitutional meeting. Maxwell 
agreed that the meeting was unconstitutional, but said that, 'There is 
no time for such niceties'." 
Allister Mackie had learned of the meeting in a phone call from 
Jimmy McNamara," The first I knew of the workers mass meeting was 
this morning. 
it was on 
I was standing in my pyjamas when I got a Call to say 
I did not get much of a chance to address the men. 
Asked why he had not told Mr. Mackie about his intentions to call the 
meeting, Mr. Maxwell replied 'These things happen'." (Daily Express, 
16 September 1975). In his presentation of the Wolfe document to 
the meeting, Maxwell declined to mention that the principal objective 
of the report had been to examine ways in which the government might 
'help the company avoid liquidation, but instead maintained that it was 
a malicious effort to push the co-operative into liquidation. 
(Financial Times 29 October, 1975; Mackie, 197Eb,p. 139). Mackie 
insisted that the meeting wasunconstituional, but attempted to explain 
the intentions of himself and Wolfe - that they hoped to save the 
co-operative, but that liquidation would be a final alternative forced 
upon them, in which they had no option. He concluded earnestly, 
"If you accept Robert Maxwell, then you are accepting his morality ••• " 
but his quiet words were drowned in the waves of angry hostility, 
reVerberating around the crowded room. Mackie then left the meeting, 
particularly saddened that the motion of no confidence in him came from 
'the SGA, which he had been a member of for fourteen years. Afterwards 
he explained, in private, one reason why he could not battle in debate 
with Maxwell: "I'm not a well man, t've only got one kidney, and that 
doesn't work very well. After some of the mass meetings, I would gO 
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and retch up everything in my stomach. The emotion in the 
meetings overacts the adrenalin glands and my body can't handle it. 
I'm not excitable, I'm very relaxed most of the time, but in those 
meetings with Maxwell, I just go sick." 
By now many of the assembled ''lorkers were oblivious of any concern 
for Allister Mackie, and adulatery in their slavish devotion to 
Robert Maxwell. Ronnie Gibson laughingly recalled, "The guy who was 
moving the motion actually said, 'Maxwell was a captain in the army, he 
can be our captain too~ He was quoting from the bible as well - it was 
a farce". Also in his speech Grant made the classic . statement, "We've 
got to face it... we need to fee 1 the master's whip!", which the 
Sunday Times gratefully sub-headlined in its extensive report of the 
events (21 September 1975). The irony was that the speaker, Ken Grant, 
was chief reader, a foreman that is, not an ordinary shopfloor worker; 
and among foremen such sympathies are legendary since it is customary 
that they should wield the whip, not suffer it ~ Similarly ~~ckie 
was astounded ,at the workers choice of a chairman for the meeting, the 
head printer who had applied for the assistant production manager's job, 
n the workers put a management man into the chair:" (The intriguing 
tactic by employers of encouraging foremen to speak at meetings as if 
they were ordinary workers and then extensively reporting their 
comments in the 'manufacturers newspapers'was apparently common in the 
early nineteenth century!) (Marx and Engels, 1976,p.208). But the great 
majority of the workers at the SDN meeting were prepared to go along 
with this ugly charade, as Gibson stoically remarked, "Too many of the 
workers are willing to accept anything just for a job. II John Hodgeman 
made a valiant but solitary effort to convince the ~ workers they 
were sadly mistaken in the course they were intent upon, he remembered, 
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itA move was made by the chairman to take a vote, and at 
this point I put up my hand. I asked him if it was not 
reasonable to allo~ someone with a contrary view to the 
proceedings to speak. Several voices among the workforce 
tried to persuade the chairman not to allow me to speak 
but he allowed me to go ahead. The first point I made 
when I spoke was that the whole meeting was unconstitutional 
and therefore invalid: that I was loathe to participate in 
any voting procedure; but that I could not allow these 
proceedings to come to a conclusion without any voice of 
dissent being raised. I pointed out that I did not have 
any alternative motion or amendment, but I pleaded with the 
workforce to vote against the motion, in order not to invest 
Maxwell with supreme authority. I tried to explain my reasons 
for so persistently opposing Maxwell •••••• The meeting listened 
to everything I had to say without further interruption, but when 
I came to the conclusion that I would rather lose my job, and face 
the dole queue than be a pawn in any more of Maxwell's games, 
this raised the old spectre of them being thrown in the 
streets again and I lost all sympathy. Allister Bluth, who 
was to be appointed the new chairman in place of the existing 
Mackie, replied to my speech. He said the only priority 
now was to save the jobs. He made no reference to saving 
the co-operative, and his final lines were that, "When I 
~e into the Scottish Daily News, I leave my politics at 
the door." The vote was then taken. The support for 
Maxwell was so overwhelming that he did not bother to count 
the 'ayes'. A count of those agains~~wed there were 
12 voters, there were also eighc abstentions." 
The workforce had eagerly approved the motion in hopeful 
anticipation of the announcement of the full implications of item 4 on the 
492 
agenda "R. Maxwell's proposals for additional capital injection 
by himself and others ••• ", which thy felt sure would include a 
personal investment of several hundred thousand pounds. This was 
the 'silver hammer' of Robert Maxwell that he had deployed so 
skillfully on this and other occasions. ~s Marx once observed, 
"the splendid Gaels had now to suffer still more bitterly for their 
romantic mountain idolization of the 'great men' of the clan." 
(l976,p.692) • For it transpired that Maxwell was only prepared to offer 
a maximum of £25,000, which would barelycover two weeks losses of 
the newspaper. Moreover the shocked workers learned next that the 
"others" to con!.ribute would simply be themselves, in the naked 
motion that 
"A vote in principle be given to authorise the Company to 
deduct a half-week's wages per month for the next three 
months as an additional contribution to the share capital 
of the Company if necessary." 
This was presented as "an opportunity to further invest in the enterprise n , 
which most people distressfully interpreted as a wage cut over the next 
three months. The proposal was later presented in the previous format 
of a 50 pence investment by Maxwell for every pound contributed by the 
workers. Thus the SDN workers were guilty of allowing themselves to 
be seriously manipulated due to misconceived self-interest. 
Immediately after the meeting, in a televised press conference 
Robert Maxwell strained to preserve a shattered public image confronted 
by awkward questions: 
"Reporter: I understand that the mass meeting was told today that you 
are somewhere in the region of £200,000 short - or that is required 
to keep things going? 
Maxwell: We are very solvent, we have no financial problems. 
Reporter: Why are you asking workers to give a cut in their wages? 
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Maxwell: We're asking nobody to takea cut in their wages. 
Reporter: Can you tell me precisely what the workers have volunteered 
to do? 
Maxwell: The workers have volunteered to make a further investment 
in this company during the last quarter of this year - October, November, 
and December, of a figure of approximately between 45 and 50 thousand 
pounds, as sho\'ling thei r confidence in the future of this newspaper. 
Reporter: And how are they going to do this? 
Maxwell: They're going to do this by er ,paying a half week, using 
a half week's money per month ••• invested in the ••• half a week's money 
per month. 
Second Reporter: "Can I ask one straightforward question again? 
Maxwell: If it's straightforward. 
Second Reporter: It is absolutely straightforward. 
Scottish Daily News need any ne\~ cash? 
Maxwell: No. 
Reporter: Why, Mr. Maxwell •••• ? 
Does the 
Maxwell: If it needed any new cash, why would we wait for this 
investment to be made in October, November and December, and what would 
it do with its huge high six figure cash balance today? 
Reporter: Is the Dail¥ News, Mr. Maxwell, short of money? 
Maxwell: No! n 
(BBC2, 10 November 1975) • 
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Victims of An Ideological Clash. 
There followed a sombre Council meeting in the late afternoon 
at which Robert Maxwell secured the, as yet unsoured, fruits of his 
victory, and as each item on the agenda came up in turn, he apparently 
had cause for a burgeoning satisfaction. In the first matter to be 
considered, it was revealed by Wolfe and the SDN's lawyers that 
examination of the original contract with Beaverbrook had revealed no 
reference to VAT payments, and therefore the ~ could hold on to the 
E59,000 VAT money. ~Urning to the price rise, the circulation manager 
had recommended that it should be at the beginning of' February, which 
allowed Maxwell to appear reasonable by suggesting early January. On 
the question of the Wolfe report, Wolfe stated that he had prepared the 
document for the Council and not the DTI, and Mackie was criticised for 
submitting it to the Minister. Considering the events of the mass 
meetin9~ "Mr Maxwell apologised to the Works Council and the Federated 
Chapel for calling the mass meeting but said it was an emergency: the 
workforce had.to have their say before the Council made any irrevocable 
decisions" • 
. In discussing the motions which had been passed, wMr. Goldberg 
said that Mr Mackie should heed the workforce." To which Jimmy 
McNamara,there in place of Russell, heroically replied that he was in 
favour of "winding up in a working class manner." Mackie accepted that 
he had no aiternative but to tender his resignation, and Wolfe stated 
that, "I note the resolution passedby the workforce as far as my position 
s company secretary is concerned. I have done my duty with a clear 
conscience. I am not prepared to prevaricate and disguise the 
seriousness of the financial situation of the company, or to hide it 
from the Executive Council. I note that the workforce believes that 
. 
Robert Maxwell can keep this company going. I hope their confidence 
is fulfilled. I resign in order to leave him to operate as he sees fit: 
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By agreement, in his absence James Russell's resignation was also 
tendered. Thereupon Allister Blyth was proposed as the new chai~uan 
by Maxwell and seconded by Goldberg, and since there was no other 
nomination, Blyth was elected unopposed. Finally, before excessive 
jubilation could break out in the Maxwell camp, "Mr. R. Patrick of 
Boyds intimated that Boyds wished to be relieved of legal liability 
and would be withdrawing their services to the Company. He informed 
the directors of their responsibilities under Section 332 of the Companies 
Act and their view of the present financial position." (WCM, 15 September 
1975). 
The debate about the democratic and commercial viability of the 
Scottish Daily News now moved out of the Albion Street building and 
into the pages of the national press, where it was to be a controversial 
focus for many weeks to come. 
claims of imminent liquidation: 
In an opening barrage Maxwell refuted 
"The paper has doubled its circulation and doubled its 
advertising. It has a substantial six-figure cash 
balance in hand. It is reducing substantially the initial 
losses that any newspa~r ~s bound to incur during tile 
period of its launch and it is expected to break even early 
in 1976 and perhaps go into profit later in that year ••• 
I am sure that, now the internal squabbles are over and 
there is a clear and united management line which the 
workforce understands and overwhe~ngly backs, the 
Scottish Daily News can now look forward to getting on with 
the job of producing an exciting, challenging, and successful 
newspaper_ I have no intention of taking over the Daily News: 
in fact I intend to hand it over to a full-time professional 
as soon as possible." (Guardian,16 September 1975). The Economist 
analysis simply resorted to the crude Social Darwinism so reloved of 
corporate man: "when disaster is at hand, power tends to go 
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into the hands of one pO'17erful and determined man. The 
real test will come if the SDN survives. Will Mr. Maxwell 
continue in power by force of personality?" 
(27 September 1975). 
Under the imposing headline of "Victim of an Ideological Clash", 
Allister Mackie made a resounding reply in the Scotsman, in which 
he was "at pains to point out that the battle between himself and 
Mr. Maxwell has never been on a level of a clash of personalities, but 
a clash of ideologies." The article described Mackie as a figurehead 
for the whole co-operative concept and, as a fervent beheliever in 
the principle of workers control, the spokesman for the elected body 
responsible for running the co-operative rater than a leader, and 
continued quoting Mackie: 
"The differences between the Works Council and Mr. Maxwell 
arose because of his style of management. We fought 
to preserve the Works Council's right to make basic 
policy decisions, but Mr. Maxwell refused to recognize 
them unless he happened to agree with them. In other 
words, he was running the paper on his own. What the 
workers were saying in yesterday's vote was that they 
didn't want a co-operative, they wanted Mr. Maxwell to 
run the company. It was a vote against the concept 
of the co-operative. I stood for that concept, and 
that is why I felt it a matter of honour to resign. 
Mr. Maxwell's management style is totally authoritarian 
he tolerates no opposition, and that is not compatible 
with a co-operative. He has made very many bad 
f 
commercial deCisions, and the Works Council prevented 
sane of these from being implemented by having a restraining 
influence. Now I think there is a danger of more such 
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decisions beCBu se he is not inhibited by the Works Council". 
(17 September 1975). 
The analysis of Mackie was strongly supported by Eric Tough, the 
general manager who had resigned the previous month, when Maxwell 
became Chief Executive. Tough insisted that the concept of a 
workers co-operative in Albion Street was "stone dead". Now 
that the original concept had vanished it would be unfair to judge 
the principle of workers control by the fate of the Scottish Daily 
News. 'If it succeeds or fails now, it will be on its merits as 
a newspaper and as a Maxwell venture. The economic. climate and 
advertising revenue may well have an effect but the experiment as such 
has been wrecked'". (G}l~dian, 17 September 1975). Even the august , , 
columns of the Daily Telegraph found some sympathy for Mackie's position: 
"Mr. Robert Maxwell is at loggerheads with union leaders o,"Yer his 
personal domination of the strife torn Scottish Daily News which is rQ~ 
as a workers co-operative. There were hints in Glasgow last night 
that a meeting of print union leaders will be held shortly to decide 
what action they can take to unseat Mr. Maxwell from his position 
as .chief executive. It is felt that he is using all his power to 
gain control of the organisation. Mr. Mackie was one of the few 
people who stood up to Mr. Maxwell, and his removal is seen in some 
quarters as a further step towards absolute control by Mr. Maxwell. 
Mr. James Crossan, Imperial Father, said last night that he felt the 
paper was no longer a workers co-operative and Mr. Maxwell seemed 
bent on absolute power ••• He said the workers seemed to regard 
Mr. Maxwell as a 'Father Christmas figure' but he hoped they would 
change their opinions before it was too late. 'There is no way that 
Mr. Maxwell alone can save the paper.' (17 September 1975). 
f 
Maxwell was not quite alon~, in that he had two unremitting 
supporters in Nathan Goldberg who was soon to become editor, and 
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Alister Bl'lth who had taken over as chairman of the .e!?!!. Goldberg 
was something of an enigma: he was undoubtedly ambitious as his 
quarrels with other senior edito~ial appointments had shown; he 
described his support of Maxwell as pragmatic - a necessary expedient 
in order to preserve the paper. But Goldberg was also an idealist 
who had drifted in and out of sympathy with a number of left-wing 
organisations, including the International Socialists; and was 
currently a member of the Communist Party, where ironically, Maxwell's 
firmest opponents, including Jimmy McNamara and Ronnie Gibson, were 
loc~ted. This prompted the following amusing exchange between Mackie, 
a stalwart of the Labour Party, and Gibson : 
Mackie: How could you let anyone like Goldberg in your party? 
Gibson: How could you let someone like Maxwell in yours ! 
It was a lot easier to understand Alister Blyth. Charlie 
Armstrong, who had worked alongside him for years, explained: 
"Blyth was picked out early by Maxwell as someone who would 
do what he was told, but would be presentable to the 
workforce. In the Beaverbrook days Blyth applied 
for an overseers job twice and both times he was knocked 
back. It was only then that he. got interested in the 
union, because it was the only possibility left open to him. 
When the ~ started he certainly didn't want to go back 
as a stereotyper in the foundry, its an awful job. 
But he wanted to do eveything else: he wanted to be an 
overseer, on the Works Council, and an FOC -- the lot. 
Be had to be told it was not on". Early in the summer, 
Ronnie Gibson had angrily supported this assessment: 
"Blyth wanted to be FCC and on the Works Council, it was 
impractical. It is the same as with overseers and 
FOe's, the two argue against each other, it is impractical 
to have one man to do this. At the monent Blyth is 
organizing the competitions, as he did the advertising 
at the launch, but now we have executives to do this 
work. Blyth is after the job of competitions manager, 
but the only reason he is doing the work is because he 
is a director, though it was understood in the articles 
of association that no director should benefit from his 
position." 
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Hence a measure of Blyth's abilities, and an indication of his personal 
and political orientations, was that as a works councillor his 
major contribution to the SDN, prior to assuming the chairmanship, 
consisted of organizing the June car competition, and the weekly spot-
the-ball competitions, which occupied most of his time. He also 
organized a golf competition, and among his sugges~ions was that the 
Council should consider organizing a lottery in conjunction with the 
tabloid relaunch, and using bingo as a promotional medium. (WCM, 4 
August 1975). It might be argued that Blyth was eminently suited to 
become a competitions promoter, but hardly the chairman of a newspaper 
with a supposedly socialist and trade union orientation. 
From the start of Blyth's chairmanship it was apparent that he 
was the representative of Maxwell, and would obediently comply with 
almost any of Maxwell's requests. Often Blyth was prepared/or 
constrained, to carry this compliance to ridiculous lengths, for example 
in refusing to give press interviews independently, unless he had been 
briefed by Maxwell. It fell upon Blyth to show that the ~ was 
still under workers control, and to send prickly replies to the frequent 
press criticism of the current ~ hierarchy: 
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liThe original grave mistake of Mr. Mackie and his 
supporters was to refuse Mr. Maxwell's advice on 
management matters when he offered it last spring. 
decided that with the assistance of Mr. Tough they 
They 
could do the job themselves. 
show, they were sadly wrong. 
In this, as the weekly losses 
Mr. Mackie and his 
supporters tried to get rid of Mr. Maxwell.from the co-operative 
once they had his investment secured. But the vast 
majority of our workers have decided that such an act could 
not be condoned in a work co-operative ••••• What went 
wrong, and what the executive' council and the workforce now 
realise, is that people like Mr. Mackie, who were good at 
getting the project started, but had no senior newspaper 
or publishing management experience are not necessarily the 
best people to run a multi-million-pound business providing 
employment for 500 people - especially when it is a project 
as complicated as a national newspaper." (Guardian, 18 September,l975) 
This was how the current orthodoxy in the Maxwell camp: that 
Mackie had been a useful person to have during the struggle to establish 
the paper, but that he was unsui ~able to be the chairman of a commercial 
venture; as one spokesman put it : 
"It is recognised by everyone that Mackie was the principal 
founder of the co-operative and newspaper - it was his 
enthusiasm and. reputation which was the main support in the 
year of campaigning. It is recognised that 'Benn loaned 
the money·to Allister Mackie rather than the SDN'. But it 
is thought that Mackie had lost his grip in a tight 
situation and prematurely given 'up, and was dragging the 
paper down with him, by submitting a report to the Minister 
which in effect proposed liquidation, without the prior 
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consultation, or the permission, of the Works Council 
members". 
(An irony was that it was true that Mackie's personal reputation as 
a trade unionist and Labour councillor in Bathgate was extremely 
influential in persuading the government about the loan. And there 
was more to this still, as Charlie Armstrong explained, "Allister Mackie's 
mother was for a long time Lord Provost of Dundee, and so was his 
father, together they practically organized the Labour Party in the 
city for years. Allister was always in their shadow, which is 
one reason why he moved down here. When Harold Wilson first heard 
about the ~proposal and Mackie, he said 'Oh, that's Annie Mackie's 
son ~'. The Labour Party is even more nepotistic than business !" 
Thus ironically, since the state remained the only real possibility of 
securing substantial additional funds, the workers had cast aside their 
one real connection with the Labour Government, in favour of Maxwell 
whom the government was glad to keep at arms length). 
The great consolation to Macki~, as he recovered in exile at 
home from the ordeal he had been through, was that the sympathy of 
the- wider labour movement remained with hi! supporters,· and antagoni,stic 
to the Maxwell takeover: "We're out, but at least we were right. 
We were right, and we've got the trade union movement behind us, 
otherwise we Would be nothing." Realising that there remained work 
to be done at Albion Street Mackie bravely resolved to return: 
"Mackie: I think I will go back. 
Gibson: Back to work? But they won't even speak to you : 
Mackie: Oh, they'll speak to me, they'll have to speak to me." 
.One role which Mackie could resume, was as a union activist; 
f 
"The tragedy is that the co-operative was a success and we 
produced a successful newspaper. It wouldn't have been 
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possible under any other set-up. We performed our 
own miracles by hard work and dedication. During the 
pre-launch period, some of· the men were doing a day's 
work, sleeping in the building, getting up in the morning 
and starting allover again. A l2-hour day was normal. 
Now, in their own interests, union chapels will have to 
adopt a policy against the manag~aent( which there was no 
need for before. We had a unique situation where 
management and unions, even the most militant members were 
working as one. The first harvest which will be reaped 
from the seeds which were sown this week will be one of 
confrontation. Traditional attitudes will come back ~ 
it's inevitable." (Scotsman, 17 September 1975). 
The first positive indication of the validity. of Mackie's 
prediction concerned the issue of the compulsory levy on the SDN 
workers wages. In the heat of the mass meeting, an overwhelming 
majority had voted in favour of the idea; but as the implications 
of the proposed means test dawned' on people, resistance mounted. 
Strangely, the resistance was greatest from the NUJ who were among 
Maxwell's most devoted supporters. The NUJ chapel met immediately 
after the mass meeting to discuss the implication that anyone who 
refused to pay the levy would be hauled before a means testing body. 
It was unanimously agreed to reject any compulsory levy, but accept 
that anyone could invest on a purely voluntary basis. The NUJ chapel 
later passed this motion overwhelmingly, and the decision was 
communicated to Maxwell. The next day a document was circulated, 
by the night news editor, which stated that, "Those who feel they 
cannot contribute on hardship or on other grounds, will be given the 
opportunity to discuss their case with a special committee selected 
from the Federated Chapel and Works Council," John Bodgeman, who had 
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already resigned from the newspaper in protest, and was a committee 
member of the NUJ chapel, and previously Glasgow branch secretary, 
exploded in anger, and told the deputy editor that the paragraph 
relating to means testing would be· reported not only to the NUJ 
branch, but to·the national officials of the union: "Goldberg 
disappeared upstairs, and ten minutes later, the new chairman, 
Alister Blyth, came on the tannoy, and asked that the paragraph 
be deleted and ignored by the workforce." 
The only real defences protecting the SON workers now from a 
complete degeneration of their pay and conditions were the external 
trade.union organizations, and those SON union chapels, especially 
the AUEW and EEPTU, who remained distinctly unmesmerised by the promises 
of Maxwell. At a meeting on 22nd September Maxwell was confronted by 
all of the full time union officials who had members at Albion Street, 
as one explained: 
"Maxwell had arranged the meeting 'to smooth over any problems'; but we 
were angered by the idea of a compulsory levy on our members wages. 
We demanded that the levy be voluntary not compulsory and he agreed. 
Maxwell accused Jimmy McNamara of attempting to sabotage the paper; and 
Alex Fairly, the AUEW official, told Maxwell not to. insult his members 
in his presence, otherwise there would be trouble. Fairly adopted a 
very hard line and Maxwell understood. While Maxwell was out of the 
room looking for the Wolfe document to prove that it included a clause 
about liquidation, Alister Blyth was in the room on his own. We 
turned to him and asked, 'One day the paper needs £250,000, and the next 
day it doesn't. Which is it? t Blyth was lost without Maxwell, he 
didn't know what to say. He didn't say very much, and was noticeably 
relieved when Maxwell came back." 
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Maxwell At Large. 
Having triumphed in the Works Council on the fourth floor of 
Albion Street, Maxwell could now turn his overbearing attention to 
the critical functions of the floor beneath - the edito~ial floor. 
Many journalists were already upset by the tannoy broadcasts they had 
endured, which they regarded as an ill-mannered and unwarrented 
intrusion upon their professional autonomy. Unaffected by such 
considerations, Maxwell became a frequent visitor to the editorial 
floor to offer helpful suggestions about editorial style and content. 
John Hodgeman, who was a sub,editor on the night shift, particularly 
resented this assistance: "Most nights when I worked on production of 
the newspaper Robert Maxwell would appear for five or ten minutes 
soon after the production of the first edition. He would examine 
it and make comments, and on at least one occasion when I disagreed 
with his interpretation of news value I offered him my seat, which he 
declined. This behaviour was not only unacceptable in a workers 
co-operative, but it would have been totally unacceptable in any 
ordinary trade union organized newspaper." Maxwell wanted significant 
changes in editorial orientation, but the abrupt and heavy-handed approach 
he made to this, in a memorandum circulated to the editorial staff, 
only served to provoke and distress the journalists. 
" ••••• It is incumbent upon those of us who have a major 
responsibility in the management and content of the Scottish 
Daily News to give urgent consideration as to what steps must 
be taken in order to produce a newspaper which will be bought 
by more and more people and in sufficient quantity to attract 
advertisers in exactly the same way as our successful rivals 
do. The first priority as far a~ I am concerned, is therefore 
the identification of a target audience to whom our newspaper 
intends to serve, and to create a paper and adopt a formula 
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that will appeal to our audience. We must agree that 
we cannot be all things to all men. The paper must be 
consistent in personality, something that has not happened 
since its launch. The paper is probably too serious at 
present, both in content and presentation. Subbing is 
dull and quite often spoils good content •••. The editor 
and senior editorial staff and all members of the editorial 
staff must be conscious at all times over the next few 
months that they should go for stories which can help 
advertising and circulation whenever they possibly can." 
Proposals such as this were directed obviously towards producing a 
more commercial and popular newspaper, abandoning the ~'s previous 
editorial political principles. Most of the SDN journalists did not 
object to a change in editorial orientation, what they resented was the 
method by which this change was being imposed. Mackie bitterly 
commented, "The editorial, forever a weak part of the co-operative, were 
beginning to become aware of the disastrous course the co-operative had 
embarked upon when there was interference with the editorial content of 
the paper by Maxwell. It was one thing for him to undermine the 
Council's authority; it :was another to attack the editorial's!" Thus 
the commitment to professional independence proved stronger than the 
commitment to co-operative control. 
A second matter which caused considerable disquiet in the days 
after Maxwell had assumed control, was the election of two replacement 
members of the Works Council. The proper procedure for this would 
be to have an AGM, though of course, this procedure already had been 
neglected. Now the idea of a democratic election was abandoned 
altogether, at least until the next AGM in six months time: the 
remaining Council members unilaterally decided that nominees could be put 
forward by the workforce if they could secure forty signatures in support -
but the remaining members of the Council itself would select the new 
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members. (WCM, 19 September 1975). This effectively deprived 
the shopfloor workers of their right to elect members of the Council, 
and was a dismal sign of the disintegration of democracy in the 
enterprise. Originally there were eight nominations for the Councili 
four of these failed to collect the required signature. One of the 
four who gathered sufficient support was John Hodgeman, who withdrew 
his resignation when he realised he could stand: "I felt that as 
a Works Councillor I could effectively thwart Maxwell's plans to run 
the company. Only as a Councillor would I have an authoritative voice 
with the workforce. I got the 40 signatures with little trouble, 
for most of the workforce, though supporting Maxwell and disagreeing 
with my views, respected my right to hold them, and felt that I had not 
only been an honest and consistent opponent of Maxwells, but because I 
had given up so much in the material sense in joining the co-operative, 
that I was still working for its good •••• But the following day I 
received a letter from the editor, Fred Sillito, informing ~e that he 
had been instructed by Robert Maxwell not to allow me to withdraw my 
earlier resignation notice and that I would have to go". Another of 
the candidates was Charlie Slater of APEX, an elderly but principled man 
who felt he had little to lose in standing up to Maxwell. The EEPTU 
FOC, Bob McKay rallied support for Slater, "I organized a petition round 
the building in support of Charlie from the APEX chapel, because I knew 
his heart was in the right place. I got 112 names, which was a lot 
more than anyone else had. I put the petition in for the Council to 
consider, but it was ignored." At the following Council meeting, 
Dorothy Grace-Elder of the NUJ was elected by the Council members 
unanimously, and when there was a tie for the second position between 
Charlie Slater and Tommy Clarke of NATSOPA, Clarke was elected by the 
casting vote of the chairman, Blyth. 
The immediate task, of the new Council was to attempt to reduce the 
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losses of the newspaper, and to quickly find the considerable 
injection of funds necessary to surviv.e the winter. Before any 
productive effort in this direction could be attempted, a crisis 
occurred which induced a terminal deterioration in the finances of the 
SON. The Beaverbrook management carried out the legal action 
they had threatened, and secured a writ to seize the account of the SON 
at the Bank of Scotland, up to the sum of £59,680, which they insisted 
was owing to them. Robert Maxwell's reaction to this disaster 
compounded the problem immeasurably: in a manner reminiscent of the 
press barons of the early twentieth century, the whole 'of the front page 
of the Scottish Daily News on 20 September 1975 was devoted to the story 
in bold headlines, with a picture of Robert Maxwell, and the telex he 
had sent to Sir Max Aitken, the Chairman of Beaverbrook, reproduced 
in heavy type: 
"Beaverbrook Raid On News Cash" 
n 
....... If two companies have a ?ommercial dispute, there is 
a civilised way of dealing with matters. I am sorry that 
Beaverbrook have decided to behave in the most uncivilised 
manner by arresting the Scottish Daily News' bank account, 
thus attempting to make it impossible for us to operate 
normally and causing the maximum amount of damage and 
inconvenience to our business. This is in spite of the 
. fact that I offered to Jocelyn Stevens (Deputy Chairman of 
Beaverbrook Newspapers) to deposit the disputed VAT monies 
into a joint account, and the fact that he knows that the 
Scottish Daily News is solvent and has the cash to meet 
all bills as they fall due. 
On behalf of the 500 workers who are members of this 
co-operative and their families I can tell you that this 
action fills them with disgust, and we and all the 
people of Scotland see in your action the unacceptable 
face of the men who run the Daily Express," 
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If this alone was not sufficient to destroy the reputation of the SON, 
underneath the story were more bold headlines: "It's A Bloody Disgrace", 
which repeated the same story in even stronger language. The belief 
of many people that Maxwell wanted to use the newspaper as a personal 
vehicle was dramatically endorsed. But more seriously, an event which 
could have been played down as a legal manoeuvre, (other newspapers 
did not give it much prominence), was massively publicised, and 
effectively ruined the last vestiges of the financial credibility of 
the SON: "OVernight, credit facilities dried up, bills had to be paid 
on the spot and the accounts department was swamped with invoices from 
creditors scenting extinction. Reporters no longer had credit lines 
for taxis, petrol for the two editorial cars had to be bought with 
cash and reclaimed, and photographic supplies were only to be obtained 
cash on the nail." (McKay and Barr,. 1976, p 142). If the 20 
September issue of the SON was the consummation of Maxwell's relationship 
with the newspaper - with such a melodramatic account of a dispute he· 
had dragged the organisation into - it was achieved at a very heavy cost. 
Retaliatory accusations did little to help, "The money by law belongs 
to the ~ and the Express are trying to get it by subterfuge. They 
would like to do anything to close down this paper because they have 
first option on the building ane because they need the circulation in 
Scotland. They have a direct incentive to destroy this company." 
(Observer, 21 September 1975). 
Perhaps encouraged by his venture onto the front page the previous 
Saturday, a few days later a new, unprecedented, column appeared in the 
Daily News: "Maxwell at Large". The article was lively, amusingly 
written, and touched on many matters, but sandwiched in between somewhat 
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incredible assertions that Scotland was "a potential land of milk 
and honey", and demands that Scotland wake up to the "idea of 
holding the Olympic Games in Glasgow," was an amazing explanation 
of why Maxwell had become involved in the SON: 
"They don't believe me when I tell them it's for an 
ideal - that ideal, very simply, is to end conflict 
at work. Work should be enjoyable, satisfying. It 
should be fair. It should be secure, For too long 
the working situation has been split between boss and 
worker. Between them and us. A workers co-operative 
is a way of ending this sterile'struggle. 
It's a crazy; grim game for most people. A game of cut 
and thrust, of grasp and grab, often putting Rollerball 
in the shade. Particularly when companies they work 
"for are controlled in England and America. Am I so 
crazy in wanting to transform work from being a daily 
tortuous battleground to being one of the most satisfying 
elements in our existence?'~ (24 September 1975). 
The sub-headline of the article confidently commented that it would be, 
"A though provoking column that will appear occasionally in the 
Scottish Daily News." The Daily News NUJ chapel was incensed at 
what they thought was a flagrant abuse of the NUJ rule prohibiting 
regular articles from non-specialist writers who were not members of 
the.union, and instructed the editor not to print any more of these 
articles. There was not time to discover whether this instruction 
was enforceabl~, but James Russell, the financial journalist, was highly 
sceptical: 
"Newspapers attract idiots ••• an~ power megalomaniacs ••• 
There is nothing to stop Robert Maxwell writing ten pages 
of this rubbish if he wants to now. There is no-one to " 
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oppose him. Maxwell can take any amount of abuse -
it's action that will shift him. The article reveals 
the extent of Maxwell's political ambitions in Scotland: 
the prospects of North Sea oil, the chance of holding the 
Olympics, and the attraction of American capital." 
Yet complete control somehow eluded Maxwell as important pockets 
of resistance still existed in the few remaining militant FOCs and 
chapels. Trade unionism generally at the ~ON had been progressively 
eroded under the strains of the co-operative, to the extent that when 
the full-time officer of the Scottish Graphical Association pleaded 
with his members to prevent Maxwell taking over, their response was 
to threaten to resign from the union and create a non-union shop. 
But others were determined to continue the fight against Maxwell through 
the trade union organizations, both inside and outside the SON. Jinnny 
Crossan, the Imperial Father of the Federated Chapel, freely gave press 
statements highly critical of the recent developments, which infuriated 
Maxwell. At the Council meeting of 19 September, "Mr Maxwell ...• 
wished to express his disgust and abhorrence at Mr Crossan speaking 
to the Daily Telegraph". Maxwell accused Crossan of "speaking to 
the capitalist press", though of course he displayed no reluctance in 
doing this himself. Alister Blyth added that "the press in fact 
have every handout which he had issued as private and confidential 
to the staff. Mr. J. Milne (the General Secretary of the STUC) also 
stated that the press were too knowledgeable with regard to certain 
matters." At a later Council meeting Crossan was banned from 
speaking to the press. (It would be difficult to imagine any union 
convenor acceding to being muzzled by directoral management this way 
elsewhere) • The Federated Chapel supported the stand of the Imperial 
f -
Father. A month before Maxweli had warned the Federated Chapel 
that he would disregard any of their instructions if he felt they were 
not in the best interests of the co-operative; and it seemed 
likely that sooner rather than later, he would have a serious 
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collision with the unions at Albion Street. (McKay and Barr, 1976,p.12). 
As always, Maxwell's immediate solution was to attempt to get rid of 
the FOCs who opposed him, these "irresponsible people" as he 
described them to the workforce, without whom everything would be 
alright. The galling thing for Maxwell was that the AUEW, which was 
the centre of resistance where Jimmy McNamara and Ji~my Crossan were 
based, had the power to stop the paper if they thought the deterioration 
in the co-operative was irredeemable. 
Though, one by one, Maxwell had destroyed hi~ opponents at the ~, 
and at the meeting of 15 September finally eliminated all effective 
opposition in the Works Council with the resignation of Mackie, Russell 
and Wolfe; yet he still had the rearguard action of militant 
members of the Federated Chapel to contend with, who could close the 
Scottish Daily News if he pushed too far. The SON was on its 
financial knees, beyond any recovery except by the immediate application 
of the policy of Wolfe, which Maxwell had discredited and delayed~ or an 
immediate contribution of considerable capital which Maxwell was unable 
or unwilling to arrange.. Moreover, within a few days the crescendo 
of critical press coverage of his takeover at the SON reached a climax 
with an astonishing two page investigative article in the Sunday Times 
on 21 September 1975. 
How Maxwell Sabotaged The Workers' Dream. 
It was a classic irony that under the banner headlines "How 
Maxwell Sabotaged the Workers' Dream", the Scottish Daily News itself 
should be the subject of the kind of crusading journalism that it had 
promised but never been able to deliver. The graphic report focussed 
upon the perplexing paradox of how a man judged by DTI inspectors to be 
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"not a person who could be relied on to exercise proper 
stewardship of a publicly quoted company", could assume control of 
a workers co-operative, funded through the DTI by 1.2 million pounds 
of public money, ostensibly because it was a "social experiment". In 
a brilliant display of journalistic ability, Ian Jack, Phillip Knightly 
and James Fox began: 
"Robert Maxwell having cut a unique swathe through British 
capitalism, has now succeeded in turning the latest manifestation 
of British socialism - the workers control movement -
into an instrument of his own ambitions •.•• The result so 
far of the five month career of the Scottish Daily News is 
that for an outlay so far of El14,000 - his own stake in the 
co-op - Maxwell has gained control of physical assets worth 
about E2 million, and of a business into which has been 
sunk an interest-free Government loan of £1.2 million as well 
as a large unsecured loan from Beaverbrook, former owners 
of the plant, and £200,000 in workers contributions •.•••..• " 
The article then launched into a shattering resume of Maxwell's business 
career, compiled from the OTI reports and the investigations over a 
decade of the Sunday Times itself, including the collapse of Simpkin 
Marshall; the dubious accounts of Pergamon Press; and the failure of 
Maxwell to win control of bigger corporate assets in the News of the World 
takeover bid, and ILSC and the Leasco saga. The final part of the 
article concentrated on why Tony Benn, in view of his own department's 
report, allowed Maxwell's participation in the co-operative, and concluded 
sympathetically: "His decision was understandable. He had already 
taken a lot of criticism for having backed the co-operative in the 
face of formal advice not to do so. Nevertheless it was for the lack 
of that last E114,000 that the dream 0' the co-operative was sacrificed." 
A leading editorial comment on the SON affair which was described 
as "a scande1 and a tragedy", returned to the question of public 
investment and responsibility more critically: 
"Mr Tony Benn, the then Secretary for Industry, could 
have given the co-operative the last El14,000 from public 
funds. If the experiment was worth attempting at all, 
that would have been a small price to pay for keeping 
Mr Maxwell out of it The Government, moreover, 
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seems to have assumed only the most trivial and ineffective 
watchdog role over the development of the Scottish Daily News. 
With Mr Maxwell moving smartly i.nto the driving seat, the whole 
enterprise has been an exercise in what socialists often attacked 
the Tories for doing: spending public money without securing 
public control 
No one doubts. the energy with which Mr Maxwell plays the 
role of chief executive. But, equally, his presence 
meant that the co-operative never had a chance. Whether 
he should be allowed to control a newspaper funded largely 
with public money, in the name of a social experiment which 
is now a fiction, is a question of some importance which 
the government cannot evade." 
This powerful article must have dispelled any lingering illusions of 
the public or government about the ~. But though the report was 
circulated widely in Albion Street, the workers there were too dazed 
to be shocked further, and some responded with the somewhat surprising 
cynicism, considering the context, "You don't believe what you read 
in the papers do you?" Others reflected, "The Sunday Times said 
things about Maxwell we knew already. He '.s only as bad as others 
in newspaper management, industry, and government !" Ronnie Gibson 
despaired at this negative attitude to the exposure, "Some of the 
journalists refused to read the Sunday Times article, they have just 
buried their heads in the sand. One day in the dole queue, they will 
scratch their heads and say, 'What the hell happened?'''. 
514 
Robert Max\'lell' s reaction to the piece was more predictable, 
for him it was a "balls" article, by a "bolls" newspaper, which 
had been carrying on a personal vendetta against him for years, 
and anyway had a vested interest in the rival publication The Scotsman, 
a newspaper which published his comment that the Sunday Times article was 
"an onslaught as incomprehensible as it is unfair." (22 September 1975). 
As usual in these instances, Maxwell began legal proceedings against 
the newspaper, alleging that in the article some of the more 
condemnatory accusations and more colourful descriptions of his 
business practices, (not mentioned here), were "grossly defamatory." 
Normally after a respectable period of years had elapsed, Maxwell would 
quietly drop such legal action rather than face the cost of proceeding 
to court_ In this case, four years later, in October 1979 there 
was a nominal two sentence statement in court, both sides paid their own 
costs, there were no damages awarded, and the Sunday Times article was 
in effect totally vindicated. 
Other newspapers reported the details of the Sunday Times 
accusations against Maxwell, and the Financial Times took up the the~e of 
the government's responsibility ~n the SON affair: 
"The Government's dilemma is that it is concerned about 
maintaining the jobs of 500 former Beaverbrook workers 
in Scotland, but at the same time it has serious 
reservations about the fundamental change in character 
of the project from an experimental co-operative to an 
enterprise which has come under the increasingly vigorous 
personal control of Mr Maxwell, who has a El14,000 stake in it". 
(22 Sept~er 1975). Endeavouring to rebut the growing 
onslaught of criticism, a series of press statements were 
issued from Albion Street. A &~tement. from Robert Maxwell 
once again attempted to associate the success of the relaunch 
with his arrival back at the SON; and insisted that it was 
'blatantly untrue' that the Scottish Office, entertained 
any reservations about the project because of his own close 
involvement in its management. In another statement 
Alister Blyth maintained "The unanimous opini.on of the 
Executive Council is that the SON remains as it always has 
been a workers' co-operative in which the Executive Council 
and in the first analysis the workforce has the final say 
in all major policy decisions affecting the company. 
Mr. Maxwell is the company's elected chief executive and 
is responsible for its day-to-day management and answerable 
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to the Executive Council". (Guardian, Scotsman, 22 September 1975). 
In fact, on the isolated occasions when this question was briefly 
considered in what remained of the Works Council, the following, scarcely 
reassuring comments were offered: 
"Mr. J. Milne pointed out that we would had a hard job 
convincing other trade union General Secretaries that they 
should invest money. However, Mr. R. Maxwell said that 
he would probably get money from the NOR, but that we must 
first of all kill this notion that we are no longer a 
workers' co-operative. Mr. J.Milne expressed the view 
that this would be no problem." (WCM, 19 September 1975). 
"Before proceeding with normal business, Mr Blyth (with all the 
recent adverse publicity in mind) asked the meeting to express 
their confidence that this company was, in fact, still a 
co-operative, in the true sense of the word. Mr. Bargh was 
the only director who spoke on this issue. He stated that 
he felt that the 'ideal' was diminishing but the fact that he 
was present proved he still believed in the co-operative". 
(WCM, 26 September 1975). • 
The urgency of the need to convince the outside world that the 
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SDN was still a co-operative, was due to the simultaneous effort 
to raise further capital. Maxwell and Blyth were emphatic 
that, "There is no truth in the rwnour that we are seeking extra 
cash from the Government". What this meant in practice was that, 
as in the Wolfe plan, they wanted the government to waive part of 
the security it held on the Albion Street building, so it could then 
be used as collateral in an attempt to raise a minimum of £250,000 
from normal commercial sources. Maxwell again denied the company 
was facing a cash crisis: "We are meeting all our bills as they fall 
due and have a high six figure balance with which to sustain the 
paper through its early operational losses •••..• We are taking prudent 
steps to see us through the next six-month period of revenue uncertainty. 
We may never need the money.~ (Financial Times, 23 September 1975). 
Maxwell expected to receive a satisfactory reply from the Scottish 
Office "very soon"; though clearly the bad publicity surrounding 
his role in the enterprise sharply reduced the chances of a sympathetic 
response. (The Scottish Office were somewhat surprised at Max1Ilell' s 
optimism since no formal proposal, as yet, had been received.) 
Meanwhile there occurred a series of rapid financial manoeuv~es 
in the attempt to save the fading life of the newspaper. Firstly, 
Maxwell sacked the auditors of the ~, the firm of Fremch and Cowan 
in which Professor Briston was a partner. They were replaced by 
Coopers Lybrand, "who are vital to the future of the Company; this has 
been cleared with the Board of Trade. Coopers have also agreed to 
take it on. I believe that their name on any piece of paper is worth 
a great deal for the future of this enterprise. They also work a 
great deal for the government and the Department of Trade and Industry 
are delighted with this change." (WCM, 19 September 1975). (Maxwell 
could also have meritioned that Coopers Lybrand were the accountants of 
Pergamon Press). Announcing the change "Mr Maxwell said that the 
change in auditors was no reflection on French and Cowan but the 
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executive had decided that auditors with an international standing 
were required". Professor Briston who was still financial adviser 
to the SDN, was angered that he had been asked not to attend the 
Council meeting which had asked for the resignation of the auditors, 
and added, "I feel in the circumstances I will have to think what my 
commitment is to the shareholders in the company." Later, Briston 
considered remaining with the SDN "assuming we can come to some 
arrangement on the future of the newspaper, which suits the paper and 
not just Mr Maxwell." (Scotsman, 24 September 1975). Perhaps 
finding this impossible, Professor Briston resigned as financial 
adviser to the SDN on 27 September 1975. A second manoeuvre was to 
appoint both the Clydesdale Bank and the National Westminster Bank 
as bankers for the company in addition to the Bank of Scotland. 
(As every impoverished student knows, a multiplicity of bank accounts is 
often part of an attempt to stave off imminent bankruptcy, rather than 
an indication of great riches). A final change was that, with 
the reSignation of Rankin Durnin as financial controller, James Roy, 
the production manager, was "appointed Secretary of the Company for the 
time being"~ (WCM, 25 Septembe~ 1975) • (my emphasis) • This 
was certainly a critical period for the ~, but this was not sufficient 
excuse to hold Council meetings, at which important decisions were taken, 
almost on an impranptu basis at the end of September. Inevitably, if 
not deliberately, they were poorly attended - only four out of the 
seven remaining Councillors being present at the meetings on the 
aft~rnoon 19 September, and on the 25 September. Council meetings previously 
were always well attended, except in the brief period at the beginning 
of August, when, temporarily, Maxwell and Blyth also had assumed control. 
At the end of an extremely busy week Robert Maxwell and Alister 
Blyth successfully secured a reply i~ ~he Sunday Times, which appeared, 
briefly, at least, to stem the escalating controversy over the newspaper. 
On the front page, Maxwell made the startling announcement that he 
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intended to resign as the SON's chief executive at the end of 
October, because of pressing business interests elsewhere, though he would 
remain a member of the paper's executive comnlittee. "All I am 
doing now is fulfilling a request 'from 500 people to save their jobs" 
he told a London press conference. The Sunday Times and other 
newspapers had done "immense damage" to the SON. "The attempt to 
assassinate us has partially succeeded. There has been a run on 
credit, they have made our negotiations for extra capital much more 
difficult. They have truly put at risk one of the noblest experiments 
in British democracy." Mr Maxwell said that the "great and mighty 
establishment" was against the Scottish Daily News survival". 
(28 September 1975). In the letters page of the newspaper was a 
long and laudatory account, signed by Blyth and Sillito, of how 
Maxwell "a successful socialist businessman", had rescued the 
co-operative: "Without Mr Maxwell's money, drive and advice,plus 
the dedication of our workforce, it could never have got off the ground." 
The account contained numerous distortions favourable towards Robert 
Maxwell, but the most blatant one was that, "The decision of the 
Executive Council to grant Mr Maxwell executive powers early last month 
was unanimous; Mr Allister Mackie was in the chair." In fact, 
although the assumption of executive powers by Mr Maxwell was discussed 
at the 1 August Council meeting, Mackie, Russell and Tough were 
adamantly opposed, and no specific powers were defined. At the meeting 
on 6 August when Maxwell was installed with general executive powers 
in circulation and advertising, Blyth was in the chair, and Tough 
resigned in protest. Furthermore, the letter argued, "Robert Maxwell 
is not self-styled chief executive of the Daily News. He is the 
elected chief executive of the paper ••• At a recent meeting of the 
Executive Council"under a new chairman, Mr Maxwell was unanimously 
elected as chief executive." But Maxwell began publicly using the 
appellation 'chief executive' on 20 August, and it was not until the 
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19 September Council, almost as an afterthought, that "l<'.r. A. Blyth 
proposed the formal appointment of Mr Robert Maxwell as chief 
executive until such time as a general manager was received". (sic) 
Great play was made of the point that "on assuming executive pm"ers 
he instructed PA management to start looking for a full-time 
professional chief executive with newspaper experience," without 
acknowledging the fact that in assuming executive powers Robert Maxwell 
displaced Eric Tough, who was the finest professional PA management 
consultant with extensive newspaper experience that the ~ could 
ever hope to obtain. 
(This article, which was sent by telex, provoked another rebellion 
on the SON editorial floor, when it was learned that Robert Maxwell 
had added a paragraph to the telex, as Denny McGee, the assistant editor, 
explained, "without consultation with the editor under whose name 
the article was appearing". Sillito asked McGee to have the 
paragraph removed, but when he contacted Maxwell at a London press 
conference, "Mr Maxwell came to the phone and insultingly told me not to 
behave like a child. I consider thi~ gross impudence, especially 
coming from a man who in the first instance was guilty of a serious 
indiscretion in the wording of the communication to one editor 
purporting to come from the editor of the Scottish Daily News. The 
really important aspect of this whole matter is, however, the increasing 
trend by Mr Maxwell to influence the editorial content of this 
newspaper and in this instance to assume he has the authority to speak 
on its behalf." (McKay and Barr, 1976, p 145). 
The Sunday Times editorial was unmoved. That Robert Maxwell 
was appointed to the role of chief executive, and did not seize it 
• was not our main point": 
"We believed, and still believe, that his powerful presence , 
in Glasgow is against their interests, and inimical to the 
future existence of a 'workers' co-operative. The paper 
is a professional job, with a lot of vigour and variety, 
and clearly retains the professional commitment of a 
dedicated body of journalists. and printers. Whether it 
succeeds or fails - and \ ... e certa"inly hope it succeeds -
the question will be: was this the result of workers' 
control or tycoon's control? The Government, not 
least, as subscriber of £1.2 million of taxpayer's money 
must now ask , ... hat, precisely, it is financing." 
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As part of the unconvincing exercise to prove the co-operative 
was still functioning, Maxwell was finally awarded a contract of 
employment and employee shares in the SDN on 26 September. The 
Sunday Times arg~~ents rendered such gestures virtually meaningless. 
A more dramatic act was necessary. Denying that it had anything to 
do with the impending appeal to the government for further support, 
Maxwell suddenly resigned from the posts of chief executive and director, 
which he had sought so ruthlessly, and abandoned the bemused workers 
in Albion Street on 3 October. That day a prolonged, but emotionally 
exhausted, mass meeting passed a desultory vote of confidence in Maxwell 
and asked him to stay. Maxwell attacked his old opponents on the 
Council, and condemned the Sunday Times articles as damaging to both the 
newspaper and the co-operative. In a good speech from the floor, 
Mackie replied that the Sunday Times pieces were only damaging if you 
equated Maxwell with the co-operative, and insisted that Maxwell's 
approach was incompatible with the functioning of any committee. 
Maxwell accused some of the FOCs being "enemies of the co-operative", 
whereupon an FCC retorted that Maxwell was simply attacking the trade 
union movement. Maxwell proclaimed that "I never leave in the middle 
of a battle", and yet was apparantly leaving, without properly explaining 
his reasons why. Detailed explan ation was not demanded, because no one 
in the ~ actually thought that Maxwell was going for good. It was 
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wid~ly believed that he was withdrawing to Oxford to allow the 
appeal to the government to take place without his formal involvement, 
and if successful, he would be recalled. (McKay and Barr, 1976, 
pp 145-6). Though at a distance, Maxwell's influence remained, "Blyth, 
time and again, refused at mass meetings not to contact Maxwell. It was 
evident that the tactics of the leaders were to raise the extra finance, 
then to invite Maxwell back". (Mackie, 1976,p.140). 
Keith Bradley, who was well informed, provid~d a sober assessment 
of Maxwell's action: 
"Maxwell cannot manage the Pergamon business and the SDN 
indefinitely. Travel is difficult as he does not live 
near London Airport and Pergamon is in Oxford. He is 
really making a hole in his pocket, and he is only a 
millionaire on paper. He is not rich like Hugh Fraser 
Most press barons were never very rich or powerful men 
compared to some multi-millionaire capitalists, even Beaverbrook 
at the height of his prestige during the war was not that 
powerful. Newspapers provide a sense of power rather than 
the reality." 
As he was leaving, Robert Maxwell was asked if he had been 
embittered by his experiences at the ~ and stoutly replied, 
"I certainly felt very upset by the way I've been attacked, 
in particular about being called a Fascist •.. I fouqht against 
Hitler, was wounded several times - I mean like millions of 
other people. I did my bit during the war. But to couple 
this, the bulk of my family were annihilated by the Nazis and 
the last thing you can throw at a person like myself is the epithet 
of being a Fascist." (McKay and Barr, 1976,p.l46). 
Maxwell was not a fascist, but equal~y, was a rather strange adherent 
to the doctrine of socialism which he formally espoused: his aggressive 
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corporate ambitions far exceeded what was tolerable even in the 
Wilson years of the Labour Governments' infatuated embrace of private 
enterprise. Maxwell's occasional references to"the establishment," 
particularly when annoyed at the opposition to his plans of powerful 
political or coroprate interests, were not based on the political 
philosophy of the anti-establishment radical, but the pique of a 
nouveau riche distressed at his continued exclusion from the 
establishment despite his determined attempts to gain entry. 'l'he 
political approach Maxwell revealed at the SDN was fundamentally that 
of a populist with labourist overtones, though some of the tactics he 
adopted bear more than a superficial resemblance to Fascist traits, 
which have been outlined by Alan Bullock in "The Fontana Dictionary 
of Modern Thought: a distaste for liberalism and democracy, with a 
preference for the authoritarianism of a single leader with charismatic 
qualities and dictatorial powers~ a cult of action designed to seize 
power; a heavy reliance on mass propaganda and fear; and once in 
power the liquidation of rivals without regard for the law. (1977, 
p.228). To this may be added more particularly, the attachment of 
blame for all problems experienced to a small, isolatable, group -of 
people, the removal of whom would lead to an immediate and general 
improvement; and the berating of the mass of workers with emotional 
and simplistic slogans, the exercise of which would solve all problems. 
It could be argued that many of these characteristics are commonplace 
in the attitudes and practices of executives and politicians in the 
leading positions in many contemporary British institutions: rather 
than undermining the argument that these are intrinsically fascist 
methods, this simply indicates the extent to which such methods do 
permeate advanced capitalism, and remain all the stronger for being 
largely unconscious and unquestioned. Though Robert Maxwell's methods 
were extreme, they were not unique. Often he simply expansively 
revealed orientations which other powerful people share, but prefer 
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to keep carefully concealed. In many respects such met:hods 
are merely a harsh extension of the tradition which Alan Fox has 
identified as dominant in management . 
.. •••.• The subscriber to the unitary ideology will tend 
to define transgressors as aberrants. His own conviction 
of the rightness of management rule and the norms issuing 
from it may create difficulty for him, not simply in 
acknowledging the legitimacy of challenges to it, but 
even in fully grasping that such challenges may at least 
be grounded in legitimacy for those who mount the~. Surely 
the transgressors must know in their hearts that they are 
doing wrong, behaving foolishly, defying proper authority, 
hurting others needlessly, acting perversely or maliciously? 
••••• Along with a liberal use of 'team' or 'family' metaphors 
inspired by this presumed unity is apt to go a strong belief 
that in a properly ordered world managerial prerogative 
could always be enforced against the few malcontents by 
means of coercive power if necessary. The greater the 
tendency to see the 'true' nature of industrial enterprise 
as unitary, and to see any challenge to managerial rule as 
of doubtful legitimacy, the greater the disposition to 
view the enforcement of prerogative by coercive powers as 
desirable and justified. The time-consuming and patience-
straining process of 'winning consent' through consultation 
and negotiation may appear not only burdensome in practice, 
but even pusillanimous in principle." (l973,pp 189,187). 
Hence many workers at Albion Street accepted Maxwell's domination, 
because that was the form of authority to whi~h they were accustomed 
under the old Beaverbrook regime. Inffact Robert Maxwell shared many 
of the attributes and aspirations of his illustrious predecessor as 
chief executive, Lord Beaverbrook, who was also an acquisitive and 
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highly energetic entrepreneur, an ~mbitious populist politician, 
and an egocentric crusading press proprietor. Even A.J.P.Taylor 
in his hagiographic biography acknowledged Beaverbrook was a very 
domineering and obsessive character: 
"He had to be the boss, issuing orders without respect 
for protocol or the rights of others. When this 
position was denied him, he relapsed into impotent 
rage and threats of restgnation ••••. The tlinistry of 
Information, coming on top of his Canadian work, had 
given him an insatiable appetite for publicity and 
propaganda. !' (1974, pp 212 .. 31.. 
Rejecting the more damning criticisms of Beaverbrook's belligerent 
preoccupations and personal aggrandizement contained in Tom Driberg's 
study Beaverbrook: A Study in Power and Frustration (1956) , Taylor 
disarmingly insisted, "Beaverbrook was not interested in power except 
~n the sense of being able to ensure that his orders were carried out." 
(l974,p 787). 
Closure 
After Robert Maxwell's departure. the newspaper became obsessed 
with its own tragedy, and the image created by a dignified birth 
was shattered by a pathetic decline. The delaying tactics Maxwell 
had adopted made aid from the government or elsewhere less likely, 
and the opinion of many observers was that there was nothing left to 
save. The government, in th~ terms of the loan offered to the ~, 
had'carefully prepared a pOSition of neutrality in the event of the 
failure of the newspaper, and the scandal and conflict accompanying 
Maxwell's involvement encouraged it to adamantly adhere to this policy. 
Unimpressed by suggestions for modifying the ~ into a 24 hour 
newspaper. thereby capturing evening sales, Bruce Millan at the Scottish 
Office refused the repe.ated impassioned requests to change the terms 
of the original loan. On the day of the final refusal, James Hamilton, 
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an SDN shareholder and the Labour MP for Rothwell, announced on 
local radio that he had seen the accounts of the ~, and that it 
would be "criminal" of the government to put anymore money into it: 
"I don't think there is any possible chance of survival at all. 
The information I have got tonight is that as far as they are 
concerned, they don't have next week's wages." A claim which wa~ 
categorically denied by Nathan Goldberg, who had assumed the doubtful 
honour of editor and chief spokesman of the doomed newspaper. 
(Guardian, 18 October 1975). 
Goldberg and Blyth continued to project a brave but empty 
optimism, which could not pay creditors. Finally a mass meeting 
on 20 October, at which some workers anticipated details of a last 
minute rescue would be announced, was instead informed of the 
appointment of a provisional liquidator. James Whitton of Coopers 
Lybrand would take over the running of the newspaper "from the Council, 
seek to raise fresh capital, and if this failed, sell off the assets 
to pay creditors. "They were magnificent in the 'I,;ay they took it", 
Nathan Goldberg said of the stunned workforce. Ronnie Gibson provided 
a more caustic assessment: "If they had taken these measures six 
weeks ago when Mackie wanted to, they could have succeeded. We would 
have been a lot stronger financially and in morale. Mackie saw this 
happening six weeks before the others - that we needed to take drastic 
action. But the workforce sacked him, and replaced him with Maxwell 
who told them we had a six figure bank balance." 
Harold Wilson agreed to meet a delegation from the SDN at 10 
Downing Street, though simply to explain the reasons for the government's 
refusal of further aid. An impressive array of six ministers met the 
SDN people, though it was clear that the most significant member of 
the delegation was "the provisional liquidator. In the best tradition 
of brown ale and sandwiches, the ~ team left the Prime Minister 
buoyed by their distinguished reception but empty handed. "The 
526 
Government think it's a damned good paper", Alister Blyth 
proclaimed. More to the point, Wilson announced in the Commons 
that the liquidator's report was awaited by both the creditors and 
the government. The liquidator approached 17 possible purchasers, 
including most national newspaper publishers, the TUC, the Scottish 
TilC, and the co-operative movement. He admitted that only "a massive 
injection of money or a real honest-to-God offer to buy" could sustain 
the paper for more than another few days, 
Only Robert Maxwell confirmed an interest in buying the premises 
and plant,though their was no chance of him taking over the ~ as a 
going concern, since this would involve him assuming responsibility for 
the El.95 million of loans outstanding to the government and Beaverbrook, 
together with whatever debts were owed to other creditors. Maxwell's 
telexed offer was "subject to contract and subject to being able to 
reach satisfactory agreement with the executive council of Scottish 
News Enterprises, including the respective trade unions on behalf of 
the workforce, as to my future plans for its utilization," However 
James Whitton was unable to quantify the offer since Maxwell had left for 
the continent. (Financial Times; Guardian; 29 October 1975) • 
Two days later it transp~red that the offer was worth between £500,000 
and £750,000 for the plant and premises bought from Beaverbrook six 
months before for £1.6 million; and Whitton dismissed this as an 
unacceptable opening bid. The prospect of acquiring a valuable property 
quite cheaply by now had aroused other interest which enabled Whitton 
to grant one week's stay of execution on the newspaper's life, that also 
served to allow the ~ workers to earn the six months' insurance stamps 
necessary for earnings-related benefits. Whitton camnented, "I am 
trying to keep the paper going and resuscitate the co-operative. If 
I cannot do so I will try to find a buyer to keep the paper going during 
the transition from co~operative management to a traditional form of 
newspaper." He made it clear that anyone buying the building and 
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plant to set up a new paper would have to renegotiate the whole 
of the wage structure and manning levels agreed with the Scottish 
Dai ly Ne\is. (Guardia!.!., 1 November 1975). 
A rally in Glasgow on the Saturday of the final week of 
publication was addressed by a motley assembly of Scottish politicians 
and personalities ranging from Jimmy Reid to Teddy Taylor, with 
representatives of all the political parties, though rather than an 
indication of the breadt.h of support for the Scottish Daily News. 
this was another confirmation of its complete lack of identity. 
Most of the crowd were from the SON itself, and the mood of despair 
was stronger than hope. The end came quickly,the following Thursday 
when the provisional liquidator announced that unless "something 
extraordinary emerged'" in the next two days the Scottish Daily Ne\"s 
would cease publication on Saturday 8 November. James Whitton's 
verdict of capital punishment was greeted by the worKers wit.h a curious 
respect for the logic and the instrument of their end. Later the 
liquidator expressed his condolences I "They are the salt of the 
earth"; he said. "It is a rotten thing to have to do but I had no 
alternative •.•• It was not a difficult decision but it was one of the 
most sad decisions." (Guardian 7 November 19751. Now the uncertainty 
was removed, many of the ~ workers responded with the abandon of condemned 
men, as one admitted, "It was an evening for drinking, whether 
celebration or despondency, depending on what side you took." 
The depressing and certain prospect of a return to the dole 
queue, was not relieved by the faint hope of launching a new evening 
newspaper Robert Maxwell had planted on the horizon in a final lengthy 
telex, which was presented to the mass meeting. Maxwell had from the 
beginning wanted to compete with the Glasgow evening newspaper monopoly 
which Sir Hugh Fraser had paid Beaverbrook £2.75 million pounds to 
create in buying the Evening Citizen title. Any viability the proposal 
possessed though,was seriously undermined by the detailed suggestions 
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which showed that the problems of the recent past would recur 
once again. Agreement was dependent upon acceptance of the print 
unions of manning levels and wage scales for an eventual 24 hour 
newspaper, which they had already rejected. In reiterating 
condemnation of the SON Council and management in the telex it was 
obvious that any new management would have the problem of operating 
under Maxwell's domination; and the concession of worker participation, 
in view of the developments at the SON was not very convincing: "The 
new company to run the evening paper would be a limited liability 
company owned by one of my family companies (not Pergamon Press). 
I envisage it to be a worker participation enterprise incorporating a 
profit sharing scheme, with half of the 12 member board of directors 
being elected by the workforce." 
A gesture the workers unanimously agreed upon however, was 
to occupy the Albion Street premises a second time, which would strengthen 
Maxwell's request for the building and plant to be sold together. 
In a last heroic press statement Nathan Goldberg declared: "We 
will occupy the building with a view t~ establishing the right to work; 
preventing any asset",stripper moving in to break up the property and 
sell it off in bits and pieces; to retain the co~operative: resuscitate 
the newspaper and save the jobs. We will stay here till hell freezes 
over'l. (Financial Times, 7 November 1975). This rhetoric spilled 
onto the front of the Scottish Daily New~ on 7 November where the whole 
of the page was devoted to an emotional and unrestrained shout of 
defia.nce; 
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"SORRY, BUT WE REFUSE TO DIE" 
This was the clear unequivocal message yesterday from the 
500 men and women who work for this newspaper ..• For to long 
workers have been treated like the brick and mortar which surround 
them, like assets or liabilities which can be stripped at will. Well, 
to all would-be undertakers we say this - neither our bodies nor 
souls are at your disposal. 
Asset strippers be warned; you will not murder our chances 
of the Right to Work in producing a newspaper worthy of this nation. 
We have not fought so long and so hard for the rats to emerge from 
their sewers to nibble away at our innards. OUr responsibility is 
to our families, the dignity of our fellow workers and the people of 
Scotland. If anyone wishes to take over the building arid plant 
they must be prepared to save as many jobs as possible and carryon 
the tradition of the Scottish Daily News in producing a newspaper 
worthy of the nation." 
With writing as poor as this, readers could be forgiven finding it 
something of a relief that the newspaper was finished. The final 
ed.ition restored a little dignity. The headline story, "Prisoners 
, 
of the Ghetto", was an expose of a virtual police state which existed in 
Barrowfield, one of the poorest G.lasgow housing districts, where a 
ten o'clock curfew was effectively imposed, and residents were 
threatened with arrest who stepped out of their doors; "They have 
made this area the dustbin of the world. Now the police are trying 
to put the lid on it", a community worker commented. The impact of the 
story was only slightly weakened by a photograph of three women residents 
with beaming smiles on their faces. Under the single column headline 
"OUr pride, our hope, our thanks", the last editorial comment touchingly 
said, "It was not to be. The Scot€:tsh Dailv News as we have known 
s. 
and cherished it dies this morning. Six months was our life span. 
Made of the stuff of dreams and idealism perhaps. There was also the 
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reality, mostly painful but mixed with the sweet purity of doing 
something that W<l.S worthwhile ••••• And let no one detract from the 
value of the co-operative system. It is not only workable but 
necessary for the lifestyle of people at work. The proof is in the 
miracles our 500 men and women have achieved despite the opposition 
and adversity. That is the beautiful experience which will remain 
in all our hearts and no one can take it away from us ...... (8 November, 1975' 
As the soul of the SDN flew out of the qreat steel and glass 
building in Albion Street, and the last reels of newsprint were run 
to their ends to print the final edition, the reaction of other 
newspapers was to scramble for the ~'s readers, "For the News get the 
Express", a Scottish Daily Express poster campaign declared. Qninously, the 
Scotsman, F~inburgh Evening News, Glasgow Herald and Evening Times on the 
day of the SDN ceased publication, all announced plans for re-equl.pment 
and redundancies. The 1,000 workers at Scotsman Publications in 
Edinburgh were told of plans for capital expenditure in new production 
technologies the proprietors insisted were necessary to halt the qroup's 
profit decline. Union representatives were told that the company's 
parent group, Thomson Regional Newspapers'had aqreed to allocate 
sufficient funds to extend the Edinburgh newspapers existing computer 
setting systems with computer controlled photo-composition systems. 
David Snedden, managing director said that, "Profits had increased 
steadily for 10 years to 1973 but had declined since. Moreover, there 
had been a long term and serious fall in the value of the newspaper's 
profits because of sharply rising costs. This was jeopardising the 
survival of the company and had to be checked. The new equipment 
would give the newspapers increased capacity but would require fewer 
people." The same day William Forgie, managing director of frutram, 
the subsidiary of Sir Hugh Fraser's Scqttish and Universal Investment 
Trust which published the ~gow Herald, said that the company was 
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examini.ng re-equipment of its printing premises in Mitchell Street, 
Glasgow, and also mentioned that although they were not interested 
in the ancient plant at Albion Street, "we might have a look at 
the building alone". (Financial Times, 7 November 1975). 
The national newspapers that had plans for new technology and 
substantial redundancies were not slow to reassert their proposals 
in the context of the collapse of the SDN, which briefly had presented 
an alternative path that print workers could follow. A number of 
national newspapers pressed for the adoption of production re-organization 
schemes, but the most dramatic was that at the Financip 1 Times, which 
the newspaper presented under the deceptive headline, "FT Radical 
Retraining Plan". What this amounted to in practice was a drastic 
40% staff cut from 1,329 to 796, though the FT management had devised 
an ingenious way of securing union consent to such a severe intention: 
"The management has suggested to the printing unions that every 
employee who loses his job because of the company's new technology 
plans should undergo a retraining progr.amme, at the company's expense. 
The FT would then seek to find an alternative job in the employees 
chosen field. During the retraining and as long as an earnings 
difference exists, the E! has offered to bridge the gap between the 
employees net salary in his new job and his net earnings as of 11 July 
this year." Other remarkable features of the scheme were a suggestion 
for a "joint. technology section" without jobs allocated according to 
"traditional territorial concepts" but on the basis of the "objectively 
assessed suitability of the individual". "In addition management would 
supplement union subscriptions so that each union would receive an 
amount equivalent to subscriptions from the whole group.'~ OVerall 
responsibility for implementing the plan would be the responsibility of 
a joint supervisory board comprisi~g fwo full-time directors of the FT 
and printing union national officers. Though cleverly conceived 
to win the approval of printing union leaders, and soften the resistance 
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of the print worker.s, the FT workers rejected the scheme. The FT 
managing director, Alan Hare, who \ianted to make the FT "the most 
technologically advanced newspaper in the world", responded with 
the traditional menace of management in these circumstances, "We 
are not saying that unless we get what we require in three or six 
months time, the newspaper will close, but unless a scheme on the 
lines we are proposing can be agreed, it is likely that at some 
future date this will happen." 
25 October; 1975). 
(Financial Times, 7 November; 
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The Second Occupation 
The weary band of workers who took up occupation of the cavernous 
floors of Albion Street for ~ second time, lacked the moral indignation 
and political resolution which had unified and sustained the first 
occupation. By now many workers were completely disoriented, and they 
occasionally turned up at the SDN simply because they had nowhere else to 
go. Ronnie Gibson stoically chronicled this sad demoralization: 
"All the militants have left, Mackie and McNamara have 
left, and only four members of the Federated Chapel remain. 
There's no trade union leadership there. The people sitting 
in don't know where they're going: half of them are 
keeping the place warm for Maxwell and the other half just 
want a job with anyone. The rally last week was not 
successful, most people don't know what's happening, and 
the others are self-motivated. Among the leaders are 
three Scottish Nationalist punters, two of whom were SNP 
candidates in the last election, one Liberal, and one 
Johny-come-Iately to the CPo Students and other broad 
left political groups have· been inviting speakers from the 
~ expecting them to be socialists, then they find them 
to be Scottish Nationalists .and they become very suspicious. 
Maxwell may employ about 300 people, he wants us to sit 
in as it lowers the price of the building. Maxwell is 
the only person who knows what he's going to do now. He 
is waiting for interest to evaporate to get it more cheaply, 
but the liquidator will wait indefinitely to sell the building. 
Only about a hundred and fifty people are turning up for the 
mas~ meetings, mostly out of curiosity, there are only 
thirty or forty people regular11~around.· They are 
distributing a four page supplement around the factories 
which is be~ng produced on an outside litho, not on the SDN 
presses, as the insurance is too high to operate these 
and NATSOPA would not put up with it. If we were to 
use the remaining newsprint the receiver would dock the 
money from the holiday pay not yet paid out. But the 
litho is costing E150 a week and there isn't much in the 
fighting fund. The supplement consists of four pages: 
two pages of news, one of sport, and half a page on what 
is happening at the SDN." 
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On 21 November 1975 there was a national demonstration against 
unemployment in London, which was not expected to be a large affair. Yet 
with mounting unemployment in evidence throughout the countI.-y, organizers 
of the march and police were surprised as more and more demonstrators arrived 
in coaches and trains and twenty thousand people completely blocked the 
street next to Euston Station for a mile. The last contingent to arrive 
was a special train of Glasgow trade unionists, an~ng whom were a group 
from the SDN. As the Glasgow contingent arrived a huge roar of welcome 
issued from the waiting crowd. The massive Scottish Daily News banner 
was unfurled, and the SDN workers proudly took a central place in the 
demons~ration, with grim smiles pinned to their faces. Despite the cheers 
and the warmth of the welcome, the ~ struggle had distanced itself from 
the mainstream of the labour movement,. and in a sense the SDN group was 
present under false pretences. On sale to the marchers were hundreds of 
newspapers, magazines and pamphlets, produced by the trade unions, socialist 
parties, and revolutionary groups, and among this brigh~ kaleidoscope of 
left publications the Scottish Daily News would have appeared very dim 
indeed, if it had been available. One newspaper which stood out from the 
vast·array of literature was an English version of the Portugese workers 
Republica, the publication which simultaneously had experienced similar 
traumas to the SDN, though temporarily wit~ a different outcome. The 
jubilant, energetic, and de~ermined Marxist revolutionary editorial of 
Republica made the Daily News read like a diluted Tory rag in comparison. 
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The lead story called for solidarity between British and Portugese 
workers: "Quite obviously, the capitalist interests of the western 
countries and the governments that represent them, are determined to 
do everything they can to prevent a socialist revolution in Portugal. 
A victory to the Portugese working class would give strength to 
the working class movements allover Europe. It would encourage 
workers in Spain and elsewhere to follow suit. It would bring to the 
very heart of the capitalist world an exa~le of what workers' democracy 
really means. Over the last 18 months the Portugese working 
class has made enormous advances. Through constant pressure from 
below, the Portugese economy has been wrested largely out of prhTate 
hands, and in the factories, villages, neighbourhoods and barracks, the 
Portugese workers have begun to build up their own democratic organs of 
power." (Republica, 17 November 1975). 
While those still in sympathy with Robert Maxwell occupied Albion 
Street, the SDN workers who had completely disassociated themselves 
from the enterprise were learning the solitary experience of being 
isolated and trapped among the unemployed with little hope of an early 
escape. Wistfully, Allister Mackie asked me a question I had feared, 
"Have you ever been unem~loyed?". "NO", I replied, embarrassed at 
the privilege of having a secure job and salary. "You should experience 
it sauet1me", he continued, "unemployment is a very important experience. 
It will change the way you look at yourself, and at the world. You 
never realise what it means until you have been through it." As 
always, John Hodgeman was more jocular and emotionally colourful, "I'm 
blacklisted now, everywhere, even Fleet Street .•.•• When I drive up to the 
dole in my Rolls Royce, and they layout the red carpet for me to walk 
up to the counter and pick up my E500 to pay the rent on my manor house, 
I think how lucky the working class is •••• I was on E126 a week for 
years, I went down to £80 a week for my principles in joining the SDN -
and now I'm on £25 a week on the dole. I'm beginning to find out wha~ 
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life is really like." Probably Bob McKay the electricians FOC, 
expressed the view of all those that had been attracted to the SDN 
out of idealism, "I had a good job, but I moved to the Daily News 
when it started for the experience, you know the ideal. In the 
other job I got good money for doing the same thing day in and day out, 
but the idea of the co-operative was exciting. I'm not in the CP 
or anything, but I could see the need for a change in industry ••.• I·m 
out of work now, I have been for three months, I didn't think it would 
all end like this." 
Unemployment allowed plenty of time to ponder what had gone 
wrong at the SON, and a number of people attempted a detailed analysis. 
The problem was how to broadcast their findings. A BBC 2 special 
documentary, "The Cost of the Daily News", narrated by Brian Barr, 
provided an instant and dramatic assessment of the problems at the SDN, 
and a number of the old Works Council were able to voice their criticisms. 
But the stroke of luck in having someone at the BBC who was sympathetic 
to the SDN and had followed its career closely, was not replicated in 
. 
the attempt to publish accounts of what had happened. The national 
newspapers, now the scandel was over, were not interested. Allister 
Mackie quickly wrote a brief article for the Institute for Workers 
control, which was heavily doctored by the Sunday Times lawyers, free 
of charge, and appeared with suitable excisions after a long delay. 
Unfortunately the resources of the IWC are limited, which led to the 
following sorry exchange with Jimmy McNamara, 
"J.N. How many of Mackie's pamphlet will be printed? 
T.e. Oh, about three thousand. 
J.N. (Visibly shocked and saddened.) Three thousand: What 
abo~t the trades councils, the branches and the chapels! Three 
thousand: Something has got to be don~ to reach the workers and trade 
unions, to tell them about the struggle at the ~, three thousand copies 
will hardly go anywhere." 
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In another effort, John Hodgeman received a conunission from the 
editor of the Spectator to write an article on the SDN's dO~TIfall, 
but this fiery satirical piece, "Maxwell's Silver Hammer" was 
returned with thanks. Ron l-lcKay and Brian Barr received a large 
commission from a conservative London publisher, who thought they 
were going to write the story of how hopeless and misconceived workers 
control of a newspaper turned out to be in practice. When they didn't 
write this story, the book was refused, and was in the end published 
by a small Scottish house, Canongate , who had "the courage to publish 
when others quailed". (1976, p.2). Patiently, Alliste~ Mackie 
for over a year wrote and typed a full account of what had transpir.ed, 
but he had no urge to attempt to publish further, "I just want to put 
it in a library somewhere, so that if in the future someone wonders \lhat 
really did happen, they can read it. I had to leave a record, otherwise 
the whole struggle will be distorted". 
In Albion Street the workers watched the world go by, as they 
slipped quietly from the Scottish public's consciousness, and guarded the 
giant presses they could not afford to·use. For newspaper workers this 
silent impotence was soul destroying. The daily four page emergency 
edition of the SDN could not be sustained on a volunteer labour force,' 
and had to be suspended by Christmas, A weekly edition re~emerged in 
January under the editorship of Dorothy Grace-Elder, but though this 
lasted for seyeral months it gradually lost heart and folded. The 
first major issue that the SDN was not able properly to comment on was 
the publication of the Labour Government~s White Paper on devolution. 
Given the chorus of hostility that greeted the insipid and uninspired 
government proposals from the Scott!sh press, it was probably of some 
reIief to the government that the Daily News, "hich had been displaying 
growing Scottish Nationalist sympat~ie~, had disappeared. The intended 
weak Scottish Assembl~with limited powers over domestic issues, failed 
to arouse interest or support in Scotland, which perhaps was part of an 
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elaborate subterfuge by the government to induce boredom .. ,ith the 
subject. Ano~~er explanation of the rapid collapse of popular 
interest in devolution, was unintentially put by the Financial Times: 
"The Scottish Establishment is now strongly pro-devolution, if 
not actually nationalist in tone. The Church, the business community, 
the universities and the media- from the quality papers to the popular -
are all devolutionist and ready to become more so if their present 
enthusiasm is thwarted". (28 November 1975). Anything which could 
stimulate such a consensus among the Scottish establishment, was unlikely 
to retain much appeal for the Scottish working class. The break-up of 
Britain proved not as imminent as was feared. 
In December a creditors meeting in Glasgow called by the official 
liquidator, revealed the SDN final balance sheet, about which so many 
misleading euphemisms had been invented in the last two months of 
publication. Total liabilities were E2.49 million and estimated realisable 
assets El.2 million. This meant that the government would receive 
about SOp in the pound on the loan of El.2 million secured against the 
building and plant. Beaverbrook's unsecured loan, and all the issued 
share capital of workers and investors was written off as.a total loss. 
About 300 other ordinary creditors ranging from local news agencies to the 
gas board would receive no payment on outstanding SDN debts amounting to 
more than E330,000. James Whitton confirmed that he had not received 
a positive offer for the building and plant, though Robert Maxwell had 
estimated the assets as worth E750,000, he had not made a firm bid. 
Whitton calculated a considerable difference between the estimated value 
for the property and plant of E867,000 on a disposal basis, and a 
valuation of El.8 million if sold for newspaper publishing. (Guardian, 
17 December 1975). 
• 
Months passed with the liquidator and Maxwell staying at arms 
length, hoping that the other would concede the several hundred thousand 
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pounds that separated them. Repeatedly the liquidator set deadlines 
for when he would sell the plant for scrap if an acceptable fi.rm 
bid was not received, but the dates passed with the occupiers refusing 
to concede defeat. On a few brief visits to Glasgow, Robert Maxwell 
outlined his proposals for a Strathclyde Evening News to the workers 
committee, a venture which could become a 24 hour paper with a morning 
edition; though he insisted that manning and wage. agreements were 
critical to the feasibility of the project. It also became clear 
that Sir Hugh Fraser was interested in the Albion Street building as 
a central part of his strategy to re-equip the Glasgow Herald and 
Evening Times, neatly obstructing the' creation of a rival paper in the 
process.. (Guardian; 14 February 1976). Negotiations between Robert 
Maxwell and the local officials of the print unions broke down irreparably 
when he refused to incorporate the 1976 statutory £6 wage award in the 
proposed wage rates for print workers on the new paper, which the print 
unions had settled with the Scottish Daily Newspaper Society to take 
effect from the beginning of Jyly. Dorothy Grace-Elder took M~~ell's 
side against the print union off~cials, saying that the SON workers 
were not interested in sacrificing the project for a "miserable £6". 
But the print unions were not prepared to see the low wages of the SDN 
survive in a privately owned newspaper. (Financial Times, 24 April 1976). 
Though the SDN workers prevented the auction of the Albion Street 
printing machinery, nothing more was achieved. After a long year's wait, 
the ~oken occupation ended when the liquidator took advantage of a 
weekend lull to have the locks changed on the Albion Street building, 
and the workers gloomy resistance finally petered out. 
November 1976). 
(Guardian, 17 
According to the survey conducteQ by Br~dley and Gelb, a third 
of the ~ workers found other employment within three months of the SDN 
liquidation. It took another third of the workers up to 18 months to 
540 
find work. Of the SON workers in employment, only half found 
work in their old skills. After 18 months, one third of the SON 
workers, about 160 people, were still unemployed, with little hope 
of finding satisfactory employment again. (1978 ,po 40) • 
The Fate of Albion Street 
The death of the SON must be put in the context of the continued 
life of the national press under private ownership. By a seemingly 
inexorable process the national newspapers are becoming appendages 
of conglomerate and multi-national corporations. As one era in 
the turbulent history of newspaper production at Albion Street ended, 
another began. George OUtram Ltd, the publishers of the Glasgow Herald 
and Evening Times who were to move into the Albion Street ~remises, 
warned union chapels that their ElO million development scheme had been 
prejudiced by recent unofficial union action, which had stopped the Times 
for four days, and the Herald for two. Without assurances that 
unofficial action would cease and that any disputes would be subject to 
agreed procedures, OUtram's could not recommend the development p~an 
to the board of the parent company Scottish and Universal Investment 
Trusts Ltd. John Crawford managing director of OUtram's said that if 
the development scheme was not implemented efficient production could not 
be sustained on existing plant for more than two years, which was 
regarded as an intimation that the 1,300 jobs on the two papers could be 
at risk in the near future. The chapels freely gave the required 
guarantee, and a relieved Crawford commented, "I have been given 100 per 
cent assurance by the OUtram chapels that the recognized procedures will 
be adhered to in the event of a dispute. There is every indication that 
we can look forward to a stable period of industrial relations. That 
was the platform I was looking for to enable the group to go ahead with 
a major programme of technological innovation. This is a development 
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which cannot be postponed for too long if the papers are to survive." 
(Guardian, 24 November 1976). 
Print workers at the Glasgow Herald and Evening Times offered 
their assurances, as ever, out of expediency rather than any real 
sense of commitment to OUtram's management, since they had good reason 
to be profoundly sceptical about the credibility and probity of their 
ultimate proprietors, as they watched unfold over the next three years 
a fascinating saga of court cases, boardroom battles, takeover bids 
and public investigations by the Monopolies Commission, as the financial 
conduct of several SUITs directors was called was calle'd into question, 
and the company became the subject of an overpowering embrace by the mining 
multinational Lonhro. On 18 November 1977 Sir Hugh Fraser and five 
other SUITs directors were charged that they put forward a balance sheet 
for 1974-75 "which did not give a true and fair vie".' of the affairs of 
the company". It was alleged that the balance sheet contained an item 
showing current assets at EIO,433,432, with a note that E9,733,557 was 
"cash at bankers and on hand"; when the six accused knew the s~ at 
the bankers and on hand was no more than E5,500,000, and that the balance 
of E4,233,457 was on loan to Amalgamated Caledonian, a property 
dealing associate company. Three of the directors were further charged 
under the Companies Act in connection with dealings in SUITs shares. 
(Guardian, 19 November 1977). The six directors denied the charge 
concerning the missing E4.2 million, inSisting it was simply an 
'accounting error', but Sir Hugh Fraser pleaded guilty to an amended 
charge that he had not informed SUITs of 61 share transactions between 
1974-76 involving 3.5 million shares. Furthermore, there was some 
confusion in SUITs as to whether the loan was secured or unsecured, a 
matter of some importance, since the London property deal fell through 
• 
and the E4.2 million had to be written off, which was 12\ of SUITs total assets. 
(Incidentally, four times the amount of money lost by the SDN) • How 
the SUITs accountants and auditors had made such a serious error of 
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present.ation in the accounts preoccupied the court case, since Scottish 
accountants are infamous for their painstaking conservatism and 
exactitude. Sir Hugh Fraser was scarcely reassuring since he told 
the court that similar loans in the past had been classified in this 
way, and that he was not "competent to understand the subtleties 
of company accounting". (Sunday Times, 21 May 1978). 
Sir Hugh Fraser of Dineidwg became chairman of SUITs and 
of the prestigious House of Fraser in 1966 at the age of 29, upon the 
death of his father, Lord Fraser of Allander. In the middle 1970s 
Fraser occupied the headlines more because of his private life than 
business activities, and in 1976 adm~tted selling off El.5 million 
worth of SUITs share~ to payoff gambling debts. To the shock and 
horror of the Scottish establishment, in 1977 Fraser sold a 24 per cent 
shareholding in SUITs to Lonhro, and was replaced as chairman by 
Tiny Rowland, Lonhro's abrasive chief executive. Resentment at one of 
the few remaining identifiably Scottish companies falling into the hands 
of a multi-national active largely in third world countries was fuelled 
when Rowland did not arrive for his first annual meeting as chairman 
of SUITs because he was too busy. Undeterred, Rowland having acquired 
40% of the SUITs equity for Lonhro, followed this with a bid worth 
£40 million in Lonhro shares for the remaining SUITs shares. The bid 
was supported by Sir Hugh Fraser, but opposed by three of the independent 
SUITs directors who felt that the offer was far too low considering the 
valuable range of interests SUITs possessed, including Whyte and Mackay 
whisky; that Lonhro shares were unattractive; that cash should be 
included in the offer; and that SUITs had better prospects as an 
independent company. In reply Lonhro offered "an opportunity to 
participate in a dynamic company with a proven growth record", and said that 
efforts would be made to retain the Scottish identity and integrity of 
the company. The takeover was referred by Roy Hattersley, the Prices 
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Secretary, to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, a decision which 
did not unduly disturb Tiny Rowland. 
For Rowland, like Robert z.1axwell, was familiar with public 
controversy surrounding his aggressive business acquisitions. It was 
an ugly boardroom row over Rowland's style of management at Lonhro in 
1973 that caused Ed\"mrd Heath to utter his immortal phrase about the 
"unpleasant and unacceptable face of capitalism". The Conservative 
Government appointed Department of Trade inspectors to examine the 
way the company was run, and the eventual 700 page report was heavily 
critic~l of Rowland and several other directors. Yet in the normally 
measured terms of the Guardian financial pages, "Mr RO\-Iland won the 
immediate victory by a swift and merciless execution of his opponents. 
The lengthier campaign, involving making Lonhro a more acceptable name 
in the City, has been going on ever since. There has been little 
conspicuous sign of success as London institutions have tended not to 
invest in Lonhro. If Mr Rowland wins his present skirmish with the 
Monopolies Commission his task will be made much easier." 
and Round the Monopoly Board", The GlJardian, 30 May 1978). 
("Round, 
Doubts 
concerning Lonhro included the proportion of non-remittable overseas 
earnings which could not be brought into Britain; the 40 million Lonhro 
shares owned by the Kuwaiti royal family; and the question of whether 
Lonhro planned to change its tax domicile. But Lonhro had been making 
efforts to increase its British based activities, and the acquisition of 
SUITs would not only help this, but give Lonhro a vital foothold among 
institutional investors: more importantly still, SUITs was linked to the 
famous, and highly profitable House of Fraser based on Harrods, the best 
known store in Britain, and if Lonhro was to increase its 19 per cent 
holding in this company it would provide an immense boost to its profits 
and public image. 
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While the Monopolies Commission was pondering the merits 
of the SUITs takeover by Lonhro, Lonhro itself became subject to 
the uninvited attentions of Sheik Sabeh al Ahmed Nassr of Gulf Fisheries, 
who with a 21 per cent shareholding in Lonhro, insisted on boardroom 
representation for two nominees. This raised suspicions among Lonhro 
directors that Gulf Fisheries, with its close relations to the Kuwaiti 
royal family, was seeking a full takeover of Lonhro. Though Sheik 
Nassr maintained he was primarily interested in the disappointing 
Lonhro share price performance, Rowland was quoted as saying, "It is 
clear to me that what Gulf Fisheries would like is to get control of • us. 
(Guardian 12 March 1979). For the time the thr~atened Kuwaiti takeover 
disappeared, and in March 1979 the Monopolies Commission finally approved 
I 
Lonhro's takeover of SUITs. Rowland increased his offer to £56.6 million, 
and finally to £67 millions, to secure critical defections among SUITs 
institutional shareholders who had previously opposed the deal. "For 
Lonhro the takeover means the acquiSition of a large chunk of high 
quality British earnings to counterbalance the international trading 
group's more speculative and volatil~ overseas earnings", the Guardian 
pleasantly commented. (10 May, 1979). One part of the SUITs empire 
for which Tiny Rowland had ambitious plans was the newspaper operations. 
Already a substantial newspaper proprietor in Africa, Albion Street was 
next on the agenda: 
"In fact it now appears that Mr Rowland is planning to turn the 
Glasgow Herald into the base for a national newspaper with the 
possibility of a separate Sunday paper as well. It is suggested that 
the new newspaper would follow a left of centre political line and would 
be likely to be more in sympathy with the Labour Party than other political. 
parties. This it is thought would be in line with Mr Rowland's own 
thinking. He apparantly regards himself as a 'revolutionary capitalist' 
and has looked upon the activities of the present Labour Government with 
some admiration." (Guardian, 16 October 1978). 
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Therefore Robert Maxwell could muse that although he had failed to 
retain control of Albion Street, certainly a man after his own heart 
had taken over ultimately. 
( After George Outram, the Lonhro subsidiary, moved into Albion 
Street, the Sunday newspaper which emerged suffered a remarkably similar 
trajectory to the §Q!. The Sunday Standard enjoyed the support of vastly 
greater financial, technical and editorial resoYrces· than did the SON, 
but failed to penetrate the ABCl SCottish Sunday newspaper market to 
the projected circulation of 175,000. Consistent substantial losses 
prQved an unacceptable drain on the reserves of Outram's and two years 
• later the paper was unceremoniously ditched, having lost in the region 
of £5 million) (Adver~isin9 Magazine, Summer 1981) 
AS Albion Street succumbed to a-marauding multinational inexorably 
th~ same fate befell the impoverished Beaverbrook Newspapers itself. After 
receiving approaches from a number of consortiums, including Sir James 
Goldsmith of Cavenham Foods and Tiny Rowland of Lonhro, the Beaverbrook 
board sold the Daily Express, Sunday Express and Evening Standard to the 
property company Trafalgar House Investments for £13.7 million on 30 June 
1977. The Daily Express announced t~e takeover under the front page 
headlines: "Your Express: A New Horizon". nThe;fiaancial strength of 
the i5~0·DillionTrafalgar House group was put last .. night.behiad Beaverbrook 
Newspapers,-publisbers.~f·the Daily.Expr-ess, Sunday Express and Evening 
Standard." (1 July 1977) In a personal front page message to readers 
victor Mathews commented: "This is a proud day for Trafalgar House and 
myself. I have always been convinced that the three Beaverbrook newspapers •• 
play an important, indeed indispensable part in the life of the country. 
~ colleagues and I resolved that, if approached, we would do what we 
could to put our muscle behind all three newspapers." Mathews, the deputy 
chairman of THI, became the new chairman of the Express group, and assumed 
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the role of newspaper proprietor with considerable enthusiasm and 
as much ignorance. Several years of internal battles followed as 
Mathews attempted to cut overheads, ~articularly on the Daily Express 
by drastically reducing manning: Mathews announced that he would cut 
staff on the Express by two thirds if the unions would let him. The 
Express chapels d ug in for a long fight and Mathews resorted to the 
orthodox threats, "I couLd still close it all up. One may face a 
situation when one says there is no way of getting·"this right.n 
(Guardian, 29 June 1978). Four years later Fleet Holdings was set up 
to manage the Express group inde~~ndently of Trafalgar, and though 
the papers managed to limp along, survival remained .distinctly precarious. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
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CONCWSIONS 
Personal Reflections 
"They were heady days at the Scottish Daily News. During 
the struggle I was signing cheques for half a million pounds, and 
then going down to the burroo to pick up my £20 dole. It was a 
heady experience", Jimmy McNamara reflected afterwards. "We believed 
for a whole year, and we believed without any evidence, that the British 
market was similar to the continent: that if left wing papers had a big 
enough circulation that advertisers would use them. Because advertisers 
are mercenary people, we believed that if our circulation was big enough 
they would use us as a medium for their products: if we had a market 
that these people wanted to reach, then they would not be interested in 
our politics. But we failed because of economic forces: what we 
believed was not true, in the interests of established SOCiety advertisers 
were not prepared to cut their noses to spite their faces". Jimmy, 
who was eternally amused by life, and who's son was the only card 
carrying member of the C.P playing in the Scottish Premier League, ended 
up travelling down to Fleet Street where to his delight he became an 
engineer with Express Newspapers once again ! 
"For Robert Maxwell co-operation means obedience", Charlie Armstrong 
maintained in 'his direct and forceful way. -I once said to him, 'If you 
vere 20 years younger, I'd take you outside and kick you from one end 
of Albion Street to the other'. He just laughed". But Armstrong was 
aware of the government 's role in the downfall of the SON too: "A 
lot of members of the Labour cabinet were against the Daily News from 
the start. They felt it would gradually become an SNP rag. They were 
right in the end." Armstrong tried his hand at the garage business 
for a while, but he too could not resist the feeling for the newspaper 
. 
industry, and a few years later managed to get back on the Evening Times. 
, 
"You can't have worker participation in a capitalist enterprise ~~yway. 
Nobody tells Robert Maxwell what to do" adamantly insisted Ronnie Gibson~ 
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"The Labour Government forced us into it with Maxwell. We couldn't 
have found that amount of money on our own." Gibson stoically resumed 
his previous work in the ·health service. John Hodgeman put it more 
lyrically: "From the state-subsidized shambles of the SON the only 
concrete lesson to emerge - the one being voiced in the Clydeside 
yards, the Lanarkshire forges and the Nationalist living rooms from 
where most of the cash support came is: 'If ye want tae dae it ••• 
dae it withoot Robert Maxwell'''. After an active and colourful two 
years as the Scottish organizer of the National Union of Journalists, 
including being arrested while picketing at a provincial newspaper, 
John Hodgeman became sub-editor on Socialist Worker, "I'm doing something 
I really believe in now, it makes a big difference, y'know." 
"We should have been a more courageous and investigative newspaper. 
We have not been able to emphasize our wish to change society", was the 
regret of Allister Mackie, the idealist at the heart of the ~ co-operative. 
~Ninety per cent of the people worked in a co-operative, only ten per 
cent for a co-operative. Half of the workforce would have preferred a 
traditional management - something they could confront, rather than be in 
m~agement themselves. Blyth destroyed confidence in the co-operative 
structure, he said, 'We need Maxwell in management, I am sorry to admit, 
we need his experience'''. Perhaps the most chastened by the bitter 
events at the SON, Mackie had to sadly leave the industry, "My one big 
regret is ~at I am no longer a member of a print union. My branch 
secretary advised me that because there were absolutely no job opportunities 
eitner at the time Dr in the future I should relinquish my union 
membership. I did so, and am now a member' of the GMWU". Working for 
·an Edinburgh cleaning company, Mackie pondered deeply on the ~ failure, . 
and came' to the sober but damning conclusion that, "The DTI set us up to 
fail •••• They wanted us to fail, and 'were re~ieved when we did •••• " 
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Robert Maxwell had a diametrically opposite view of what had 
gone wrong to that held by the majority of ex-Council members, as he 
announced in his telex of 6 November 1975: 
"The blame for the failure of Scottish News Enterprises 
Ltd does not rest on the shoulders of the journalists 
or the workforce. In fact they performed miracles 
of production of which there has been no equal in this 
country. The real blame must clearly rest with the Executive 
Council who, contrary to the representations made to the 
,DTI and the declaration in the original prospectus, 
decided last April to run'the newspaper without a man of proven 
commercial ability and took it upon themselves to run 
the day-to-day affairs of the company without the necessary 
knowledge and experience. The real lesson fo~ the future 
of any workers co-operative is that it is not enough to have 
a skilled and dedicated workforce to produce a product or 
service, you must also have a highly capable bUsiness 
management team responsible for ensuring the commercial 
success of the enterprise." 
(Rebert Maxwell continued his meteoric business career, apparantly 
unaffected by the SDN fiasco. In 1977~ the Director of Public 
Prosecutions held that proceedings against Maxwell due to the DTI report 
"would not be justified." Maxwell retained control of Pergamon Press, 
increased the ownership by his family interests, and recorded improvements 
in profitability. One notable area of expansion of Pergamon's work 
was in the Soviet Union, where Maxwell received attention for publishing 
an authorised biography of Leonid Brezhnev in the remarkable time of 
nine days, when in ,competition with an American publisher. Nor was 
Rebert MaxWell's political career at an en~ , b~ energetically attempted 
to secure nomination as an MP in one European parliament; and also made 
sso 
an aggressive attempt to secure nomination by the Kettering Labour 
Party in 1978, issuing an impressive curriculum vitae: "Publisher, 
politician, fighter, and man who gets things done. Robert Maxwell is 
all of these - and more." (Sunday Times, 5 March 1978). 
Thwarted in his political ambitions, in the early 1980s Maxwell 
attacked the commercial route to power with prodigious energy. A series 
of aggressive corporate acquisitions earned him headlines such as, 
"The Resurrection of Robert Maxwell" (Sunday Times, 4 April 1982) and 
"A 7Ycoon Who Bounced Back With A vengeance". (Guardian, 25 May 1982) 
Baving secured a 77' holding f&r Pergamon in 'his old adversary British 
Printing Corporation, Maxwell was declared chairman in February 1981 and 
immediately changed its name to all-embracing British Printing and 
Communications Corporation (BPCC). With a turnover of £200 million and 
a workforce of over 8,000, Maxwell was now in ,control·of the largest 
printing group in Europe. A programme of ruthless rationalisation was 
adopted to stem the group! losses including over 2,000 redundancies, 
together with a campaign to win back major colour printing orders from 
overseas. Once restored to strength BPCC proved a vehicle to rapidly 
overwhelm failing printing companies unable to weather the recession as 
Maxwell acquired an even larger share of British printing capacity. 
Modestly he insisted in one interview, "I don't want you saying that 
Maxwell waved a magic wand, or Maxwell is the saviour of the British 
printing industry. This has been a delicate business and I couldn't have 
done it on mr own." (Sunday Times, 13 February 1983) In fact the pattern 
of BPCC's rationalisation of the printing and packaging industry was 
most starkly revealed in the acquisition of Odham's printers of Watford, 
which was merged with Sun printers of Watford at the cost of 1,400 jobs, 
. 
to release the site for a hypermarket, meanwhile enhancing the BPCC 
, 
monopoly of gravure colour printing. '"I treat workers as individuals. I 
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never let them down and I do not bluff. It is perfectly human that 
people should try to stop closure, but trade unionists are realists. ft 
Aspirations to become a media baron were less easy to satisf y, 
:but having acquired an 8% share in Central TV, Maxwell would:have been 
happy to have become the majority shareholder if the owners,·Associated 
Communications Corporation, and the IBA, had consented. Having failed 
to acquire a national newspaper title Maxwell.offered to print them all 
at the grandly named British National Printing Corporation. He announced, 
·proprietors have realised that being both printer and publisher is the 
road to ruin. We will be in contract printing of newspapers before very 
long. ft (Guardian, 6 April 1982) If possession of a national title for the 
moment had escaped him! Maxwell could still look forward to earning the 
accol ade of ' The Man Who Saved Fleet Street'. That he could stand up in 
bare knuckled fights with the London print wor-kers who did not share his 
vision of the future had been proven in a bitter dispute at the Park 
Royal works of BPCC, which was the main BBC contract printer. When 350 
members of Sogat 82 refused to co-operate with Maxwell's reorganisation 
proposals, they were sacked and the receiver called in. The settlement 
came "after three weeks with Sogat 82 conceding the transfer of the Radio 
Times printing to East Kilbride and major job losses. 
Other escapades such as the chairmanship of Oxford United Football 
Club kept Maxwell in the public eye. Failing to appreciate the distinction 
between a club and a company, he attempted to merge Oxford Fe with Reading Fe 
into the Thames Valley Royals to the fury of the fans of both sides: 
(Guardian, 24 April 1983) Although Maxwell's career as a leading business 
celebrity developed as his wealth accumulated, he could never quite shake 
off the taint of the Department of Trade inspectors reports which dubbed 
him a man unfit to control a publicly ~~ted company , even though an 
. 
unabashed Maxwell insisted, .ftThey were talking a load of crap." (Guardian, 
2 August 1982) Nonetheless aspects of Maxwell's highly individualistic 
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business methods remained intact, including an apparent inability 
to delegate, though he contested, "With 12,000 employees in the 2 companies 
(Pergamon and BPCC) and an annual turnover of £300 million, you have to 
,delegate", yet his personal signature was required for every employee hired, 
every piece of overtime n0t, paid for by a customer, and every cheque~ 
(Sunday Times, 4 April 1982) 
Some of the workers at the SON who had supported Maxwell had seemed 
to yearn for the easy certainties of this form of autocratic control: 
-Most of the workforce are convinced that they need somebody, if not 
Robert Maxwell, somebody with the same kind.of charisma to run the paper ••• 
Some people regretted the fact that there wasn't a man at the top." How 
tragic, confused and h~lpless this deferential section of the workforce 
'had become was revealed by another worker: "We're not too happy with the 
government. The way I look at it the government has taken us half way 
across a busy street and stranded us in the middle. We'll probably get 
knocked down - but maybe somebody'll come and take us over the other side." 
Other workers were resentful, "Big daddy Maxwell, he was gonnae get us 
this, gonnae get us that, - got us nothing, got a black eye through it, 
we got nothing. He done nothing for us as far as I can see. 
The SON's ex-management team strongly contended Maxwell's analysis 
of the failure " as Eric TOugh maintained: 
.. ' . 
-Now I think we were so undercapitalised that we -couldn't 
have made it anyway. But we might have been able to go 
to the government and say that we were doing better and to 
plead for more money and more time 'to sort things out. 
The paper did, afte~ all, improve tremendously. But 
having got mixed up with Maxwell and with these emotional 
, non-commercial considerations; the government was bound 
to 8ay 'no' •• My deep regret is that Maxwell crossed 
this whole field and ruined the possibility of this terribly 
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vital experiment being taken to a satisfactory conclusion, 
one way or another. We have no real idea now what might 
have been achieved and we can't even point to clear-cut 
reas~ s why things went wrong. Maxwell's presence, 
his influence, permeated every issue.· 
(McKay & Barr, 1976, pp 120-1) 
External Assessments 
Most of those who had been involved in the Scottish Daily News were 
convinced of how the great potential of the newspaper had been cruelly 
destroyed by a combination of the discrimination of market forces, the 
belligerence of Robert Maxwell, and the intransigence of the government. 
Most external assessments of the newspaper were'bnmune to these 
considerations, and simply treated· the failure as a vindication of 
the official pessimistic forecasts, without further examination. 
Only McKay and Barr provide a sympathetic assessment of the ideals 
and effort which composed the SON struggle, though even they 
accept relatively uncritically the market constraints within which 
the newspaper was compelled to operate, and, therefore that failure 
was inevitable: "There had never been any rational baas for imagining 
that it would have been a different conclusion.· (1976,p 156) In 
accounting for the market collapse of the newspaper McKay and Barr 
penetratingly focus upon editorial weaknesses : ·The much heralded 
breath of fresh air blowing through .its.pages had turned out to be 
a stale draught," (p 163) and divert at~ention from the more critical 
problem of advertiser discrimination, since there are many popular 
newspapers with equally poor editorial quality which survive. Estimating the 
cent5al role of Robert Maxwell, McKay and Barr o~ten lapse into an 
unconvincing awe at his ~coonery, though their final opinion is scathing, 
. 
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"Robert Maxwell, through his very presence in Albion Street or in 
the background, ensured that no one will ever really know whether 
the Scottish Daily News could have been a successful experiment in 
workers' control". (p.12l). '!bey also acknowledge the serious 
inadequacies and contradictions of the Department of Industry's 
involvement: "Having so hamstrung the co-operative that they had to 
accept Maxwell's money with all its conditions, the government then 
refused to help the project during the last desperate days in September 
and October because of Maxwell's association with it.", (p.160). Moreover 
McKay and Barr do not dismiss the problems experienced in the Works 
Council between worker representatives and management in the facile way 
of other commentators hostile to any conception of workers control: 
"Management does not have a monopoly of virtue or of 
intelligence, even when it comes to managerial skills 
If the project had survived it would have indicated ways 
in which the tension between worker directors and 
profeSSional management could have been resolved. This 
is certain to be an area of difficulty in any enterprise 
controlled by the workers unless, of course, the workers 
unquestioningly adopt the assumptions and values of 
professional management; it is hard to imagine that any 
group of workers accepting these values would also have 
the vision to try to control the whole operation. Although 
both Allister Mackie and Eric Tough claim that the 
co-operative was starting to come to terms with the 
distinction between policy making and day-to-day management, 
seemingly intractable problems remained unsolved. Any 
worker with a coherent, left w~ng'political stance is bound 
to see a political content in many issues Which a manager 
would regard as day-to-day business." (pp. 162-3). 
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McKay and Barr conclude that as a commercially viable newspaper in 
a competitive market the SON was doomed to failure; that as an 
experiment in workers control it was interesting; and as a demonstrative 
struggle against unemployment it was vindicated. They accept that 
the SON workers shared an overwhelming experience but maintain that 
"although the crisis in the newspaper industry will continue and deepen, 
it is difficult to imagine that the same components will coincide again 
to produce another attempt by newspaper workers to take over from the 
bosses." (p.166) 
The consensus of external opinion did not bother with the internal 
SON struggles explored by McKay and Barr, but was content with orthodox 
references to the commercial unviability of the enterprise. The Economist 
in its inimitable unworried style offered the following slick judgement: 
"The economic air was hostile from the start. Declining newspaper 
circulations, the effect of the recession or available advertising and 
an already crowded Scottish market all militated against success. 
All that was known and pointed out in private and official reports long 
before the venture ever took off." (15 November 1975). This fast, 
no-nonsense approach actually conceals and confuses more than it explains. 
Newspaper circulation was declining, by an average of 10\ in all market 
sectors national, provincial morning, and evening in the period 1971-76 
as previously indicate~yet, during the same period Scottish morning 
papers actually increased their circulation by 22.6\, or over 200,000 
copies (RCP, Final Report, 1977, p.270). Reference to the advertiSing 
recession is relevant, but does not begin to explain why the ~ 
attained only 20' of target revenue, while the rest of the provincial press 
attained 9o,. As for the 'crowded Scottish market': a choice of 11 
newspapers was commonly available in Scotland, compared to 10 in England, 
f 
less than half the number of newspaPers available fifty years previously. 
(CUrran, 1979, p.67). 
• 
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The Royal Commission on the Press hardly delved deeper than 
the Economist. In keeping with the obsequiousness 
that it displayed towards market forces throughout the Final Report, 
it treats the ~ failure as a forego ne conclusion. The Commission 
refers simply to the pessimistic consultants' reports, and records 
the shortfall in circulation, though strangely making no mention of 
the lack of advertising revenue, except to criticize the SDN's 
own advertising strategy. The Commission concludes with pompous 
and patronising praise of the effort devoted to the dead co-operative: 
"The Scottish Daily News was fired by ideals of co-operative 
production which were evident during our visit. As we saw, 
these created a dedicated leadership and workforce and 
permitted very low manning levels and high productivity. 
We respect and admire the principles and effort which 
sustained the paper during its brief life, and we regret 
deeply that so much of value should have been squandered. 
SUch a spirit deserved a better opportunity. We think 
it would be wrong to conclude from the history of the 
Scottish Daily News that co-operative newspaper production 
has no future. But we hope that the next attempt will 
combine co-operative idealism with commercial realism. 
We doubt whether the history of the Scottish Daily News 
offers useful hints for other promoters of new daily 
newspapers." (RCP, Final Report, p.S3). 
The Commission makes no mention whatsoever of the underfunding of the 
!E!, yet estimates that to set up new plant to publish an evening 
newspaper, of average SO,ooo Circulation, would cost E2 million at 1976 
prices; that promotional and development expenditure was needed; that 
time was necessary to build up circulation and even longer to develop 
advertising, suggesting that it would take four or five years to break 
even, by which time losses would have mounted to El million. (p.54) •. 
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On the Commissions own calculations therefore, the SON with an 
achieved circulation of 140,000, and a projected circulation of 
250,000, would have needed at least E6million to firmly establish 
itself, which ~as £3.5 million more than it actually received. The 
Commission recognises that these costs are so great that new entrants 
are effectively excluded, and that only the largest existing publishers, 
utilizing spare capacity, can conceivably afford the expense of 
launching new papers, (though in fact the ~ launch was the first 
new provincial morning for decades). (pp.5l-4). The Commission reveals 
the true extent of its commitment to co-operative newspapers, behind 
, 
the inflated rhetoric, "Such a spirit deserved a "better opportunity", by 
~esolutely rejecting all and every proposal for public intervention to 
help reduce the financial barriers to entry in the newspaper market 
through the provision of subsidies or public printinq capacity. (pp.ll6-l26). 
Thus to suggest that in the present market context any co-operative 
newspaper "combine co-operative idealism with commercial realism", is 
in effect totally negative: without public intervention it is highly 
unlikely that any co-operative national newspaper could be launched, 
and if it was, in the effort to comply with advertising market 
requirements it would become virtually indistinquishable from the capitalist 
press. 
In their extensive writings on the subject Bradley and Gelb 
contribute little of significance to the explanation of how the SON 
failed. What they do, with a skill which it takes years of academic 
training to refine, is avoid all of the critical issues, and secrete 
on to the SON occurrences their own alien and rather irrelevant economic 
and socioloqical analysis, which explains more about the relationship 
of academics to workers struggles than about what took place at the SON. 
Bradley and Gelb begin their analysis by diSmissing the ~ as unviable, 
without any independent inquiry, tersely repeating the judgements of 
sse 
the Bank of Scotland, Strathclyde University Business School, and 
the Industrial Development Unit: this "wealth of advice", as they 
refer to it, (though more' accurately it should be the "advice of 
wealth"); which was based largely on the flimsy Chesters report, 
they accept without question. Since they assume that the SDN 
was bound to fail, there is therefore, no reason to attempt to 
explain why the SDN did fail. Without further investigation they 
are content to confirm that, "Sales dropped to what must be the lowest 
ever for a national newspaper. Advertising revenue fell far below 
projected levels." (1978,p.8) • With r~gard to sales they are wrong, 
the !Q! could only be considered a Scottish national newspaper, and 
in that league had the third highest daily sales. Bradley and Gelb 
claim to be interested primarily in the economic and political aspects 
of the~, "political economy" no less, but in fact they are primarily 
concerned with abstract and obscure problems, neglecting any consideration 
of the concentration and contraction of the press or the effect of 
advertising revenue. If they neglect to consider the concerted effect 
of private monopoly and advertising on the press, Bradley and Gelb 
reveal that they are not remotely interested in the editorial problems 
of the press by excluding the subject completely from their analysis, 
maintaining that they "do not wish to introduce here any welfare loss/ 
gain from the operation of the worker press E!!:~." (1977, p.23). 
The most notable lacuna in Bradley and Gelb's analysis is the 
absence of any proper consideration'of the role of Robert Maxwell - their 
work really amounts to a Hamlet without the Prince. That there is 
practically no ment1on°Aaxwell in several of their articles is uncanny, 
but may possibly have something to do with the fact that Bradley and 
Gelb received IIIlch of their documentary material from the Maxwell camp. 
, 
In the fleeting references they offer to the assessment of the 
involvement of Maxwell they emphaSise the assistance of his "commercial 
expertise", though they do concede that the conditions of the government 
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loan which forced "the commercially inexperienced workers into 
collaboration with a financier, jeopardized the idea of workers 
control fran the outset." (l979a, pp.3,9.) The only discussion 
of the internal struggles at the SDN which they offer, was in a paper 
presented to the International Industrial Relations Association, 
which purports that the dominant orientation of SDN workers was 
one of 'pragmatic acceptance'; but this sociologically inc 
conception merely conceals the fact that the dominant orientation 
of the SDN workers was based on fear and insecurity, which Maxwell 
frequently exploited. To support their contention, they offer the 
following rather warped explanation: 
"Mackie and Maxwell, legitimated their positions by relating 
to totally different developmental stages of the enterprise, 
the former to a stage which demanded predaninantly 
idealism and a commitment towards the co-operative, 
the latter to a later stage which demanded business 
expertise and practical management skills •••• Whether 
Mackie's inexperience contributed to the newspaper's 
decline is difficult to ascertain. However, Maxwell 
seized this opportunity to regain control, appealing 
directly to the economistic and pragmatic attitudes of 
the workforce, thus by-passing the chairman and the 
ideologically motivated caucus which surrounded him on 
the board of directors. On 20 June 1975 he sent a 
telex to the SDN workers which ••• appealed to the 
commercially motivated workforce; it sidestepped Mackie, 
whilst exposing the contradiction between inexperienced 
worker management and "experienced capitalism". (l979b,pp.ll-l2). 
, 
At one level this is merely a repetition of the stereotyped management 
view that only executive management are qualified to take important 
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decisions, and workers are incompetent to do more than obey. 
As an explanation of the struggle between Maxwell and the Council at 
the SON it is extremely misleading: the "inexperienced" Council 
which included a PA management veteran and others with considerably 
more experience of the newspaper industry than Robert Maxwell, had 
already set in train the relaunch programme of recovery when Maxwell 
returned to executive power at the end of July 1975, and his 
contribution to this was largely diversionary. In another sense, 
Maxwell was more commercially oriented than the Council, but this 
narrow commercialism contradicted the ideals upon which the co-operative 
I 
was founded, and if the ~ was to be just another popular tabloid 
run by another omniscient proprietor then co-operative sacrifice and 
commitmen~which was the only thing which made the SON potentially 
viable, could not be expected. The interpretation of Bradley and 
Gelb would be unconvincing if any adequate presentation of the events 
at the SON was given; this they do not attempt, but instead support 
their argument by a disgraceful distortion, referring on a graph to 
the point where the SON cash flow position considerably improved in 
August due to the tabloid relaunch, as the "point at which Maxwell 
resumed executive powers", implicitly attributing to him the recovery 
which he had played little part in creating. (1979b, p. 13). 
On the question of the role of the government Bradley and Gelb 
are more illuminating in their analysis, but in their conclusions even 
more perverse. '!bey convincingly explain that the SON funding 
was an unintended compromise between the committed Benn, reluctant 
Cabinet, and nostile Treasury, which accounts for the severe terms of 
the ~ loan, and the 'official indifference to the financial problems 
experienced later. However Bradley_, and Gelb can find no other reason 
to justify state intervention in industry than a peculiarly heartless 
and manipulatory Keynesian logic. The conditions which they set to 
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test the acceptability of state aid are that : 
"1. The duration of support is short relative to the delay in 
factor market adjustment. 
2. Intervention does not substantially hinder or slow down 
factor reallocation to more viable sectors. 
3. Factors affected are not unemployed through deliberate 
government policy." (1979b, p.10). 
Thus the implicit assumption throughout Bradley and Gelb's work is 
that state intervention in industry is, and should be, only temporary. 
This view is based on a dependence on the free market and private 
sector to reallocate an equilibrium in the distribution and 
utilization of factors of production, especially labour, which is 
something that the unrestrained and uneven development of capitalism 
has patently failed to do. They argue that the "respectable case" 
justifying the ~ loan was as a "temporary employment maintaining 
operation", and therefore, that the terms of the loan were quite 
appropriate. As evidence that the assistance given was of "positive 
and substantial" benefit to the state they calculate that after the 
sale of the secured assets; with six months tax and national insurance 
receipts from the 500 workers; .and the savings on unemployment 
benefits during this time; that the direct "profit" to the state was 
of the order of half a million pounds, assuming that none of the workers 
could have found alternative employment. Indirect losses by rival 
newspapers and investors they estimate would not wipe out this overall 
benefit. (1979a). As evidence of the benefit to the SON workers 
that the temporary aid provided, Bradley ,!!ld Gelb cite, with all the 
studied cynicism that bourgeois economists can muster that despite 
the E400 capital investment, over a· full year: "After tax, a worker 
would have taken E2,1~2as opposed to £1,445 unemployment benefit. 
The gain after .the 'Daily News' collapse, assuming total loss of a £400 
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capital contribution, would merely have been cut to £336 from £736. 
This may not seem much for a year's work. However it is hard to 
assume that it should be assigned a zero welfare weight, especially 
in view of the implicit rejection of leisure as a "good" contained 
in most attitudes to unemployment." (1977, p.l9). Such stunted 
balance sheet values may impress Treasury mandarins, or merchant 
bankers on the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, but 
they would be regarded with repugnance by the idealists who founded 
the SDN, who were intent on social and industrial change, and who 
knew there was something on the bottom line besides pounds and pence. 
In their assessment of the experience of the SDN, and of the 
other two workers co-operatives that they had reluctantly funded, the 
senior civil servants of the Department of Industry revealed that they 
had learned nothing, but merely confirmed their original sharp 
prejudices. Once Benn was ejected from the Department, the early 
failure of the ~, and the difficult lives of Kirkby Manufacturing 
and Engineering and the Meriden Moto~cycle Co-operative, allowed the 
senior officials of the Department to abandon the social considerations 
concerning unemployment in depressed areas and industrial innovation, 
and reassert orthodox market criteria for public assistance of 
profitability and return on capital. Applying such criteria, 
assistance would not have been given to any of the co-operatives, and 
certainly not the ~ after it had been categorically refused by the 
private banking sector. Having foreclosed the possibility of any 
future co-operative innovation by restoring discriminatory market 
«iteria, Sir Peter Carey the Permanent Secretary at the Department 
~f Industry revealed his contempt for the achievements of the workers 
leaders at the three co-operatives wpich had been funded, and his 
disregard for the problems they faced which he was partly accountable for: 
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"1 think that as far as monitoring is concerned, we 
have learned a cons~derable amount from these particular 
cases and this particular form of organization. 
One of those lessons is that good professional 
management is a sine qua non for success. 1 think 
that the lesson is being learned by the co-operatives. 
In the case of Scottish News Enterprises there was not 
time for it to be learned because the enterprise failed 
very quickly. 1 think that in the other two cases 
the importance of good professional management is 
recognised, and the importation of such management need 
not undermine the basic rationale of a workers co-operative." 
(Sixth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, 17 
May 1976, pp. 386-7). 
In p~oviding this sick epitaph on the greatest British post-war 
experiment in workers management, Carey was either oblivious to the 
internal struggles which took place.at the SDN, or if he was aware 
of .them, sided completely with the management. Such mindless 
conservatism justifies Brian Sedgemore's condemnation of the 
undemocratic elitism which pervades the higher echelons of the Civil 
Service,and the addiction of Carey and others to archaic and irrelevant 
economic shibboleths, which leads them to systematically frustrate 
the interventionist policies of successive Labour Governments. 
(Guardian, 16 September 1977). 
Conclusions. 
The Scottish Daily NewsW~ritain's first worker controlled mass 
circulation newspaper. As-a.newspaper and"as a co-operative it was 
, 
riddled with contradicti~ns, and ·during its brief precarious life it 
• 
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staggered from crisis to crisis. As a newspaper supposedly 
devoted to the cause of workers struggles, it was dependent on 
the goodwill of advertising executives for half of the revenue essential 
for its survival. Old journalists promised a youthful editorial, 
but their newly discovered editorial freedom was used merely to 
instinctively continue with what was considered safe and familiar. 
Instead of pioneering new editorial frontiers, they disinterred old 
editorial formulas. The political ideal of a labour newspaper, never 
coherently conceived or firmly embraced by many, was quickly jettisoned 
in the vain search for a commercial product. The result was that 
committed readers felt disappointed and betrayed; 
If it "was Itself-evident to all concerned ••• that the paper, 
when it was launched would have to be a marketable commodity" in 
Allister Mackie's phrase, the severe constraints of .this existance were 
discovered (1976,p.113). The SON was arrogantly tossed aside by 
advertisers whose narrow commercial tastes the newspaper offended, and who 
saw the co-operative as a potential threat to their interests. The 
~ was continually in the uncomfortable position of being unable to 
convince trade union readers of the extent of its political commitment, 
or to persuade advertisers of its lack of political commitment. The SON 
suffered the classic dilemma of reformism: it was too hesitant to 
forcefully initiate the concept of a socialist newspaper, and too weak 
to withstand the battering of market forces as a conventional newspaper. 
The most Obvious contradiction at the SON was the presence of 
Robert Maxwell as co-chairman, who cast himself in the role of aggressive 
newspaper proprietor in an organization supposedly subject to workers 
control. The impossibility of reconciling Maxwell's direction with 
democratic contro~ was shown not Simply in his continual conflict with 
the Works Council,but in the opposition he met from a succession of SON 
management executives who could not reconcile his control with collective 
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responsibility. In order to establish executive control of the SON 
Maxwell had to cut a swathe through the Council, management, and 
professional advisers, lead~ng to the removal or resignation of 
almost all of the original team. This disruption seriously contributed 
to the commercial difficulties of the SON and provided much bad publicity. 
When Maxwell eventually eliminated all rivals to his executive power 
he took control of a demoralised, declining organization with an 
administrative shell. Maxwell more than anyone attempted to make the SDN 
comply with what he understood to be market imperatives. Fundamental 
to Maxwell's orientation were two obsessions: firstly competition with 
other popular newspapers; and secondly the price of the ~. But these 
crude market fixations contradicted the original orientation of the 
co-operative, which was to meet the need for an authentically Scottish 
labour newspaper rather than competing with popular rivals with a 
similar product; and in this endeavour price was largely irrelevant since 
people would buy it for its editorial values, not its cheapness, and would 
even be prepared to subsidize it. Yet Maxwell clung to his decision 
to initiate and maintain the price reduction of the SON, in the face 
of substantial and recurrent evidence that it entailed financial suicide 
for the newspaper, with the tenacity of a man in the grip of a dogmatic 
belief rather than someone exercising considered commercial judgement. 
Though the paper certainly had many other fundamental problems which 
would ultimately have brought its end, Robert Maxwell's involvement 
was the principal cause of the short, painful and frequently humiliating 
life of the Scottish Daily News. 
If Maxwell was the instrument which crushed the dreams of the SON 
idealists, the instigator of this brutal end was the Labour government. 
At every turn the government discouraged and delayed the ~ workers, 
• 
contemptuously neglecting an opportunity to implement the Labour Party's 
poliCY of a socialised press. When the goveI'Dlllent failed to wear down , 
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the determination of the SON activists, it allowed the civil 
servants at the Department of Industry to impose crippling terms on 
the loan to the SON which ensured that the co-operative was under-
capitlized from the start, and dependent on the contribution of Robert 
MaxWell. If the ~ did do more harm than good to the prospects 
of co-operative control of newspapers and other industries, there were 
those in government, particularly at the Dol, who wanted this to be so. 
o There exists a deep-seated antagnism to economic and industrial 
innovation within the right wing of the Labour Party, ,and throughout the 
senior civil service:for them, the Ire-generation of British industry' 
to which the 1974-1979 Labour government was formally committed, could 
only be the re-generation of capitalism. The Department of Industry 
remains completely immersed in traditional commercial values and 
practices, and its highest aspiration seems to be to act as an orthodox 
capitalist merchant bank. In this context, the SON was simply an 
unwanted embarrassment, and never stood a chance. 
Among the enduring lessons to emerge from the SDN experience is 
the incompatibility of professional management control and democratic 
workers control. "The newspaper will be run by the workers themselves 
but, within that context, it will have expert management with traditional 
executive responsibilities", the guide to the ~ prospectus optimistically 
stated. But the experience at the SON was actually one of an 
implac able contradiction between management priorities, methods, and 
values, and those of the workers rep~esentatives, which could only be 
resolved by the defeat of one or the other. The technical skills of 
professional management were necessary for the commercial survival of the 
~, but the accompanying baggage of manageri~l hierarchy and assumptions 
was mortally threatening to its s~i.al as a co-operative. 
The basic unsolved contradictions of the ~ co-operative stretched 
down on to the shopfloor. Co-operative ideals and equality nurtured 
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during the exhausting struggle to establish the paper, quickly 
evaporated with the difficulties encountered after the launch, and 
were replaced by a pragmatism and elitism directly transplanted from 
the past. The aristocracy of labour proved incapable of shaking off 
the ingrained traditions and assumptions of the past when faced with a 
real, if hazardous, opportunity to do so. The traditional economism 
and political conservatism of the print unions re-emerged at the ~, 
with a deferential yearning for the personal prosperity and security 
they had enjoyed in the days of the Beaver, reqardles~ of how other 
workers had fared during that period. 
"If this fails it has not shown co-operatives will fail, if it 
works it has not shown they will succeed - it is ~ a co-operative", 
was the opinion of one of the SDN librarians. with which many people 
concurred. They had discovered the enormous difficulties of individual, 
isolated co-operatives in a hostile market environment, which are 
incapable of transforming the eXisting economic system but are themselves 
overwhelmed, and either collapse or become mutations of their original 
principles. "We have created a monster, we can only destroy it now", 
one ·of the ~ activists said in genuine despair. Union activists· in ·the 
It newspaper industry, and wider labaur movement, have a duty to the 
ideals of the SON struggle·not to create· another monster. If the 
dTeam of a socialised press is to be achieved it will require·more 
than an attempt to rescue a failed capitalist newspaper, or the launch 
of a solitary labour daily. Extensive intervention in the existing 
newspaper market will be necessary to ensure access to launch funds for 
diverse publications, as well as access to printing capacity and 
d1stribution services. Commercial advertising will need to be replaced 
as a main source of revenue.· Fina~l~ to ensure democratic control of 
both the newspaper enterprises and editorial direction more thorough 
methods of participation and accountability will be required than have 
80 far been contemplated. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Scottish Daily News disaster was not a unique experience in the 
history of the British press. Every attempt to launch and sustain a 
radical mass-circulation newspaper in Britain for a century has met with 
ignominious commercial failure. It is now proposed to examine the political 
economy of the press to discover the factors which militate against efforts 
to achieve a democratic press. 
In chapter two the historical development of the press is considered, 
and how advertising discrimination eliminated the radical social democratic 
press. The career of the Daily Herald is studied as an acute illustration 
of this process. Chapter three explores the contemporary ownership and 
control structure of the press and notes the degree of centralisation and 
concentration that has occurred. The scale of the advertising industry 
and the extent of the advertising subsidy of the press is examined. 
Chapter four investigates the editorial construction of the contemporary 
press, and the pressures which influence the manufacture of news are 
considered. Chapter five looks at the conflictual industrial relations 
of Fleet Street, and the impact of new technology. 
The final chapter considers the alternatives facing the media: either 
the further concentration of electronic ideological power of the multinationals, 
or a democratic struggle to achieve a socialised media. 
CHAPTER TWO • 
------
THE LIBERAL THEORY OF PRESS FREEDOM AND THE ELHUNATION OF THE LABOUR PRESS. 
The widely accepted orthodox version of press history is that 
the British press attain~d its freedom during the middle decades 
of the 19th century, when it was gradually released from the legal 
and fiscal controls by which the state had sought to control the press 
and restrict its readership. According to this view the expansion 
of advertising revenue provided the indispensable foundation for the 
... economic independence of the press: 
"Since sales were inadequate to ,cover the costs of producing a paper, it 
was the growing income from advertising which provided the material 
. 
base for the change of attitude from subservience to independence. 
The chief methods by which governments could influence the press - a direct 
subsidy, official advertisements, and priority of intelligence - were 
rendered less effective because proprietors could afford to do without 
them ••••• The growth of advertising revenue was the most important 
single factor in enabling the press to emerge as t.he Fourth Estate of 
the realm." (Asquith, 1975, p.72l). 
This version of press history legitimates and sustains the liberal market 
based theory of press freedom, which has proved of pe~vasive and enduring 
influence in protecting the capitalist press from politically initiated 
reform or significant change in any way. Thus the first post-war Royal 
Commission on the Press declared, "As long as newspapers are sold to the 
public for less than they cost to produce, they will need a supplementary 
source of income. Of the various possible sources of income, the sale 
of their space to advertisers seems to us to be one of the least harmful 
its receipt creates a relationship both remote and impersonal." (RCP,1949,p.l43) 
The two subsequent Royal Commissions stressed-the difficulty of detecting 
4 
• 
advertising influence upon editorial content, and broadly concurred 
with the judgement that undue advertising influence was limited. 
(RCP, 1962, p.87; RCP, Final Report, 1977, pp 104-5). Despite the 
official consensus a penetrating challenge to the orthodox interpretation 
of the history of press freedom has been mounted by the work of 
James Curran, who has convincingly argued the need "not only to reo-examine 
critically the accepted view of the historical emergence of a 'free' 
press but to stand it on its head. The period around the middle of 
the nineteenth century •.•• did not inaugurate a new era of press freedom 
and liberty: it introduced a ne~ system of press censorship more 
effective than anything that had gone before. Market forces succeeded 
where legal repression had failed in establishing the press as an 
instrument of social control, with lasting consequences for the 
development of modern British Society." (1977, pp 197-198). 
The original aim of press taxes was to restrict readership of 
newspapers to an elite, and to restrict ownership of the press to the 
propertied classes. The control system of the state failed, for in the 
early decades of the 19th century, a radical working class press 
flourished with a circulation o~ about 200,000 and a readership 9f four 
million, which successfully evaded press taxes. The radical unstamped 
press circulated freely among working people, was read in communal 
gatherings focused upon their common experiences-, and defined the 
prevailing social reality as a process of exploitation which could be 
. 
resisted, rather than preaching passive acceptance: 
"The radical press was important in reinforcing a growing consciousness 
of class and in unifying disparate elements of the working community 
. partly because its leading publications were national media, providing 
national coverage and reaching a national working-class audience. It 
helped to extend the often highly exclusive occupational solidarity of 
5 
• 
"the new tmionism" to all other sections of the labour conununity 
by showing the common predicament of unionists in different occupations 
and in different trades throughout the country. Workers struggling 
to establish an extra-legal union in their locality read in the 
radical press in 1833, for i~stance, of similar struggles by glove 
workers in Yeovil, cabinet makers and joiners in Carlisle and Glasgow, 
shoemakers and smiths in Northampton, bricklayers and masons in London 
(to mention only some) as well as the struggles of workers in Belgium 
-
and Germany. Similarly, the radical press helped to reduce the 
geographical isolation of local-labour co~~unities by, showing that 
localized agitation -whether against the Poor Law Commissioners, new 
machinery, longer working hours or wage cutting - conformed to a common 
pattern throughout the country. The radical press carried ne\>lS that 
none of the respectable papers carried, it focused attention on the common 
problems and identity of interest of working people as a social grouping, 
and it coalesced disparate groups fragmented by primitive communications 
and sectional affiliations into mass working class audiences. It 
was in the words of the Chartist leader ~'eargus O'Connor, "the link 
tha't binds the industrious classes together". (Northern Starr 16 January 
1841). (Curran, 1977 ,p. 203) • 
The reduction in stamp tax of 1836 is often held up as a major 
reform, when in fact the penalties for evading taxation were increased 
.. 
by this measure, which made it difficult for the radical press to continue 
their evasion of the tax. Before only the establishment papers paid 
stamp duty, the radical papers could keep their costs down by evading 
the duty, and paying the nominal fines when caught. The philosophy 
behind the reform was "made clearer in 1853 and 1855 when advertising and 
-
stamp duty were lifted completely allowing the reduction of the price of 
the establishment press and ,the wider disseminatio~ of what the authorities 
.. 
• 
considered to be I sound doctrines I among the ,,,orking class. The 
radical press had been sustained by a high retail price, and without 
advertising revenue was free to criticize and attack the system of 
industrial capitalism. But in the second half of the century the 
6 
radical press came directly into competition with the cheap mass 
newspapers which received substantial revenue from commercial advertising 
which was denied the radical press. 
Competitive pressure sharpened severely with the concentration and 
technical developments in the press of the late 19th century. Previously 
the low launch costs of newspapers and the limited capital costs of 
printing machinery, made it possible for working class political groups 
to own and control newspapers. For example The Beehive was launched in 
1862 with capital of less than £250 raised by trade union organisations. 
But with the development of linotype composing and mechanized printing 
presses, there was a serious rise in fixed capital costs. Economies 
of scale benefitted the major publishers and printing companies as production 
and newsprint costs increased. Pagination also increased, along with 
increased editorial, publicity, and circulation charges. The rise 
in costs necessitated a rise in·circulation levels, and the break-even 
point was raised further as newspaper prices were successively reduced. 
Newspapers came to cost a lot more to produce than the price at which 
they sold, therefore increased circulation meant increased losses unless 
there was increased advertising, which came to contribute half or more 
of total revenue. (Curran, 1977). 
The rise in the costs of publishing national newspapers entailed 
in this competitive process meant that ownership and control of the press 
gradually passed solely into the hands of the capitalist class. And 
as the radical press was gradually absorbed or eliminated, all of the 
new generation of national popular newspapers founded at the end of the 
• 
19th century, and the beginning of the 20th century, connnencing 
with Northcliffe's Daily Mail in 1896, were on the right or extreme 
right of the political spectrum. At this time proprietors bought 
and sold national newspapers in rapid succession, and editors found 
themselves engaged in playing ideological musical chairs, as the 
7 
ownership of their newspapers passed from Tory to Liberal, and then back to 
Tory proprietors. (A. Smith, 1977, p.l93). Not only did wealthy 
proprietors now own and control the press, but advertisers had assumed 
a role which Curran defines as thatof a de facto licencing authority: 
in order to connnercially survive newspapers needed large amounts of 
advertising revenue, and to secure this revenue they had to provide an 
editorial stance, that would not be objectionable to advertisers in 
general. (1977). The founding by the labour movement of the Daily Herald 
and the Daily Citizen was part of a determined attempt to resist the 
proprietorial and advertiser domination of the press, though ultimately, 
the failure of both labour papers only confirmed the trends they were 
fighting against. 
The first real test of the mass circulation proprietoral popular 
press came with the First World War, the tragic turning point of Western 
industrial civilization. Philip Knightly, a Sunday Times journalist, 
in his book on war correspondents, 'The First Casualty', (the first 
casualty being the truth,) documents how during the war, to prevent any 
lessening of the war effort, more deliberate lies were told than in any 
other period of history. Lord Northcliffe, the proprietor of both 
The Times and the Daily Mail, became the director of propaganda in 
enemy countries, and Lord Beaverbrook, who having acquired a taste for 
propaganda, later acquired the Express newspaper empire, headed the Ministry 
of Information. Knightly vividly records how, 
"As the war progressed, as mechanized slaughter reached a scale never 
before envisaged (nearly 10 million killed in .the fighting or as a direct 
• s 
result of it, 21 million wounded}, and as a rotting corpse on barbed 
wire became a symbol of a world gone mad, so the propaganda machine 
that had made possible the transition from peace to war multiplied 
like a tumour on the brain of Europe." (1975, p.84). 
For example in August 1914 at the Battle of the Frontiers, a German 
victory wiped out about 300,000 French soldiers, or nearly 25% of the 
combatants, a carnage never before equalled. Yet it remained completely 
unreported in Britain until after the war was over, The Times official 
history approved, "Such silence was prudent ••• had it been known in 
England that France had lost more than a quarter of a million men from 
her regular army in the first month of fighting, British determination 
must have been gravely weakened." (Knightley, 1975, p.92). German 
newspaper readers did not fare better: they were subject to a propaganda 
campaign which asserted that the Russians had mobilized first, the French 
had invaded German territory, and the envious English had seized the 
opportunity to crush a competitor whose commercial and naval superiority 
had to be forestalled; which made the war generally acceptable. In 
Britain it is important to note that newspapers did not have to be 
directly controlled by government, as Churchill recommended in the case 
of The Times, most only needed a light touch of the rein, as they made it 
clear that they would back the war wholeheartedly. 
Lord Northcliffe said. (Knightly, 1975, p.94). 
"Trust the generals", 
The inter-war years saw an intensification of the concentration 
and monopolization of the newspaper industry by press barons who wielded 
almost feudal power. The ~utocracy of the proprietors was scarcely 
relieved by their acute eccentricity: Beaverbrook and others constantly 
subjected ~helr newspaper staff and reading public to indulgent displays 
of their own obsessive fantasies. "He used to dictate nessages into a 
Soundscriber and dispatch them to the paper: 'We have a system you know. 
• 9 
I speak at this end and there is a machine at t.he other end and it 
comes out as a leading article.' How charmingly impish it is in 
retrospect, and how tyrannical and soul-destroying it was at the time". 
(Hirsch and Gordon, 1975, p.70). 
In 1946 the National Union of Journalists successfully called 
for a Royal Commission on the ownership and control of the press. 
In the debate in the House of Commons on 29 October 1946 NUJ members 
explained why their union thought an inquiry necessary: 
"They said that journalists were concerned at a tendency towards 
monopoly in the control of the Press. During the previous 25 years 
the number of newspapers in the country had decreased and those that 
remained had come into fewer and fewer hands. Independent provincial 
papers had been bought up by proprietors o~~ing newspapers in a number 
of provincial towns and dictating from London a uniformity not only of 
policy but of contents. This concentration of ownership was 
incompatible with real freedom of the Press and, in conjunction with 
the great increase in the circulation of national newspapers, produced 
a concentration of power in the hands of a few men which was capable 
of dangerous abuse and was in ·fact being abused to suppress opinion and 
to distort news. The increase in the size of newspaper undertakings 
subjected journalists who were trying to present news and views8eriously 
and r~sp~sibly not only to the opinions of individual proprietors, but 
to the commercial considerations governing the employment of great 
accumulations of capital. The result was a progressive decline in 
the calibre of editors and tn the quality of British journalism. These 
developments, the speakers suggested, were likely to continue, and if 
unchecked ,would endanger not only the freedom of the Press but the welfare 
of the country. (RCP, 1949, pp3~4). 
In their written evidence to the Roy~l Commission the NUJ perceptively 
argued for the accep~ance of the press as a public service ~ith clear 
duties incompatible with market controls: 
,., 
• 
10 
"We are of the opinion that the production of newspapers cannot be 
governed by the strictly commercial considerations which govern the 
making and marketing of other commodities in general demand. Our 
function is in the nature of a public trust and should be so regarded. 
We seek above all else, as a body of professional men and women, 
that the industry in which we serve the community should be directed and 
managed primarily in the public interest." 
1949,p.l). 
(RCP, Memoranda of Evidence 1, 
The conclusions of the Royal Commission predictably were complacent, the 
Labour Government of 1945-51 exhausted its energy in ,the struggle to 
nationalize the coal and steel industry and to create the National 
Health Service; the opportunity to attend to the problem of the capitalist 
press which the journalists had demanded was missed, and the labour 
movement has paid a severe penalty ever since. 
Between 1947 and 1960 a total of 17 daily and Sunday papers were 
closed and there was a national scandal at the takeover of the Liberal 
, 'News Chronicle by the Tory, Daily Mail. The News Chronicle had a 
'tradition of distinguished radical correspondents and was read by the kind 
of'people who despised everything the Tory establishment stood for: then 
'suddenly these people found dropping uninvited through their letter' 
boxes one of the worst examples of the popular Tory press instead of their 
own newspaper. The second post-war Royal Commission on the Press met 
under Lord Shawcross during 1961-62, in its Report the Commission 
rejected any form of public subsidy, and simply hoped that enterprising 
management and imaginative editors could save the diversity of the press. 
{ReP, 1962). That such qualities alone were not enough, was revealed 
by the elimination in the late 1960s of the last two remaining national 
newspapers of the left, the Sunday Citizen and the Daily Herald, both of 
which were progressively s~rangl~d by 
th~ugh they had extensive circulations. 
lack of advertising revenue 
11 
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The market had created a control system which unlike stamp 
duty, could not be evaded or defied. This control syslem had entirely 
decimated the national radical press by early in the 20th century, and 
more gradually destroyed the national social democratic press during 
the course of the 20th century. Before 1890 the three largest 
newspaper companies had only a small fraction of national newspaper 
sales, by 1976 the three largest newspaper corporations had 86% of 
the total national Sunday newspaper circulation, ·and 72% of the total 
national daily circulation. (Curran, 1979, p.63). This enormous 
concentration of ideological for~e represents a constant threat to the 
labour movement. The third Royal Commission of 1974-77 under Professor 
Oliver McGregor was prompted by Labour MPs concern at the ove~~helmir.g 
Conservative bias of the national P!ess, acutely apparent during the 
general election of Feoruary 1974 called in response to the loiners strike. 
Despite a wide brief to examine the economics, concentration, diversity, 
.and industrial relations of the press, the Commission laboured to produce 
a R~port devoid of any conception of the crucial need for structural 
reform of the press, and the weak recommendations of the Report were 
j~stifiably ignored. Presently the ma~ket forces which have imposed 
the cumulative degeneration of the national press are free to continue 
this process untrammelled. 
. 
In the historical development of the national press, therefore, an 
essential component of working class culture and political activity was 
almost completely exterminated to be replaced by the dreadful commercialism 
and cheap vulgarity of the capitalist popular press. This loss has 
enormous tmplications for the future of the labour movement, and it is 
imperative to·understand exactly how it took place, which can best be 
done by examining the career of the Daily Herald. For the metamorphosis 
of the Daily Herald, is an acute illustration of what occurred in the 
British press in general during the 20th century. 
... 
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THE DAILY HERALD 
The Daily Herald was a product of the great iabour unrest of 1911. 
It first appeared as a newsheet of the London print unions during an 
industrial dispute, and in 1912 it was the official strike organ of the 
London transport workers. Moderate trade union officials had access 
to the Liberal papers, the activists wanted a labour paper which would 
reflect rank and file initiatives. The Daily Herald was independent of 
party orthodoxy, was militant, and debated keenly distributivism, guild 
d d ' I' 1 socialism, an syn 1ca 1sm. T~e Herald linked sections of workers in 
struggle,. as one reader ~provingly commented: 
"Let anyone consider the influence of the Herald day after day imparting, 
sub-consiously it may be, its note of rebellion and independence. Day 
after day its records of the uprisingsof the workers give an intimate 
sense of labour struggling and show the need for solidarity and action 
on a large scale. Its opposition to paternalism daily reiterated will 
make labour critical and suspicious of reform dopes like the Insurance 
Acts, and compulsory arbitration will be examined before being taken." 
(Daily Herald" 28 October 1912)-. 
The Herald connected the militant women's suffrage movement with other 
dissidents, one member of the Women's Social and Political Union 
maintained ~hat, "What had drawn her into the movement in support of the 
Herald was the splendid uncompromising spirit manifested towards the women's 
cause primarily, and also the workers movement generally." (Daily Herald, 
10 January 1913). 
1. The distributivists called for diffused property ownership as a 
necessary counterweight to capitalist wage slavery and state 
collectivism, the syndicalists looked in contrast to revolutionary 
industrial organization both as the agency of social emancipation, a~d 
as the embryo of a new social order. (Holton,1974,p.353; Holton,l976). 
Guild socialism was a predominantly middle class philosophy which 
briefly emerged at the time in response to syndicalism: "it is neither 
revolutionary nor reformist. It is ~ither Utopian nor realist. It 
hoVers in a state of.uneasy equilibrium between the medievalists and the 
revolutionaries." (Mellor, 1921, pp40l-2). 
.. 
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The success of the Daily Herald startled the labour establishment, 
who launched· an official labour paper, the Daily Cit!..zen in 1912, to 
enable the Labour Party leadership to reassert and develop support for 
its policies. Bob Holton has"compared the Herald and the Citizen in an 
illuminating article which clearly displays the contradictory tension 
between the rank and file members and the leadership in the labour 
movement. (1974). The Citizen sought respectability and acceptance, 
wanted to harmonize the relations between labour and capital, and served 
as an agency of social control over the labour movement. The editorial 
policy confirmed Labour Party p~agmatism and focused upon the parliamentary 
leadership in Westminster. Among the Citize~s testimonials in the first 
edition was one by Lord Northcliffe who appreciated the implications 
of the paper in creat.ing a "representative press." The Citizen 
stressed that strikes should be a last resort and unreservedly upheld the 
authority of trade union leaders over the rank and file. But the Citizen 
employed professional journalists who failed to connect with the 
interests of the organized working class, the editorial had a superficial 
"-
coverage of labour matters and lacked a convincing raison d'etre. 
The Citizen hoped for sub?tantial advertising revenue, in contrast 
. 
the Herald relied on grassroots support and rich radica~ patrons. The 
circulation of "both papers fluctuated considerably in response to 
national crises the Herald around 100,000 and the Citizen around 150,000. 
With the onset of war, the Citizen joined the other popular papers in 
projecting wartime patriotism, the Herald was unique in opposing the war, 
and became a rallying point for anti-war opinion. The Herald was a forum 
for wide-ranging dissident views, the Citizen, was, in the typical 1 well 
chosen words of Beatrice Webb, "smug, common and ultra-official". However 
even a labour paper so dedicated to orthodoxy as the Citizen, failed 
to attract advertising revenue, and collapsed in 1915. The Herald converted 
to a weekly and continued as the lone national voice of radical opinion 
throughout the war. 
• 
The Herald was relaunched as a daily in 1919, but though twice 
the price of its rivals, could not compensate for the lack of 
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advertising revenue, and consistently made losses. After being rescued 
by the railwaymen and the miners, the Herald was forced into the hands 
of the TUC and Labour Party in 1922, ceased its role as the campaigning 
newspaper of dissident movements, and gradually became, as the Citizen 
before was intended to be, the official mouthpiece of the labour 
establishment. Yet even in this restricted role the Herald stood 
out from its contemporaries: only one national daily paper - the Herald -
supported the General Strike i~ 1926. But the degeneration of the 
paper under commercial pressures developed seriously when a private 
publisher, Odhams, acquired a 51% share in the newspaper, the TUC 
being left with 49%. 
In an interesting precursor to the Bullock principle, there were 
nine directors of the new paper: four 'A' directors appointed by the 
TUC, and· five 'B' directors appointed by Odhams. J.S.Elias, the 
managing director of Odhams was chairman, and Ernest Bevin a member of 
the General Council of the TUC was vice-chairman. Only 'A' (TUC) 
directors could vote on.questi~ns of 'industrial policy' and 'pqlitic~l 
policy'. 'Commercial policy' was entirely in the hands of Odhams, and 
the 'B' directors also had control of the appointment of the editor. 
This was not thought to be a problem by the TUCi an opinion that was not 
shared by editors such as William Mellor and Francis Williams who were 
amongst those dismissed from the post. 
While Bevin toured the country offering financial inducements to 
individuals and their local Labour Party to 'register' new readers, Elias 
. poured millions into advertising publicity for the new paper. In a 
determined bid to reach a circulation of two million which he felt would 
finally overcome·advertisers resistance to the paper, Elias resorted to 
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slick merchandi2ing techniques such as offers of free gifts to new 
readers, including fountain pens, cutlery and silk stcckings .. Competitors 
retaliated with their own free gift campaigns. A temporary cessation 
of hostilities was broken when the Herald began offering cost price 
bound sets of Dickens and other books, which prompted another round of 
free gift mongering. Though the Herald won the race to a circulation 
of two million, it was soon overhauled by the Daily Express, in 1937. 
The dramatic increase in the Herald's circulation in the 1930s had 
.. 
been achieved primarily not by appealing to the political sympathy 
of labour people, but by shalloy commercial enticements. And the Herald 
was still losing money at the rate of £10,000 per week. (G.Brown, 1979, 
. 
pp8-9). The. Herald circulation gradua·lly declined from its peak of over 
two million during the 1950s, and in 1957 Odhams insisted that the TUC 
give up its editorial 'rights. By 1960 Odhams itself was taken over 
by Cecil King's Mirror group, which became the International Publishing 
Corporation. IPC promised to publish the Herald for seven years, but 
just three years later, Cecil King asked to buy the TUC rights to the 
. p.ifferen t 
title, sever the links with the labour movement, and launch , newspaper 
,which would "keep continuity w;th the l?resent Daily Herald readers." 
The TUC debate of this proposal in the Congress Of 1963 was 
immensely revealing. Bob Willis and Frank Cousins for the General 
Council were equivocal and restrained in their approach, focusing on 
the market problems of the Herald, cautiously accepting some of the 
arguments of Cecil King and Hugh Cudlipp the editor of the Daily Mirror 
" that the paper ca.nnot and never will sell so long as it has the name 
Daily Herald. This, it is said, creates a prejudice in the minds 
of the reading public and stamps it as a political paper tied to the 
Movement, and therefore it is not attractive to the general public to buy". 
(TUC,1963,p.i). Though distress~4 at the imminent downfall of the 
Herald, they were pessimistic about the prospect of gathering support 
in the trade union movement for the paper, and were prepared to consider 
• 
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the alternative commercial newspaper proposed by King. In 
emphatic contrast Finlay Hart of the Boilermakers insisted that 
"the experience of these three years has shown that we shall never 
have a Labour-trade union paper, running as we want it to, run by 
private enterprise •••• We were informed that ••. the paper will not 
sell because of the name. In my opinion that is absolute nonsense. 
It has nothing to do with the sale of the paper; and you can give it any 
other name and it will not affect the problem that we encounter. 
What private enterprise seeks is eventually to destroy the one working 
class daily newspaper over which the trade unions have certain control." 
Hart referred to his alarm as he saw his fellow shipbuilding 
workers in Glasgow, who were all loyal trade unionists, buying the 
Daily Record, Express and Mail each morning. Several delegates 
pointed to what was wrong with the paper, a member of the Tobacco 
Workers Union argued "that over a long period of time now the Daily Herald 
has not truthfully reflected either the views of this Congress or the 
views of the Labour Party. Many of us who, quite sincerely, hold 
very strong what is termed Left-wing views can never get into the 
Daily Herald, even letters." ·This view was supported by J. Parker 
of the Sheet Metal ~lorkers, "I do not think we are facing up to the 
situation. Bob Willis appealed at the end of his speech: he said 
there are eight million trade unionists and we can solve the position 
if we buy the newspaper. If you were to go to the majority of the 
trade union branches, I believe, and tell the members who attend those 
trade union branches that they should buy the Herald, you would get 
some very rude replies, because the majority of members, the active 
lot of difference in the policies expressed in the 
members, who attend trade union branches do not see d Herald and 
-those of the Mail, the Telegraph and the other daily newspapers 
What appeal does the Herald make.to the youth of ~his country? Have 
a look at the youth on the march at Aldermaston and s~e how many of 
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those marchers have a Daily Herald under their arm or in their pockets. 
Very few indeed. Because again, youth do not see any difference in 
the policies expressed by the Herald and those of other newspapers. 
They see them on the Right •••• Many of the youngsters do not see a 
lot of difference in the policies of the General Council and the 
Government today." 
But it was left to E. Brandon of the Lithographic Artists to make 
the most penetratiQg and prophetic analysis: 
"I came here as an ordinary rank-and-file member of my trade union and 
of this particular Congress. I'almost feel that I am in a position of 
stepping in where general secretaries fear to tread. I do not apologise 
for that. I work on the Daily Mirror and I am deputy F 0 C of the 
engraving department, so the machinations of the King Group are 
something to which I am not a stranger. 
Two points that Mr. Willis made have made me think that here are 
·the King strokes again, on a larger scale than when we tried to negotiate 
with him on behalf of our members. I believe that the actual 
circulation of. the Daily Herald is somewhere round, give or take a few 
thousand, 1\ million. Now that ain't hay, you know, in any newspaper 
circulation figures. I agree it is small beer when you think of the 4\ 
million of the Daily Mirror - God help us ! sales every day. But the 
fact is this: if King does not get his way, he has decided that the 
paper will.be "run down". It is a lovely word, like "exhibition." 
You can run a paper down in two ways: you can let it die, or damn 
welt steamroller it. You have the obvious choice: let it die King's 
way or let'him steamroller it King's way. If, in this new, un-named, 
. rather bastardlsed version of a newspaper he proposes, he is going to 
increase pagination - more pages, but he does not say what he is going 
. . 
to have in them - and if he is sincere in his attitude towards the 
Daily Herald, why cann9t .he increase their pagination now and. help to 
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save it? Would it be because he does not really want to? I leave 
that to you to decide. 
But to talk in terms of getting a daily newspaper, which will 
match or out-match the Daily Mirror - I suppose he means in circulation, 
because it does not require much out-matching in any other direction, 
unless, of course, you are a Garth fan •.• Bob Willis has told you 
how he is going to get the circulation. He will take damn good care 
it is not from the Mirror. He does not care a damn where else it is 
from. Like the rest of the NPA, he does not worry about small 
newspapers dying. He kills them and sheds crocodile tears allover 
the front page about the "demise of our famous contemporaries" ! 
People of that ilk we know damn well. 
1 
He kills them by the price he 
is charging for the paper ••• 
But with eight million people represented in this hall, if we allow 
our only newspaper to die, then we deserve what King. will give us and I 
know what that is - damn all '" (TUC, 1963, pp iii - vi). 
Cecil King got his way, the Daily Herald was stopped in 1964 and 
was replaced by the supposedly radical Sun aimed at the middle market, 
which was an anodyne commercial product it was hoped might attract the 
advertisers repelled by the politics and the readership of the Herald, 
as a company memorandum confided, "The new paper is to have the 
more representative make-up essential to advertisers." (Curran,1978,p.260) . 
The IPC Sun alienated the committed readership of the Herald, and failed 
to find the lo.osely defined 'social radicals' the marketing experts 
aimed at. Not wanting to transform the ~ into a competitor to the Mirror, 
IPC sold the paper to Rupert Murdoch's News International. The Murdoch 
Sun pursued trivialization with a single-mindedness no other popular 
newspaper had ever dared, and with massive advertising campaigns ironically 
1. IPC is owned by Reed International which is the largest supplier of 
newsprint in Brita~. 
• 
succeeded in becoming both a rival to the Daily Mirror and in exerting 
a strong downward pull in the editorial standards of all the popular 
papers. In February 1974, the Sun, which began life as the strike 
bulletin .of the London printers in 1911, carne out vehemently against 
the miners strike, and recommended its three and a half million readers 
to vote Conservative in the General Election. It has not deviated 
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from that narrow path since. The metamorphosis of the Daily Herald/Sun 
is the most poignant illustration of the dynamics of the popular 
newspaper market: 
"The characteristics of the old baily Herald that conunanded intense 
loyalty amongs~ its regular readers and made it such a distinctive voice 
in popular journalism rested on a market base similar to that of all the 
quality newspapers - a socially homogeneous audience with shared 
values and understandings. Its reduction to a well-processed commodity 
with a universalized appeal to a heterogeneous mass audience was the 
inevitable price that had to be paid in a market where quantity is 
the only. bankable alternative to social quality." (Curran, 1978,p262). 
The Daily Herald was a popular newspaper, but in contrast to the 
entertainment sheets of the capfta1ist press, the Herald paid serious 
attention to current affairs: "The Daily Herald dev~ted more of its 
space to political, social and economic affairs than any other mass 
circulation paily, and at one time during the post-war period more than 
any other quality daily. It was, in fact, the foremost quality 
newspaper of the working class". (Curran, 1978, p255). The loss of 
the Herald was a symbol of the diSintegration of the cultural tradition 
of the Labour Party, and the accelerated erosion of its base as a mass 
movement. The decline of social democracy has paralleled the emergence 
of the highly varied and energetic revolutionary press of the new left, 
for example Socialist Worker· and Socialist Challenge, and the proliferation 
of rank and file trade union newspapers, which have attempted to recreate 
•. 
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a more vibrant and relevant socialist alternative. But the 
circulation of the revolutionary press remains small to that attained 
by the Herald, and they are continually confronted by the commercial 
problems which crippled the Herald. 
A recurrent theme of the orthodox autopsy of the Herald was that 
expressed by Sir Dennis Hamilton of The Times, who argued, "the Herald 
was beset by the problem which has dogged nearly every newspaper 
vowed to a political idea: not enough people wanted to read it." Yet 
at the time of its death the circulation of the Herald was l~ million, 
three times the circulation of each of the three quality newspapers 
including The Times. Moreover, as Table 1 reveals, unlike the qualities, 
the Herald was read by relatively poor working people who passed it 
around to their workmates, friends, and family. It has been estimated 
that the readership of the Herald at the end was 4.7 million people, 
twice as many as the readership of The Times, Financial Times, and 
Guardian 'put together. 
Table 1: Readership of selected natior-al newspapers, 1963-4 
Total number Proportion of readers of 
of reaQers over social grades . 
15 years old AB C1 C2 DE 
'000 , , , , 
Daily Herald 4744 3 10 48 39 J 
Guardian 954 45 31 15 8 
The Times 917 51 25 17 8 
Financial Times 552 59 28 9 5 
National Readership Surveys London: Institute of Practitioners in 
Advertising July 1963 - June 1964) tables lA and l8A • 
. Social grades were classified as follows: 
AB upper middle class and middle-c1ass-
Cl lower middle class 
C2 skilled working class 
DE semi and unskilled working class and 'those at the lowest levels of 
subsistence (Appendix E.p.139). 
Source: Curran, 1978, Table 11.6, p.253. 
• 
Surveys conducted by both Odhams and IPC management showed that 
the Herald's readers were the most committed and intensive of any 
newspaper audience in the country. But the Herald received less 
than half the advertising revenue of the Mail and the Express per 
l,OOO.readers. During the post-war newsprint rationing when there 
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was a shortage of advertising space, the Herald received an equal 
share, but as soon as it was possible for advertisers to discriminate 
against the readership of the Herald, the paper lost advertising 
revenue. Though in 1964 it had 8.1% of the total national circulation, 
it only received 3.5\ of the total advertismg revenue. (Curran, 1978,p.251). 
The Daily Herald at its origin was the militant representative of the 
organized working class, and in its maturity was the steady, if staid, 
representative of the established Labour Party and trade union movement. 
In the words of Curran "The Daily Herald, the lone consistent voice 
of social democracy in the national press, died because its readers 
·were disproportionally poor working class and consequently did not 
constitute a valuable advertising market to reach." (l977,p.225). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CAPITALIST PRESS I: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
CONCENTRATION AND CONTRACTION 
Private Ownership of Press Freedom 
In capitalist societie~ the national press is invariably under 
private ownership, with proprietors enjoying all the rights associated 
with private property. An extreme expression of this position was 
.. given by W.P. Hamilton of the Wall Street Journal who said: "A newspaper 
is an enterprise owing nothing whatever to the public interest. It is 
emphatically the property of the owner, who is se1lin9 a manufactured 
product at his own risk." (RCP, 1977, p.10). Though also based on 
property rights, the liberal theory of press freedom to which successive 
Royal Commissions on the Press have subscribed, maintains that it is 
the duty of the press in general to represent the public interest, but 
believes that this may most effectively be achieved through the medium 
of the market. Theoretically, the market offers an index of readership 
demands, and in the competitive pursuit of profit, publishers seek the 
most efficient ways to discover and meet these demands. If alternatives 
do not exist i~ is because there' are insufficient resources to provide 
for them, or too few people who want them, whereas the majority are 
satisfied with existing provision. Thus the defenders of private 
capitalism claim that it is more r~sponsive than other systems through 
. 
the ordinary mechanisms of the market to the wishes of readers. (Murdock 
and Golding, 19776, p.114'.) In support of this view the last Royal 
Commission (the McGregor Commission) proffered an elevated quotation 
by an American judge in 1919: " ••••• the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free-trade in ideas - the best test of the truth is 
tfie power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market". (1977, p.109),. 
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A corollary of the supposed freedom to launch different 
newspapers and compete in'the market for readers, is that there is 
no regul~tion or guidance concerning the duty of newspapers to reflect 
the interests of tile public, which was endorsed by the Commission: 
liThe justification is that this freedom produces a sufficiently 
, diverse press to satisfy the public interest by ensuring a 
.' broad spectrum of views, and at the same time, meets the 
individual interest by enabling virtually everyone with a 
distinctive opinion to find somewhere to express it. 
Consequently, there is no specific obligation on editors or 
proprietors to have regard, in what they publish, to the 
need to meet either the public or the individual interest, 
since the invisible hand of the market is expected to 
fulfil both." (RCP, 1977, p.9) 
Thus unlike broadcasting, the press is free to be partisan, 
since supposedly all important vie\Ols will be represented in the 
different papers competing for readers. Whereas in broadcasting, the 
. 
restricted frequencies necessitate ensuring the formality of 
representativeness. Yet though they are legally obliged to be 
impartial in the BBC charter and broadcasting acts, there is growing 
e'''idence to .suggest that both the BBC and IBA systematically violate 
.. 
the acts by presenting selective and discriminatory interpretations 
of the news in the manner of monopolists. (GUMG, 1976 and 1980.) 
However, the press does not have to concern itself with such editorial 
principles, and when the monopoly control and output of the press is 
examined, the idea of a democratic free market in newspapers is found 
-
to be as shallow and deceitful as the idea of a free market in health 
care or education. The idea of a socially respons~ve and diversified 
press is systematically inhibited and destroyed by the " present market 
system. 
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The mythology of a free market presupposes among other things: 
1) that there will be a competitive range of services or products 
2) that the demands of consumers wil f be the major determinants 
of supply 
3) that entry is open to any~ne who recognises a gap in existing 
provision. 
As Murdock and Golding maintain, because of the concentration, 
centralisation and contraction of the press in this century, the 
British press seriQusly fails to meet each of these criterion of a 
free market. (1978, pp.77-84.) 
Monopoly 
'the ~rend towards monopoly in the British press accelerated 
rapidly 'with the lifting of government controls on· the use of newsprint 
in 1956, which destroyed the sheltered market in which a range of 
• 
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vulnerable newspapers such as the Daily Herald had harboured. I"ntense 
competition was renewed ·for market share of readers and advertisi.ng, 
the effects of which precipitated a major restructuring of British 
newspaper capital. The peculiar features of newspaper economics 
benefitted the larger national newspapers at the expense of omaller 
ri vals. As Hirsch and Gor do.n explain high overheads are unavoidable 
in newspaper production. To print the first copy a newspaper must 
have plant, offices, staff and a distribution network. Though 'first copy' 
-
costs are immense, with each successive copy the cost per copy falls 
dramatically until very high circulations are reached, that is 
newspaper production enjoys increasing returns to scale. (1975, p.4l-2.) 
(Pratten (1971) indicates that the percentage increase in total costs 
per unit at 50% of the minimum efficient scale of new plant is 720% in 
newspapers compared to 6% in vehicle p4oduction for example.) Newspapers 
.with larger circulations therefore have lower unit costs than papers 
with small circulations, and may undercut them in price. A more 
devious tactic to eliminate rivals, deployed with devastating effect by 
t~e press baroqs, was to allow ·costs to ~ise as economies of scale 
accrued: although this absorbed most of the savings through economies 
of scale, it made it prohibitive~y expensive for smaller competitors, 
burdened with similar costs, to enter or "survive in the industry. As 
.. 
the bigger. newspapers also accumulated a dispropo~tionate share of 
advertising revenue, newspapers unpopular with advertisers were sent 
into a spiral of decline in which depleted resources resulted in a 
reduction ~n quality and ultimate collapse or takeover. (Engwall, 1978, 
. pp. 88-93.) Thus the emerging monopolies of the national press could 
, . 
be presented in the technical language of economic necessity, bereft 
of political considerations. (Hall; 1.978, p .• 33.) But abruptly 
• 
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escalating costs in the1970s brought the spectre of recurrent 
losses to the whole of the national newspaper industry which 
made even the greatest publishing houses seemingly vulnerable, 
and prompted an anxious search for integration with more secure 
capital. 
Subsidiaries of Multi-nationals 
The Royal Commission of 1949 came towards the end of the 
era of press barons who were presumed to be independent of both 
government and other economic interests, and proudly stated that 
"it is undoubtedly a great merft of the British press that it is 
completely independent to outside interests and that its policy 
is the policy of those who own and conduct it." (RCP, 1949, p.149). 
Since then, as James CUrran reveals in his brilliant critique of the 
work of the press commissions, the national press has either been 
bought by multinational corporations, or newspaper'companies 
themselves have diversified on a multinational basis: 
"Seven multinational corporations with interests in oil, 
transport, mining, construction, engineering, banking, and 
other economic activitiea extended over five continents 
controlled, in 1976, 282 British newspapers and over 270 
British magazines with an aggregate circulation in excess 
of 49 million. A large and steadily increasing section of 
the British press has become the property of ~nternational 
congl~erates which, in addition to their vast economic 
power, are now in a position to decisively influence the 
flow of printed news and opinion in Britain." (Curran, 1979,p.60>. 
Newspaper publishing now represents only a fraction of the total 
turnover of the multinational companies concerned, and every commercial 
national newspaper is engaged in extensive business interests outside 
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publishing. The last Commission was thus forced to admit: "Rather 
than saying that the press has other business interests, it would be 
truer to argue that the press l1as become a subsidiary of other 
industries". (RCP, 1977, p.l48). In a display of delightful naivety 
the Commission continues: "We welcome the arrangements made by some 
companies for ensuring that their newspapers are separated editorially 
and managerially from their other interests". (p.1SO). The same 
... 
sentiment is shared by other liberal press commentatars, such as 
Whale, who in a remarkable £eat~f imagination compared multinational 
contral with the editorial freedom permitted by a newspaper Trust, 
because "When newspapers be lang to big commerical graups with varied 
interests (like the American oil company to. which the Observer passed) , 
the tap men have global prablems of trade and investment to. occupy their 
Dlinds." (1977, p.74.) In reality, the economic diversificatian af the press 
has exposed the illusion that. the capitalist press is independent of capital, 
and in a general sense, of the values and ideology of capitalism: that it 
is a neutral countervailing force of liberal legend. (Curran, 1979, p.62). 
The trenq towards concentration in the newspaper industry, has 
been accompanied by a trend 'tawards vertical integration by which 
publishing groups have acquired control af paper manufacture, printing 
and newsagents. Horizontal integration has also developed rapidly as 
.. 
newspaper publishers have acquired substantial interests in the other 
media, including books, radio, and television, together with interests 
in the crucial field of electronic communication. As multinationals 
consolidated their media interests across continents, vast horizontally 
and vertically integrated international cultural monopolies were 
cteated. (Garnham, 1979;.Mattelart, 1979). ·"Core companies have 
linked cable, satellite and ~omput~r technologies to mass media advertis-
ing, newspapers and radio and television broadcasting •. As a result, 
communications technologies' are more than the infrastructure of a vast 
• 
accumulation process, but instruments of world system legitimation 
as well." (Mosco and Herman, 1980, p.352-3). 
Some multinationals however, have remained in a fascinated 
embrace with newspapers despite the arrival of an electronic age. 
A string of national newspapers may serve as fine traditional 
flagships for conglomerates who accumulate most of their funds by 
engaging in more dubious, and certainly less cultured pursuits. 
Multinational companies nonetheless, are unlikely to be patient 
indefinitely with newspapers that are a persistent drain on their 
resources, however respectable they may be. Spectacular losses 
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by some national newspapers in recent years have required massive 
cross-suhsidies from corporate owners. Between 1970 and 1975, the 
worst year on record, four out of eight national dailies made a loss, 
and six ~ut of seven national Sundays (RCP, 1976, p.S); a total loss 
for Fleet Street estimated at £21 million. (Jenkins, 1979, p.74). 
The newspaper proprietors responded to these figures with open panic, 
calling on Peter Shore, the Sec~etary of State for Trade, to arrange 
for an emergency Interim Report of the Royal commission, the establish-
ment of which they had initially opposed. Lord Goodman, the Chairman 
of the Newspaper Publishers Association (NPA) wrpte that they were 
in "total agreement that, independent of the deep-seated and funda-
mental diffic~lties into which the Commission is enquiring, the 
newspaper industry is currently facing a crisis of unprecedented 
dimensions and dangers." (RCP, 1976, p.l6). (The unforeseen scale of 
the increases in newsprint and other costs had genuinely rattled the 
proprietors, but it was tactically useful for them anyway to 
exagerate the ser,iousness of the sit.uation.in order to help force 
through the introduction of cost-saving new technology against 
determined union oPposi'tion.) The apparent decline in profi tabili ty 
.' 
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of the national press further \In\'~nilined the appearance of autonomy, 
since this meant "managements diql,1ing ever deeper into their reserves, 
running up huge overdrafts or m~'king their holding companies' non-
Fleet Street operations to keep Gfloat. By 1976, revenue from oil 
wells was supplying either cash ~.)r security for five titles: the 
Observer, the Sunday Times, The 2~mcs, the Daily Mail and the London 
Evening News." (Jenkins, 1979, p.74). In these critical instances, it was 
not the readers who determined the survival of newspapers, but 
multinational companies which m~de the conscious political decision 
to subsidise loss-making newspa~~s. 
Philanthropy, Profitability or P~~stige ? 
The consensus of liberal ol'inion seems to be that, whatever 
other motivations are relevant, ~rcprietors sustain newspapers despite 
serious losses partly out of phil",nthropy •••• " the spirit of public 
service never ~holly dies •.• " (\~hale, 1977, p.Sl). "The evidence 
suggests'one inescapable conclusi0n: few, if an~of the proprietors 
see profitability as their sole or primary goal ••• A proprietor 
may therefore pursue a particular editorial policy because of family 
sentiment. Or. he may refuse to ~lose a newspaper which is makin9 
substantial losses because it wa$ his father's or grandfather's 
prize possesion." (Sisson, 1915. pp.134-6). "Finally, some publishers 
are evidently willing to support titles making losses for long periods 
.. 
••• the proprietor may carry on O~t of public spirit •••• Fleet Street 
is not an industry noted for rational behaviour." (Rep, 1977, p.SO). 
The supposedly hard-headed Econo~ist too, succumbed to this persuasive 
explanation, "the pride of the P\~blishing families has usually been 
stronger than the profit motive. No one would run a British national 
newspaper purely for profit. Eve" the small minority of papers that 
do make money could get a higher ~~turn on their capital elsewhere." 
(23 March, 1974). 
• 
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The press, in fact, is normally among the most profitable 
industries in Britain: the belief that the press is impoverished 
" wes more to assiduous cultivation then to reality." (New Statesman, 
29 February 1980). The Royal Commission acknowledged that the provincial 
press in 1974, a poor year, made over 15% return on capital, which was 
twice that in industry generally. (RCP, 1977, p.31). More recently, 
profit figures have leapt upwards, as revealed in.a statistical survey 
by ICC Business Ratios, which showed that the newspaper industry was 
in the top five in the prof~tability league table for British industry_ 
Over a three year period ending in April 1980, the return on capital 
employed for national newspapers was 27.6%; in the North and Scotland 
weeklies had a return of 48.8%. and provincial dailies 36.3%. The Times 
closure depressed the average figure for the newspaper sector for 
1979-80 to 20% but if this is excluded, thc sector average return on 
capital rose to 33%. (Guardian, 2 April, 198 1). In the past newspapers 
have made money fast for proprietors, and as Rupert Murdoch has shown 
with the "Sun and the News of the World with recent annual profits of 
around £15 million, this is still possible. Parent companies have been 
able to use newspapers as cash generating machines, as· Reed International 
used the Mirror.to fund unhappy adventures in overseas investment. This 
practice is now common in the provincial press which are used as bases 
. 
to launch into the printing companies, holiday firms~ and property 
development as well as T.V. and radio, that permit a strong hold on 
local economies. Profits from newspaper publishing have usually made 
possible the diversification into other profitable activities, which 
may in turn be used to.subsidise newspapers in times of temporary 
d;fficulty. Alternatively, the highly profitable provincial press 
may be used to subsidise their national parents who have fallen on 
hard times. 
• 
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If national newspapers have made losses in the past, the 
wounds are largely self-inflicted. "Fleet Street is not so much 
intrinsically unprofitable, as suffering from a stupendous hangover 
after decades of corporate rapacity and incompetence." (New Statesman, 
29 February 1980). In more measured terms the McGregor Commission 
concurred with this estimate of the corporate carelessness of national 
press proprietors trading in the soft markets of the middle decades 
of the century, and the difficulties that ensued when market conditions 
became tougher: 
"Examination of data over a period of years suggests that 
there is a tendency for newspapers to lose control of 
their costs when their circulation and profits are rising. 
Perhaps more important, they find it difficult to regain 
control by operating more efficiently or tightening budgets 
if the paper loses its public appeal and circulation falls." 
(RCP, 1977, p.49). 
Whereas the old press entrepreneurs were free to readily win 
press fortunes and recklessly lose them, ·the new corporate controllers 
. 
must subject the newspaper industry to the discipline of profit 
again. Blaming print workers high wages and manning levels for the losses 
which are a result of the whole structure of the industry, profit 
maximising strategies are now being applied by newspaper managements 
with a vengeance in marketing and circulation, price and advertising 
policy , together with determined efforts to introduce the new tecbn-
. 
ology and ~ass redundancies. Until profitability is fully restored 
national ne~spapers at least function as part of tax avoidance 
strategies of conglomerates, thus in 1977 when Trafalgar House bought 
Beaverbrook Newspapers, annual profits' of £40 million were in sight 
for Trafalgar, and the .prospect of paying mainstream corporation tax 
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loomed on the horizon. (Chester and Fenby, 1979,p.222) In the 
last analysis, if for a time newspapers. do not earn significant 
profits, they do permit the defence and propagation of the profit 
making system in general from which multinationals derive their 
power and wealth. (Enzensberger, 1970). 
Capitalists and the Press 
This is not to suggest that individual capitalists invariably 
enjoy an easy relationship with the press. Some capitalist executives 
experience profound discomfort ~t the publication of any element of 
external independent criticism which would not be allowed in their 
own companies. Captains of industry also can be victims of shoddy 
. 
editorial standards masquerading as 'investigative journalism', and the 
taste of the popular press in part~cular for sensational revelations 
of scandel in high places. However accusations by business leaders of 
the intrusion, irresponsibility or impertinence of the press are often 
based purely on a resentment at the capacity of the press to scrutinize 
their activities. Similar to capitalists' mistrust of the capitalist 
state, there is a deep-seated wariness about the mass media: 
"Because' the media institutions are not simply pas~ive 
transmission belts of capitalist class propaganda, but 
instead have a degree of autonomy from both the capitalist 
class·and the state, it allows a limited degr~e of both 
news and entertainment content that can, overtly and covertly, 
challenge specific corporate practices, corporations and 
industries and specific government policies, agencies and 
officials. This limited independence, however, looms 
large in the corporste elite's consciousness. Criticism 
of specific practices and institutions are viewed as 
. . 
dangerous, creating hostility that can undermine the publi~$ 
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faith in the profit system as a whole and lead towards 
infringements on capitalists' freedpm. The belief in 
'freedom of the press' or the 'marketplace of ideas' 
as elements of capitalist democracy t.akes a back seat 
to fears regarding capitalist's own freedom. As a 
result, the corporate elite tend to view the media, 
like they do the state, with distrust and suspicion." 
.. 
(Dreier, 1982, pp 123-4) • 
Thus the press can identify and cr i ticise ind hddu,H capi talist 
miscreants, as the Sunday Times' did in a powerful indictment of the 
Distillers company over the thalidomide affair. Conflict between 
competing capitals does create opportunities also for the exercise 
of criticism, as for example, when the Daily Mail condemned Lord 
Mathews, then chairman of both Cunard and Express newspapers, for 
proposing to order the replacement for the Atlantic Conveyor from a 
shipyard' in the Far East, though this is frequently merely internecine 
rivalry. In the last analysis the capitalist press is not able to 
criticise the capitalist mode of production on which it is itself 
based nor th~ class of people who own the press. For the press ·is 
locked into the ownership and control system that it must comment upon, 
both through direct and indirect ownership connections and through 
interlocking directorships: 
"In 1978, for example, nine out of the top te~ British 
. 
communications concerns had directorial inks with at 
least one of Britain's top 250 industrial corporations, 
and six had links with a company in the top twenty. In 
addition, seven out of the ten had boardroom connections 
with leading insurance companies, five had links with 
major banks, and six shared directors with other 
significant banks and discount houses." .cMurdock,1982,p.142) 
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As the subsidiary status of the press develops, the constraints 
upon the press increase, and the areas which are open for free comment 
become subject to a process of erosion, leading to extensive potential 
"no go" areas for critical reporting. (Ascherson, 1978, p.13l). 
Concentration as a Threat to Cultural Diversity 
When not dispensing sympathy for the supposed financial plight 
of newspapers, successive Royal Commissions have sought to defend the 
liberal theory of press freedom, that the free market guarantees 
• 
diversity of press ownership and consequently diversity of editorial 
contents, but have faced increasing difficulty in squaring the theory 
to the statistical evidence. Concentration ratios markedly increased 
. 
in the spate of takeovers throughout Brtish industry over the last two 
decades, and by 1968 the top five firms in each industrial sector 
controlled on average two-thirds of the market. By the beginning of the 
1970s major media markets had concentration ratios at or above the 
average for the industry as a whole. (Murdock and Golding,1977,p.96). 
The development of monopoly is most acute of all in national newspapers, 
where by 1978 the five leading companies accounted for 95% of total 
da~ly circulation, and 96% of total Sunday circulation. (Audit Bureau 
of Circulation, 1978). The· share of the three leading corporations' 
alone in 1976, "exceeded the two-thirds market share test of monopoly 
with 72% of total national daily circulation, and 86% of total 
national Sunday circulation. (Curran, 1979,p.63). .. 
The McGregor Commission itself noted that in 1976 Reed 
International had 35% of total weekly sales by popular daily and 
Sunday newspapers, and News International had sales of over 30%~ that 
is two companies enjoyed two thirds of the market share. (RCP,1977, 
p.2S). The trend towards concentration in the provincial press, which 
. " 
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previously was more diversified, has been equally pronounced in the 
post-war period. Between .1947 and 1976 the five leading national 
chains share of the regional evening newspaper circulation increased 
from 44% to 58% (Curran, 1979, p.64). International evidence 
on the concentration of press ownership compiled by Nixon and Hahn 
reveals that the United Kingdom has the greatest concentration of the 
press of any industrial country (with the exceptions of Ireland and 
Australia where British ownership and influence has exerted a similar 
effect), a concentration comparable to that of third world countries 
where monopoly control of the press is simply one arm of ruling 
dictatorships. (1971, p.13). 
Why such a degree of concentration is a severe threat to 
cultural democracy is cogently elucid~ted by Murdock and Golding: 
"First, concentration limits the range and diversity of 
views and opinions which are able to find public expression. 
More significantly it is those views and opinions representing 
the least powerful social groups which are systematically 
excluded "by the process of concentration •••• Second, 
concentration of control over the media into the hands of 
large conglomerates emphasises production for maximum profit 
at th~necessary expense of other social goals that should be 
a vital aspect of communication media. Third, such concentration 
is undemocratic in two senses. It removes the media from 
public surveillance and accountability, that is it renders 
them externally undemocratic. In addition the concentration 
of control further away from the point of production reduces 
" internal democracy within the media organisations themselves." 
(1977, pp. 105-6). 
. . 
• 
.. 
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This coherence of thought was beyond the capacity of the 
McGregor Commission, and it refused to recommend any extension of 
monopoly surveillance, commenting lamely "we have not found 
evidence of abuse of monopoly." (1977, p.134). In the worst 
instance, the fie~d of womens magazines, IPC and D.C. Thompson 
in 1975 controlled 87% of the market, yet the Commission could 
"not detect any indication that monopoly and concentration of 
ownership in the periodical field constitute such grave danger as 
to merit further regulation." (p.139). 
The monopolists who control the press have extended their interests 
. 
into the other media, including television, radio and book publishing 
where concentration has been actively developed. (Curran, 1979," p.66) . 
In the United states the Federal Communication Commission insisted on 
divestiture where a local monopoly of both newspapers and broadcasting 
"existed, based on the first amendment of the American Constitution 
which they interpreted as requiring that the public should hear a 
multIplicity of voices in the interests of free speech (RCP, 1977, p.146). 
In a peculiar inversion of this logic trre provisions of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority Act 1973 recommended exactly the opposite for 
British local radio: in case the advertising revenue of local 
newspapers was adversely affected by the setting up of a commercial 
.. 
radio station, local newspapers were compulsorily offered a shareholding 
• in the radio company. This has created a situation of interlocking 
local news monopolies, and though the McGregor Commission recommended 
that they should be dismantled, nothing significant has been done 
to achieve,thi"s. (RCP, 1977, p.143-6). 
Contraction in the National and Local Press 
Accompanying the trend towards concentration has been a 
considerable contraction of the press: in most categories of the press, 
• 
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national dailies and national Sundays, and provincial morning 
papers, a little over half the newspapers are in existence which 
existed fifty years ago. (Curran, 1979, p.67). Successive 
Commissions have had to search for bits of evidence that the market 
was capable of sustaining a minimum of press variety. Repeatedly 
the McGregor Commission commented, "Britain is alone in the world 
in having nine newspapers circulating allover the country, and this 
is a benefit which we prize highly", without explaining that rather 
than a proof of .the diversity of the British press, this was only 
a proof of the fact that Britai!~ has the most centralised press in 
the world, made possible by its compact size and dense population, 
whereas other industrial countries have a more diverse press since 
most of their major newspapers are based in cities or regions. The 
Fleet Street press account for 65% of the total newspapers bought in 
Britain each week, with daily sales of 11.9 million popular papers 
and 2.1 million quality papers in 1976. (RCP, 1977, p.270). The 
5 national popular dailies thus compose around 55% of the total 
national newspaper market, yet the McGregor Commission is forced' to 
concede about these homogenized entertainment sheets, "It is true 
that one of the effects of present competition among titles, particularly 
the Sun and the Daily Mirror,. and between the Daily Mail and Daily 
Express, is to make them more alike and so to reduce genuine diversity", 
and concludes unconvincingly:"But so long as the variety of titles 
and of ownership continues, the possibility of change remains." 
(RCP, 1977, p.109). 
In their evidence to the 1949 Royal Commission the NUJ 
maintained: 
"In the past the robust public opinion which is the surest 
• 
38 
safeguard of democracy has been in no small measure due to 
the influence of the local newspapers. Every important 
centre had two or three or more newspapers representing 
different points of view and out of the clash of contending 
views there emerged a consensus of well-infonned opinion". 
(RCP, 1949, p.l). 
After the disappearance_ of almost all alternatives in 
local newspapers the 1977 McGregor Commission wanted to cling to 
the belief that a free market would promote diversity in the regional 
daily press at least, but had to reluctantly concede that most 
evening papers were now impregnable monopolies, that competitive 
pressures had resulted in a dwindling range of titles and shrinking 
consumer choice. (Curran, 1978, p.6-7). Now.?7 to,~s in the UK 
have an evening newspaper, and there is no competition in any of 
these towns apart from free sheets. The largest ten publishers 
account for 80 per cent of the total UK evening paper readership. 
Four companies - Thomson Regional Newspapers, Associated Newspapers, 
Westminster Press and United Newspapers account for just under half 
the total circulation. The same four companies dominate the weekly 
press. Regionally, this pattern of ownership creates several 
complete monopolies, for example, United Newspapers owns all the 
daily papers in South Yorkshire. Any remaining chance of some 
regional diversity of editorial opinion is effectively eliminated by 
the fact that many local papers share advertising and editorial copy, 
in extreme cases as much as 80\ of editorial copy may be shared with 
another paper. Finally, the most important source of editorial 
copy for all of the provincial press is the Press Association based 
in London. (New Statesman, 29 February 1980). With astounding 
ingenuousness the McGregor Commission could claim .... ~the publishers 
.. 
• 
of monopoly newspapers have stressed to us ••• the importance they 
attach to giving space to minority views," (RC?, 1977, p.110). 
In fact not only are critical or dissenting views eliminated by 
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the disappearance of newspapers prepared to present them, but by the 
economic needs of newspapers that survive: "The increasing conformity 
of the British quality press, in style and in substance, is an example 
of this fundamental tendency of oligopolistic competition to serve the 
centre of the market at the expense of minority tastes." (Hirsch and 
Gordon, 1975, p.45). 
The almost total monopolies in the provincial press are owned 
either by national chains, which are themselves subsidiaries of 
international conglomerates, or by .families in which the backwoods 
aristocracy and refined military are heavily represented. Small 
groups of highly unrepresentative people are thus in a position to 
control the flow of local news and opinion in whole areas of the 
country." Monopoly local newspapers are comparable to monopoly radio 
stations without being subject ~ public accountability or a statutory 
obligation to be politically' impartial. (Curran and Seaton, 1981, 
pp.295-6). The. 1949 Commission, at a time when the remnants of 
diversity still existed in the provincial press could see the danger 
that "the monopolist, by its selection of the news artd the manner 
in which it reports it, and by its commentary on public affairs, is 
in a position to determine what people should read about the events 
and issues of the day, and to exert a strong influence on their 
opinions." (RCP, 1977, p.128). After any element of diversity 
was eliminated from the provincial press, the McGregor Commission 
was apparently immune to such considerations, and actually used the 
existence of monopoly control to excuse cri ticiSll of it in the 
following perverse logic: "It is difficult to judge whether monopoly 
.. 
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has led to inferior editorial performance •. The near universal 
monopoly in daily newspapers and the small number of. directly 
competing weekly newspapers make· useful comparisons impossible." 
(RCP, 1977, p.l29). The Commision proceeded to offer the rationalizations 
of the pUblishers themselves, that monopoly gives them financial 
security and enables a better service by allocating more resources 
than would be possible under competition, (without the Commission 
commenting that this always has been the first ditch defence of the 
most unscrupulous monopolists in'history); and incredibly the Commission 
concluded by calling upon the evidence of a survey of the editors, 
(of monopoly provincial papers), who when asked if they thought the 
lack of directly competing newspapers was harmful, 60% of them refused 
to answer! 
Conclusion: The Ruins of the Free Narket Defence of ·Press Freedom 
Briefly, the liberal belief in market competition as the key to 
press diversity, rests upon a profound contradiction: the cost 
reductions derived from unequal access to advertising revenue, promoted 
unequal competition. This competition actively reduced press diversity 
and developed ~nopo1y thereby restricting press freedom. Neither 
increased efficiency or new technology will resolve this basic problem 
of unequal competition, which will impose further contraction and 
concentration upon the press. (Curran, 1979, pp. 65-8) • 
.. 
The corqerstone of the liberal belief in the free press,is the 
freedom of anyone to establish a newspaper if sufficient demand exists. 
In practice access to the newspaper market is severely restricted. 
The entrenched market power of incumbent publications and the heavy 
costs involved in launching a new newspaper, but also the heavy losses 
involved during the establishment of a paper are an overwhelming 
deterrent to all except those who are already in the market, or those 
• 
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with vast capital resources to support them. (Curran, 1979, pp;68-9). 
The McGregor Commission recognised that "anyone is free to start a 
national newspaper, but few can afford even to contemplate the 
prospect." (RCP, 1977, p.9). In fact the Commission estimated at 
1976 prices, that the cost of setting up the plant to publish an 
evening newspaper of average circulation was at least £2 million, with 
.. an additional accumulated loss of £1 million over five years before 
the paper broke even (p.54). (By comparison the costs of launching 
a new paper based on plant already in operation are modest, yet there 
has been a marked reluctance to attempt even this.) It is important 
to emphasise that this imposing barrier to entry to the newspaper 
market is not the accidental result of the operation of newspaper 
economics, but part of "a deliberate strategy on the part of those 
dominant in different market sectors to eliminate old rivals and prevent 
_ promising new entrants. In the circulation wars earlier in the century 
Northcliffe and Beaverbrook both allowed costs to rise, including 
wages, as a way of squeezing competitors out of business. (Jenkins, 
1979, pp. 62-6~). Proprietors-in the p~ovincial press have been no 
less ruthless: 
. 
"Newspaper companies have worked hard to eliminate rivals - but by 
the deployment of financial muscie, rather than journalistic competition. 
The standard weapon of the large group against the small group, or 
independent, has generally been the setting up of non-economic 
advertising rates:, a lethally-effective device which can still be 
deployed against any would be intruder into today's well-established 
market". '(New Statesman, 29 February 1980). 
In conclusion, the press in theory is, aade responsive and 
", -
acoountable by the process of competition, but restricted market entry, 
CU Q1ulative newspaper, closures, and increasinq concent'raton of ownership 
have coalesced to produce a growing monopoly. The economic transformation 
• 
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of the post-war press has called into question mrulY of the most . 
cherished assumptions of the liberal theory of press freedom, and 
successive Royal Commissions have seen their traditional notions 
increasingly undermined by the evidence they themselves have produced. 
Standing among theruins of the free market defence of press freedom, 
the McGregor Commission reached pathetically for the philosophy of 
professionalism and public service to protect the- integrity of the 
capitalist press. But the Commission was unable to define adequately 
what professionalism would mean in terms of the partisan tradition 
of press reporting, and whilst wishing to transplant the public 
service ideology of broadcasting to the press, the Commission refused 
to accept the public regulation and accountability which is essential 
to it. (Curran and Seaton, 1981, p.306). 
_The Latest Acquisi'tions and the Lack of Opposition 
The most recent takeovers in the newspaper industry are among the 
most dangerous ever, since they have reinvigorated and consolidated 
I 
monopoly by r~ing ailing national newspapers and making them part of 
massive international conglomerates controlled by aggresive entrepreneurs. 
In the forward to an Economist Intelligence unit Report in 1967, 
Lord Devlin wrote,"The forecast is that before the decade ends, if 
.. 
present trends continue, three more national dailies and one more 
national Sunday will have gone. They will not be swallowed up by 
tycoons anxious to -foist the~r own brand of politics on increa~ing 
masses. There are no such people." It would be difficult to imagine 
- someone bei?g more wrong. A spate of national newspaper collapses 
in the I-ate 1970s and early 1980s have been averted by the arrival of 
a parade of tycoons who have jostled each other in eager bids to 
• 
Table 2 Recent Acquistions in the National Press 
.. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Proprietor/ 
Chairman 
Victor 
Mathews 
(Deputy 
Chairman) 
James 
Goldsmith 
Rupert 
Murdoch 
Tiny 
Rowland 
Parent 
Company 
Trafalgar House 
Genera1e Occidentale 
News International 
Lonhro 
1 Average Turnover 1978, 1979. 
2 Estimate 
Source: Company Reports 1978, 1979. 
. 1 
Turnover 
£0 million 
600m 
1,700m+ 
1,500m 
Printing and2 
Publishing as 
% of Turnover 
17% 
5% 
65% 
5% 
.. 
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National 
Newspapers 
Daily Express (1971 
Sunday Express(197~ 
Daily Star (1978) ! 
New Standard (1980) 
Now! (1979-1981) 
Sun (1969) 
News of the ~'lorld 
(1968) 
The Times (1981) 
The Sunday 'rimes 
(1981) 
Observer (1981) 
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secure control of available titles. Undoubtedly the prospects of 
earning useful profits from assets which previously had been poorly 
managed was the primary i~centive of Mathews, Goldsmith, Murdoch and 
Rowland, but the opportunity to foist their particularly reactionary 
brand of politics on mass readership was an important bonus. 
Far from fighting this severe degeneration of the independence 
and diversity of the press, print union leaders were willing 
accomplices in what they saw as a necessary rationalisation of the 
structure of national newspaper industry. The sole concern of print 
union chapels, when a newspaper became vUlnerable, was simply to 
maintain employment through preserving the title under another 
promising millionaire or multinational •. The Labour Government repeatedly 
capitulated in favour of the reorganisation of the press industry under 
the single criterion of profitability, and shrank from referring 
takeovers to the Monopolies Commission. 
victor Mathews: Daily Express and Sunday Express 1977 
Early in 1977 Beaverbrook Newspapers was faced with mounting debts 
and threatening bankers. In search of an immediate injection of 
. 
substantial funds the executive management decided upon the sale of 
the only worthwhile newspaper they published, the London Evening Standard, 
to Harmsworth's Associated Newspapers who were intent on closing it 
and creating.a highly profitable monopoly for their Evening News • 
• DUring the strained negotiations to arrange this deal between the· 
two longest ancestral adversaries of Fleet Street, both the journalists 
and print workers werefirmly excluded. Dependent entirely upon 
rumour, the workers at both the Standard and the News feared for their 
jobs, and a statement that nothing had been signed was finally 
eitracted from Jocelyn Stevens only after the mass occupation of the 
• 
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Beaverbrook boardroom. Harmsworth refused to do even this, and 
incensed the News journalists by revealing more in an interview 
with The Times than he was prepared to co~unicate to his own staff. 
The editor of the Standard, Simon Jenkins, wrote in The Times that 
"the disappearance of the Evening Standard would leave a yawning gap in the 
cultural and political life of London." (25 April 1977). However, 
though union leaders from both newspapers asked Roy Hattersley, the 
secretary of State for Price and Consumer Protection, to make a 
reference under Section 58 of th~ Fair Trading Act 1973 to the 
Monopolies Commission, he displayed a marked reluctance to do anything. 
Journalists at the Daily Express and Sunday Express as well as the 
Standard threatened. industrial action unless there was a search for 
an alternative buyer a~d an inspection of the Standard's books 
by an independent accountant. 
Harmsworth had expected a difficult fight over the financial 
details of the takeover and the major redundancies involved, but he 
was taken by surprise along with the rest of the Associated 
executives, by the extent of jQurnalistic opposition led by 
Charles Wintour the ex-editor of the Standard, to the qlosure of 
a newspaper with an independent tradition in favour of an evening 
version of the strident Daily MatI. (An attack by Wintour upon the 
hereditary origins of Harmsworth's proprietorship prompted the 
• 
following frank admission of Sir Max Aitken, "the suggestion that 
the Rothermere line of descent is any different from my own family 
is fancif~1~" (Guardian, 6 June 1977). The irony became publicly 
apparent that Harmsworth who had engaged in the recent Press Charter 
talks dedicated to preventing "any action or threat of whatever kind from 
whatever quarter" to supress news OP ~omment, was somewhat. less committed 
to such fine idealism when it interfered with making money. A 
correction of a.misprint in a Times article added a sharper irony: 
• 
46 
"In the first edition of yesterday's Times, the Hon. Vere Harmsworth 
was quoted as saying that the editor of the proposed new London 
evening paper would be chosen by the staffs of both existing papers. 
What he actually said was that the editor 'would be chosen by me'." 
(27 April 1977). The opposition to the Standard closure caused 
uncomfortable experiences for several people who prefer to remain 
aloof from the problems which follow in their train. "Lord Goodman, 
who had been orchestrating the sale found himself - perhaps for the 
first time in his long and distinguished career as a negotiator -
face'to face with some of the people whose jobs he had been 
negotiating, and to his bewilderment was jostled by workers shouting 
'Save our Standards' It (Sunday Times, 1 May 1977). 
Building unity between the print workers and journalists 
of the two papers which had maintained a daily competitive rivalry 
was a difficult task. In particular the Standard journalists felt 
protective about a paper which they had a high regard for, and felt 
close to a few of the management executives who were fighting for 
them, whereas \:he ~ NUJ 1rJete better organised and more prepared 
to take industrial action. The tension between the two sides was 
so great the first meeting broke down in angry exchanges. (Chester 
and Fenby, 1979, pp.l30-31). Mike Rothwell the Foe of the News 
-tried to build an alliance with union members of the·rival paper, 
which was made more difficult by the fact that the Standard NUJ 
had withdrawn from their federated house chapel. But by 28 April 1977, 
the day of the proposed announcement of the Associated management's 
• plans,. a joint meeting passed the following resolution: 
"That this meeting of FOC's and union representatives of 
Associated Newspapers and Beaverbrook Newspapers agrees to 
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resist any proposed merger or selling of any title between 
Associated Newspap~rs and Beaverbrook Newspapers which 
would result in unemplo~ent for any of our membership, 
and would be detrimental to the reading public in London. 
Our aim; therefore, is to maintain two evening newspapers." 
In contrast print union leaders did not resist since "most of the 
union leaders, like Keys (of Sogat) and Dixon (of the NGA), were 
by now reconciled to the inevitability of the deal •••• As far as 
the preservation of both t~tles~was concerned it seemed they could 
not win, so their main objective had been to extract the best 
possible terms for those who would be made redundant." (Chester and 
Fenby, 1979, pp.175-77). In fact, the startling intervention of a 
bid from Sir James Goldsmith for the whole Beaverbrook group provided 
a temporary reprieve for the Standard. The proprietorial ambitions of 
Goldsmith had been regarded for some time as a threat on Fleet Street, 
but now he emerged as a saviour and offered the following syrup, 
"I will'come only if the workers, print unions and journalists want me. 
But if you do want me, and I wapt you, observe that I have larger 
resources even than Vere Harmsworth". (Sunday Times,' I May 1977). 
The profound limitations of the rebellion of the Beaverbrook workers 
were revealed in that the FHC (office branches) could welcome 
Goldsmith's·offer in the hope of "averting the continued concentration 
of newspaper ownership." 
Goldsmith was rejected by Sir Max Aitken in favour of 
Trafalgar House, a company with more patriotic connotations, and 
a £1600 million balance sheet. The critical contact, as is often the 
case in these matters, was made at a raceco~rse, when Evelyn de 
Rothschild, a Beaverbrook director, approached Vic Mathews, the 
.. 
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Trafalgar managing director at Sandown Park and asked if he was in 
an 'acquiring mood'. Trafalgar was a major property and shipping 
company which had acquired other. v.enerable English institutions 
such as Cunard, the QE II, and the Ritz, and succeeded in making 
them profitable again. Trafalgar paid £13.6 million for the whole 
Beaverbrook Group and Mathews was installed as executive chairman 
of what became Express Newspapers. "Mathews credentials as a potential 
newspaper proprie,tor were not immediately apparent, though like 
Sir Max Aitken he was a firm believer in capitalism, conservatism 
and patriotism". (Chester and Fenby, 1979, p.221). 
On the question of newspaper control the McGregor Commission 
had piously intoned, "We have received evidence which suggests that, 
where newspaper companies are owned by large holding companies, their 
day to day running, including matters of editorial policy, is almost 
invariably left entirely to the newspaper subsidiary." The unseemly 
and disturbing nature of the true relationship between corporate 
heads and newspaper subsidiaries was openly revealed after the 
Trafalgar takeover. On 26 June Mathews announced, "I would not 
allow Trafalgar to interfere editorially or in any other way" 
(Sunday Times), and two days later elaborated, "One must accept 
that there must be a relationship between proprietor and editorial 
.. 
and one must have a common purpose and policy, and mine is that 
Britain is first." (The patriotic incantations of Mathews however, 
did not stretch into employment policy, as seamen discovered when 
the Trafalgar shipping line changed many of their ships to a flag 
of convenience rather than pay National Union of Seaman rates). In 
an immortal line Mathews later declared, "By and large the editors 
will have complete freedom as long as they agree with the policy I 
have laid down". This meant the rapid departure of Simon Jenkins, 
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the edit.or of the Evening Standard, and Roy Wright, the editor of 
the Daily Express. The reason Mathews gave for sacking Jenkins 
was "a number of little irritating things". (The Times, 14 November 
1978). Simon Jenkins described what successive editors of the 
Express had to endure: 
"Mathews would delight in pouring out homespun wisdom, at 
considerable length often at the busiest time of the day 
This would sometimes have to be recreated by a journalist in 
the form of an editorial. He would hold hour-long post-
mortems, and would discuss at length the main headline 
on the front page. Over the months following his assumption 
of control, Mathews came to suffer from the most tiresome, 
and tre most common, occupational hazard of proprietorship: 
a susceptibility to comments made to him at the stream of 
functions to which he accepted invitations. The editorial 
content of the Express came to be regarded as his personal 
responsibility. II (1979, p.101.) 
. 
Revealing a volatile combination of publishing ~nexperience 
and patronising arrogance Mathews freely admitted to ·shocked television 
interviewers that he would personally suppress stories which were, 
in his opinion, harmful to British interests, and, for example, that 
.. 
he would never have allowed a story with the political implications 
of Watergate to break in his newspapers. (BBe, Platform One, 15 November 
1979). In gratitude for this sterling support, Margaret Thatcher soon 
made him Lord Mathews. (Another of Thatcher's fervent supporters, 
Larry Lamb, editorial director of the Sun, received a knighthood, as 
. 
part of the effort to create a new generation of press barons.) 
Within a few months Trafalgar addea 42 magazines to their publishing 
empire by the acquisition of Morgan-Grampian for E20.5 million. The 
·' " 
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suave chairman of Trafalgar, Nigel Broakes, confidently announced he expected 
EIO million profit per annum from their publishing interests within 
a couple of years. Initially expectations were disappointed, but the 
publishing division profits for the six months to 31 March 1981 
reached E6.1 million, and compensated for losses in shipping. 
Bill Keys the Sogat general secretary said that Mathews was 
"like a breath of fresh air in Fleet Street." Print workers at the 
Express were not so enthusiastic when immediately Mathews called for 
large scale redundancies at the same time as commenting on those 
whom the chapets regarded as primarily responsible for the malaise of 
the newspapers, "it is not our policy to make management changes". 
(Guardian, 28 June 1977). In practise Mathews approach amounted to a 
pugnacious attempt to browbeat the Express chapels into reducing 
manning in return for the further investment necessary to maintain 
the life of Express newspapers. When union defences proved unassailable, 
Mathews decided the only alternative economy was to publish more 
\ newspapers on the same presses. The concept of a 24 hour paper for 
London and Manc~ester was raised" (ironically involving the return of the 
printing of the Scottish Daily Express to Glasgo'''), ,Intractable 
difficulties with the 24 hour proposal, diverted interest to the 
idea of a down-market daily newspaper to compete with the Sun and 
Mirror. Mathews had promised that the Express would remain a 'family 
newspaper', but the planners of the new Daily Star were intent on 
the imaginative editorial concept of "plenty of tits and bums". 
When it emerged with a million pound publicity campaign in November 
1978 the Daily Star "immediately established itself as the tackiest 
product yet to call itself a newspaper. It was a sort of daily Reveille, 
with cruder nudes, louder headlines, and dirtier stG>ries than the rest. II 
'(Guardian, 27 April 1981). F1nally in a deal with Associated Newspapers, 
• 
the imposition of a monopoly London evening newspaper was arranged 
at the end of 1980, with the closure of the News, at the cost of 
1,750 jobs and the relaunch of the Standard as the New Standard 
under joint proprietorship; and betraying many of the signs of 
degeneration originally feared. 
These rationalizations did not succeed in curing the 
fundame~tal malaise of Express Newspapers. Despite several changes 
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of editor the circulation slide of the Daily Express into obscurity 
continued. Initiating a bingo war that was to engulf the popular papers, 
the Daily Star achieved a sharp i~crease in circulation up to 1.5 million 
by June 1981, though this was still far short of projections, and the 
paper was reported as accumulating the spectacular loss of almost £1 
million a month. By this time Trafalgar was losing money on its shipping 
interests also due to the decline in" world trade, and its image as a 
go ahead successful company was becoming tarnished in the City. In 
return for an original outlay ~f £15 million, Beaverbrook Newspapers 
had brought Tr~falgar some lucrative property deals, including the 
sale of Aitken House in Fleet Street for £8 million, and the proceeds 
of turning the old Evening Standard offices in Shoe Lane into a massive 
office complex. But at this point the decision was made"t~ divest 
Trafalgar of the"financial and political embarassment of Express 
Newspapers by combining it with Morgan-Grampian in Fleet Publishing and 
floating the new company off in a share deal with Trafalgar's shareholders. 
Nigel Broakes, the enigmatic non-executive chairman of Trafalgar 
recalled how he had acquired the Express to keep Victor ~~thews amused, 
"It was in May 1977, at lunch at the Ritz, that I persuaded Victor, that 
we could, and should buy the Beaverbrook Newspaper Group ••• I must admit 
that, at the forefront of my mind was the desire to see Victor once again 
engrossed with a challenge." (Sunday Times, 29 November 1981) Now engrossed 
in the redevelopment of London's dockland as chairman on the Development 
Corporation, Broakes had resolved to throw the Express out of the Trafalgar 
• 
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group. 
Jocelyn Stevens, managing director of Express Newspapers, and 
one of the last remianing people of the Beaverbrook old-guard was aghast, 
"he felt like a lifeboat being lowered in mid-Atlantic from one of 
Trafalgar "s Cunard liners." (Sunday Times, 29 November 1981). On other 
occasions Stevens had successfully diverted plans to dispose of Express 
Newspapers in ways he did not approve, but this time there was to be 
no reprieve. Though he had worked closely with victor Mathews, Stevens 
had annoyed Mathews the previous July by attacking the government's 
economic policies, (when the CBr criticised the government, Mathews, 
one of Thatcher's most vehement supporters,' withdrew Trafalgar House 
from the organieation). When Stevens insisted he could not support the 
optimistic profit forecasts prepared for Express Newspapers he was 
summoned to Trafalgar House headquar~ers and dismissed. The audacious 
demerger had been made possible by the 1980 Finance Act which allowed 
companies to distribute shares in their own subsidiaries to existing 
shareholders without'them incurring immediately a capital gains liability. 
However serious imponderables remained including the difficulties of 
making a realistic valuation of the assets concerned, and the possibility 
that someone, as. yet unknown, might try to grab a majority. holding in. 
the new newspape~ group. (Guardian, 1 December 1981) Lonhro, Associated 
Newspapers, and Robert Maxwell were all reported as interested predators. 
Speculation that Trafalgar was looking for a buyer for the 
newspapers was emphatically denied by Mathews, but received a rather 
different response from one rumoured purchaser, millionaire Australian 
Robert Homes a Court: "I am interested in any major newspaper that is 
for sale. I have not yet made a bid for the Daily Express. I would make 
a bid for the Daily Express, the Sydney Opera House or anything else that 
interested me, if it was a good business proposition." (Sunday Times, 
16 December 1981). (In fact Holmes a Court's interest during the next few 
months was taken.up in acquiring control of Lord Grade's' television and 
film empire Associated Communications Corpor~tion. On being made a 
•. 
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director of ACC having acquired a £15.5 million stake in the company 
Holmes a Court stated,"I'm not a candidate to be Lord Grade's successor. 
I have eight other companies to run." (Guardian, 18 December 1981) 
Within three months Grade was out and Holmes a Court was chairman 
and chief executive of ACC. Homes a Court then proceeded to arrange 
the takeover of ACC by his Australian companies, a bid which Victor 
Mathews, the fourth largest voting shareholder in ACC and chairman of 
the ACC takeover committee, was powerless to resist. (Guardi~, 23 March 1982) 
The divorce of '!'rafa1gar from Fleet Holdings was achieved in 
April 1982, and Ian Irvine an accountant from Touche Ross, Trafalgar 
House's auditors, became managing director of the new public company. 
Lord Mathews stayed ~n as non-executive chairman of Fleet but the link 
with Trafalgar was now tenuous. Jocelyn Stevens who had received a 
reported £130,000 compensation in settlement of his two year contract, 
had entert~ined the idea·of raising sufficient funds with Graham 
Sherrin, a disaffected executive of the Morgan-Grampian magazine 
group, to acquire control ·of Fleet. However at the launch of the new 
company he maintained that he nQ longer had any interest in buying 
Fleet and commented, .. I am rather gloomy about that p~ospectus, 
it is far worse than I expected." (Guardian, 27 February 1982) 
Lord Mathews conceded that all but £8 million of the £30 
million which Trafalgar were pumping into Fleet would be used by loans 
due by Fleet to Trafalgar. Though Morgan-Grampian annual profits 
were running at £7 million th.e losses on the Daily Star approached 
£10 milliorl, and the Daily Express was running at a deficit of £2 million 
·per year. As Trafalgar recovered its profitability, having escaped 
the battles of the newspaper industry, the scene was set for the arrival of 
another promising ideologue with a g~eat deal of cash to spare and an 
interest in acquiring a newspaper group and a baronetcy~ 
.. 
• 
James Goldsmith: Now 1979-1981 
Disappointed at his failure to get control of the Observer 
in 1976, and piqued at his rejection by Beaverbrook though he had 
held 35% of their non-voting shares, Sir James Goldsmith began to 
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look .for another publishing venture, since as Chester and Fenby put it, 
he wanted to take par t in what he termed "the national debate." He 
did not have "the inclination to serve time on the backbenches of the 
House of Commons. It was logica 1 that he should want to own a 
powerful newspaper." (1979,p.88) He was quite open about his 
ambitions "I want to get into newspapers because I am a politician 
manque. I want to do exciting things with them, develop them, use 
them to playa part in public affairs." (Jenkins,1979,pp 97-98) 
Goldsmith's interest in the press had been aroused when 
he found hirr~elf in the spotlight during the rescue of Slater Walker 
Securities in 1975, and realised the assistance supportive editorials 
could lend. On the other hand, Goldsmith was stung by repeated 
attacks upon his exotic business practices and personal affairs 
in Private ?ye, which he found to. his chagrin he could not suppress 
despite the issue of an avalanche of legal writs, includjng the 
charge of criminal libel. One reason why his ambitions for 
the Express group were frustrated,· was that although his 
major company Cavenham had sales of £1,650 millions, recently 
it had been brought under the control of the French based Generale 
Occi~entale. In shifting 51% ownership of the major food combine 
overseas, G91dsmith had eradicated the influence of minority 
shareholders, and there were fears that the same fate might befall 
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the Express. Goldsmith's huge financial empire was a~ enigma: 
"No one except Goldsmith himself and his closest advisers really understands 
how this ~ollection of companies and its cross-shareholdings hang together. 
And his desire, as he put it,- 'to paddle his own canoe', by taking 
the company out of the public limelight, is likely to leave even 
more q~estions unanswered at a time when public corporation~, 
.. 
encouraged by the gradual updating of company law, are generally 
improving their standards of disclosure." (Guardian, 7 May 1977). 
Yet it was the newspaper establishment who blocked Goldsmith. Union 
leaders were ~pressed by his financial wizardry, and Roy Hattersley 
revealed how accomodating social democratic rationality can be: 
"Goldsmith has elan and energy and is determined to have political 
influence. So it's much better to have him in the open as a newspaper 
proprietor where we can all see him". (Chester and Fenby, 1979, p.208). 
Thwarted in his efforts to acquire an established newspaper 
in Britain and encouraged by the success of the colour magazine 
L'Express he owned in France, Goldsmith launched the news magazine 
~! in September 1979. Now! projected many of the t~ai~s of its 
illustrious prop!ietor: it was glossy, expensive, superficial, and 
p~anoid in its right wing politics. The magazine was deeply 
unpopular wi~h journalists, partly because of Goldsmith's vendetta against 
Private Eye, but Goldsmith expansively declared "If you pay peanuts, 
you get monkeys", and tried to buy in journalistic talent with 
£30,000 salaries and Rover cars. The £600,000 promotional material 
of the magazine claimed that Now! was intended "to appeal to the 
intelligent, individualistic, informed and influential reader", but 
somehow a diet of "in-depth exclusives" on Ronald Reagan, the Shah of 
. . 
Iran, Margaret Thatcher and Chairman Sua, failed to excite much 
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interest. Early in 1981 Goldsmith demonstrated his contempt for 
editorial freedom by stopping an edition of Now! going to France 
when it criticised President Giscard whose goodwill he needed in his 
effort to buy Figaro. The magazine was the only news journal to 
present a political line consistently to the right of the hard-line 
Thatcher Cabinet. This fortunately failed to win a viable readership, 
to thepublic delight of Private Eye who ran stories of huge dumps of 
the magazine mouldering in remote airports. With a circulation of 
l25,ooo,losses amounted to £2.5 ~million a year, and after 2~ years 
the magazine was closed having cost £6 million. Goldsmith said 
"Like all new products in the consumer area, you have more of a 
chance of failing than succeeding. II, 
The closure was greeted with a huge sigh of relief by everyone 
in the media who regarded the strident tone of reaction issuing 
from its smooth pages as a painful embarassment. Tom Baistow 
commented on Goldsmith's fall: "The debacle of Now!' is the price 
of that overweening arrogance and gnawing political ambition which he 
has been indiscreet enough to reveal ••••• like so many self-made 
millionaires (Lord Mathews of the Express Newspapers and Mr. Tiny 
Rowl~d, prospective owner of the Observer, to name but two), 
Goldsmith believes - or at least believed until his last look 
at the magazine's books - that money can buy anything, including 
readerships." (Guardian, 28 April 1981). The abrupt and autocratic 
closure of ~!, while it bdre all the hallmarks of Goldsmith's 
dealings, sent financial journalists scurrying to discover the true 
state of Goldsmith's financial empire. 
In September 1979 Goldsmith to~d Forbes magazine, "I. don't 
owe money to the banks, I'm not running for office. I'm not a 
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public company. I don't give a damn what "anybody says: I'm 
going to do what I think is right. Not many people have that 
luxury." However Goldsmith seemed to be forgetting that Generale 
Occidentale was apublic company and owed £275 million to the banks, 
and for example, the major subsidiary, Allied Suppliers, to which 
Cavenham had changed its name, had 20,000 shareholders. It emerged 
that strong pressure from institutional shareholders in France 
caused Goldsmith reluctantly to abandon his costly personal political 
platform. By now Goldsmith had pulled out of Bovril and gone into 
oil exploration, and though he claimed he had abandoned interest 
"in a British newspaper empire this is hard to believe. As editor-in-
chief of L'Express, Goldsmith revealed in a Guardian article the full 
virulence of his views~ 
"For years every strategic centre of British life has been 
infiltrated systematically by the far left. The purpose has 
been to undermine, destabilise, demoralise, and, when conditions 
are ripe, to take over ••••• But the far left is not to blame. 
A healthx body rejects a virus •••••• It is the unhealthy body 
that succumbs. The success of the far left has been made possible 
by the astowlding apathy and weakness of the majority ••••• The 
majority has traditionally been no more than the carcass on 
which the extremist minorities have supped ••••• A contributory 
factor to the confusion of the past few decades has been the 
decline of the class that has ruled Britain for so many 
generations. As with many ruling classes throughout history, 
Britain's finally went soft. It is a shame that when the 
Thatcher Government was brought to power by a tide of healthy 
reaction, by a national desire to really change things, our 
new Prime Minister, in the cause of Party" unity, chose to use 
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as tools to accomplish that change the amiable residue 
of a senescent ruling class. Mrs. Thatcher now needs a 
tougher and more hard nosed team." (23 July 1981). 
This is disturbingly reminiscent of the political diatribes 
in Germany in the early 1920s. It is a frightening prospect that 
the possessor o~ such powerfully authoritarian and incipiently 
fascistic views, should be in a position to take control of a 
major newspaper to use as a personal vehicle of political propogation. 
Rupert Murdoch: The Times I Sunday Times 1981 
Rupert Murdoch was another millionaire newspaper proprietor 
who made unsuccessful bids for the Beaverbrook and Observer newspapers. 
Though he had made a fortune from the salacious blend of soft 
• 
pornography and scandalous innuendo about peoples'private lives 
which permeated the ~ and the News of the World, he had not gathered 
much public respect. He was eager to extend his newspaper empire, 
and the acquisition of a newspaper of some standing might impro~e 
his seedy image. Murdoch was the son of an Australian newspaper 
magnate, and did not allow any liberal niceties to intrude into the 
exercise of hi~ formidable political power as he pushed his newspapers 
to the right. His Australian company News Ltd. owned a large string 
of newspapers, including three of Sydney's five ~aily papers, and 
in the 1975 Australian general election Murdoch waged an intense 
campaign agaiast Gough Whitlam's Labour Government, which caused a 
strike by journalists in protest at what they felt was news management. 
A few years later in 1979 Murdoch had problems when he bought a 48, 
stake in Sydney's Channel 10 television network, since Australian 
law prohibited more than 15' of the shares of a television company 
being owned by a ~oreign resident, and Murdoch's home was entered in 
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the International Who's Who as New York (Guardian, 27 July 1979). 
In November 1979, Murdoch was defeated in a bid for the Melbourne 
Herald and Weekly Times due to the intervention of the Trade 
Practices Commission worried at the creation of a dangerous monopoly 
in the Australian media. Murdoch had left Britain despairing of 
defeating the Fleet Street union chapels, and disgusted at his 
.. exclusion by the establishment. In New York he acquired the Post 
and Village Voice, and other interests. As in Australia and Britain, 
his American newspapers assumed a new political stridency, for example 
the Post backed the candidature of hard-liner Ed Koch in the city's 
mayoral elections against the fierce opposition of some of Murdoch's 
journalists. (Jenkins, 1978, pp.93-4). At least a dozen New York 
~ journalists resigned rather than work for Murd~ch, Robert Lipsyte, 
one of them,. resigned because he was "denied the freedom to have 
opinions in counterpoint to the paper's policy". And Rupert Murdoch 
decided the paper's policy, as journalists were reminded during his 
daily visits to the newsroom •. (Guardian, 1 November 1977). 
. 
Early iri' 1981 Murdoch crowned his glcba! ne~·'spaper empire by 
grabbing control of the two most influential newspapers in Britain 
The Times and the Sunday Times so quickly that any effective public 
debate was forestalled. The International Thomson Organisation had 
failed in the-attempt to force the new technology through at The Times. 
and Sunday Times by the blunt means of a protracted lock-out, lasting 
from 30 November 1978 to 14 November 1979 at a cost of E39.9 million • 
. Faced with the continued militancy of both journalists and print 
workers, the new Lord Thomspn wanted to extricate himself from the 
promise given by his father to the Monopolies Commission in 1966 
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that resources would be made available to·Times Newspapers "to enable 
them to continue publishing these papers as quality papers in the 
national interest. This undertaking will continue for twenty-one 
years and will be binding on our successors." Already the younger 
Thomson had broken the terms of the agreement by moving his home 
to Canada, but ~ prolonged inquiry by the Monopolies Commission into 
the sale of Times Newspapers would have been an acute embarrassment. 
The substantial losses of The Times made it an unlikely candidate 
for referral, but the Sunday Times also was sold as a bankrupt concern 
which enabled the Trade.Secretary, John Biffen, to decide not to refer 
the acquisition by Murdoch to the Monopolies Commission. (An invest-
igation of the accounts of the Sunday Times by the New Statesman 
revealed that the paper had in fact made a profit of £1.4 million in 
the previous year.) For just £12 million Murdoch had not only 
entered the British establishment, he had bought two of its foremost 
institutions. Journalists on the Sunday Times considered challenging 
the decision in the courts, but in the event, were satisfied by 
minor changes.~n the articles of association of the company, pu~rtedly 
safeguarding the position of the independent national directors and 
editorial independence. The print unions mounted no opposition to 
the deal. As the New Statesman acidly concluded about the affair: 
"In the true spirit of corporatism, the future of our supposedly 
free press is now being stiched up in wheeling-and-dealing between 
union bosses and newspaper barons - whose terms of dispute and 
negotiation do not include anywhere the public's right to buy 
competent, honest and.plurally-owned newspapers". (13 February 1981). 
The McGregor Commission maintained an important sign of diversity 
in press proprietorship was that: "No proprietor publishes both a 
.. 
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popular and quality newspaper". (Rep, 1977, p.25). Less than four 
years later Rupert Murdoch had simultaneous control of tho two most 
prestigious quality newspapers·in Britain, The Times and tile Sun~ 
Times with over 20% of the q~ality market, together Witil tile two biggest 
circulation British newspapers, the Sun and the News of th~ World with 
over 30% of the popular market. It is too soon to assess tlle political 
influence Murdoch will gain from the greatest concentration of 
newspaper power in the history of Fleet Street, but one of his first 
targets a few months later "in an address to the Advertising Association 
was the British establishment "who don't like commerce. '!'hey distrust 
money. They despise business, they create the social and psychological 
currents which have done so much damage to Britain and its willingness 
to change. They have helped to make profit a dirty word." That he 
might take the editorial safeguards of The Times deal somewhat less than 
seriously was also hinted, "We hear a lot from editors about the 
freedom of the press and they are right about some of the limits. 
Who am I to disagree? After all, as you know, at The Times I am 
supposed to kiss six national directors on both cheeks before I speak 
with an editor." (Guardian; 25 April 1981). 
The galloping acquisitiveness of Murdodh was not in any way 
exhausted by the Times Newspapers purchase, and within ~nths he 
launched a £22.75 million bid for Fontana/Collins the largest 
remaining independent book publisher in Britain. Having acquired 
30.4\ of the shares in the company from CIr member of the Collins 
family, Murdoch made a bid for the rest of the shares whi~~ involved 
him doing business again with his old adversary Robert ~'~~11, who 
had bought a 9.4\ stake in Collins some time' before. E~ly in 1981 
Maxwell had become chief executive of the British Pri~~~~ Corporation· 
which specialised in gravure colour printing and had the ~jor 
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contract to print the TV Times and Sunday Times colour supplement. 
f.lurdoch attempted to take the Sunday Times magazine contract to 
News International's own printing house Bemrose, which prompted 
the threat of court actioh from Maxwell. At this point their feud 
was forgotten in favour of mutual self-interest: f.laxwell was sold 
Bemrose for £3 million, and received the punday Times contract until 
1987, .plus a two year contract to print the proposed colour supplement 
for the News of the World1 Murdoch bought Pergamon Press's 9.4% share 
in Collins for £873,000. However neat an arrangement, both proprietors 
soon faced slight setbacks." Ma~well became engaged in a major dispute 
at the Park Royal works of BPC who printed the 4.3 million copies of 
the TV Times when Sogat refused to accept serious redundancies, and he 
called in the receiver. Murdoch found his offer for Collins blocked by 
the determined opposition of the Collins board backed by the leading 
FOntana authors and both the institutional and small Scottish shareholders. 
However, having been offered two seats of the Collins board, Murdoch 
gracefully withdrew his bid in the knowledge that under takeover rules 
he could either secure a creeping control over the publishers by 
acquiring an extra 2% of shares each year, or make another full bid a 
year later. 
Meanwhile the tenure of Murdoch at The Times was anything but 
peaceful. Hu~e losses of the order of £20 million in 1981 at Times 
Newspapers were a heavy drain on the resources of the Murdoch media 
empire. Unless dramatic economies could be rapidly achieved the 
possibility of liquidation was real, and in an apparant bid to retain 
control of The Ti~ and Sunday Times titles they were quietly 
transferred from Times"Newspapers to News International in December 1981. 
The British establishment were outraged when ~wo months later they 
learned of the fate of their. favourite masthead, and the fact that the 
independent national directors Lords Dacre, Greene, Robens, and Roll, 
appointed at the time of: the Murdoch takeover to protect the editorial 
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integrity of the paper frolll undue proprietorial interference, had 
not even been consulted. A News International executive claimed that 
the company's "extremely ('xpensive legal advice was still that it had 
acted within its rights," but after talks at the Department of Trade 
with John Biffen, the Trad~ Secretary, Murdoch beat a hasty retreat and 
tran.sferred the titles back to Times Newspapers. (Guardian, 19 February 
1982). 
Undeterred by this s~tback Murdoch continued with his campaign 
to secure a further 600 r~lundancies at Times Newspapers in order to 
slash labour costs. The brunt of this cut was aimed at the NATSOPA 
clerical chapel where 371 redundancies were required, and when a sufficient 
number of volunteers did not come forward 210 notices of dismissal were 
issued. An intense eispute was politicised by the realisation that it 
was partly an effort to.br~~k the power of the militant. NATSOPA FoC 
Barry Fitzpatrick. The NATSOPA chapel refused to be decimated in this 
way, and when murmurs of· support came from the NATSOPA chapel at the 
~,. Murdoch was forced to compromise. Still, in the space of a year, 
Murdoch had succeeded in cutting 1,000 full time posts from a total of 
3,200 at Times Newspapers, and. 1,000 casual shifts from a total of 
3,500, with a saving of £11 million per annum. (Financi~l Times, 
20 March 1982). 
·If he had met with so~e success in restructuring the industrial 
relations of Times Newspapers, Rupert Murdoch was less satisfied with i, 
his efforts to reshape the editorial line of the two newspapers. Originally 
he ~ad denied any such ambition, "I am not seeking to acquire these papers 
to change ~hen into somethin'3 entirely different," and the guai'antees 
seemed to prot~ct the papers from any proprietorial change of mood. First· 
signs were promising as Murdoch appointed Harold Evans, who had helped 
transform the Sunday Times into an inf~rmed, .investigative newspaper, 
as editor of The Times, desc.ribing him as "one of the world I s greatest 
editors." The honeymoon was soon over: in an effort to revitalise the 
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Times rather staid editorial style, Evans ~ade advantage of 50 journalist:::: 
acceptance of voluntary redundancy terms in September 1981, by h.ir ing 
54 more on bigger salaries including four assistant editors. Though a 
more original and socially aware Times began to emerge, the slow gain 
in circulation from 274,000 up to 307,000 was not enough to assuage the 
anxieties of Murdoch about the political agnosticism that was creeping 
into the paper, nor calm the old guard among the editorial staff who felt 
their ability and achievements were being questioned, for Evans "had 
inherited a deeply traditionalist and self-centred institution, conscious 
(perhaps over-conscious) of its distinctive history." (Observer, 
14 March 1982) 
Murdoch had placed Evans in a difficult position, and then proceeded 
to exploit Evans' vPlnerability. One of the guarantees that had been 
offered was "an annual pudget for editorial space and expenditure," and 
within these parameters the editor would be free to operat.e without 
interference. However nQ recognisable budget was set, and though Murdoch 
app~oved the major items of Evans' expenditure, this did not stop him 
criticising Evans' extravagance. The guarantee not to intrude in 
editorial decision making did not stop Murdoch frequently discussing 
editorial matters with Times journalists when Evans was not around. The 
insecurity of Evans position became so pronounced that Murdoch was· 
forced.to issue the following statement of the front page of The Times 
of 11 February 1982: "Reports in competitive newspapers that Harold 
Evans is about to be replaced as Editor of The Times are malicious, 
self-serving and wrong. Mr Evans outstanding qualities and journalistic 
skills are recognised throughout the world, as are his improvements 
to The Times over the past twelve months." Predictably enough, just 
over four mOnths later the following anouncement appeared on the front 
page of The Times : "Mr Harold Evans .~as today submitted hi.s resignation 
as Editor of The Times. His resignation has been accepted by the Board 
of Times Newspapers Limited." (16 March. 1982) 
.. 
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In the intervening months be-tween these two announcements, one 
of the most protracted and embaras~ing efforts to get rid of a national 
newspaper editor had been made, which was celebrated in a delighted 
special Private Eye Memorial Issue: "Dame Harold Evans: A Nation 
Mourns." (26 March 1982) The ambival~nce between Evans and Murdoch had 
existed at the time of the original takeover of Times Newspapers by News 
International when at first Evans h~d been involved with a rival consortium 
to rescue the papers and preserve their journalistic integrity, but then 
abruptly changed sides after procuring the supposed guarantees of editorial 
independence. As Evans discovered the guarantees did not exactly provide 
the conditions in which free comment could flourish, as a disturbing 
Panorama programme put it, "There is an atmosphere of suspicion and fear 
in the Times building • They are degicated journalists, but they will 
only speak off the record about editorial interference by Rupert Murdoch, 
and management incompetence. It is a testing time for journalists' ethics 
"as well as the viablity"of The Times." (SBCl, 1 March 1982) Nor had the 
Sunday Times escaped this malign influence, though a principle of the 
guarantees stated that the editors of the newspapers would "continue 
to make all appointments to the .journalLstic staff, subject to the 
constraints of editorial budget." Peter Lennon, a journalist, maintained, 
"Murdoch was responsible for dem9tong Hugo Young and sacked Ron Hall, 
the ed"itor of the colour supplement, who was replaced by a News of the 
World man. Three senior editors have suffered, one demoted, one demoted, 
and one fired, and Frank Giles the Sunday Times editor simply had to 
accept it." 
Th~ kind of paranoia sweeping through the company's management 
was indicated "by a memorandum from Gerald Long, managing director of 
Times Newspapers, "All executives of the company are reminded that 
written authorisation is required for'. any proposed action," of whatever 
nature. There is no exception to this rule. Verbal authorisation can 
never be accpeted. All executives must make themselves familiar with 
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the channels for seeking authorisation for any proposal and must 
follow them invariably." (Free Pres$, March/April 1982) (Soon after 
Long was removed to become deputy chairman of News International, 
being replaced as managing director by Bill Gillespie who was deputy 
managing director of the News group newspapers including the Sun and 
News of the World). (Guardian, 19 March 1982) The fear haunting 
Gray's Inn Road was summed up in Peter Lennon's conclusion, "I am a 
freelance journalist, dependent for my living on ·newspapers of a certain 
type carrying my stories. By what I have just said, I have wiped out 
half of my market." (Panorama, B~C 1, 1 March 1982) Another journalist 
unafraid to talk since he was already about to resign was Anthony Holden, 
assistant editor of The Times who ciaimed that Murdoch was furious with 
the SDP sympathies ~merging in the paper, and wanted a line supporting 
Reagan, Thatcher, and monetarism. Specific articles which had not pleased 
the proprietor included one by B.P. Thompson on Poland, and another by 
Ray Buckton on the ASLEF dispute. Editorial policy on race relations 
and·El Salvador were also disliked by Murdoch. 
Evans' efforts to resist this proprietorial encroachment were 
undermined because the majority of established journalists, organized in 
a body, Journalists of The Times Ltd (JOTT), were rnor~ concerned about 
Evans own impact upon editorial policy than Murdoch's. One of them,· 
Geraldine Norman, explained, "On "the one hand people are outraged at the 
idea that Murdoch is sacking the editor in a high handed proprietorial' 
move and feel he shouldn't be allowed to gat away with it. But on the 
other hand, the pa~er has been an unhappy place since last year because 
of the fe~ing that Mr Evans has been mucking us about - we don't know 
what's happeni.ng to our copy, if its being rewritten, and if we'll still. 
be doing the same job tomorrow." (Guardian, 23 March 1982) Among the 
editorial interventions of Evans that the staff resented was his 
tendency to "run things through" his own typewriter late at night with 
suprising results for their stories. 
• 
67 
In order to avoid the involvement of the outside directors 
Murdoch realised that he had to procure the resignation of Evans 
rather than fire him. Evans reluctance to go, led to the amusing 
situation· of the proprietor on one side of the Atlantic claiming that 
the editor of The Times had resigned and the resignation had been 
accepted by the board unanimously, and on the other side of the Atlantic 
Evans stoically remaining in the editors seat, and the national directors 
.. insisting that they had not been involved in the decision. At this point 
Harold Evans could have appealed to the national directors for protection 
and could probably have survived but he declined to do so. Admiration 
at Evans determination not to be shoved out despite pressure from senior 
management, and the fact that his successor Charles Douglas~~ome had 
started to tell staff he was now ed~tor, was somewhat tempered by the 
impression that Evans was predominantly concerned with the size of his 
severance .payment. Initially his lawyers claimed £500,000, but Evans 
settled on an estimated £260,000. (Four months later it was announced 
that Harold Evans was to be appointed as an editorial consultant of 
Goldcrest Films and Television, a subsidiary of Pearson Longman, whose 
chief executive. said they had invited Evans to join them pecause "we 
fundamentally t~ink he is a damned good fellow. He has decided to make 
a real name and career for himself in television." (Guardian, 22 July 
1982) 
The new editor, Charles Douglas-Horne, nephew of the former prime 
minister, was firmly set in the traditional Times mould, "I am not a 
quintessential SOP sympathiser like many of my colleagues. I believe, 
for instance, that we have been too dismissive of this government's 
economic policies." Though they may have agreed on economics, Douglas-
Home was an unlikely choice of editor from a man who a year before 
. . 
had railed against the British establishment and their unwillingness 
to change, conc~uding, "It is going to take a lot to break down the 
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snobbery and shibboleths to reverse the gentrification of Britain." 
(Advertising Hagazine, Summer 1981) _ The incongruity had struck 
Douglas-Home, "I cannot imagine why Murdoch's chosen me1 I'm 
everything he's said to abhor - double-barrelled name, been to Eton, 
and not an obedient man. n (Sunday Times, 14 March 1982) Rupert l-turdoch' s 
ambitions for The Times included a rapid and massive increase in 
circulation up to 400,000 with the long term aim of achieving 750,000 
to 1 million. To achieve this the cover price of -The Times would be 
frozen to allow it to cut into the market of the Telegraph, and 
ultimately to be price competitive with the Mail and the Express, 
reaching beyond the Times dignified elder readership to the affluent 
young members of the middle class. (Fiancial Times, 20 March 1982) 
It is hard not to escape the conclusion that the former editor of 
The Times was far bett~ equipped to pursue this strategy than the new 
editor, but this did not daunt IVlurdoch's pursuit of a saturation coverage 
at both ends of the Br itish newspaper market. "The trouble with Rupert," 
Harold Evans once declared, "is that he thinks he's the greatest 
newspaperman in the world"." 
Tiny Rowland: ·Observer 1981 
Finally, Tiny Rowland of Lonhro successfully stormed the 
last bastion of the liberal estao1ishment, The Observer, in June 1981. 
The newspaper was sold by David Astor in 1975 to Robert Anderson, 
chairman of the American Atlantic Richfield Corporation, who had heard 
th~ newspaper was on the market through a friend "who happened to 
be in u:>nd~>n at the time." Anderson accepted ownership for a token 
£1 note, toget~er with the debts of the paper, and delighted 
journalists by stating The Observer was "one of the world's great 
newspapers. It must be preserved as a~ independent and vigGrous 
voice in Great Britain and abroad. I believe that its future can 
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be as long and illustrious as its past." (Jenkins, 1979, pp. 95-6). 
By the beginning of 1981 these fine sentiments had vanished and, as 
the newspaper itself reported Anderson decided to dispose of the 
Observer, without any con'sul tation with the board of the 
Observer, the editor, or the staff. (1 March 1981). Rowland had built 
Lonhro into a huge mining and agriculture multinational with a 
turnover of £1.S6 billion and profits of £84 million in 1979. 
However, the buccaneering style of Rowland had not endeared his 
company to the reserved institutional investors in the City, which 
placed an extremely low market value on Lonhro at £190 million in 
1980. This had impaired Rowland's attempt to takeover the House of 
Fraser, which the City valued more highly, and the bid was lengthily 
considered by the Monopolies Commission. Clearly Rowland lacked 
acceptability. The dignified proprietorship of the Observer could 
help to overcome this social handicap. 
The Observer NUJ chapel reacted angrily to the secret deal by 
which t~ey had been sold to a company they had criticised repeatedly 
in the past, and called for a reference to the Monopolies Commission 
on the ground~ that the Observer was solvent, and that if Lonhro 
was allowed to buy the paper that an independent tru~t be established 
to run it with adequate editorial safeguards. In a slick attempt 
to circumvent a reference to the Monopolies Commission, Rowland 
announced that he would buy aSO per cent holding in the Observer 
himself, since the Fair Trading Act conditions only allowed for a 
referral when a newspaper with a circulation of 500,000 or more was 
sold to a company with a controlling interest of 25% in another 
newspaper. Since Rowland himself held only 17% of Lonhro shares he 
could evade the regulation. The move brougnt an outraged response 
from the Observer's editori, Donald Tre1ford, who .in .. a leading 
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article directed at Atlantic Richfield insisted that the sale 
should be referred to the commission, "to attempt to circumvent 
that opinion by clandestine de~ices is to flout the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the monopolie~ legislation. It is no way for an 
American company to treat a Briti~h government or a British board 
of directors. At the very least it is discourteous and ill-advised. 
It is the unacceptable face of multi-nationalism~" (22 March 1981). 
The outcry was such that a formal reference to the Monopolies 
Commission was unavoidable, during which it was possible to penetrate 
some of the d~pths of Rowland's career. Brought up in Germany, 
when he was 15 years old Rowland had joined the Hitler Youth "as 
everyone did n he said. Returning to Britain he served briefly in 
the British forces. At the end of the war he went into business, 
and then emigrated to Rhodesia. In Africa he built up mining and 
agricultural interests, but also newspapers. Lonhro owned the 
Tanzanian Standard and The Times of Zambia among others, and in both 
cases, while the newspapers remained the property of Lonhro their 
editors were appointees of the respective Governments. Later, 
after the election, Rowland offered to invest £3 mil~ion in a daily 
newspaper which would be wholly loyal to Mr. Mugabe in Zimbabwe, an 
offer which.was treated with some scepticism since Lonhro had previously 
backed Nkomo, and obviously wished to protect its £50 million ass~ts 
in Zimbabwe. (Guardian, 2 April 1980). When asked about his relations 
with newspaper editors in Africa, Rowland replied, "Easy, I simply 
appoint them on the advice of the local minister of information." 
(Jenkins, 1979, p.9S). 
In this context, it was deplorable that a rival bid by the 
publishers of the Melbourne Age was not considered by Anderson. When 
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the Monopolies Commission's judgement emerged it was an approval 
qualified by a number of conditions concerning an independent 
board of directors ru1d editorial freedom. John Biffen, the Trade 
Secretary agreed to the sale before any discussion of the safeguards 
took place which was condemned in a furious editorial by Trelford: 
"The so-called safeguards proposed by the commission offer less 
editorial freedom than Lonhro offered in their own submission, 
less than Mr. Biffen gave to the editor of The Times and 
Sunday Times - and less than the editor of the Observer currently 
, 
enjoys. They are illiberal, qnworkable, unacceptable ••.•••• 
The Commission .•••• has produced a shoddy report .•• It is as 
though it had made up its mind in advance and wriggled 
uncertainly to its destination past minefields of inconvenient 
fact. Even worse, however, it claims a faulty and dangerous 
knowledge of how a newspaper ought to work. This amounts broadly, 
to an implicit beli~f that newspapers are too important to be 
left to editors and journalists. They should be controlled by 
people of 'character and s'tanding", 'presence and influence', 
people like •••• well, like the Monopolies Commission." 
(5 July 1981) • 
When Lonhro attempted to select the 'independent' directors, 
the Observer NUJ chapel insisted that they would refuse to have 
any.thing to do with them. Finally, in an exhausting meeting at the 
Department. of Trade, the details of Lonhro's takeover were negotiated 
between the co~pany and the Observer editor and NUJ chapel. Lonhro 
would pay Atlantic ~chfield E3 million plus a 20 per cent holding in 
George Outram. Safeguards would be w~itten into the articles of 
association of the company, including: subject to a proper budget 
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the editor would retain control of editorial appointments and 
the editorial content, the editor would retain control of any 
political commenti instructions, to journalists should be given 
only by the editor or those to whom he had delegated authority. 
Five independent directors, drawn largely from the higher echelons 
of media executives, would approve the appointment of the editor 
in consultation with the journalists, and ensure that there was 
no proprietorial interference in the accurate presentation of news. 
(Observer, 12 July 1981). The conditions were close to those 
established at Times Newspapers, and reassured the Observer journalists. 
Whether they are actually capable of. restraining a proprietor of 
the ferocious energy and immense determination of Tiny Rowland 
remains to be seen. 
Resistance ? 
Hence the recent catastrophic decline in the independence 
and diversity of the national press shown in Table has been 
effected with the minimal amount of resistance conceivable. The 
regulations applied by the Monopolies Commission are a seive, incapable 
of catching anything, even if governments are prepared to exercise 
their responsibilty to prevent newspaper monopoly, which they are 
not. Proprietors wishing to avoid the awkwardness of a reference to 
the commission, have the simple expedient of pushing'a newspaper 
into bankruptcy before they dispose of it. Journalists, who one 
might expect to mount the most tenacious defence of editorial 
freedom, have proved no more than paper tigers, tamed by the closeness 
with which they regard their proprietors, an affection which is often: 
. responded to with contempt. The admiration of journalists for their 
brutal and philistine proprietors is difficult to fathom. Even those 
who should know better, who have studied the impact of proprietors on 
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the press, such as Simon Jenkins ex-editor of the Standard, display 
a fascination for proprietors combined with an implicit disdain for 
print workers; the wors·t comment Jenkins reserves for Mathews, 
who signalled his departure .from the Standard, was that he "was 
a building contractor by trade." (1979, p.1S). Lewis Chester and 
Jonathan Fenby, both professional journalists, in another study 
display an acute infatuation with the life-styles of millionaire 
proprietors and fatuously conclude, "Like it or not, the history 
of Fleet Street - and, in particular, that of Beaverbrook Newspapers -
suggests that vigorous owners are crucial to the development of 
vigorous newspapers." (1979, p.243). 
With opinions like this dominating their profession, it is 
not surprising that when Thomson decided to sell to Murdoch, The 
Times and the Sunday Times journalists lamely submitted to their fate. 
The principal objections of the Observer editorial staff did serve 
to del~y the Lonhro takeover; but having lived with an American oil 
multinational for several years, editorial criticism of the influence 
that the vested interests of L6nhro in Africa might have on the 
newspaper rang somewhat hollow. As for print union. leaders, although 
they are willing to indulge in the rhetoric of press freedom, they 
are clearly prepared to settle for the proprietor with the biggest 
bank roll. Print chapels are often too embroiled in pay negotiations 
to notice who the proprietor is, an acute illustration of this 
narrow economism being that the Observer editorial criticisms of 
the Monopoly Commission safeguards that they were "illiberal, 
unworkable, unacceptable", did not reach most of the readership 
because of a dispute over differentials betWeen NATSOPA and the NGA 
at the newspaper. (Though·it could be argued that,generally, the 
militant pursuit of economistic ends by the print chapels represents 
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a more important constraint upon ~roprictors than hard-hitting~ but 
ultimately ineffective, editorials~) Thus proprietors have been 
able to deal in national newspapers as they deal in any other 
commodity and no effective force presently exists to prevent them. 
, . 
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ADVE RT IS ING 
The Scale of the Advertising Industry 
In examining press performance relative to the criteria of a 
free market: competition, consumer sovereignty, and free access, so 
far the anQlysis has focussed only upon the ownership structure. 
When the effects of advertising are examined further critical limitations 
are discovered, particularly regarding the idea of consumer sovereignty. 
Advertisers now make a larger contribution to the finances of the 
British mass media than do consumers: commercial TV and radio derive 
nearly all of their revenue from advertising, while newspapers and 
magazines derive over half their revenue from advertis~nents. (Curran, 
1981,p.45) • F~owing from this financial support by advertisers is 
immense influence over not only the media, but wider society. Pohl 
and Kornbluth's vision in The Space Merchants of a world dominated by 
giant advertising agencies which do not stop short of armed warfare 
in their competitive struggles may not yet have arrived, but advertising 
has become a major British industry, with a total revenue of £2.5 
billion in 1980, and is comparable in size and turnover with other 
important industrial sectors. 
Newspapers alone received £511 million from classified advertisements, 
and £932 million from display advertisements in 1980. Charles Wintour, 
an eminent editor of the Evening Standard once said: "No national 
newspaper would have the slightest hope of economic survival if all 
advertising revenue were withdrawn from it. To a considerable degree, 
newspaper managements and advertisers are therefore in partnership". 
(1972 p.35). This may seem obvious, except that successive Royal 
Commissions on the Press have been keen to preserve the polite liberal 
fiction of a "remote and impersonal" relationship between advertisers 
and publishers, and to conserve the idea that advertisements are essentially 
neutral and passive, exerting·no influence upon editorial content. 
-Anyway, the HcGregor Commission co:nplacently concluded, it would be 
difficult to get concrete evidence from the victims of illegitimate 
influence since "i t would not be in their interest· to speak about the 
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success of advertisers in exerting pressure." (RCP, 1977,pl05) In fact 
there is normally no need for advertisers to exert direct influence upon 
the m~dia, because acute dependency upon advertising revenue has already 
shaped the form and content of the media in a manner acceptable to 
advertisers. Left criticisms of particular examples of deliberate distortion, 
falsification or censorship in the media due to advertisers influence can 
usually be refuted, because it is the general structure and operation of 
the media which is at fault: "advertising patronage is essentially an 
impersonal means by which Britain's mass media are fashioned according to 
the marketing needs of the economic system and the class ineqJalities of 
power, influence and consumption ••• '~ (Curran,l98l,p45) 
Examination of the statistical data concerning the extent of the 
advertising subsidy of the press and the rest of the mass media reveals 
·the scale of the problem. Table 3 shows that there has been a steady 
growth in advertising expenditure from £554 million in 1970 to £2,562 
million in 1980, comprising 1.34% of the total gross national product in 
t~e united Kingdom. Despite the ~iew that commercial television is draining 
away the lifeblood of the press, in reality the relattve shares of 
advertising revenue of the press. and television have remained relatively 
constant over the last ten years, with only a slight decline in the share 
of the press from 49.5% to 45.1% and a slight increase in the share of 
television from 22.6~ to 27%. In America the advertising industry is 
much bigger still, ·with a tu~nover of over $36 billion in 1980, as 
Table 4 r~veals. The considerable growth of the advertising industry 
. in the US over' the last ten years 1970-1980 till it now constitutes 
1.6% of total us GNP, indicates that further growth of the industry can 
be expected in the UK. However even- in the US, with hundreas of commercial 
T V ~tations, andthe e~r1y introduction of Cable -TV in .many p~rts of the 
country, newspapers have proved able to retain a majority of advertising 
Table 3 Total Advertising EXpenditure in the united Kingdom 1970 - 1980 
Total Expenditure iA Distribution of total expenditure by media: 
£M % of total 
At current As % of At constant Press TV Radio Cinema Ot!ltdoor/ 
prices GNP prices Newspapers Magazines Transport 
" 
1970 554 1.27 554 49.5 22.7 . 22.6 0.2 1.1 4.0 
1971 591 1.20 544 48.5 22.2 24.2 0.2 1.0 3.9 
1972 708 1.28 608 49.3 21.0 24.9 0.1 1.0 3.7 
1973 874 1.36 716 51.4 20.0 24.0 0.2 0.8 ·3.5 
1974 900 1.21 667 52.1 20.0 22.6 0.7 0.9 3.8 
1975 967 1.03 565 49.6 20.6 24.4 1.0 0.7 3.6 
1976 1188 1.07 567 47.6 20.5 25.8 1.5 0.7 3.6 
197=1 1499 1.19 604 46.5 21.0 26.6 1.7 0.6 3.6 
1978 1834 1.27 645 46.0 21.4 26.3 1.9 0.7 3.7 
1979 2137 1.30 6·51 47.8 22.6 22.0 2 •. 4 0.8 4.4 
1980 2562 1.34 628 . 45.1 20.6 27.0 2.1 0.7 4.5 
Note: Figures include agency commission and production costs. 
Source: The Advertising Association; London; J.W.T. Unilever International Co-ordination Group, 
Journal of Advertising, 1982, p 85. 
Index of 
Media 
Rates 
100 
109 
.116 
122 
135 
171 
209 
248 
284 
328 
408 
• 
~ 
~ 
t 
Table 4 Total Advertising Expenditure in the United States 1970 - 1980 
Total Expenditure in Distribution of total expenditure by media: Index of 
million US dollars % of total Media 
At current As % of At constant Press TV Radio Cinema Outdoor/ Rates 
prices GNP prices Newspapers Magazines Transport 
1970 12,940 1.53 12 940 44.1 16.2 27.8 10.1 NA 1.8 100 .~ 
1971 13,580 1.50 13.580 45.6 15.8 26.0 10.6 NA 1.9 100 
1972 15,280 1.53 14,150 45.9 14.9 26.8 10.5 NA 1.8 108 
1973 16,460 1.48 14,310 45.1 14.4 27.1 10.5 NA 1.9 115 
1974 17,4BO 1.46 13,980 45.8 14.2 27.8 10.5 NA 1.8 125 
\ 
1975 18,470 1.41 . 13,480 45.7 13.3 28.5 10.7 NA 1.8 137 
1976 22,250 1.52 14,540 44.5 13.1 30.2 10.5 NA 1.7 153 
1977 25,270 1.54 14,690 44.1 13.7 30.1 10.4 NA 1.7 172 
1978 29,190 1.59 15,440 43.5 14.0 30.8 10.1 NA 1.6 189 
1979 33,090 1.61 15,680 43.8 14.0 30.7 9.9 NA 1.6 211 
1980 36,300 1.60 16,500 43.0 13.9 31.2 10.2 NA 1.7 222 • 
"" 
Notes: a) 'Magazines' includes fram publications and business. publications; b) Figures include both agency 
commissions and production costs; c) The data reported here differ from the usual method of presenting USA figures, 
primarily in excluding direct mail-and a 'miscellaneous cdtegory which includes cinema and transport advertising. 
Source: J.W.T. Unilever International Co-ordination Group, J()urnal of Advertising, 1982, p86. -...J 
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Table 5 Distribution of Total Advertising Expenditure Between Media 1960-1980 in the united Kingdom 
t 
Table 6 Total Advertising Expenditure By Type 1960 - 1980 in United Kingdom 
1960 1972 1974 1976 1978 19,80 
Em % .£m % Em % Em % Em % Em % 
DISPLAY ADVERTISING 
Press 1 151 47 270 38 328 36 438 37 644 35 932 36 
Television 72 22 176 25 203 23 307 26 482 26 692 27 J 
Poster ,Transport, 22 7 34 5 48 5 69 6 116 6 186 7 
Cinema & Radio 
DISPLAY ADVERTISING 
TOTAL 245 76 480 68 579 64 814 69 1242 68 1809 71 
OTHER ADVERTISING 
Classified Advertising 43 13 150 21 228 25 255 22 402 22 511 20 
Trade & Technical 31 10 61 9 80 9 103 9 169 9 214 8 
Journals 
Financial Notices 2 4 1 17 2 13 1 16 1 21 1 28 1 
~~--- ---- . 
TOTAL ALL ADVERTISING 323 100 708 100 900 100 1188 100 1834 100 
~ Excluding financial, classified and advertising in trade and technical journals. 
Company reports, prospectuses and other notices, but excluding di~play advertising by financial institutions. 
Source: Derived from, M.J. Waterson, Advertising Expenditure 1960-1980, Advertising Magazin~ Summer 1981,p38. 
(All percentage figures have been rounded off to the nearest whole number) • 
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revenue, receiving 43% of the total in 1980 compared·to 32."% received 
by TV. 
Table 5 shows that althoug~ the advertising revenue of the 
national press has declined over the last ten years to 17% the regional 
press has been able to retain a 25% share of the total advertising revenue, 
not much less than the 27% of TV itself. Finally Table 6 shows the 
importance of display advertisements in the press comprising 36% of total 
advertising expenditure in 1980. These are particularly vital to the national 
press, and tend to be large advertisements extolling the virtues of the 
products of big companies. Classified advertisements are the vital source 
of revenue for the regional press, which receives 70% of the total 
classified ads placed in newspapers. Together these tables reveal the 
ascendancy of advertising in the media industries: that is the advertising 
industry and media are not in equax partnership, the advertisin9 industry 
due to the enormous revenue it generates for the media is the dominant 
partner in the relationship. 
, Economic Aspects of Advertising Subsidies 
Hirsch and Gordon in their book Newspaper Money argue that it is 
too readily assumed that newspapers will reflect the views and interests 
of people at l?rge, when in reality it depends on how profitable it 
is to present those views (1975, pl2). The .ost important 
determinants of profitability are circulation and advertising revenue: 
for the national press it is advertising revenue that has essentially 
determined the two broad strategies, which have dichotomised the national 
press into two rigid categories, one of privilege and one of deprivation. 
The first strategy' is to aim for a low circulation of affluent readers 
with resuiting high advertising revenue. The second strategy is to go 
for a high. circulation with the consequent relative reductions in 
advertising revenue because of the low socio-economic position of the 
readership. "The structure of the mddern newspaper, particularly the 
sO-Galled 'quality' n~wspaper, has thus evolved in a form that organises 
• 'It'. 
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readers into market lots, packaged in suitable editorial material, 
for sale to advertisers.~ (Curran, 1978,p.235). 
Advertisers will pay six times more to reach a given number 
of readers of the Financial Times compared with the same number of 
readers of the Daily Mirror. The only socially accurate test of 
comparative advertising revenue is the millinch test: that is the 
advertising rate per column inch per 1,000 readers. This test 
reveals how advertisers intensively discrimi.nate between readers on the 
grounds of social class. The Financial Times received 80% of its 
revenue from advertising in 1974, the Daily Mirror received only 31%. 
This advertising subsidy enables the quality press to provide a much 
better service at lower cost to the reader: in 1973 the direct cost of 
the Daily Mirror each copy was 2.2p, the direct cost of the Financial 
Times was l6.5p, yet they retailed at only a few pence difference, 5p and 
8p respectively. Newspaper executives may insist that advertising 
revenue i~ vital to the survival of popular newspapers, but in a very 
real sense advertising no longer subsidises editorial in the popular 
press - editorial subsidies advertising: "while, in the quality nationals 
and the regionals, both display and 'classified advertising provide 
. 
a revenue proportionately greater than their share of total paging, the 
reverse is quite markedly the case with the popular nationals". 
(Henry, 1978,p.29). The Financial Times, in strictly marketing terms, 
has the most successful formula of all: a very low circulation of 
people who command great private and public spending power and who are 
therefore the most attractive to advertisers. (Hirsch and Gordon, 
1975,pp. 43-63). Between 1967 and 1969 The Times, in an editorial 
.campaign, made the mistake of increasing its circulation from 270,000 
to 450,000, for the first time reaching a non-elite readership, costs 
I 
increased but advertising revenue did not, and an embarassed Times had 
to consciously divest itself of its new readers. It must be realised 
.. 
........ 
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that the quality papers do not want and cannot afford to have a 
significant working class readership. Hence the Guardian in a 
promotion to the advertising industry declared that it was read by 
"The thinking Rich ••••• 85% of them are ABCI - which is a better 
percentage than the FT or Telegraph can offer." Its readers \Olere 
not '.'down-at-heel extremists without a penny to bless themselves with" 
but "have bank accounts full of lovely money." (Curran and Seaton,l98l, 
pl30) • 
Royal Commissions have ignored the damaging effects of advertising 
revenue in dichotomizing the press; the McGregor Commission for 
example, resorted to coy adspeak euphemisms to describe the class 
stratification of the newspaper market: 
"The populars are an expensive way of reaching the AB readers 
because an advertiser in buying space is paying to reach an 
audience most of which is of no interest to him. This is one 
reason why the qualities can charge a rate per reader which 
. is substantially above that of the populars. A more important 
reason is that advertisers are willing to pay more to reach 
better off and more influeq,tial readers." (1977 ,p.46) • 
The Commission accepted unreservedly the logic of marketing management, 
"for attracting advertisers appropriate segments of the market must be 
indenti·fied". (1977 ,p.48) • The'debilitating impact of this logic 
upon publications will be examined in a moment, but the method of 
identifying "appropriate segements of the market" is in itself offensive. 
The.newspaper publishers,advertising agencies, and advertisers devote 
themselves ~o survey results such as the NRS: "The general objective 
of the National Readership Survey is to provide such information, 
acceptable to both publishers of print media and buyers of space, as 
will be most relevant to the assessmen~ and e~ficient use of the medium. 
...... 
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Among possible measurec, this requires providing a basis for 
estimating the numbers and kinds of people .likely to receive 
different patterns of exposure to advertisements inserted in individual 
publications or combinations of publications". (JlCNARS, 1979,p.ll). 
To 'efficiently use the medimn' and 'expose' people more effectively 
to advertisements, advertisers break the population down into rigid 
social categories, beginning with "social grade". The people who would 
probably be among the first to deny the existence or importance of 
... 
class inequality, divide the population up into social grades on the 
basis of occupation, A;B;Cl; C2; D; and E -those at the lowest level 
of subsistence: State pensioners or widows (no other earner), casual 
or lowest grade workers". Breakdowns of sex, age, region, lTV area, 
weight of lTV viewing and lBA listening are made, and analysis extends 
to special interest groups such as petrol buyers, holiday takers, owners 
of cheque books, possession of consumer durables, and such esoteric 
classifications as "recent acquisition of power tool (men)". (p.l4) 
Such surveys are intended to sift the population to find those people 
who have money to spend, to design advertisements and publications 
exclusively for these people, and. to allow the systematic neglect of 
the less affluent because of their lower advertising utility. 
The objection of the McGregor Commission to any form of public 
intervention in the press was that the market was·neutral, whereas 
intervention was manipulative, involving an element of judgment, 
. 
effecting the viability of titles, and assisting some titles at the 
expense of others. (Curran,l978,pp.3-5). Yet advertisers systematically 
exert this discrimination. The unequal distribution of advertising 
revenue has produced a politically unbalanced and culturally polarized 
press. Charles Wintour has claimed, "How far, then, is a newspaper 
influenced by advertising? On the essentials of political policy there 
is no influence whatsoever". (1972, p.42). The. slight flaw in this 
argument, is that it conveniently ignores the wholesale destruction o~ 
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the committed radical press due to the impact of lack of advertising 
revenue, and that the remaining newspapers are unlikely to want to 
print anything which would offend advertisers. 
has maintained: 
As James Curran 
".The death of the Daily Herald, News Chronicle and Sunday 
Citizen (Reynolds News) decimated the social democratic 
press. It meant the loss of the only social democratic 
papers with a large readership which devoted serious attention 
to current affairs. The surviving pro-Labour papers are 
first and foremost entertainment sheets, devoting less than 
10 per cent of their editorial space to political, social and 
economic news, they scarcely constitute an alternative political 
voice ... (1978, p. 254) • 
The McGregor Commission accepted the mythology that the failure of 
radical newspapers was due to their inability"to meet the changing 
needs of readers", when each of the newspapers that failed, had a 
much larger circulation than quality newspapers that survived. Radical 
newspapers appealed to people, the problem was that they appealed to 
t~e wrong people, who did not co~stitute.a valuable advertising market. 
The Daily Herald failed because of advertising dis~rimination 
against it, and the premature end of the Scottish Daily News was 
determined by lack of advertising. (The rest of the left press is 
deprived o~ advertising revenue, and has to compete with the capitalist 
press with fewer pages, higher prices, fewer staff, less editorial 
facilities, and less extensi~e distributioni therefore the left press 
sells only'to the committed). (Beharrel and Philo, 1977,p.121). 
·Eight newspapers died in the. 1960s and early 1970s from the same causes: 
whilst they did not offer as broad a coverage of the mass market as 
TV or the biggest selling popular newSpapers, they could not offer an 
affluent segment of the middle class market. As Graph 1 show~ this 
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Graph l: The Bermuda Triangle of the British Press 1960-1975: 
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area of the national newspaper market of moderate circulation and 
low socio-economic readership has become a Bermuda Triangle: the 
graveyard of newspapers t~t do not fulfill the advertising markets 
requirements. (The graph also ~hows that the Daily Mail and Daily 
Express which attempt to occupy the gulf between the quality and 
popular press are perilously close to the danger zone, and any sudden 
fall in the circulation or advertising of either paper would involve 
either collapse or permanent subsidies from the parent group. The Star 
launched in 1978 is capable of surviving at a lower level of circulation 
than would be normally necessary, because it shares overheads and 
printing facilities with the Express; in turn this has helped to keep the 
Express alive): 
The Tension Between Editorial Freedom and Advertising Subsidies 
The influence of advertisers does not end with control over whether 
a newspaper exists or not: they determine the shape and content of the 
papers that do survive. The realities of 'joint supply', when 
advertisers provide more than half the revenue of newspapers and represent 
a much more cohesive and vociferous group, is that their wishes are 
complied with, regardless of the desires of readers. Advertisement 
related features pages are the least popular among readers, and yet 
they have spread because advertisers like them. colour·supplements· 
appeared in 1981·with the Sunday Express and News of the World, not 
because readers would enjoy them, but because they would attract 
advertisements: if they do not attract sufficient advertising revenue, 
they will be withdrawn, whatever the wishes of readers. The Daily Mail 
has developed an appeal to middle class women, and has now launched the Mail 
on Sunday aimed at women, not because women badly need a paper to 
reflect their views and interests which the rest of the national press 
neglect, but because the Mail has located a lucrative and exclusive 
section of the advertisement market. 
..... 
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The development of target marketing means that newspaper and 
magazine launches will be directed at increasingly specific sections 
of the public. 
"The successful commercial,publisher is a shrewd producer 
of commodities. He is not interested in pushing out the 
frontiers of debate or knowledge. He is simply trying 
to make money. At the core of this commercial drive is 
the publisher's desire to discover groups of readers who 
the advertisers wish to reach •••• Having identified the 
demand for advertising.space, the publisher then tries to 
work out what kind of editorial is needed to ensnare the 
readers". (MPG, 1980b, pp.ll-l3). 
But not all of the public will be covered by specialist publications: 
"Womens magazines tend to be oriented towards the middle class. 
This is a consequence of the much higher advertising subsidies that 
middle class women readers generate by comparison with working class 
readers ..... This gravitational pull towards the middle class, exerted 
by advertising, has contributed to the remarkable conservatism of much 
wom~n' s !j6urnalism~ '. It has also resulted in a broad range of cultural 
provision being' geared disprpportionately to one section .of the community." 
(Curran, 1981,pp. 56-7). Systematic class discrimination is 
accompanied by systematic age discrimination • The relative affluence 
. 
of young people encouraged advertisers to promote a lavish range of 
publications aimed at the youth market. In stark contrast, few 
publications cater for elderly people because their disposable income 
is less than that of young people. 
There is a constant tension between editorial and advertising 
iO newspapers, editorial is intended to inform, advertiSing to persuade 
with no more of the truth than is necessary. (Whale, 1977, p.89). 
The McGreqor Commission piously declared, "We believe that there is 
evidence that ~he overall balance of contents of newspapers is not 
• 
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unduly influenced by the needs of advertisers ••• 11 (RCP, 1977,p.lo4). 
This is commercially induced blindness. Half of the content of 
newspapers presently consists of advertisements which imbue 
newspapers with a quality of coarse commercialism that overwhelms 
any distinctive editorial orientation confined to a few pages. 
Regional and local newspapers are so saturated with advertising that 
they are virtually indistinguishable from advertisement Free Sheets, 
and only the Post Office regulation that a publication cannot be 
registered as a newspaper if it carries more than 66% advertising preserves 
the remaining fragments of editorial space. In commercial television 
the cost of producing 30 second advertisements is £20,000 - £100,000, 
often a great deal more than the programmes which are wrapped around 
them. (Sunday Tlines, 31 May 1981). The same phenomena is occurring 
with newspaper~more resources are being devoted to procuring advertising 
revenue than gathering the news: in the typical regional newspaper there 
is a sharp contrast between the crowded and bustling tele-ad office and 
the deserted editor.ial office, depleted of journalists. The question 
Jean Seaton asks of commercial television has become relevant for 
newspapers: "how does the real purpose of producing audiences for 
advertisers af~ect the apparent purpose of producing programmes for 
audience consumption?1I (Curran and Seaton, 1981,p.240). 
An executive of Times Newspapers has called ~or the integration of 
advertising and circulation sales policies in newspapers, an integration 
already represQnted by joint commercial management in several publishing 
houses, (Mander, 1978,pp 72-80). What this invariably means is that 
editorial policy is of "the greatest importance to the economics of the 
press - provided editorial policy is defined as the determination of 
what sort of content will best fit the publication for its market." 
(Henry, 1978,p.4). That is, editorial is designed by advertising 
market requirements to appeal to a particular readership. In the 
.. 
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quality press this means editorial specialism, in the popular press 
the pressure is to build the largest readership possible, and 
therefore specialist and substantial material on politics, economics 
and current affairs has declined" and been replaced by common-
denominator entertainment material with little news relevance. 
(CUrran, 1981,p.62). Advertising influence need not be directly 
imposed on the press because it is effectively internalized by 
newspaper marketing strategies to maximise revenue . Any editorial 
criticism of the damaging effect of advertising influence is stifled 
at birth - in a large Swedish newspaper a group of feature journalists 
started a series of critical articles on advertising which led to 
immediate protests from the advertising department: "Do you want' to 
cut off the hand that feeds you?" (Engwall, 1978,p.2l7). 
In contemporary newspapers, as with commercial television, it is 
often difficult to detect when the selling message has stopped and 
the info~ation material has started, particularly with the spread of 
sycophantic consumer journalism. (Schiller, 1971,p.4l). As editorial 
criticism has been neutered, advertising pronouncements have become 
more aggressive. Advocacy advertising has enabled companies to 90 
beyond merely selling products or an image, and more forcefully enter 
the political arena. Now highly developed in the United State's, 
advocacy advertising is used by corporations to push certain positions 
on political issues which effect their commercial interests such as 
government regulations, taxation, pollution control, and conservation. 
Corporations aggressively justify their own activities and performance, 
and attempt to undermine the motives and actions of opponents: it 
.often amounts to "counter advertising to counter the news". (Sethi, 
1977,p.7). A cross-section of wealthy American oil, chemical, and finance 
, . 
.... ~ 
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multi-nzltionals have engaged in extensive ideologicu1 warfare 
to prevent refo~llls proposed by government agencies, academic and 
research institutions, or public interest groups. In 1974 US corporations 
spent $224 million on thi~ form of advertising. Seven major oil 
companies· spent $59.8 million on 'goodwill' advertising in 1973, 
'goodwill' concerns matters such as "environmentalism, energy-related 
issues or explanations of the capitalist system", and is tax-deductible. 
(Sethi, 1977,p.16). Among the examples of advocacy advertising compiled 
by Sethi, include a campaign by the American Electric Power Company 
Inc against the Environment~l Protection Agency regulations on strip 
mining and air pollution; a campaign by Allied Ch~nical to explain 
that "Profits are for People"; another by the Chase Manhattan Bank, 
"Unless we stimulate the formation of capital ••• you're the one 
who may be out of a job"; another by Mobil, "The popular misconception 
that 'Big Oil' is run by the few for a privileged few is nonsense" (sic). 
Image building advertisements have greatly increased in the British 
press, along with a growing readiness to engage in major advertising 
campaigns during times of commercial difficulty. Unwanted takeovers in the 
private sector are now often accompanied by a flurry of competing 
advertisements,· such as in t~e attempt by S.W. Berisford to take over· 
British Sugar in 1981. In the public sector, nationalized industries 
have used advertising campaigns to pressure government. Although 
British companies are more cautious in engaging in ideological struggles 
through advertising than are their American counterparts, there are 
precedents for this when it is deemed necessary: Tate and Lyle 
mounted a successful attack through advertising on the Labour government's 
plans to nationalise the sugar industry; and somewhat less successful 
efforts were made by the private steel companies and private road 
haulage lobby. Private building companies mounted a similar 
campaign duri.ng the 1974-79 Labour government which helped divert the 
pressure for nationalisation. Softening up exercises have occurred 
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in ancitipation of any effort at socialist intervention in the 
economy: AIMS,a group of right wing industrialists, has launched 
several page declarations, "That liberty, which stands on the unique 
foundations of democracy, free~om of choice and expression and free 
enterprise, is being eroded by State interference •••• That a halt 
must be made to nationalisation, State control, and excessive 
bureaucracy .• " (Guardian, 3 July 1978) If any future Labour 
Government attempted to nationalise a strategic and highly profitable 
sector, such as the banking or insurance industry, they would be 
confronted by a blitz of hostile advertising which would saturate 
every newspaper in the country. Advertising agencies have already 
entered the Britisn political scene with ravaging effects, as in the 
Saatchi and Saatchi selling of Thatcherism during the 1979 general 
election. Their "Labour Isn' t Working~' poster with a picture of an 
endless dole queue had a profound impact, and assisted in the election 
of a government that tripled unemployment to three million in two years: 
the aim is to sell the product, regardless if the consequences are the 
opposite of'what the advertisement claims they will be. 
A~most by definition, the products most heavily promoted by 
advertising are those which are most unnecessary, dubious, or harmful. 
Charles Wintour asked the rhetorical question, "ls it wrong to give 
some uegree of preference to stores which advertise? Not at all, 
.. 
provided that their products are good - and they are unlikely to waste 
money advertising unless they are". (l972,p.39). This would be 
laughable, if the McGregor Commission, as a justification for newspaper 
advertising, had not repeated the quotation verbatim (except that, 
in another clue ~o its prejudices, it mistakenly puts the word "stories" 
instead of "stores"!). In a general sense advertising powerfully project 
. 
the primary social characteristics of capitalism: acquisitiveness, 
individualism, competitiveness, consumerism, aggression and elitism. 
...... 
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"Advertising cannot help but promote and reinforce the values and 
visions of Western capitalist society." (Schudson,l98l,p.ll). Most 
advertising is devoted to misleading consumers, whether in the 
form of the subtle exaggeration or - at the other extreme - the 
deceitfu~ deception: there is no place for the critical and 
comparative presentation of products. The harmful psychological 
effects of much advertising include promoting a sense of insecurity and 
failure among people made constantly aware of the material possessions 
they can never obtain, implicitly because of their own inadequacies: 
and exploiting people's emotional vulnerabilities. Unsafe products 
are promoted, and dangerous practices encouraged. The Advertising 
Standards Authority was set up by the advertising business supposedly 
to ensure a system of self-regulation - in practice it is no more 
than a flimsy cover for the most blatant disregard of the interests of 
the public. 
Tobacco Advertising: Promoting Cancer 
The most glaring instance of the moral ambivalence of advertisers 
is tobacco advertising. Smoking is the largest avoidable hazard to 
health in this country according to most medical opinion. Smoking 
causes cancer, heart disease, emphysema and bronchitis, in terminal 
. 
stages causing ~isery, wretchedness and grief for hundreds of 
thousands of people. Fifty thousand people each year are killed 
because of cigarette smoking (Elstein, 1979). A report Smoking and 
Health, prepared by officials from seven Whitehall ministries in 1971, 
was more conservative in its estimates, but still maintained that if 
only two out of every five people stopped smoking then 100,000 people 
who would have been widows and widowers would still have their husbands 
and wives 20 years later. In 1978 an all-party select committee in 
Parliament called for a complete ban on cigarette advertis~ng. The 
director of ASH maintained, "Tobacco is the only product that will kill 
between a quarter and a thir4 of its users before their time. The 
very idea of p~omoting it at all with that degree. of risk, is just wron9 
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• to anyone concerned with health." (Guardian, 17 August 1981). 
Yet the tobacco industry has maintained huge and sustained advertising 
campaigns up to the present day. A ban on TV advertisements has 
simply meant a huge wave of cigarette advertisements swamping 
newspapers. The colour supplements of the Sunday Express and 
News of the World launched in 1981, served as vehicles to carry glossy 
enticements to smoke to the working class, which are now banned on 
TV. Sunday (the News of the World magazine) carried up to six full 
page ads for cigarettes in its early issues, the Sunday Express magazine 
carried four full pages. In contrast the Observer and Sunday Times 
magazines, which cater for a predominently middle-class market, on 
average carried less than two full page cigarette ads. The total spent 
by the Health Education Council and ASH in anti-smoking campaigns in 1979, 
was £0.4 million whereas tobacco companies spent £80 million on 
cigarette promotion, a ratio of 1:200. (Guardian, 6 May 1980). 
Thus any attempt by health education to conquer the smoking habit is 
overwhelmed by an avalanche of counter propaganda. {Wintour accounts how 
a tough "Smoking Yourself to Death" fzont page of the Evening Standard 
in 1971, led to the tobacco compani.es doubling their expenditure on ads 
in the newspaper the following year.>. (1972,p.36). 
Treacherously, advertisements are aimed at the most vulnerable: 
Philip Morris had to be halted in their 'Club Marlboro' campaign to 
encourage young people to smoke, despite the existence of a voluntary 
code not to e~courage the young to start. Third world countries are 
the victims of unrestrained cigarette advertisement campaigns for the 
highest tar brands which induce addiction most. 
Advertisers and manufacturers point to the laxness of government 
as an excuse to continue advertising (apparently governments are not 
only concerned about the loss of £4 billion tax revenue, but the 
increased number of people who would be around to claim state pensions!) 
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. . . But advertisers themselves sometimes sec~ engaged ~n a crusade: 
advertising agents Allen, Brady and March, acting for the British 
Tobacco Company placed copy in the Financial Times declaring that 
II a citizen has certain inalienable rights in a free society. The 
right to .exercise free choice, for instance" (presumably to choose 
cancer). One sinister episode sho\is the extent of the tobacco 
advertisers determination. A Sunday Times article by the paper's 
medical correspondent Oliver Gillie on heart transplants said clearly 
that in five out of seven case histories smoking had clearly damaged 
the patient's hearts. Probably for the first time in British journalism, 
Gillie named the cigarettes which they smoked. In the middle of the 
article was a full page advertisement for Embassy - one of the cigarettes 
blamed for helping to kill someone. Normally the advertising department 
would be warned to rearrange the schedule to avoid a clash with the 
offending article. In this case it did not happen. Wills, who 
make Embassy, complained. They were not charged for the ad, and got another 
one free, but soon decided to withdraw £500,000 of booked advertising 
from the. paper. Wills marketing manager claimed that the decision to 
switch to the new Sunday Express colour magazine had already been 
made, and give~ the mass working class. readership of ~he Express, there 
was probably an element of truth in this. However the ad manager in 
charge of the Wills account at the Sunday Times asked the board if 
Wills could be placated by a statement that there was no campaign against 
smoking at the Sunday Times. The board discussed the possibility of 
banning all cigarette advertising from the paper. A majority were 
against, and Harold Evans was given the job of drafting a statement 
which would be shown to the tobacco companies - though not the readers. 
As the New Statesman scathingly concluded, n It is clear that in 
its heart the board ••• capitulated to what is one of the most brazen 
examples of interference in editorial policy by an advertiser." (27 Feb.1981) 
... 
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Thus the chairman of the Imperial Group, with half yearly profits of 
£50 million in the tobacco division, could report "encouraging progress" 
in the launch of new cigarette brands in 1980; and the chairman 
of BAT, ''lith profits of £416 million in 1977, could state "I see a 
company a's a living organism t.hat has to grow" (Guardian 12 June 1978). 
It is clear that advertising is a central weapon of the ideologi.cal 
contagion of corporate capitalism. 
Conclusion: The Pincer Effect Of Proprietorial Control and Advertising 
The whole economic structure of Fleet Street has been built 
on expanding advertising revenue, which increased for the national 
newspapers from £10 million in 1948, to £162 million in 1975, to £ 426 
million in 19 80. This revenue fuelled increased pagination, staffing, 
pay, and other' expenditure, thus the annual costs of an average London 
daily newspaper increased from £l~ million in 1946 to £28 million in 
1974. (Curran, 197B,pp. 263-5). ~dvertisements themselves are 
costly to produce, including the expense of large advertising 
departrnents,plus production and paper costs. The competition for 
advertising led to marginal revenue from advertising being gradually 
overtaken by marginal costs as newspapers held their rates down. For 
the national popular dailies, in 1960 60% of advertising revenue was 
absorbed by advertising cos~s, in 1973 85% of revenue ~a~ absorbed 
by costs, and ip 1975 100%. (RCP, 1977,p.39). This 'has been the major 
CQntribution to the cumulative economic crisis of Fleet Street. An 
improvement 1n advertising has allowed a temporary breathing space, 
but other problems have to be faced. In 1980 about 400 advertisement 
Free Sheets expanded to £84 million of the market, and seem certain to 
proliferate. (Guardian 8 September 1981). Channel 4 television was 
launched in 1982 supported by advertisements; and Breakfast TV, a 
real threat to morning newspapers, arrived in 1983. A further severe 
contraction and restructuring of the national newspaper industry is likely, 
and whatever the reasons put· forward, the primary cause will be changes 
in the preferences of adVertisers. 
Table 7 Proportion of Press Revenue Derived ~rom Advertising in 1979 
National National Regional Local Total 
Daily & 
Dailies Sundays Sunday Weeklies Newspapers 
Papers 
44% 44% 66% 85% 59% 
Source: Derived from J.Curran, 1981, p ~5. 
, 
Trade ,Technical 
& Professional 
Journals 
64% 
Other Total 
Periodicals Periodi:: 
47% 
-aJs 
54% 
• 
\0 
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Table Estimates of the Proportion of Newspaper Advertising Revenue 
Which Is Absorbed By Costs: Averages: 1960, 1973, 1975. 
1960 1973 1975 
National Popular Daily 60 85 100 
National Quality Daily 40 55 65 
National popular Sunday 65-70 95 115 
National Quality Sunday 40-45 60 70 
London Evening 55 65 75 
Provincial Evening 50 n.a. 55 
Provincial Weekly 40 n.a. 55 
Source: RCP, 1977, Table 5.5, p39 
.'t •• 
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In conclusion, "The Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of 
"pincers" is: " a gripping tool made of two limbs pivoted together 
forming a pair of jaws with a pair of handles to press them together 
with" • The twin forces of proprietorial and advertising control, 
through the medium of the mar~et, exert a powerful pincer effect upon 
the national pre~s: a constant pressure to constrict editorial 
orientations into a narrow range supportive of the maintenance of the 
capitalist system, and of the interests of the capitalist class. 
DISTRIBUTION: 
When radical newspapers emerge successfully in defiance of 
commercial for~es they immediately encounter another almost impossible 
hazard: the monolithic monopoly of distribution. "Getting a paper 
printed is one thing; getting it to the readers is quite another. 
It is at the distribution stage that the gap between the freedom to 
publish in principle and in practice really opens wide. Anyone can 
publish whatever they like, but there is no certainty that large numbers 
of peopl~ will have an opportunity to read it." (Whitaker, 1981,p.87). 
In theory distribution involves merely shifting tons of newsprint and 
magazines from publishers through retailers to readers, in practice 
political as well as commercial decisions are constantly made. The 
Minority Press Group have examined how WH Smiths and John Menzies 
systematically exclude radical publications fromrtheir monopoly network 
of distribution. (l980a and 1980b). Three canpanies, WH Smith, 
Menzies, and Surridge Dawson had control of 57\ of the newspaper distribution 
and 69% of the magazine distribution in England in 1975; Menzies alone 
had 79\ of the newspaper and 93\ of the magazine distribution in Scotland. 
Big towns are divided into cartels among the companies, and WH Smith 
. 
ha~ a sole monopoly in 43 towns, while Menzies have a monopoly in 21 towns. 
Finally, Smiths and Menzies nave 600 of the most important newsagents in 
.. 
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railway stations, airports, and city centres. (MPG 1980b,p.33; 
1981, p.191). The McGregor Commission recognised no dangers 
in this constriction of sources of supply and could only comment lithe present. 
system satisfactorily meets th~ needs of most newspapers and periodicals." 
(RCP, 1977,p.65). In fact this monopoly effectively 
gives these companies a stranglehold on the supply of publications to the 
whole country, a formidable power which they do not exercise in a 
liberal or responsible way: "the whole distribution system is sewn 
up by Smiths, Menzies and Surridge Dawson, who are quite clearly 
conservative and not committed to the free availability of challenging 
opinion. Their self-confessed liberalism is merely a ritual word-game 
performed for the benefit of state inquiries. In reality it does not 
exist." (MRG, 1980b,p.67). 
WH Smiths and Menzies will no~ sell new radical publications. 
In justifying this discrimination their first line of defence is that 
it is not an economic proposition to commercially distribute radical 
publications, but this argument is empty since both companies also 
refuse to distribute radical publications which are commercially 
successful. Gay News had a print run of 20,000 when it approached 
WH Smiths in 19·76, but it took 6 months lobbying to ge't the company to 
accept it, and then in 1979 the magazine was rejected by Smiths for 
alleged obscenity. Socialist Worker, with a print run of 20,000 and 
Socialist Challenge , with 10,000, both were given brief trials by 
Smiths in limited areas and quickly dropped. The trial of Socialist 
Challenge in 1977 coincided with the publication of the report of the 
1977 Royal Commission on the Press when Smiths were particularly sensitive 
to accusations of mono~ly, and by this solitary action they felt they 
had fulfilled their obligation to 'radical po~itics'. Private Eye 
enjoys a circulation of over 140,000, and, however satirical, is far 
, " 
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from being politically radical, yet Smiths have always denied it 
the means to reach a potentially vast readership. Finally, the 
Leveller with a circulation of over 6,000 was refused by Smiths 
as non-viable. But Smiths find, acceptable numerous magazines with 
circulation figures of around 3,000 including such esoteric titles 
as Pig Farming and Dental Technician. (MPG, 1980b,pp.41-46). 
The explanations offered by monopoly distributors as to why 
they will not supply radical publications do not stand serious scrutiny. 
They discriminate against publications which do not carry advertising, 
because they feel advertising is a proof of credibility. They insist 
upon publicity or promotion for new publications, which means their 
system is only open to publications launched by ccrrumercial organisations 
with large resources. They claim that radical publications contain 
libellous material, when all newspapers unfortunately are likely to 
attract writs. Finallv thev claim that radical publications do not 
fit the f~mily imaqe they like to foster, when Smiths have for same 
vears distributed Mayfair and other similar maqazines which are hardly 
family reading. (MPG, 1980b,pp.46-7). The radical publications that 
have penetrated and survived this censorship system have done so ~or 
" particular reasons. The New Statesman with sales of 40,000 was set 
up in 1913, before th~ worst effects of monopoly distribution were felt, 
and although it presents left-wing views has by its longevity and 
distinguished connections, almost become part of the publications 
establishment.· Time Out offered a unique guide to London entertainment, 
was highly successful with a small distributor with sales around 100,000 
and could not be ignored by Smith and Menzies. 
The formation of the Publications Distribution Co-operative (POC) 
attempted to bridge the divide between radical publishers and readers 
by supplying the 150 radical bookshops in the country. This alternative 
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distribution network has provided a life-line for ·the radical 
press, and without it, many publications would die. However in 
other countries the distribution system is more open. 
"The distribution of.the p~ess in France works on completely 
different principles from those operating in Britain. 
Here the established practice is that wholesalers can 
choose which newspapers and magazines will be available to 
readers. They can therefore reject those they don't 
like. In France, the tables are turned. By law, any 
publication is guarant~ed access to distribution: and 
the newsagents, in turn, have to display it. Not only can 
publishers select which particular outlets they wish to take 
their publications but the law states that distribution must 
be controlled by publisher-co-operatives. As a result, 
small or contentious papers are widely available and all 
shades of political opinion represented on the news-stands 
in a way which would be inconceivable in this country". (MPG,198C~'p.7) 
The principle achieved py law in 1947 was the "unrestricted distribution 
of the printed word". The result is that radical publishers can 
choose between 40,000 differ~nt sales points through the national 
distribution system, and with this assistance French radical and 
left-wing publications have thrived with large circulations relative to 
. 
their British counterparts. French society thus benefits from a much 
greater cultural and political freedom and colour than in Britain; 
for example, in a casual survey of Parisian press kiosks the MPG found 
850 titles on sale in a stand on the Boulevard St Michel, in contrast 
the main Paris branch?f WH Smiths had only 108 titles ! (198~Q~p.ll-l5). 
Wh!-taker's conclusion is right, "The distribution barrier is probably the 
most important single reason why radical papers in Britain do not have 
the readership many of them deserve and which - in some countries - they 
would certainly <Jet." (l98l,p.91). 
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CHAPTER POUR 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CAPITALIST PRESS II: IDEOLOGY k~D EDITORIAL 
IDEOLOGY 
How capitalist ownership and control of the press through the 
competitive process serves to extinguish the expression of political 
opposition and create a monopoly for the ideology .of capitalism was 
remote from the concerns of the McGregor Commission. Instead it 
reduced the question of general ideological distortion down into a 
superficial consideration of particular instances of bias. The commission 
recognised the virtual identity of o~inion expressed by all capitalist 
newspapers: "the g~neral agreement amongst national daily newspapers on 
the main news of the da~, especially when this is of a political,' 
social and economic kind." (RCP, 1977, p.78). But from this disturbing 
fact the Commission drew,bizarre conclusions: firstly that this 
"qua~ifies the assumption both of a wide gap between quality and 
popular dailies and of a ijecessary connection between the number of 
titles and the extent of diversi~y in dealing with news", (p.79); and 
secondly that, "the finding that newspapers display a marked similarlity 
in the selection and presentation of news suggests that bias cannot. 
be exp~ained simply as political prejudice on the part of an individual 
newspaper." (p.83). The idea that monopolistic comp~titors produced 
virtually identical products, in this case news, and that any individual 
newspaper's prejudice was subsumed under a collective ideology they all 
shared somehow escaped the Commission, which was left making pathetic 
recommendations for journalists "to make clear the distinction between 
fact and comment", (p.93). The gullibility of the Commission stretched 
to repeating uncritically the claims made in the submissions by 
newspaper companies: 
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"They stressed the importance of attracting readers, and 
of maintaining the independence of newspapers from proprietors, 
advertisers, political parties and interest groups as a central 
feature of the freedom of the press •••• They emphasised as a 
sine qua non of press freedom that the public should get what 
it wants, even if that is not what some high-minded or nice-
minded critics think it ought to want." (p.94). 
Despite such fine sentiments, the most cursory investigation 
of the political economy of the press reveals that the interests and 
values of the newspaper reading public are systematically neglected, and 
that newspapers are dependent upon the whims of proprietors and advertisers 
whatever image of dependence they like to project. However trapped 
in its own limited conception of a free market in ideas and newspapers 
the Commission had no solution to the systematic hostility to organised 
labour it-acknowledged existed in the capitalist press, except to 
treat this as a "gap" in the market to be filled by a labour 
newspaper, at trade union expense, without any general change in the 
structure of t~e press. (p.I07): 
Marxist analysis has proved more penetrating and identified the press 
as an important means of maintaining the ideological dominance of the 
capitalist class. Social, cultural and ideological dominance have combined 
.. 
in a hegemonic rule that permeates all of the institutions of capitalist 
. 
society. For example, the central feature of a capitalist social 
formation is the market economy, that is the domination of social 
relations by the exchange relation: the ideological effect of the 
"market is to obscure the exploitative basis of production under 
capitalism by the focus upon 'free' exchange. (Hall, 1977, p. 323). 
The converse of capitalist hegemony is the "acceptance" by the 
working class of its own subordination and explqitation~ However, 
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the daily power of hegemonic institutions .conflicts with the daily 
experience of exploitation by the working class and the consequent 
resistance to capitalist relati~lS of production. The result of this 
conflict is a divided or contradictory consciousness among the 
working class, as Gramsci explained: 
"The social class in question may indeed have its own 
conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a 
conception which manifests itself in action; but occasionally 
and in flashes - when, that is, the class is acting as an 
organic totality. But this same class has, for reasons of 
submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception 
which is not its own but is borrowed from another class; 
and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself 
to be following it, because this is the conception which 
it .follows in"normal times" - that is when its conduct is 
not independent and automonous, but submissive and subordinate." 
(1971, p.327). 
Parkin similarly isolated·a dominant, subordinate and radical 
value system. (1971, p.97). Within the consciousness of every worker 
there is therefore a conflict between accepting and resisting the 
imposition of capitalist relations. Recognition that ideas can be 
imposed upon workers which are antagonistic to workers own real interests, 
raises the question of 'false consciousness'. "The adequacy of 
a conceptual framework is therefore not a simple question of 
objective truth or falsity; the appropriateness of a system of 
categorisation cannot be meaningfully assessed without reference 
to the purposes and interests of those who employ it, for these 
necessarily structure what aspects of reality are relevant for them. 
The critique of a particular conceptual framework as ideologically 
distorting must therefore refer to its inadequacy in respect of 
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specific human goals and purposes." (Hyman, 1975a, p.l98). 
Realisation that ideas are a social product, based on 
conflicting interests and orientations, requires further consideration 
of the concept of ideology: "the concept ideology makes a direct 
reference to the role of ideas. It also entails the proposition that 
ideas are not self-sufficient, that their roots lie elsewhere, that some-
thing central about ideas will be revealed if we can discover the nature 
of the determinacy which non-ideas exert over ideas." (Hall, 1978~,p.IO). 
The distinguishing feature of the Marxist approach to ideology is 
that the mode of production is considered to provide the economic base 
upon which ideas are constructed, o~ set the constraints within which 
ideas are worked out. Marx lucidly summarised the position as follows: 
"In the social production of "their existence, men invariably 
enter into definite relations which are independent of their 
will, namely relations of production appropriate to a 
given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political super-
structure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life 
conditions the general process of social, political and 
... 
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness." (1975, p.425). 
This conception of an economic base and ideological superstructure 
has preoccupied Marxist. analysis ever since. Marx employed the notions 
of determination and conditioning in the loose sense of setting limits, 
exerting pressure and closing off options, but the economic determination 
. " 
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of the Soviet interpretation has attributed little of this subtlety 
to the base/superstructur~ couplet. (Murdock and Golding, 1977~, 
pp. 16-17). Ideological produc.tion is part of a superstructure in 
a number of senses: firstly material production provides the surplus 
upon which other activities are based, and the social relations of 
production determine how that surplus will be distributed. In another 
sense the political and ideological superstructure is detached from the 
economic base in order to secure the long term interests of capital 
against the immediate interests of particular sections of the capitalist 
class. In the attempt to avoid the debilitating economic reductionism 
of Marxist orthodoxy, cultural' theorists developing the work of 
Althusser have elaborated the concept of the "relative autonomy" of 
the superstructure, and stressed "the need to grasp the relations and 
reciprocal determinations between 'the economic foundation' and'the 
whole immense superstructure' as complex and not simply reflexive, 
transparent, or unmediated." (Connell, 1978, p.74). The media depend 
upon their relative autonomy from the immediate economic interests of 
the.ru1ing class because open complicity would destroy the basis of 
their legitimacy. (Hall, 19.77, p.345). "Pluralism, however restricted, 
carries conviction; monolithicity breeds distrust." (Downing, 1980, 
p.-169) • 
A major schism between Marxist scholars has oecurred on the 
question of how relative is the 'relative autonomy' of the 
superstructure? 
"The problem which Althusser and his followers are attempting 
to solve in the~r development of the theory of ideology is 
one which has plagued Marxism since its inception. It has 
oscillated between allowing the realm of ideology too much 
and too little autonomy. Too much, when it is ~eorised as 
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a separate realm, an independent level of the social formation 
with its own history, in some kind of articulation with an 
equally independent"'mode bf production' identified as 'the 
economic' level; too little when it is reduced to an 
epiphenomenal reflex of some contradictions \1i thin the economy." 
{Lovell, 1980, p.248). 
A political economy of culture in considering the base/super-
structure relationship therefore must avoid "the twin traps of 
economic reductionism and of" the idealist automization of the ideological 
level." (Garnham, 1979, p.127). Economic reductionism makes it appear 
as if the ideological effects of the media were the inevitable outcome 
of the economic practices of the media industries, and ignores the 
specific effects of subordinating media production to the logic of 
capitalist commodity production. Automization of the ideological level 
replaces economic determination with "the relatively autonomous level 
of communicative-ideological determination." (Connell, 1978, p.72). 
This neglects the fact that under monopoly capitalism the basel 
superstructure ~istinction breaks down as the superstructUre becomes 
industrialised. (Garnham, 1979, p.130). In general principles there 
is probably a greater degree of agreement than the more polemical 
critics of both camps would care to admit, for example, MilibaI1d, who 
is often charged with reductionism has argued that ideological hegemony 
"is not simply something which happens, as a mere superstructural 
derivative of economic and social predominance. It is, in very large 
part, the result of a permanent and persuasive effort, conducted through 
a multitude of agencies~1I (1969, p.lSl). Whereas those who maintain 
th~ relative autonomy of ideology, always stress its determination 
"in the last instance" by the economic~ (Hall, 1975"F,.p.29). However, 
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when the specific methodological focuses of the two approaches are 
examined sharp distinctions emerge. Political economists tend to 
neglect textual analysis, on the assumption that the output of media 
dominated by the production relations of capitalism is fairly 
predictable. On the other hand, though Althusserians claim ideology has 
a distinctive material process of production, this does not lead to 
analyses of texts in the context of the forces and relations of 
production within which they were created, but a reversal to traditional 
textual criticism. (Lovell, 1980, p.250). 
To understand the connections between material and mental 
production better, it is necessary to return to the definitive 
passaye of Marx and· Engels in The German Ideology: 
"the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling 
ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of 
society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. 
The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of 
mental production, so th~ thereby, generally speaking, the 
ideas of those who lack the means of mental prod?ction are 
subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the 
.ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the 
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of 
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, 
therefore, the ideas of its dominance." (1970, p.64). 
In ~erms of the historical development of capitalism, what 
Marx and Engels meant in the first instance by "control of the means 
of mental production", was simply the payment of intellectuals out of 
capitalist revenue. As the divisio~9f labour develops fu~ther a 
subordinate fraction of the capitalist class come to o~cupy important 
positions in the cultural sector and become possessors of cultural 
• 
capital: 
"The division of labour which we already saw above as one 
of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests 
itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental 
and material labour, so that inside the class one part 
appears as the thinkers of "the class (its active conceotive 
ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the 
class about itself the chief source of livelihood), while 
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others' attitude to thosa ideas and illusions is more passive 
and receptive, because they are in reality the active merobers 
of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas 
about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can 
develop into a c~rtain opposition and hostility between the 
two parts, which, however, in the the case of a practical 
collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically 
comes to nothing." (Marx and Engels, 1970, p.6S). 
Thus the higher echelons of media establishments tend to 
be drawn from the capitalist cla~s; whilst those in subordinate 
positions tend to remain under the direct economic control of 
media employers, a relationship which is often internalised and 
obscur~d by an ideology of professionalism. A later historical 
development of capitalism, is the actual control by capital of the 
means of cultural production as part of the process of commodity 
production. (Garnham, 1979, pp.134-6). "With the penetration of 
capital into cultural production, the product is transformed into 
a commodity." (Lovell, 1980, p.25l). Along with other commodities, 
cultural commodities possess certain contradictory qualities. 
Since they are produced for profit au~ not t~ satisfy soci~l need, 
there is no guarantee that the cultural wants and needs of the majority 
of people will be considered or satisfied. Since they are produced 
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for profit by individual capitalists and any commodity will be 
produced that can be sold, there is no guarantee that the general 
ideological needs of capital will always be served, as Garnham stressed 
"there is •.• no necessary coincidence between the effects of the 
capitalist process proper and the ideological needs of the dominant 
class." (l979,p.l37). (Though this is more apparent with book 
publishing, rock music, film and television, where monopoly controls 
are not so developed, a radical tradition survives, and messages are 
often ambiguous, than with the press where there is greater ideological 
uniformity.) Finally what is ideologically functional for capital 
in cultural products, may not be what people themselves find useful, 
indeed directly ideological appeals are often the most readily rejected. 
"We have absolutely no grounds to suppose that the use-value of 
cultural products will be readily commensurable with the ideological 
needs of capitalism, and should view with great suspicion a theory 
which clatms that, to capitalism's great good fortune, what give~ the 
audience pleasure is the same thing which produces 'the ideological 
effect'" (Lovell, 1980,pp.252-3i Garnham, 1979, pp.l36-7). 
As cultural production is absorbed into the activities of la~ge 
industrial conglomerates it becomes subject to the laws of capitalist 
development. In order to accumulate capital wage labour is combined 
with materials and instruments to produce cultural products for exchange 
from which surplus value will be realised. The growth of capital 
requires increased productivity and greater markets and to further this 
endeavour there is increased mechanization, and an intensification of the 
labour process through the new technology. The nature of this process 
. 
of production is inherently contradictory involving an increased conflict 
between capital and labour, a conflict between the increasingly 
centralised control over capital accumulation and the socialization of 
the forces and relations of production, and the conflict between the 
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of generalized commodity production. (Garnham, 1979,p.145). An 
ironic paradox in Marxist cultural analysis which Golding and r-lurdock 
identify, is that as multinational industrial conglomerates have come 
to dominate cultural production,· the question of economic determination 
has been displaced in a divorc~ of cultural analysis from political 
economy. If "every text in some sense internalises its social 
relations of production" (EQgleton, 1976,p.48), still "to focus on 
texts as ideology is to remain blind to the forces which lie behind the 
production of these texts." (Golding artd Murdock, 1979,p. 220). 
For example the operation of-the market must be explored to explain why 
dissident views have been excluded from the national press. Golding and 
Murdock conclude that two weaknesses of contemporary cultural analysis are 
firstly an undue emphasis on the links between the media and the state, 
which neglects the role of capitalist ownership and control of media 
industries; and secondly the difficulty of inference from content 
analysis, which has led to too much authority being given to evidence from 
textual analysis (1979,p.224). While valid criticisms of much 
contemporary cultural analysis, these are certainly not grounds for 
abandoning textu?l analysis completely. The Glasgow University Media 
Group have acknowledged that ilmoving from the macro-level successfully 
articulated by Murdock and Golding in their detailed examinations of the 
patterns of ownership and cultural monopoly to the micro-level of close 
... 
content analysis such as we have undertaken is difficult." (1980,pp.4l4-S). 
Nevertheless, as the Glasgow University Media Group have successfully 
shown, tackling media controllers on their own territory, in terms of 
a detailed and precise analysis of editorial output, can have a sharp and 
immediate impact in unsettling powerful yet unquestioned assumptions 
abOut 'consensus' values and 'professional' methods. 
In conclusion the Althus~er/Poulantzas theorization of relatively 
autonomous economic, ideological and political levels of· the social 
fo~ation, is challenged by a political economy which recognises that a key 
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feature of the mass media witllin monopoly capitalism is the exercise 
of political and ideological domination through the economic. For 
example, Garnham refers to· "the close inter-weaving within concrete 
institutions and within their specific commodity forms of the economic, 
the ideological and the political. When we buy a newspaper we 
participate simultaneously in an economic exchange, in subjection to or 
reaction against an ideological formation and often in a quite speci.fic 
act of political identification or at least involvement." (l979,p.132-3) . 
It remains important though to distinguish the unconscious forces of 
material production of cultural products and the conscious forces of 
ideological production, and to maintain the distinction between the 
media as processes of material production and as sites of ideological 
struggle, as well as understanding the relationship between these. 
(Garnham, 1979,p.l33). Thus an adequate political economy should reinforce 
the essential ideological struggle outlined by Lovell: 
" •••••. A struggle to prevent the appropriation of the 
experience of the oppressed to the categories of bourgeois 
ideology; to articulate and draw attention to those experiences, 
·wishes, ho~es and aspirations which are generated in social 
relations but cannot be accommodated to the categories of 
bourgeois ideology or met by capitalism; and above all, to 
keep alive the hope and belief that social relations can be 
changed so that those aspirations can be met." 1l980,p.248). 
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EDITORIAL 
Introduction 
Ideological Colonialism: Capitalist Newspapers and the Working Class 
Behind the appearance of diversity, on the major issues of the 
day, the capitalist press presents a uniform stereotype: in the 
19709 and 1980s the press supported the US in Vietnam; was solidly 
in favour of British entry into the EEC; repeatedly called for 
cuts in public expenditure; backed British troops ·in Ireland; was 
sympathetiC towards nuclear energy and the deployment of nuclear weapons; 
and furiously hostile to the Benrr campaign to democratize the Labour 
Party. (CPF, 1979,p.4). On the very rare occasions when individual 
national newspapers have broken this'consensus they have been made to 
suffer: objections to the Suez invasion in 1956 by the Guardian and 
Observer, damaged their ~dvertising revenue so severely that they took 
years to recover. "Journalists handle a public utility: information". 
(Whale, 1977,p.113).The·problem is that control of this public utility, 
and the definition of what is in the public interest, is in the hands 
of private capital. An ~ditor of an alternative paper once asserted 
that "the established press rep:r:esented the views of perhaps four people". 
Whilst four may be something of an exaggeration, it is ~ndoubtedly 
true that the press currently protrudes the ideas and prejudices of tiny, 
unrepresentative clique of enormously rich businessmen. Thus the 
press both reflects and sustains the vast inequalities of power and wealth 
that exist in capitalist SOCiety. Though the press can identify and 
criticize individual capitalist miscreants, as the Sunday Times did with 
Distillers pver the thalidomide drug issue, and this element of 
relative auton~my is critical for preserving the independent image of the. 
press in a social democracy, yet the capitalist press is not free to 
criticise the capitalist mode of produ~tion on which itself· is based, 
nor the class of people who own the press. (Holland, 1978, p.103). 
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The McGregor Commission was relatively sanguine about the 
systematic antagonism displayed towards organised labour in the 
capitalist press and calmly commented, "There is no doubt that over 
most of this century the Labour movement has had less newspaper support 
than its right wing opponents and that its beliefs and activities have 
been un favourably reported by the majority of the press." (RCP, 1977, 
pp. 98-9). But this is quite an understatement • As Milibanj has 
maintained, the press betrays a passionate hostility towards anything 
to the left of social democracy, and is militantly opposed to active trade 
unionism (1969). In the crucial area of the industrial politics of 
the working class no capitalist newspaper offers support or even adequate 
explanation, and in virtually all disputes the press is violently hostile 
to workers interests from the start. (Williams, 1978,p.22). The imagery 
of the media tends to conceal the pervasiveness of class inequalities, 
and to break up the recognition of ccllective class interests, by 
firstly. emphasizing divisions of age, sex, and race, and secondly by 
promoting nationalism. (Poulantzas, 1973,pp.214-S). There is, therefore, 
in the editorial of the capitalist press both an obdurate refusal to 
recognise the structural social and economic problems inherent in 
capitalism, and"a readiness to attack th9se who do perceive these problems 
and organize against them:. "the normal workings of t:he particular 
omic system are never treated as if they might themselves generate econ 
serioUS problems. Rather, the causes of economic problems are sought 
largely in the activities of trade unionists who reject the priorities 
and purposes of the.dominant group." (GUMG,19BO,p.112) • 
The capitalist press produces popular newspapers aimed at the 
~orking class, and in this way profitably colonises certain sections of 
the working class market but these are not papers ~ the working class. 
There is a structural absence of working class representation in the 
press, and, in the cases of the Daily Express a~ Daily Mail most clearly, 
they are 'working class newspapers' f~ capital. (Hall,1978,p.42). 
_. 
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McQuail has argued with reference to the Daily Herald's "close 
affective ties with a particular generation of Labour supporters",*, 
that "a successful mass medium cannot afford to have too close ties 
to a particular set of readers, as such. It must either have a 
general appeal or an appeal to a social category (as youth, women, 
intellectuals, etc) which can be continually adapted." (RCP, Workin~ 
Paper, (WP) No.2, p.54). This ignores the fact that four quality 
newspapers have close ties with different sections of the middle class: 
what the existing economic structure of the press does not permit is 
a specifically workers newspaper.~ The press present their own 
capitalist values as universally valid, and present a distorted and 
debased conception of working class values. The commercial formula 
for mass circulation' newspapers with a 'labour appeal' such as the 
Daily Mirror and Daily Star, is no more than a blend of vacuous populism 
and support for compromise within the existing system. "Their labour 
loyalties are firmly behind 'moderation', their acceptance of 
conventional political wisdom - the need for wage restraint today, for 
'partnership' of labour with capital always - unquestioning and loud". 
(Westergaard, 1977, pp.102-3). ~he crude manipulation exerted by the 
popular press comes close to what C. Wright Mills cond~ed as monopolistic 
attempts to shape consciousness, deny contact with real experience ahd 
frustrate the emergence of a genuine public opinion and participation. 
(1956) • Working class opposition has no outlet in the existing commercial 
press, as Westergaard observes: 
"The doubts, suspicions, resentments, partial and occasionally 
much fuller~blown challenges to the operational principles of the current 
order, which al~o form part of popular social understandings, go largely 
without echo in the media. Those strains of latent subversion depend 
for their survival, for transmission e~d magnification when·it occurs, 
on their own resources: on the circumstances of wage-earning life and 
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livelihood which give rise to them; on the formal and informal networks 
of dissident communication within labour; on resources \'lhich, 
resilient as they are, cannot normally draw on the financial and 
technical means of the media." (1977,p.l13) • 
Instead what is offered by the commercial popular press is a 
form of ideological colonialism in which alien ideas and inclinations 
are systematically imposed on the working class as if they exclusively 
belonged there: bloody mindedness, law and order, commercial sex, 
triviality, complacency and servility. In particular, the popular 
press projects a brand of authoritarianism, which possesses a sinister 
correllation to the personality variables isolated by Adorno as composing 
The Authoritarian Personality: ' 
conventionalism. Rigid adherence to conventional, middle class values. 
Authoritarian Submission. Submissive, uncritical attitude towards 
idealized moral authorities of the ingroup 
Authoritar~an Aggression. Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to 
condemn, reject and punish, people who violate conventional values. 
Anti-intraception. 
the tender-minded. 
Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, 
Superstition and Stereotype. The belief in determinants of the 
individual's fate, the disposition to think in rigid categories. 
Power and "Toughness". Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, 
strong-weak, leader-follower dimension, identification with power 
figures; over~phasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; 
exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness. 
Sex. Exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings on'. (Jay, 1973,p.243). 
Potentially the press can fulfil a range of goals: as a forum for 
debate; an educator'; a watchdog on goverrmlent and industry; a means 
of entertainment; and a means of promoting social cohesion or social 
change. McQuail noted that journalists conceded that the entertainment 
function was best performed by the press though least important, whereas 
.. 
• 
the watchdog function relating to private industry was the most 
important goal, and the least fulfilled. (RCP, W~ NO~ 1976,p.31) 
Acknowledging that the press tried to entertain as well as instruct 
the McGregor Commission still insisted that "it is the performance 
of the serious functions which justifies the high importance which 
democracies attach to a free press." (RCP, 1977,p.B). Yet as the void 
between the quality and popular press opens wider with successive 
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newspaper departures, transformations and arrivals it is becoming clear that 
the popular press have abandoned any claim to be newspapers - in the 
sense' that they convey vital information - which has determined their 
privileged status in the past. This degeneration in the popular press 
has contributed greatly to the paradox that though people now have access to 
more information technologies, possibly they are less well informed (Schiller, 
1971,p.51) • The popular press are becoming merely entertainment 
sheets with less than 10% of their content devoted to· coverage of public 
affairs, with further reductions planned, which, despite the expansIon 
of literacy, is below that of 1936. The popular press led the '''great 
educational debate" instigated by James Callaghan in the late 1970s, 
which was an ignorant attempt to ~rrest alternative teaching methods in 
the schools - y~t the popular press itself had long since irresponsibly 
abandoned any effort to perform a properly educative function. 
The Sun allocated only 7% of its editorial space ~n 1976 to home and 
international affairs, it has now no foreign correspon.dent, - soon it 
may have no British correspondents! (CUrran, 1978,p.26l-3). This is not 
the innocent diversion of hard-pressed people in need of entertainment, 
since by distracting attention away from the source of their oppression, 
the popular press serves to reinforce the existing power structure. 
.. 
• 
The central foundations of the claim to independence of the 
press are two powerful myths: the myth of the sovereign editor, 
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and the myth of objectivity. John \vhale contributed to the mythology 
with the claim that once the edi~orial budget is set, the commercial 
management leave the editorial management free to make editorial 
decisions (l977,p.80). The McGregor Commission had an even more 
inflated impression of editorial independence and integrity in the face 
of proprietorial demands, "We have recorded and take very seriously the 
possible dangers to diversity of opinion and expression which accompany 
the growth in concentration ~f ownership of newspapers. It can 
generate pressures which only editors can resist." (RCP, 1977,pp.l54-S). 
This myth of editorial sovereignty arose when it had some dubious validity 
because proprietors edited the newspapers they owned: it was not a 
justification of professional independence but of proprietorial rights. 
Today as Tunstall maintained in a research report for the Commission, 
editors are totally dominated by their proprietors: though editors can 
impose tight constraints upon their editorial staff, editors themselves 
are merely middle managers. Newspapers are built around marketing plans 
with editors relatively minor f~ctionaries, and editors are constrained 
by group policy, production r~quirements, and advertisLng.needs. The 
majority of editors do not control their own editorial budget, defer to 
higher management on crucial personnel decisions, and seek approval of 
any editorial-innovation (RCP, WP No.3, 1977) • 
In its evidence to the Commission the Newspaper Publishers Association 
offered the unreassuring comment that: "By convention an editor, once 
appointed and until removed, is the sole arbiter of what appears in the 
paper, both of advertising and editorial matter. This makes him the focus 
of. the papers identity, and therefore the man whose "freedom" from 
external pressures has to be defended." (RCP, 1977,p.154, my emphasis) 
What this means in practice was revealed in an unusually frank 
admission by Victor Mathews, the proprietor of Express Newspapers, on 
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his relationship with his editors, "I see the leaders each day before 
they go. And I sometimes have to say 'no', They have to change 
them, or there is not room for both of us •.••.•. If ~nything would harm 
Britain, then I would have to suppress it ••.. personally. For me it 
is Britain first." Interviewer, 'That is rather an odd statement, 
if you believe in the freedom of the press'. Mathews, "For me the 
country is first, Britain is first •••• " (BBCl, Platform One, 
15th November 1979). The tragic limitations imposed by proprietors 
upon editorial rights were revealed in an incident following the Munich 
Agreement of 1938 which conceded ?art of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, 
recalled by Christiansen, the editor of the Daily Express under Beaverbrook, 
"I remember feeling sick when Neville Chamberlain described Czechoslovakia 
as "a far-away country" and I remember expressing my revulsion to Lord 
Beaverbrook over the telephone. But when he said 'Well, isn't 
Czechoslovakia a far-away country?' I agreed that it was and got on with 
my job of producing an exciting newspaper." The resulting headline of 
the Express was "Britain will not be involved in a European war this 
year, or next year either." (Chester and Fenby, 1979,p.23). The 
current orthodoxy,revealing a crippled conception of editorial freedom, is 
that the editor'should have the right to determine the .contents of the 
paper, within th~ confines of established group policy, "it is the 
function of the editor to execute editorial policy, not to formulate it 
single-handed-- he should follow the policy, not the policy him " 
... 
(Henry, 1978,p.S). 
The ridiculous claim of the press to be 'objective' is difficult 
to consider seriously, since the popular press in particular makes no 
attempt to comply with the rules of the OXbridge debating society deemed 
obligatory in broadcasting, in which 'both' sides get equal opportunity 
to present their case. If any effort at all is made in the popular press 
to present a reply to an offiqial view it is usually confined to a half 
paragraph and swamped by contradictory argument. When the appearance 
• 
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of 'balance' is attained it is simply through presenting the views 
of different sections of the bourge.oisie. (Goodman, 1977 ,p. 79). " 
Alan Sapper of ACTT has argued that impartiality is spurious anyway 
in a society characterised by gross inequalities, and really becomes 
a method of commitment to the status quo. (1977,p.86). Thus a 
philosophical summary of objectivity by Poole maintained that: 
"Objectivity is what is commonly received as objectively 
valid, all the attitudes, presuppositions, unquestioned 
assumptions typical of any given society. Objectivity 
implies the acceptance of tne dominant social, ethical and 
religious views of SOCiety. Objectivity is, for all 
. . 
practical purposes, the totality of what is taken to be the 
case, believed ~o be the case, affirmed to be the case. 
Objectivity is the totality of received opinion on what is 
acceptable/not acceptable, desirable/not desirable, good/ 
not good, etc. Objectivity in any given SOCiety in fact gets 
"defined as the political and social status quo." 
(Whitaker, 1981, pp.2Q-l). 
But journalists still cling to the conception that there-is-a-reality-
out-there-to-be-described: that'the press is a mirror at reality.' 
The dictum of CP Scott that 'facts are sacred/opinion free' is still· 
applied, (though the origin of this was stmply the economic cost of 
sending too many words by telegraph;) In practice the infinite detail 
and complexity of social life requires the selection, assembly and 
interpretation of information for news production: lithe news is not a 
neutral and. natural phenomenon: it is rather the manufactured production 
of ideology." " (GUMG, 198Op. xviii). Put more sUlply, "all news is 
views ••••. all facts imply or require an interpretation. II (RCP, WP No. 2 
p.49). Inexplicably however, the high~st ideal of western journalism 
remains the 'neutral' presentation of 'reality': those pursuing other 
ideals are assumed to be producing propaganda. "JOurnalism is surely the 
.. 
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only profession where a lack of purpose is so highly esteemed, where 
belief in it is so deeply rooted and yet 59 patently absurd. Thus 
the function of objectivity is to deny that the news has a purpose: 
to transforol the selection and processing of news from an essentially 
subjective business into a technical one; and to disguise a narrow, 
highly filtered and regulated picture of the world as reality." 
(Whitaker, 1981, p.21). Thus behind. the facade of objectivity, 
as the Glasgow University Media Group found in their study, "the most 
routine and apparently factual accounts had as their organising principle 
severely limited perspectives and interpretations about the nature of 
the social world and what is important necessary and possible within it." 
(l980,p.4) • 
What then is the political impact of the press? The Frankfurt 
School in the 1930s had witnessed the rise of German fascism which had 
employed the mass media to devastating effect as agencies of propaganda. 
Writers in this school therefore fully appreciated the weaknesses of 
the liberal defences of press freedom. On arrival in America they 
became aware of how the commercial values disseminated by the media 
had permeated eyery part of social life, and they began to associate the 
mass media with the development of totalitarianism. As one commentator 
put it, "Ideology for the Frankfurt School works one way, that is from 
above, seeping into working class consciousness as an alien and 
conservative force". (Curran and Seaton, 1981,p.265). The association 
of the mass media with mass manipulation and indoctrination, was continued 
by the mass society theorists who regarded the media optimistically 
as making up for the loss of traditional forms of integration and 
. community , or pessimistically, as a powerful instrument for imposing the 
new social order with its loss of individuality and humanity. The 
concept of a 'mass· society' therefore possessed the perjorative 
connotation of atomized individuals, faceless, lacking in organisation 
. . 
or moral regulation, and susceptible to external suggestion and irra~ional 
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behaviour." (Rep, WP No. 7., 1976, p.18). In response to this 
grim perspective, pluralist theorists conducted empirical research 
which showed that people were not isolated or atomized, that they 
were oblivious to, rather ~han hypnotized by, the mass media, and 
that personal contact not media persuasiveness was what counted. 
However the profound flaw in the pluralists' research strategy was 
that they adopted a behaviouralist'focus examining immediate changes 
in audience attitudes to particular messages. Thus the power of the 
media to inform generally, is greater than the power of the media to 
persuade on a particular issue. (Curran and Seaton, 1981, pp. 265-271). 
Essentially newspapers do not tell people what to think about issues, 
they tell peopl~ what the issues are, and thus define the parameters of 
respectable debate. (Beckett,1977,p.47). 
The MethodologY of News Gathering 
Newspapers attempt to set the agenda for national deliberation. 
Normally they are in common agreement on the issues for discussion and 
the way they should be approached. The quality press gives the middle 
class view force clarity and coherence, whereas the popular press puts forward 
essentially the same ideas in a ~ore direct and coarse fashion. 
Only one set of statements actually makes sense, becau~e people are o~ly 
given informatiop to understand one set of explanations; other 
eXp'lanations, such as those of the left, are isolated as emotional appeals. 
The dominant ~emes and 'explanations are endorsed by repetition and 
~ 
emphasis, whilst alternative explanations are refuted in passing quickly 
over then. As the Glasgow University Media Group discovered, journalists 
seem to be unable to encompass or explore the rationale of alternative 
world views: "there is an attempt to reduce the plurality of meanings 
inherent in any social conflict to a set of simple formulae or frames 
of reference which are at best an ideological defence of the legitimacy 
of the status quo." (1980,pp.115,124). Thus the "press proved itself 
a loyal servant,of Thatcherism, and faithfully reproduced the appropriate 
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ideological barrages of exhortation, however flimsy the analyses on 
which they were based. It is the failure to explain the context of 
problems, and the competing analyses of them, which. creates the 
celebrated 'bias against understanding'. As one outraged trade 
unionist put it, "Everyone is against secondary picketing, but they 
don't even know what secondary picketing is. 
Quango's, but no-one knows what they are. 
Everyone is against 
This is the influence 
of the media!" In press reporting therefore, workers are systematically 
deprived of what C.Wright Mills termed a 'vocabulary of motive' : 
supportive language which providep acceptable grounds for social action. 
(Horowitz, 1967, pp. 433-4). Workers always claim, demand, or threaten, 
and if they take industrial action it is synonymous with industrial 
'trouble'. Management always offer, propose or concede, and only if they 
are 'provoked' do they take 'unders~andable' action. A settlement or 
agreement is assumed to be in everyone's interests however the terms 
affect labour. (GUMG, 1980, p.l87). Thus it is important to examine the 
framework of news rather than the details, and to understand the 
underlying values. 
Tom Burns has remarked that the news is not a mirror reflecting 
society at large, but a mirro! reflecting the vision of sqciety held ~y 
journalists. (GU~G, 1980,p.3). Journalists have the 'awesome discretion 
to ~ecide what the news is amongst the complexity of social reality, in 
one sense: news becomes news because it appears in the papers. The 
development of common news values becomes a critical tool of discernment 
which induces a common approach across the different news media, as the 
McGregor Couunission acknowledged "The pattern of news coverage extends, 
with relatively minor exceptions, across the whole range of national 
dailies, and stems from the combination of common news values and heavy 
reliance on official sources and spokesmen." (RCP,1977,p.86). 
Besides the deadening uniformity it imposes, the dependence on 'universal' 
news values assqmes that everybody lives in the same social world and 
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sees it thp. same way. Newsworthiness is assumed to be 'natural' 
and 'obvious', an intrinsic property of events, which journalists 
recognise instinctively. Justification of news values tend to be 
circular arguments about what is 'interesting' or 'relevant'. (GUMG, 
1980, pp. 112-3). However, as Whitaker warns, "it should not be 
forgotten that a handful of men dominated the national daily press (and 
particularly the popular press) in its formative years and shaped its 
news values - values which have been handed down largely intact to 
today's journalists." (l98l,p.58). Typical examples of news values 
are: waste in the public sector; efficiency in the private sector; 
the achievements of (wealthy) individuals; intimidation by trade unions; 
sex and scandel with anything. How the application of news values 
intrudes into editorial coverage, even when hopelessly inappropriate 
and unhelpful, was shown in one example cited by the McGregor Commission: 
of a sample of 201 items on school education, 24 had sex as a theme, 
22 criticism of the government or local authority, 16 violence or 
conflict, 12 scandel or misconduct, and 12 left wing activity. .Thus at 
least half of the news items presented a rather distorted assessment of 
what routinely happens in the educational system! 
Why journa~ists do not represent the different views of thei~ readership 
more adequately instead of applying professional news standards, has 
been excused by McQuail as simply a problem of scale: "the general 
problem is one of uncertainty ariSing out of the scale of mass communication. 
The journalist cannot personally know his readers or fully grasp and 
sympathise with the diverse mass readership of a large newspaper," who goes 
on to quote Gans that "there is an almost total lack of contact with and 
knowledge about the audience amongst newsmen" (RCP, WP No.2, 1976,p.33) 
This view neglects the deliberate effort by newspapers to insulate their 
staff from contact with, or influence by, the readership, particularly 
when this is composed primarily of members of the working class. 
Condescension can then b~ built upon a bedrock of deep ignorance of how 
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working people think and live. Arthur Christianson, the prestigious 
editor of the Daily Express was fond of referring to what "My friends 
in the backstreets of Derby would think ..• " Christianson had no friends 
in the backstreets of Derby. The pickled observations of overpaid senior 
columnists and sub-editors, fresh from another intrepid exploration 
of El Vino's wine bar, should not be misconstrued as an authentic 
expression of working class opinion. 
"The newspaper is not a mirror of reality, but the realisation 
.. 
of the potential of its sources. il (A.Smith, 1977,p.182). The 
sources journalists consult are therefore critical in the construction 
of news stories, and yet little effort is made to employ a wide cross-
section of sources, on the contrary the primary criteria of news sources 
is that they are easy to contact and 'acceptable'. A startling indication 
of the dependence of the press upon receipt of information from official 
sources is that only 3% of stories on social welfare, for example, 
originated from newspapers own investigations. (RCP, 1977,p.85). 
Sources monitored routinely include parliament, councils, police, courts, 
royalty, companies, political parties, pressure groups and prominent 
people. Whitaker, a working journ~list, explains: 
"What an ~xamination of published stores and their sources 
reveals is that news - certainly the serious news - is mainly 
a one-way traffic: 'Them' telling 'us' what they want us to 
know. Any seni~r politician, company, trade union leader, 
• 
'personal~ty', or even a bishop can get their message 
over to the masses simply by issuing a statement, giving an 
interview or holding a press conference. The press, being 
'objective', faithfully reproduces the message, even if it 
is a pack of lies, or just plain daft. What matters is that 
we pay attention to the right people." (Whitaker,l98l,p.32). 
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Thus the collection of 'evidence' usually consists merely of the 
collection of official opinions, which has become the stock way to write 
a story: "the organised production of news puts those with a vested 
interest in the political and commercial status quo in a position of 
being the defining authorities of truth, and the originators of news 
values." (Murphy, 1978,p.l88). The potentially insidious nature 
of this collusion between the media and those in authority is revealed 
in an incident in the Danish press described by Mortensen and Nordahl 
Svendsen: 
II 'Just call the chairman' was a set routine in many 
of the local papers • A worker who had worked for 39 
. 
years at an iron foundry was not judged by one editor to be 
a competent person as a scource about his destroyed lungs. 
The journalist had to counterbalance the evidence through 
an interview with the director who denied any relationship 
between mineral dust particles and silicosis. In this 
instance, the journalist was sufficiently involved to engage 
a third source, a physician, who agreed with the worker • 
. Thus counterbalancing ritual is not started when it is an 
authoritative source whG> pronounces." (l980,p.l74) .. 
With the growth of the press has occurred the growth of 
occupations which attempt to manage a continuous flow of favourable 
information for their organisation, thus many press 'stories' are sllnply 
public relations handouts with a few lines altered. But when significant 
information escapes which has not been officially sanctioned~ "the public 
relations industry, usually so ready todiluge the press with unsolicited 
information, jerks sharp~y into reverse gear to protect business or 
off~cialdom". (Whitaker, 1981,p.6l). However( journalists are usually so 
dependent on a steady stream of officially approved information, that they 
. . 
are rarely prepared to risk offending their sources, a vice institutionalized 
by the parliament.ary lobby correspondents, as Whale has remarked, "Journalists 
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are disciplined receivers of requests not to write about things." 
(RCP, WP No.2, 1976,p.35). This symbiosis of the press with 
powerful institutions serves to shut out the working class from any 
access to the media. Equal access to express an opinion or provide 
information does not exist. "Access·is structured and hierarchical to 
the extent that powerful groups and individuals have privileged and 
routine entry into the news. itself and to the manner and means of its 
production." (GUMG, 1980,p.ll4). Of course the 'letters page' in 
.. the popular press is a long standing joke, with tiny fragments of letters 
confined in a small section of the page, crowded out by ads, and clearly 
selected simply to repetitively reinforce the particular prejudices of 
the newspapers editorial. Ordinary people are considered a 'difficult' 
source of news since they are not waiting at the end of the telephone 
with a readily digestible press rele~se. "There is also a feeling that 
ordinary people are unreliable sources. This is due, not so much to any 
belief that individuals deliberately give false information, as to a 
realisation that if what they say is contradicted by more powerful voices 
there is n9thin9 to fall back on •••• What is said matters less than who 
says it." (Whitaker, 1981,p.38). In a final twist, 'authoritative' 
sources are usua!ly granted the privilege of remaining apo~ymous when ~hey 
request it, whereas working people when named in connection with critical 
stories are far more open to victimization. In conclusion, "newspapers own 
needs seem to !ive them more in common with powerful institutions than with 
.. 
ordinary readers." (RCP, ~ No.2, 1976,p.3B) 
The methods and constraints of editorial construction can be viewed 
with sharper focus at the local level. Local papers are important 
not only because they are the sole media dealing with the problems of 
small communities, but also because they often have the first contact 
with problems which later emerge as national issues: "They are a crucial 
link in the news-gathering chain and'a basic source for news for the 
national papers and television. Thus the deficiEmc.ies in local paper's 
.. 
• 
coverage tend to be perpetuated (rather than compensated for) in 
other sections of the news media." (Whitaker, 1981, p. 30). Most 
journalists on the national press receive their basic training in 
provincial newspapers, andoacqui~e their initiation in news values 
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at this source. Though there are hundreds of local papers, the vast 
range of titles is deceptive, since typically they are very similar 
products, with intensely commercial ° and conservative editorial orientations. 
Even the McGregor commission was forced to concede that, "In 'the 
political opinions which they represent ••• these papers do not extend 
diversity of political suppo~t as,they are all either uncommitted or 
right of centre." (RCP, 1977,p.79). One reason examination of the 
content of apparently diverse local newspapers reveals a remarkable 
consistency, is that they are all supplied with national news by the 
Press Association (PA) news agency. . In an impressive article in the 
New Statesman titled "The power by which Despotism begins", Bruce Page 
and Christopher Hird compared the operation of the Press Association to 
George Orwell's Ministry of Truth: 
"On 'essential national issues the British public gets 
most of its news coverage f~om a single source - individual 
newspapers acting rathe~ like "own-brand" retailel!s in 
relation t~ a centralised wholesaler •.• There ° is'something 
curious about the idea that a single organisation can produce 
'news' wnich is more accurate than the product ot a number 
of independent organisations. Implicit here is the idea 
of news as an objective commodity, centrally generated and 
dispensed (if there is only one version, it must inevitably 
be the most 'accurate') ••• In effect, the PA functions as a 
news-cartel, organised by the newspaper companies for their 
own benefit: it eliminates substantial competition among 
newspapers for the supply of the principal commodity which they 
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offer to the public. Among the provincial papers, which 
are mostly geog:r-aphical monopolies, the elimination of 
competition is almost complete." (29 February 1980) • 
Dependence on PA news contributes to the extreme uniformity of the 
local press, which is intensified by the use of identical feature 
articles in newspapers that are part of a commercial chain: as the 
McGregor commission noted the result can be two papers with different 
titles serving different towns with 18 out of 20 pages identical . 
.. 
(RCP, 1977,p.8l). The final consolidation of this local news monopoly 
is achieved when local radio stat~ons and local newspapers (often with 
the same owners) provide each other with the details of local stories. 
Robert Park writing about Chicago in the early decades of the 
century suggested that the newspaper can help to re-establish in the city the 
lost sense of community of a previous age, "the motive, conscious or 
unconscious, of the writers and of the press in all this is to reproduce, 
as far as possible, in the city the conditions of life in the. village •• " 
(RCP, WP No.2, 1976,p.17). Maybe more responsive local newspapers 
could achieve this, but the contemporary effect is more prosaic. Barely 
distinguishable from the advertis~ng ·free sheets which are now their greatest 
rivals, city newspapers pump out an endless supply of tawdry enticements 
to buy, combined with doses of reactionary politics, peculiarly nasty 
social comment, and superficial appeals to enjoy ~e deformed social life 
they advocate. Whitaker had to endure this nauseating~editorial style as 
a journalist on.the Liverpool ~ and Echo: -Jollity and cheerfulness 
radiated from their valium impregnated paper ••• The message was simple: 
'forget your problems, spending money will make you happy. It certainly 
made the advertisers happy and at Christmas the Echo merrily reported 
hearing "the jingle of cash reqisters in the shops." Cox and Morgan in 
their study of the ~erseyside press and politics, pointed out that the 
press was part of the local political establishment: and that commercial 
.. 
considerations inhibited investigative journalism, which would be expensive 
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to conduct, and was not necessary in a si.tuation of quasi-monopoly 
to win readers. S:.lilarly, Murphy came to a set of dismal conclusions 
that, "Local journalists and editors are mainly concerned with the 
day-to-day task of producing a p~ofitable newspaper. They cannot 
afford to offend potential contacts, they are interested in producing 
a readable newspaper at the lowest cost, they need to maximise the 
predictability of news content, they avoid stories which are likely 
to be troublesome for no profit, and service to journalistic ideals 
of freedom and public guardianship comes low in the list of priorities." 
(Rep, WP No.2, 1976,pp. 28,3-6). -
The Bureaucratic Manufacture of News 
According to Mayer, Max Weber asked a series of highly pertinent 
questions in sketching out a programme of research on the press, which, 
in true sociological fashion, remained. unattempted: 
"What are the power relations which create publicity, 
particularly the conditions of economic power? .•. How 
does the press get its material? What is the position of 
the great news bureaux and how are they internationally 
. related to· each other? What is the position of the 
creative journalists in this intrinsically rationalised 
system of the modern press?" (RCP, WP No.2, pp.16-l7) 
Pursuing this.approach, Tunstall denoted the newspaper office as a 
'non-routine bureaucracy', recognising the potential for wnflict 
between the creative and innovative orientations of journalists, and 
the organisational requirements of predictability and accountability (1971). 
In the contest between creativity and bureaucracy, invariably it is the 
latter which dominates, 'refining and packaging information in a continuous 
. 
flow. "The business of any bureaucracy is the routine production of 
sequences of activity that are antiCipated and guided by formal rules." 
(Rock, 1973) McQuail claims that it is the "technological requirements 
.. 
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of the production process and the inescapable d~~~~~:~es of achieving 
a finished product to a deadline", which leads i;:e:"~"'~--ly to "the 
routinisation of as much activity as possible a,,~ a=~~h degree of 
bureaucratic organisation, ~ivision of labour a;):: ~2.=-.c.ardisation." 
(Rep, WP No.2 (1976) p.36); an analysis which d.is!:"e:::;~ds the degree 
to which bureaucratic organisation is imposed no~ s~?ly to maintain 
a regular editorial output, but to restrict the edi~rial within 
carefully regulated parameters . In the Soviet U~ion the bureaucratic 
organisation of the news causes delays as "speed is S'.:±ordinated to 
political correctness", whereas in the West the ~phasis is on hitting 
the newstands as fast as possible with fresh stories. (Whitaker, 1981,p.44). 
However this is not a distinction between manipulatory propaganda and instant 
truth, but between different types of news bureaucracies: one which 
completes the packaging of stories after the event, and one which pre-
packages stories ready for the events to happen! Thus in the West: 
"What is printed, especially the news part, is less a true 
reflection of what is really going on in the world or of a 
reader interests than of the somewhat arbitrarj outcome of 
a particular organisational.system and its distinctive culture. 
The main line of argume~t is that news media have.su~h a 
stake, organisationally, in maximising the proportion of the 
content or of their daily work which is predictable and 
susceptiole to planning that they tend to manufapture it in 
advance, or at least fulfil their own prediction about what 
is going to be news, to the relative exclusion of what is 
unusual or unexpected". (Rep, WP No.2, 1976,p.36) 
Hierarchical editorial control and production predictability 
are associated with the central features of newspaper organisation. 
In a study of newspapers as organisations Engwall quotes Thompson's 
observation that "organisations subj~ct to rationality norms seek to 
.. 
seal off their cQre technologies from environmental. influences", (l978,p.139): 
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(though of course this proposition does not inquire under whose 
rationality newspapers are subject, and why the rationality of those 
who are part of the social environment should be excluded)? Four 
methods of regulating production are examined by Engwall: buffering, 
levelling, forecasting and rationing. Buffering consists of building 
stocks of relatively timeless material including human interest stories, 
features and editorials. This stockpiling includes not only manuscripts, 
but printed sections, and previously composed material which can be used 
again such as headlines and advertisements. (A recent Panorama 
programme on China, (BBC TV 3 Aug~st 1981) amusingly discovered that 
the political cliches of the People's Daily were used so frequently, 
that they were kept in pre-composed type to be slotted in where necessary -
unfortunately the sam.e analysis was not extended to the British press). 
Levelling involves setti~g different deadlines for the delivery of 
material to avoid the situation of sporadic arrivals of editorial copy 
and then a last-minute fl~od which the composing room cannot manage. 
Forec~sting consists of predicting those items which cannot be levelled 
or buffered. This is ach~eved by routinising the unexpected through 
the typification of news, with a ~asic dichotomy between 'soft' news 
which can be temporarily delayed, and 'hard' news which must be carried 
immediately. Hard news itself divides into news of pre~arranged 
events, ~pot news of sudden events, and continuing news of developing 
stories. The extent to which stories will be carried is decided by ~ 
rationing: with limited editorial pages many stories must be cut or 
dropped in order to carry some news which arrives late. Of course, the 
top priority remains the advertisements for which the pagination will be 
expanded or contracted as necessary, whereas the editorial can rarely 
claim extra pages. All of these organisational strategies are· 
complementary and are intended to prep:oduce and regulate the flow of 
editorial material. This effort reaches the extreme in the advance writing 
of obituaries, for example, apparently Leonid Brezhnev's obituary was 
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prepared in 1962! This practice is not wit.hout its 
hazards - one Swedish newspaper accidentall~ published the obituary 
of Winston Churchill years before he died! (Engwall, 1978,pp. 139-156). 
To fit in with this organisational pattern the creative urges 9f 
journalists are crushed into a state of regular conformity, by the 
frequent use of devices which induce writers to anticipate and avoid 
disapproval by superiors. These include attendance at editorial conferences, 
indications to avoid certain t.opics, editorial blue pencilling, the loss 
.. 
of perks, and damage to career prospects. The result is that reporters 
become merely technicians restricted to the task of writing a story to 
generai specifications drawn elsewhere. (Rep, WP No.2, 1976,p.32) 
"It is as though the journalist has to fill in an outline that has 
already been drawn and he or she already knows what should go in before 
the 'news' has happened". (Walton and Davis, 1977, p.127). The people 
who draw up these specifications are the executives, editors, and sub-editors, 
who are concerned with the presentation of information, not its collection, 
and who greatly outnumber ordinary reporters. In the popular press 
almost every story submitted by reporters is extensively re-written by 
sub-edi tors. The systematic inclinations among journalists which.serv~ 
. 
the same effect, encompass self-selection and pre-socialisation for a 
castrated role, and internalised censorship to avoid waste of effort. 
The officially sanctioned sources of inspiration for news include precedent, 
editorial colleagues, and superiors. Thus a Swedish 'satirist has 
commented "When'journalists make public statenents, they say that they 
write for their read,ers. They seldom admit, not even to themselves, 
that they are actually writing for their bosses." (Engwall,1978,p.118) • 
The editorial conference has been described as "surely the 
most organised, coherent, continuing, and centralised process" of all 
mechanisms for socialisation. (Sige~an, 1973, p.138). Rarely is 
there any genuine development of ideas allowed at these meetings, or 
mutual criticism. In particular, collective criticism of the editor is 
.. 
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avoided, allowing the editor to isolate the contributions of individual 
journalists. Thus the 'freedom of the editor' often amounts in practice 
to the freedom of the editor to dictate corporate policy to journalists. 
(Murphy, 1978, p.188). J~urnalists often find they are hampered by 
rigid editorial instructions, with sub-editors performing a 'quality 
control' function on everything they write. The proc~ss of news production 
therefore normally consists of at least three filters before any 
original copy gets anywhere near a printed page: 
Editor + News Editor ~ Reporter ~ Sub-Editor ~ News Editor ~ Editor 
Selects 
Stories 
Allocates staff Investigates 
to Stories and 
Reports 
Edits 
Reports 
Revises Selects 
Main 
Editorial 
The reporter is the sole point of connection with the people and events 
involved in the story, and yet his work is used simply as raw material 
from which sub-editors fashion what they like, which encourages systematic 
distortion. "The reporter, however, erroneous he or she may be, however 
ideologically blinkered, has at least to do business with real events. 
It is difficult to manipulate reality when one is in face-to-face contact 
with ·it. The principal requirement for manipulation - including, of 
course, that most dangerous form which derives from unspoken assumptions -
is remoteness from the event." (~Statilsman, 29 February 1980). In 
this process, journalists are made to attend to the Four Ws: 
. 
What, Where, 
... 
When and Who? Exploration and interpretation of the question Why?, tends 
to be the prerogative of senior editorial personnel. Such conditions 
and constraints cause immense frustration and disillusionment among 
journalists. Engwall records the counnent of one that, "Once I was 
committed. But now, after more than ten years in the trade, the 
caDmittment is gone. It's just a job, a way to earn a living ••• " and 
another, "A colleague of mine.said to me that he feels like a used car-dealer, 
and he wouldn't buy a car from himself!" (l978,p.l54) .' 
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On the very rare occasions when journalists escape this internal 
control system and attempt to pursue controversial stories that reveal 
those in authority in a cr~tical light, they are faced by a panoply of 
external laws and regulations wh~ch intimidate all but the most 
determined. In Britain libel laws leave journalists cruelly exposed: 
"British law is the enemy of the British press. It circumscribes press 
virtues ,and comforts press vices •••• London has become the libel capital 
of the world •••• " and yet "the libel laws offer no protection to the 
privacy of the ordinary person: they function to confer a tax-free 
bonus on wealthy public figu:r:es.'" (Robertson, 1978, ,pp. 203-219) . 
Furthermore, although in any democracy the public should have the right 
. 
to know the basis upon which all official decisions are made, and have 
access to all relevant information, in Britain there is an obsession with 
secrecy, and the Official Secrets Act is applied randomly in most 'public' 
institutions. The punitive response of successive British governm~~ts 
to investigative journalism compares badly with the statutory support of 
Freedom of Information legislation in the US and other countries. The 
frightening prospect is that a Watergate could never happen in Britain, 
beca~se the journalists responsible for the publication of incriminatory 
. 
material would be locked up as soon as the first article appeared • 
.. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PRESS III: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Introduction 
The industrial relations of the press can only be adequately 
understood in the context of the political and material conditions 
of the press industry, and the defensive trade union response to those 
conditions. For however powerful the print unions, they only exercise 
a limited and protective power over employment, production, wages and 
technology. In contrast the employers have a strategic power tQ decide 
the existence of a paper, the type of paper, and the editorial purpose. 
The development of the newspaper industry has been central to the 
. advance of capitalist industrialisation: 
" ••• The industry has repeatedly been in the front of 'social, 
political and.cultural change.~rintin9was among the first 
trades to use the workshop system: it was transformed by 
industrialisation in the nineteenth centurYJ technological 
innovation secured its position as a vital vehicle for ruling 
ideologies; and in the present century it has assumed many of 
the ·features of monopoly capitalism - mass production, capital 
concentration and market standardisation. ft (Marshall,l983,p65) 
Yet the newspaper 'industry ~emains one of the last enclaves of craft 
. 
autonomy in the face of capitars incessant efforts to restructure the 
labour process through technological and organizational innovation to 
outflank resistant workers and impose a more intensive division of 
labour. 
. . 
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Chapel Bargaining 
The survival of entrenched print union chapels jealously guarding 
their bargaining rights and achievements against incursions by management, 
union officials, or other "chapels, is explained by the peculiar features 
of the newspaper industry. The highly perishable character of the 
product makes it impossible to catch up on lost production~ tight 
production schedules constrain management's freedom to manoeuvre~ the 
intensely competitive newspaper market makes proprietors reluctant to 
lose circulation; and fragmented bargaining institutions encourage 
competitive and unpredictable bargaining. The fragmentation of bargaining 
is compounded by the many changes required in the product with successive 
editions, and fluctuations in the level of activity in the product 
market,with the result that discontinuities in production are extremely 
frequent in every department. Discontinuities in production lead to the 
development of a system of payment by task: employers could not define 
tasks clearly, and they had to pay for constant co-operation with changes. 
Payment by task meant a large number and variety of components of pay 
which encouraged the development of collective bargaining. Sisson has 
detailed the ~aleidescope complexity of constantly changing Fleet Street 
pay differentials mobilised by continual chapel bargaining. (1975) 
In the mid-1970s there were 360 chapels in Fleet Street, and each 
independently bargained on pay, manning, and conditions, with much 
~ 
success. This bargaining produced considerable wage drift, or wage 
drive, ACAS recorded the extent of the difference between industrial 
basic rates and average weekly earnings: in 1961 earnings were one and 
a half to two times basic rates: by 1970 they had become two to three 
. times basic rates: and by 1975 three to three and a half times basic 
rates. However despite the ~fforts of the chapels, Fleet Street earnings 
did not keep pace with those in manufacturing industry: in 1970 earnings 
in Fleet Street were 65' higher than those in manufacturing industry: 
.. 
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by 1975 they were only 39% higher. The inclination to maximise 
earnings had been tempered by the determination to maintain employment 
in the industry. (ACAS, 1976, pp 45-6) 
By a pre-entry closed shop the chapels' control emp loy men t , 
production, and the discipline of labour in what are essentially self-
governing bodies. ACAS admits, "r'rom a trade union point of view the 
industry is one of the most tightly organised in the country. Not only 
is trade union membership high, and universal in production areas, but 
the degree of production control exercised at the workplace by the 
chapels has few, if any, equals in Britain." (1976,p5) This chapel 
strength is aimed at outsiders and union officials, as well as 
management and employers. Though "the printers chapel is often idealised 
for its workshop solidarity, egalitarianism, and mutual responsibility," 
(Cockburn, 1983,pI6), print chapels do deserve Turner's categorisation 
of them as "exclusive democracies" with implications for those outside. 
(1962) As Cockburn reveals, the all male chapels could be ruth~ess in 
excluding any but a chosen few from the trade, and women were kept out 
at all costs. "If there was bitter~ess among craftsmen, the abyss 
separating axl of them from the semi-skilled and unskilled cat~gories 
of printing labour was wide, deep and acrimonious." (Cockburn,1983, p41) 
Print union leaders and officials often have a difficult 
relationship with their Fleet Street chapels. In disputes chapels 
are reluctant to involve full time officials who are normally called 
in on management's initiative, and are often resented by the chapel 
because they tend to secure less advantageous agreements than the chapels 
could themselves. ACAS records the despair of management at the 
growing shopfloor disregard 'of national trade union directives. '!'he 
full time officers were "unwilling or unable to prevent unconstitutional 
action by chapels even where they might privately agree a claim is 
'unjustified. Some were also said to be difficult'to contact when disputes 
arise." (1976,p123) 
• 
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The most salient feature that emerges from the many studies of 
industrial relations in Fleet Street is that essentially the chapels 
are self governing associations to which the managements sub-contract 
print work. Management has little control over personnel, production" 
and maintenance, and changes cannot take place without chapel consent. 
Often the best that management can hope for is that the FOC will 
consult with management over chapel decisions: a form of joint 
.. consultation in reverse The prevailing pattern of authority relations 
in the newspaper industry between management and unions is therefore 
one of anatagonistic detachment: industrial relations are inherently 
conflictual with periods of cease fire abruptly interspersed with brief, 
but intense disputes. Simon Jenkins, ~ormerly editor of the Evening 
Standard, refers to the "nightmare" of management "wrestling with 
almost constant labour unrest ••• A manager of my acquaintance compared 
his job to that of a provincial governor in India during the Mutiny: 
'One's whole time is taken up suppressing the latest revolt anq 
predicting where the next one is going to flare up - apart from the 
time spent convincing one's super~ors that all is under control.' n 
(1979,p69) 
At the official level the frequency of industrial disputes in 
national newspapers is frequently underestimated, as in the analysis 
in Chapter 11 and the tables in Appendix 11 of the ACAS report on the 
industry. (1976) The origin of this misconception lies in the definition 
of industrial disputes by the Department of Employment which exclude 
stoppages involving fewer than ten workers and lasting less than one day, 
except where the aggregate of working days lost exceeds 100. Yet in 
the newspaper industry stoppages involving small groups of workers, 
or only a few hours of a shift, may have devastating consequences for 
the production of an edition. Longer stoppages are rarely necessary, 
as far as the chapels ~re concerned, in order to extract a settlement 
from management. As the Royal Commission itself concluded, "The official 
.. 
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figures are inadequate. They do not provide a complete record of 
stoppages in the industry or of the fact sanctions can fall far. shor t 
of a stoppage of work yet still cause disruption and loss of production." 
(1977 ,p21S) 
Thus Jenkins records how in 1977, for example, "Not a single 
newspaper was free of labour troubles. Without actually going on 
strike, and losing wages as a result, chapel tactics had succeeded 
in costing Fleet Street over 100 million daily papers lost and over 
25 million Sundays. This staggering total was roughly the equivalent 
of the whole of Fleet Street g<>ing on str ike for· ten days." ( 1979, 
p 107) (Of course Jenkins does not offer any data to support these 
estimates!) Thus in this context 'employers representatives were left 
to bleat on hopelessly, such as Sir Richard Marsh, chairman of the 
Newspaper Publishers Association (NPA), that in almost nightly ·stoppages 
chapels would not observe procedures, that unions could not give 
assurances, and that the rank and file should be disciplined. Often the 
employers rhetoric spilled into academic accounts of the troubles of 
the industry "It is no -exaggeration to say that in the short term 
many proprietors publish thei~ ~ewspapers regardless of the costs ••• 
the damage which the chapels are able to inflict by taking industrial 
action is virtually incalculable ••• the frightening dilemma with which 
the managements are faced ••• " (Sisson, 1975,p138) That this rhetoric 
has had so little effect upon the practices in the industry is explained 
partly by the impression that survival seems often to be based on the 
~irn of the proprietors. (Sisson, 1975,pl02) Secondly, in the late 1970s 
when seve;al national newspapers seemed in danger of folding there was 
no shortage of potential saviours of this cultural heritage. Finally, 
the resolve of the employers to control labour disputes in the industry, 
freely expressed at every opportunity in general terms, seemed in 
practice secondary to securing competitive advantage ~ver rival 
publications: "collusive agreements to forgo taking advantage of 
.. 
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competitors' industrial relations difficulties have proved fragile, 
~oth inside and outside newspapers." (Martin,p198l,p5l) 
The weaknesses of .the national newspaper industry management, 
and of the NPA itself, a're usually attributed primarily to the 
domination of proprietors who adopted a short sighted and ad hoc 
approach to dispute settlement. "Examples were given where a collective 
position taken by NPA members had been rapidly undermined by individual 
houses settling with unions. Such cases, it was felt, served only to 
bring the Association into disrepute and to impair its credibility in 
union eyes during subsequent negotiations. 1I (ACAS, 1976, p79) However 
in the context of the escalat~ng 'costs . and· lessicomfortable profit 
margins of the 1970s, the pressure for a wholesale restructuring of 
industrial relations in the national press, and the reassertion of 
managerial control began to mount; It was thought that although 
labour was not the largest item of total costs, production wages were 
one of the largest items which could be made subject to management 
control. (Sisson, 1975, p142) Previous management efforts to achieve 
this did not inspire confidence, the productivity bargaining of the 
1960s had resulted in comprehensive agreements in the newspaper industry 
intended to codify and formalise agreements, reduce manning and 
control.wages: But due to sophisticated chapel bargaining, 
-What began as a management attempt to link earnings directly to 
improvements in productivity frequently ended as a strategy for 
avoiding incomes policies and providing a consolidated platform for 
further increases in special payments." (Martin,1981,p49) The work 
of the Royal Commission and the ACAS survey of 1976 provided a fresh 
opportunity to completely overhaul the industrial relations structures 
of Fleet Street. 
Procedural Overhaul 
ACAS recommended the procedural overhaul of Fleet Street along 
orthodox Donovan lines: 
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i) TO develop more comprehensive bargaining and consultative 
procedures within publishing houses by establishing Joint House 
Committees in place of the ineffective Federated House Chapels, with 
representatives of each of the "chapels, but also a full time officer 
from "each of the major unions and senior management. 
ii) TO develop and support newjoint standing procedures linking 
the Joint Standing Committee composed of senior union officials and 
chief executives to the Joint House Committees. The Joint Standing 
committee would supervise the introduction of new technology as well 
as manpower problems. 
iii) The strengthening of the organisation and policies of unions 
and management so as to promote more authoritative collective bargaining, 
in particular the creation of a single union for the print industry. 
(1976,pp183-2l0) 
Though ACAS was careful to avoid the political implications of the 
procedural reforms it proposed, the intention was clearly to w~aken 
and minimise the influence of chapel bargaining, and to prevent unofficial 
militancy. The insistence upon more "authoritative collective bargaining" 
was an attempt to shore up the authority of management and full "time" 
officials, and weaken the authority of chapels. However in a shattering 
moment of truth ACAS acknowledged, "No disputes procedure, however 
well designed, can prevent disputes arising where irreconcilable 
• 
conflicts of interest arise. " (,1976,p189) Thus the essence of the 
ACAS proposals was included in a Programme for Action agreed between 
the general secretaries of the print unions and the chief e~ecutives 
of the publishers. These proposals were put to union members early in 
1977 and all the unions except the NUJ rejected them. Equally 
participation schemes, keenly suggested by management in times of 
crisis, such as in 1974-75 in Beaverbrook, supposedly to create a 
new environment of trust and eliminate destructive conflict, the chapels 
recognised were designed fora one way flow of information to pass 
.. 
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on decisions made by management. Management were enthusiastic about 
participation during the crisis, until they achieved changes to their 
advantage, when particip"ation atrophied. (ACAS, 1976,pl4l) Anyway, as 
far as many matters proposed for participation were concerned, as one 
print worker put it, "We don.'t want participation. We've already got 
worker controL" (Jenkins,1979,p6l) Thus despite the alrost touching 
optimism of ACAS that at last there were signs of a willingness to 
introduce changes in industrial relations in Fleet Street, a deep 
division between management am unions has remained to the present 
day, with chapels exceedingly reluctant ~o concede any changes 
whatsoever, and profoundly suspicious of the motives of management. 
Editorial Exclusion 
The clearest indication of the structural anatagonism which 
exists between management and workers in the newspaper industry, is how 
the chapels are completely excluded from having any involvement in the 
editorial content of the newspapers they produce. This is one strategic 
power which management have refused to concede at all, even granting 
wage awards to prevent 'interference' ('a licence to print lies' one 
printing engineer called it). The result is that it is difficult for 
print workers to identify with the product they prod~ce, whatever 
their pride in their skills. Even the NUJ is prevented from having 
any say over editorial content. Interestingly, the only area in which 
. 
the last Royal Commission was prepared to consider significant 
intervention in the press was in its proposals for a press charter, 
all seven clauses of which detailed "essential safeguards" to prevent 
the NUJ exercising influence over the content of the press. The Commission 
proposed changes to the rule book of the NUJ exempting editors and 
other senior personnel from union membership; and limiting the ability 
of the union to secure compliance of members to majority decisions. The 
purpose of these proposals was to protect proprietors from any influence 
.. 
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of labour in deciding editorial polley, while preserving essentially 
intact the proprietors power to determine editorial objectives. (RCP, 
1977, pp 157-1661 Currqp, 1979, pp 77-78) 
The underlying assumptiohof the press freedom charter was made 
clear in the Commission's di~cussionof the closed shop issue, which 
it portrayed as a conflict between two "Valid but competing claims," 
on the one hand the freedom of a union to represent its members in 
the industry, and on the other hand, the freedom of the press: 
"For the NUJ, the first priority is the freedom to improve 
the earnings and conditions of work of its members and to 
deploy the· maximum strength for collective bargaining to 
this end. For those on the other side, what matters most 
is to secure the freedom of the press because they cannot 
'conceive of a civilised society that does not regard as 
its first priority the right of a man to express what he 
believes in whatever form he thinks appropriate, subject 
to the control of the law.' " (Rep, 1977, P l60) 
The Commission accepted this simple and distorted representation of 
the conflict ~dvanced by the Newspaper Publishers Association: that 
is, press freedom is synonymous with proprietorial co~trol of the 
private property of the press in a free market. The nright of a man 
to express what he believesn in this system applies only to the 
.. 
proprietors and their appointed editors, it does not apply to the 
tens of thousands of workers in the newspaper industry, or, for 
that matter, the tens of millions of workers outside the newspaper 
industry who could never gain access to its pages. (Curran, 1979,pp77-79) 
Most commentaries on the industrial relations of the newspaper 
industry do not treat the exclusion of the ~rint and journalists' 
unions from any influence over editorial construction as part of their 
concern. ( Though this is normally part of a refusal to consider any 
.aspect of editorial policy' or wider issues of ownership and control 
.. 
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• 
as relevant to the study of the industrial relations practices 
of the industry). Sisson approvingly quotes the Economist Intelligence 
unit's Report that proprietors often direct their energies solely 
towards the editorial function, leaving the chapels relatively 
satisfied to concentrate on production matters. (1975, pl69) Martin 
is content with C.P. Scott's simplistic distinction between the press 
as an 'industry' and as an 'institution', which conveniently allows 
him to ignore any impact the framing of editorial policy may have 
upon industrial relations. On page one of the ACAS report it records 
how, in inviting ACAS to study xhe industrial relations of the 
newspaper industry the "Commission emphasised the central importance 
it placed on any study of industrial relations taking full account 
of the context provided by the wider issues set out in the Commission's 
terms of reference." (1976) These terms of reference included "to 
inquire into the factors affecting the maintenance .of the independence, 
diversity, and editorial standards of newspapers ..... Yet this is what 
the ACAS report signally fails to do (as, it could be argued, the 
Royal Commission itself failed to do). There is no questioning of 
the nature of proprietorial o~ership and control of the press, and 
. 
dictation of ~ditorial policy, beyond occasional references to'its 
effects upon managements freedom of action. There is no exploration 
of the systematically anti-trade union bias of press editorial. The 
only reference to the financial structure of the pre$s, (in particular 
the dependenae on advertising revenue), comes when ACAS recognises 
that a number of national newspapers were financially precarious, 
and therefore efforts to control and eliminate industrial conflict 
must, ACAS insists, be redoubled. Indeed the Royal Commission in 
its report, not only defended the proprietorial editorial sovereignty 
of the past, but.was determined to preserve it in the future, as 
revealed in the comment on the possible introduction .of industrial 
democracy in the industry that ·whatever arrangements are eventually 
.. 
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made it, it will be vital to maintain effective editorial independence 
under them." (1977, p 227) 
Such approaches are not the inevitable result of harmless 
academic specialism, or the scientific and practical necessity to 
limit the focus of study. Hy~an has noted Aron's comment that students 
of industrial relations often "at the outset brush aside questions 
concerning the ownership of the firm or the structure of society ••• 
Not to ask these questions (which are called ideological or political) 
is to ask them in a particular way." He goes on to insist: 
"It is to endorse by default, the .unquestioned structure 
of power and control; and hence to define the orientations 
of study as the accomodation to this structure of the 
institutions and processes of industrial relations. It 
is to embrace what Mills (l959,pp95-99) has termed the 
strategy of 'illiberal practilaty'. In this respect the 
study of industrial relations exhibits in its clearest 
form the practical implications of the absence from 
modern social studies of an analysis of the total 
. 
society •. " (Hyman and Brough, 1975a, pp 195-6) 
Nor is it sufficient excuse for commentators to point to Fleet 
Street print workers' - among the most ancient members of the aristocracy 
of labour - lack of inclination towards a socialised press with 
... 
democratic access to policy making. It is true that whenever a 
newspaper becomes vulnerable the sole concern of the print chapels 
seems to be to maintain employment through preserving the title under 
another promising millionaire or mUlti-national. (As in the painful 
illustration of this narrow economism that the editorial criticisms 
of the safeguards proposed by the Monopolies-Commission in the Lonhro 
takeover of the Observer, that they were "illibera~, unworkable, 
unacceptable," did not reach most of the readership because of a 
~ispute over differentials'between NATSOPA and the NGA). For whatever 
.. 
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the relative powers and privileges of print workers, they are still 
wage labour subject to the direction of capital, and have imposed 
upon them an acute division of labour with the enforced formal 
separation of intellectual and manual labour, which encourages them 
to view their newspaper as simply a commodity. (Workers at the 
Thomson Withy Grove print works in Manchester print the northern 
editions of the Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Mirror and 
News of the World, presumably finding little to distinguish between 
them!) As one worker put it: 
n Forced into acceptance of conditions over which he feels 
he has no control, the worker with no other visible alternative 
but dependence on the monopoly, feels himself trapped. He 
is working for an empire which not only makes millions of 
pounds profit, but which uses its power and influence to 
disseminate ideas designed to direct him away from any 
rational solution to his problems. Engaged in what should 
be a cultural field, he contributes little and is forced 
into a position of indifference to everything but Friday's 
wage packet. (Doyle, 19~7, pI07). 
Whether print workers will ever exercise the militancy' ~hey amply 
display overpay and job control in the more ambitious areas of 
editorial control and enterprise direction, will depend upon them 
being con~inced that there are important benefits in a socialised 
press, which the capitalist press can never provide. Perhaps one 
movement in this direction is the 'Right of Reply' campaign: "One 
of its mo$t important elements is that it encourages trade unionists 
working in the newspaper industry to consider thecontent.of the 
press and their own role in producing it; and to work out by 
democratic means of discussion and decision·making, ways to 
compensate for misuse of the press, and to extend acce·ss to it." 
(CPF, 1981, pS)· 
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NEW TECHNOLOGY 
The protracted political and economic crisis of Fleet Street has 
led management to attempt a major restructuring of the labour process 
around the new technology. But the technicist language should not 
obscure the fact that the technical solution for management involves 
the defeat of labour. Rex Winsbury in a paper for the McGregor 
Commission argued that whatever the financial savings of the new 
computer technology: "A bonus in the eye~ of many US managements, is 
that ••• they believe they will be riCi·of the constraints of the 
printing craft unions, which will have vanished along with the 
technology th~t created and d7fined them." The production director of 
the American Newspaper Publishers Association put it more bluntly, 
"technology is useless without eliminating people." (RCP, Working 
Paper Number 1, 1975, pl9) 'In meeting the challenge posed by the 
new technology, sectional chapel bargaining, so effective in wage 
competition, could prove a liability~ thus commenting on the almost 
total defeat of the print unions in America, Zimbalist claims: 
"Labour has been weakened by the historical experience of craft 
unionism in the printing industry. More energy has been devoted to 
delineating craft and union boundaries than to fashioning craft and 
union solidarity." (l979,pl24) Fragmentation of bargaining could 
allow the m9nagement to playoff chapels against each other, to the 
overall disadvantage of print workers. (Martin, 1981,p72) 
Employment 
In general the primary objective of management in introducing 
the new technology is to reduce labour costs. It is in clerical 
occupations in the service industries that the sharpest impact of 
. 
microelectronics in the form of new informatlon technologies will be 
felt: the production, manaipulation, storage, and transmission of 
information may be automated. In Britain 57% of the entire workforce 
are employed in the service industries, and the impetus for the 
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rapid introduction of automation is the desire of public and 
private corporations to increase the relatively low productivity 
'of office workers. Thus in one estimate, us office productivity 
rose by 4% between 1960-70, compared to a rise of 83% for manual 
workers in the same period. There is little doubt that the 
introduction of new technology is massively labour displacing. If 
introduced with the object of saving on labour costs, word processors, 
micro-computers, and related technologies can bring dramatic 
increases in productivity with consequent reductions in employment: 
ASTMS forecasts the loss of 2.6 million jobs by 1985, and 3.9 million 
by 1991. (Hines and Searle, 1979,pp12-l8) Already the effect of 
micro-electronics technology has been considerable where it has 
been extensively introduced: in West Germany official ILO figures 
reveal huge overall job losses in the period 1970-76, three quarters 
of a million textile operatives lost their jobs through the introduction 
of microprocessor controlled textile machinery~ 200,000 sales staff 
lost their jobs through computerised cash and stockeeping systems, 
and 167,000 metal workers lost their jobs because of the introduction 
of programmed ~achine tools. In compensation 250,000 jobs were' 
created in administering new technology, and 160,000 as computer 
technicians. Across industry the total job loss in West Germany due 
to the introduction of new technology in 1970-76 was over 900,000. (1979) 
L 
In the USA the potential office redundancies are thought to be 
. 
enormous with a 2% reduction of staff per year, which would displace 
25 million workers by the year 2000. In London, in the middle of 
the office building boom, there was a reduction of clerical jobs of 
. 50,000 between 1966-71 with the growing sophistication of office 
machinery, and the velocity of this reduction is now greatly increasing. 
(FOrester, 1980, pxv) 
In the printing industry workers are con~ronted with similar 
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employment implications of the new technology, and to the armoury 
of management arguments in favour 6f the rapid introduction of 
automated printing technology is added the contention that otherwise 
print will soon be rendered obsolete by the development of electronic 
media. On the contrary Marshall has insisted: 
" The current wave of unemployment in the printing 
industry is not primarily the result of a decline in 
the importance of print media, but is directly due to 
the widespread introduction of automation and to the 
changes in national and international markets that are 
accompanying it. This is 'an obvious assertion perhaps, 
but one which is too often'lost sight of in the details. 
of labour-management negotiations and futuristic 
. 
analyses of communication technology. Print no doubt 
is in line for long term decline, but the effect of this 
is for the moment negligible when compared with the 
-II current race to integrate communications systems, 
install highly automated production methods and cut 
labour demand." (1983,ppl~2) 
As Marshall reports the decline of employment in the printing industry 
is considerable, "it is no longer a question of whether jobs will be 
lost, but how soon and on what scale." In the ten years up to 1976, 
63,000 jo~s were lost: in the first nine months of 1981 alone 10,000 
jobs went; estimates vary of a decline between 2% and 15% per year in 
the period 1978-1985, but i~ the long term Jenkins and Sherman ,see a 
reduction'from 536,000 employed in the industry in 1979, to half that 
figure by ,the'year 2000. (1979) As Marshall concludes: "~ •• Within 
the strict confines of the printing industryitself, the workforce 
cannot win as long as its present mode of labour organisation perSists. 
An increase in inv~st~ent on capital's terms, will accelerate job loss, 
.. 
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while restricted investment will also lose jobs, either to the 
new communication industries or as a result of an international 
redistribution of production." (1983, pp 48-49) 
Remarkably Fleet S'treeti which was at the centre of the employers 
new technology offensive, h~s so far largely escaped this employment 
devastation due to the resilience of the chapels. Despite highly 
pessimistic forecasts about the future prospects of employment in 
national newspapers from the Printing and Publishing Industry Training 
Board in 1975: in 1976-77 the industry employed 36,402, and in 
1978-79, after the most energetic attempts by the newspaper proprietors 
to achieve a mass shake out of labour, 36,369 were employed. The 
number of compositors, the group whose demise was most carefully 
arranged, actually increased from 4,010 in 1976-77 to 4,202 in 1978-79 
(Martin, 1981,p340) Though protected by the near impossibility of 
printing national daily newspapers abroad, whether the success of the 
.l print unions in maintaining employment can be sustained is open to 
question, In America where the proprietors adoption of new technology 
has been more ruthlessly imposed, the International Typographical 
Union is figh~ing for its life 'in the newspaper industry~ in this 
country, in a war of attri€ion, almost all the advantages are on the 
side of management. 
job Control 
Q, 
The implications of new printing technology for job control are 
profound. The antiquated Victorian hot-metal linotype composing is 
facing an invasion of electronic means of manipulating type. Word 
processors, optical character recognition (O.C.R.), photocomposition, 
facsimile transmission, and ink-jet printing, are among an array of 
methods of automating the printing process, .which employers wish to 
introduce. It is difficult to underestimate the eventual impact of 
of the changes which are being planned: 
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"The micro-computer and microprocessor are revolutionising 
printing. For although the steam dirvcn press, follo''led by 
the harnessing of electrical power, increased productivity 
many times over, they did not change the fundamental 
principle of printing from relief type. Microelectronics 
is turning type into electrical pulses and is fast super-
seding the intermediate stage of photosetting. Type can 
.. 
can be expanded, contracted, re-formed and altered in 
almost every imaginable W!y without ever being removed 
from the computer memory ••• Digitisation is in addition 
not restricted to setting type, and the electronic manipulation 
which binary coding allows means that any information 
which has been 'captured' as electronic impulses from 
a keyboard can, in theory at least, be used u.ltimately 
for typesetting output ••• To take an existing example, 
it is now possible for news reporters to transmit their 
stories digitally by telephone direct to the paper's 
computer. There they can be. stored, edited, composed, 
laid out, and (using lasers) exposed on to a printing 
plate at anyone of a number of production plants." 
(Marshall, 1983, pp69-70) 
The intention of management is to use the new technology to 
.. 
recapture co~trol over the labour process, and in broad terms, 
impose the principles of scientific management as distinguished 
by Braverman: the dissociation of the labour process from the skills 
of the workers, the labour process becoming dependent upon upon 
management priorities rather than worker~ abilities~ the separation 
of the conception from the execution of the task, the organization 
of work becoming the prerogative of management, workers being 
simply responsible for its performance~ the use of a monopoly of 
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knowledge to control each step of the'labour process and its mode 
of execution. (1974) It is the powerful "thesis of Braverman that 
there has been a systematic attempt to degrade and desk ill work 
by the application of new technology and management science: "The 
pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark 
background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem 
to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, 
and in stultifying human life into a material force." 
(Marx, 1973,pp299-300) 
However as studies of the labour process conducted in critique 
of Braverman have indicated, it is wrong to imply that the tendency 
towards deskilling is almost a uniform and universal process: 
deskilling is a complex and contradictory problem which requires 
detailed study and constant attention to the forms of worker resistance 
and their effectiveness. (Wood,l982: Zirnbalist,1979) Firstly it is 
important to recognise the social construction of 'ski.ll', which in 
the past enabled the chapels to define printing as 'men's work' and 
exclude women on principle, for example. "In sociological terms all 
. 
skills are socially constructed", since even 'genuinely' skilled ~ 
jobs are not simply derivatives of god-given technology. The issue 
hinges on the basis on which jobs and skills are constructed, and 
whether the criteria by which workers are differentiated and jobs 
defined are relatively independent of the real or 'technical' skill 
content of jobs." (Wood,1982,pl8) Secondly skill is a negotiated 
definition, the outcome of the struggle between organised labour 
and management to seize control of the labour process, and in the 
. past workers have shown a capacity to subvert the purposes of 
management by using new technology and production processes to 
extend their own influence and autonomy. Finally new machinery 
in itself may not be deskilling, but could be deployed in a variety 
• 
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of ways, what is important is who controls the operation of machinery 
and the purposes it is intended to serve.· As Marshall has indicated, 
in the printing industry: 
"The inherent capabilities of computer typesetting do not, 
however, necessarily imply deskilling. These sytems are in 
fact more flexible and capable of far greater manipulation 
than ever were Linotypes or Monotypes, and can be used to 
integrate keyboard and typographical skill with decision 
making. But in general they are being used by management 
to break up the work sequence into simplified and more 
easily quantifiable sections, and by p1acing the emphasis 
on volume production, they are wherever possible being 
used to introduce mass production methods into composition. 
This has the double advantage for employers of increasing 
productivity and reducing union power." (l983,pl05) 
(One of the ironies of the NGA's necessary political defence of the 
principle of the 'second keystroke'to preserve the jobs of their 
members, is that it restrains the skill potential that computerised 
photocomposition would present to a few 'text processors' who w~uld 
assemble whole newspaper pages on large video screens with the 
direct input of journalists and advertising people to the central 
computer). (Cockburn,l983,pllS) 
The Interim Report of the Royal Commission 
A sharp stimulus to managements' desire to introduce the new 
technology was provided by the sudden deterioration in the finances 
of the national press in the summer of 1975. In this context the 
. employers forgot their distaste for the Royal Commission on the Press, 
and called for an emergency report on what was necessary for the 
survival of the industry. The Commission was glad to oblige and in 
the Interim Report (1976) published six months later ·commented, 
·Our remit refers to the object of maintaining 'a healthy, independent 
.. 
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and diverse press. For the purpose of of the interim inquiry only, 
our working definition of this phrase has been the steps neccesary 
to assist existing titles in the short run ••• " (p2) This conveniently 
foreclosed any consideration of whether existing titles deserved to 
be assisted. After a review of the parlous financial circumstances 
of'the industry, the bulk of the report was devoted to an account of 
the savings which could be achieved by the new technology, and 
recommendations as to how this could be introduced • 
The Commission estimated the costs of the new technology as 
, 
follows: investment costs would be £20 millioni redundancy payments 
£30 - 35 million, giving a total of about £50 million, and with tax 
relief this would be £28 million. Publishers would save £16 million 
per annum, therefore recovering their costs within a couple of years. 
To do this 2,500 jobs· in composing would be eliminated. In addition 
the employers planned to eliminate 4,500 jobs in the machine room 
and publishing departments. If these redundancies were imposed in 
fuil, the labour force in Fleet Street would be cut by 25% and the 
employers would save £25 million per annum. (1976,pp46-66) The private 
sector Financ~ for Industry (FFI) would. provide the loans necessary, 
and government would provide relief on the interest. This approach 
to the introduction of new technology was the subject of a cosy 
agreement between newspaper proprietors and print union leaders as 
reassuringly described by Roderick Martin: 
·Since several houses were facing similar economic difficulties, 
proposing br.oadly sim~lar plans and anticipating similar 
difficulties, it was inevitable that proprietors should 
attempt· to coordinate. their policies, most conveniently 
through the NPA. In view of the seriousness of the industry's 
economic position and the threat to members' interests, print 
unio~ leaders agreed that an industry wide approach wa~ 
desirable·to prevent 'chaos' in the industry. Accordingly, 
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discussions between the NPA and the TUC Printing Industries 
Committee in the winter of 1975-76 resulted in the presentation 
of an agreed joint statement to the Royal Commission, the 
-
eS,tablishment of a Joint Standing Committee, and the 
signature of a joint agreement Programme for Action, in 
November 1976." (1981, p3~8) 
In explain ing why the new technology shou ld be accepted i . 
.. Owen O'Brien, the general secretary of NATSOPA, gave four reasons; 
to keep the majority of union members in secure and well paid jobs~ 
to maintain the viability of all existing titles in the interests of 
a free press~. because pensions were to be protected~ and adequate 
voluntary redundancy compensation was available. (ACAS,1976,pp25-6) 
On the basis of such statementsrp one can endorse the pr int \-lorkers 
feelings that with leaders like this, who needs enemies? If the 
management inspired proposals on new technology were introduced 
unaltered, by a process of severe attrition, the majority of existing 
print workers would ultimately end up on the dole. More seriously, 
if ".pc tnt workers were to allow hard new technological teeth to be 
grafted on to-the monopoly capitalist press, without any changes in 
ownership and control, they would have contributed ~o making it more 
highly profitable, more threatening, and more remote and unaccountable 
than it eve~ was before. In his consideration of job security on 
... 
Fleet Street Sisson recognised three groups of interested workers: 
present workers, future workers, and casuals. Employers do not 
acknowledge a responsibility to future workers, and the loss of 
their job opportunities. Sisson suggested that one way of doing 
this would be for employers to make a contribution to the unions 
. 
pension fund. The question that immediately springs to mind is what 
compensation young people w-ill feel, including the children of print 
workers~ when they cannot find work, to know that the'print unions' 
-pension fund is in a healthy condition? 
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The hopes of proprietors, union officials, the Royal Commission, 
and disinterested academics were.dashed when the joint approach to the 
introduction of new technology was put to the ballot of union members. 
The Commission reported that the prospects had looked good in the 
Autumn of 1976 of modernising production and improving industrial 
relations, but that, "since then the immediate outlook has very much 
worsened. The ballots took place in February and March 1977, and 
resulted in rejection of the proposals in programme for Action by 
all the production unions." (1977,p222) The Commission welcomed 
the decsion of the print union leaders and newspaper executives to 
persevere'with the Joint Standing Committee, despite the adverse 
vote in the ballot, and revealing' the full extent of its support of 
official union-employer collaboration against the rank and file 
commented, "Perhaps the most encouraging event in the recent 
discouraging months has been that NATSOPA was prepared to expel 
those of its members whose unofficial strike brought about a week 
1:ong stoppage of 'The Times - though it restored their union cards 
when they returned to work. We hope that this unique act shows 
that unions at national level'at least, are now ready to recognise 
this basic need and assert their authority whenever they can rely 
upon the support of managements." (1977,p22S) 
However by 1977 any chance of a concerted imposition of the 
new technology by the national newspaper employers had passed, due 
to the extent of union opposition the joint proposals had engendered, 
and the fact tha,t the immediate pressure had been taken off management 
with a ~arked improvement in the finances of all the national newspapers. 
Individual ~ewspaper houses were left to make attempts of differing 
intensity and commitment to introduce the new technology, the most 
celebrated case being the dispute·~t Times Newspapers Limited. 
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The Introduction of New Technology 
The Times Newspapers Limited (TNL) management made the most firm 
attempt to introduce the new technology, insisting upon capturing the 
original keystrokes for journalists from the NGA. The insiste~eupoh 
direct input into the electronic composition threatened to virtually 
eradicate the traditional composing room1 single handedly TNL was 
threatening the future of the NGA on Fleet Street. That TNL felt in 
in a strong enough position to issue this threat was explained by 
the declared Whomson group profit of over £100 million in 1977-78; 
and the fact that the parent company was in the process of moving 
its base to Canada, and now looked upon Times Newspapers as a 
financial embarassment rather than the figurehead which Roy Thomson 
had cherished. Another reason the Times management may have been 
motivated to issue . the challenge was that composing room costs are 
higher for the quality than the popular press. 
In April 1978 the TNL management declared they intended" to 
suspend publication unless new agreements covering guaranteed 
continuity of production, a n~w disputes procedure, new manning 
levels, and "new technology were concluded by 30 November 1978." 
Though the deadline was extended until 13 December little progress 
was made, and the management commenced a lock~out that was to last 
eleven and a half months. (It is interesting to qote that the Royal 
Commission and other official bodies were prepared to resoundingly 
condemn the print unions for stopping publication of The Times for 
six days in 1977, but that Times management could prevent publication 
of both The Times and the Sunday Times for almost a year and yet 
attract official sympathy). At the end of the dispu~the TNL 
management virt~ally conceded direct input to the NGA, and at a cost 
of £39.3 million (the companies estimate of the cost of the dispute) 
achieved agreement of" the introduction of photocomposition. Although 
the management claimed they had achieved 70% of their objectives as 
.. 
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Martin records: "The phased introduction of computerised photo-
composition proceeded very slowly, and" although extensive familiari 
isation and training p~ogra~es were undertaken, no newspaper or 
supplement was produced on the new equipment whils TNL was under 
Thomson ownership, successive datelines being postponed. No progress 
at all was made towards the achievement of single key-boarding, the 
NGA successfully resisting the pressure to go ~urther than it had 
already gone at MGN." (l98l,p299) 
The more cautious ~pproach of the Mirror Group Newspapers' (MGN) 
management had proved more successful in the sense that they had 
negotiated the introduction of elements of the new technology without 
provoking a protracted stoppage. The use of facsimile transmission, 
utilised for some time in the regional editions of Mirror newspapers, 
was extemded, and computerised composing introduced with the NGA 
retaining responsibility for keyboard input. In practice though, 
neither the savings anticipated nor the technical sophistication 
was achieved: 
"The increasesin speed 9f operating from the use of 
computerised compos~ng were slow to materialise~ it 
t..r."C -'therefore proved impossible to achieve the savings in 
"'_!-~_~ -lIanpower expected in the composing room. More importantly, 
if predictably, it proved impossible to obtain adequate 
performance standards from the page composition terminal: 
it proved impossible to make electronic full-page 
make-ap work. The performance achieved by the new 
,-~system-'proved either too slow, or otherwise inadequate, 
owing to difficulties in prOgramming. Accordingly cut-and-
paste methods of page make-up were retained, resulting in 
a substantial hiccough in the system ••• As at_~L, legal 
proceedings against the suppliers of the equipment were 
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considered, but not proceeded with. According to MGN, the 
equipment had failed seriously to, live up to the specifications 
promised: although it could be made to work, the operations 
were so complex that the error rate was high and the system 
very slow." (Martin, 1981,p317) 
As at TNL the response of the MGN parent company Reed International 
to the persistant failure to resolve the industrial relations and 
technical problems of Fleet Street, now that the Mirror papers could 
not be relied upon as a cash generating machine as in the past, was 
to put the newspapers up for sale. Whilst partial introduction of 
the new technology was achieved in several other national newspapers, 
Fleet Street remained a bastion of craft resistance to the new 
methods of newspaper production, in contrast to the provincial 
newspaper industry, where by 1979 two thirds of publications had 
introduced photocomposition and web-offset printing, and over half 
were in the course of introducing computer typesetting. (Jenkins, 
1979, pBO) 
The technical problems encountered in transforming production 
of national newspapers to new 'technology are immense. Quite apart 
. 
from the difficulty of negotiating away traditional craft jobs and 
skills with obdurate chapels, the problem of installing a new 
electronic system alongside a hot-metal system'and maintaining 
,daily production is considerable. (Robert Maxwell's offer to 
print national newspapers on a contract basis in new premises on 
new technology therefore offers a double enticement to proprietors). 
Among the reasons why newspaper corporations in the United States 
found it more "feasible to introduce the new technology are the fact 
that many US newspapers are local monopolies and could afford lengt~y 
stoppages whilst the technology was installed and the local ITU 
beaten into submission. (Jenkins,l979,p76) S~rike br'eaking printing 
companies and personnel are widely available in the US. (zimbalis~, 
.. 
• 
162 
1979) The extensive use of agency copy is common in the US 
and more suitable for electronic processing. Finally American 
newspaper readers were prepared to tolerate a lower quality product 
than would be accepted in Britain,. including poorly designed and 
laid-out newspapers, since they were considered essentially throw-
away products. (Martin, 1981,pp344-49) 
In the last analysis it is not simply that pr int worker s sk ills 
have not kept pace with technological innovation, but that the state 
of the art ofcomputerised typesetting and printing is not as yet 
as perfected as computer salesmen would like 7"publishers to believe: 
"The input practice of newspapers today is an uneasy 
compromise, a midway stage in technology development. 
Input of text is still the major bottleneck for employers 
in the newspaper industry. The word is a stubborn material 
for an industrial process. Optical character recognition 
offers few gains. One day speech-recognition systems 
may become commercially viable. In the meantime, 
each character, each WOLd must be typed into the 
computer by someone. The capitalist's ideal is that 
it should be typed in only once, preferably by someone 
who is semr-skilled and cheap or by someone who already 
has to do it once anyway, such as the journalist 
(making his rough manuscript into the final copy). 
In the meantime, they must make do with compositors, 
who have far too much understanding and ability in 
typography and, many of them, too little ability on 
the QWERTY board." (Cockburn,l983,pl03) 
If anything the limited but painful experience of the introduction 
of new technology on Fleet Street has hardened the a~titudes of the 
print unions, now that the claim that immediate introduction 
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was necessary for economic survival has worn thin. In both the 
NGA and NATSOPA the chapels involved have been able to disagree 
with their national officials and to see their opposition increase 
in effectiveness, "in both unions attitudes towards new technology 
were more hostile in 1979 than they had been five years earlier." 
(Martin, 1981, p341) In the NUYI the only union which seemed to 
have something to gain from the new technology, where members in 
.. national newspapers accepted Programme for Action by a small 
majority, a more critical attitude now also prevails. Many NUJ 
members were unhappy with their leadership's willingness to 
co-operate with the employers, and the 19777Annual Delegate Meeting 
, . 
of the union passed a resolution criticising the executive for 
failing to:inform the membership ~bout the new technology 
negotiations, and appointing a special committee to consider the 
union's policy to report back to the 1978 ADM. 
The NUJ policy on new technology which emerged, was not to 
seek to extend journalistic work into the field of production at 
present covered by other print unions. "In the absence of any 
inter-union new technology agreements; NUJ chapels will only enter 
into negotiations involving direct input or any other facet of new 
new technology which would necessitate journalists absorbing work 
traditionally carried out by another print union, if that print 
.. 
union has reached agreement to abandon that particular field of 
work." (NUJ,1980,pS9) The NUJ has maintained that it will not 
accede to direct' input over and against the interests of other 
unions 'and emphasises the importance of craft union support in 
the NUJ ~truggle for lOO%'organization so that the journalists 
are better able to resist management pressure: "traditional 
demarcation lines need not disappear in electronic systems. 
Proposals that journ,alists should take over the entire production 
.. 
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process need to be treated with a profound scepticism." One 
reason journalists have an interest in maintaining control over the 
introduction of new tec~nology is that looming over the horizon 
is another threat: computerokto-computer link ups with the facility 
for direct input of agency copy bypassing the editorial department 
altogether. (NUJ, 1980, p3) 
The defensive posture of the Fleet Street unions may well 
have been effective in protecting jobs, but the question must be 
posed whether this in its~lf i,s an adequate response to the :-:: 
transformation which is taking place in -the newspaper industry and 
the wider communications and information industries. As electronic 
networks of shared computer data bases are extended, functions 
presently performed by print wil~ be diffused into other information 
industries, and some workers now employed in print will be dispersed 
into these industries. It is important that unions are capable 
of recruiting ans representing workers across the information 
industries as they develop. There isa danger of a polarisation 
between the influx of large n~mbers of women workers employed in 
. 
de-skilled mass productio~ methods of text input and a ,small elite 
of craft work!'!rs clinging to the remaining areas of skHled work. 
Marshall contends: 
-(Th1s) would have extremely unfortunate lon~-term 
effects both for women and the majority of the • 
membership. Computer-based systems span process 
control, origination, production scheduling and 
waste and output measurementJ and the potential is 
enormous for feeding this information back to work 
study and cost analysis for use in negotiating 
productivity and pacing the work flow. If 
organi~ed labour hopes to -have any say in the future 
• 
of the industry then there must be a genuinely unified 
trade union which will give equal weight to both the 
needs of traditional print workers and those among the 
new workers who will increasingly fall within the print 
media sphere. (1983,pl06) 
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It would be perverse if unions continued to institutionalise and 
cherish distinctions between skilled and unskilled, intellectual 
and manual workers, and men and women, at the very moment when 
the evolution of:the capitalist mode of production is laying an 
objective basis for overcoming such divides. (Cockburn,l983,p234) 
At the moment the print unions have backed into a corner which 
they are furiously defending, but the question posed by Hyman and 
Elger must be confronted: 
" ••• If newspaper publishers become increasingly exposed 
to the normal disciplines of capitalist production, if 
the gains from fully exploiting technological 'innovation 
are thought to outweigh the immediate costs of challenging 
the whole basis of craft, organization, if the state helps 
assert 'a new unity :land·decisivene~s in employer·, 
strategy, can the.traditional forms of worker resistance 
and control prove viable?" (l98l,p128). 
.. 
.. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ALTERNATIVES: TECHNOtQGICAL BARBARISM OR A SOCIALISED MEDIA? 
TECHNOIDGICAL BARBARISM 
The new technology could mean the perpetuation and intensification 
of the passive receipt of centrally generated and filtered material, 
or it could be used in radically different ways to develop access 
to newspaper publishing and other information industries. As far 
as capital is concerned it is' the potential of the new technology 
to allow the political centralisation and profitable monopolisation 
of information supply that is attractive. Computerised composition 
enables page creation to take pl~ce in the publisher's office, 
pages which can then'be rapidly sent by facsimile transmission to 
decentralised production plants allover the country. Corporate 
integration with the electronic information and communication 
industries makes possible a global domination'of the mass media 
by a few multinationals. "The information revolution ••• is rapidly 
promoting information to the-status o~ a primary commodity, such 
as ·oil'or steel." (Marshall, 1983,p72) 
The history of modern t~chnology is synonymous with the rise 
of corporate capitalism. (Noble,l977) Technological change is not 
therefore an impersonal force for material advancement and social 
progress. The crucial questions are what kind of technological 
ehange, under whpse control, and for what purposes? For Marcuse 
the demands of modern technology were in reality but highly 
refined forms of capitalist domination: a "technological veil" 
was drawn over the reproduction of inequality and enslavement. (1964) 
Other members of the Frank'furt ScnOJ:)l loca·te the seeds o'f 20th 
century authoritarianism not merely in the development of capitalism, 
but in the scientific revolution. (Jay,l973) Gouldner has suggested 
.. 
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that the development of technocracy has crippled the prospect of 
democratic control. (1976) The capitalist state has nurtured "the 
growth of the multi-national corporations in a symbiotic relationship, 
and sponsored the rapid application of new technology, opening up 
the.prospect of a repressive and militaristic society. The Vietnam 
war was said to be the frontier of American technology. 
The n~w technologies of production are tightly linked to the 
new technologies of destruction. There is a disturbingly heavy 
involvement of communications companies in military projects: 
II Ci~il and military uses 
of electronic communications are inextricably miKed, 
and all the major electronics companies are heavily ~:"".:~ 
dependent on military contracts for their research and 
development programmes. Groups such as Matra, Harris, 
and IBM cover every aspect of military communications, 
manufacturing a complete range of hardware, from 
microchips to satellites, while their non-communication 
interests cover everything from battleships to ballistic 
missiles ••• Existing communications networks are not only 
used for gathering information on allies and ertemies alike, 
but they are essential for the dissemination of predominantly 
American ideology either through direct propaganda 
~ 
br98dcasting or by monopolising the cultural infrastructure ••• 
The role of ITT in the fall of the Allende government in 
Chile is infamous bu~ the extent to which telecommunications 
ariH audio-visual broadcasting systems are enmeshed in 
military networks, or the degree of overlap between 
television programme exports and foreign policy objectives 
is less well known." (Marshaii,1983,PP60-6l) 
As the scramble for ~ntrol of world wide data flows' intens.ifies, 
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the spectre of satellite warfare becomes realistic in the absence 
of any democratic agreement on communications policy. (Guardian, 
25 November 1983) 
In this fearful context there is a need to rediscover the 
Luddite tradition and challenge the prerogative of capital to 
devote the development of new~technology to expoitative and 
destructive purposes. (Albury and Schwartz,1982) Zimbalist states: 
"The actual reshaping of technology is the task of 
a broad political movement. Consciousness of the 
uses and purposes of different technological forms 
and the resources to pian and implement alternatives 
are necessary conditions for such a movement to be' 
successful. Th~ sufficient condition might be an entirely 
different mode of production." (1979,p126) 
In one example of the.birth of such a movement, in France in 1981 
tbe multinational arms and engineering giant Matra took over the 
largest French publishing house Hachette. Shortly after the 
takeover five sections of the,CGT including print, engineering, 
telecommunications workers and journalists called jointly for 
nationalisation of the group. The French unions were prepared to-
spea~ out against the multinationals and for democracy, rather than 
simply protecting sectional interests. With reference to the group's 
publications they did not propose direct nationalisation, but 
called for new forms of organization based on the active participation 
of media workers. (Marshall, 1983,p60) 
Such political movements may release the inherently emancipatory . 
possibilities of new media technologies and create opportunities for 
decentralised editorial design and.progra~ing, two-way ~ommunication, 
. 
and collective production. (Mosco and Herman, 19801 Mattelart and 
pierome, 1980) Information technology developed for commercial 
purposes may be made to serve very different purposes. Offset litho 
.. 
• 
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printing, [or example, developed rapidly in the 1960s to cope 
with the growing requirements of the revolution in office and 
business management. Demand for increasing quantities of internal 
busines.s communications went far bey.ond the capacities of duplicating 
machines, and offset machinery was introduced in great quantities. 
As the price of the second hand machines fell they became cheap 
enough for the alternative press to purchase. This re-opened the 
possibility of groups of working people raising sufficient capital 
to start their own papers. Offset litho printing allows the 
maximum flexibility in production, giving an editorial collective 
control over. layout right up to the last minute. The basic techniques 
can be learnt quickly, and it is ideally suited economically to the 
small radical papers which tend to print between 1,000 and 10,000 
copies. (MFG, 1980c,p6) The beauty of litho is the wide range of 
methods available, from the simple to the complex, which means 
groups can choose the most appropriate level of technology for 
themselves. (Whitaker, 1981,p86) Marshall maintains: 
"Although not substantial economically, the underground 
press proved to be the most e~imental, dynamic and 
uncontrollable movement 1n the graphic arts ~or almost 
SO years, in fact since the new typographers and dadaists 
had preated such havoc in the early 1920s ••• The freedom 
given to the designer by offset litho broke completely 
with the rectangular conventions of letterpress and 
created the perfect vehicle cfor the outpouring of 
energy and ideas from the new counter-culture. The new 
. 
designers explored every possibiUt.y (and even a few 
impossibilit*es) of the process, not'only in the 
national papers and ~agazines, but also in ·hundreds 
of local publications which sprang up during the 
aame period." (1983,p36) 
• 
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Equally it may be possible that adaptions of computerised 
typesetting and printing, and modi ications of other electronic 
communications technologies may offer unintended technical 
opportunities for the creation of a socialised media. Though it 
must be recognised that the present attitudes that prevail in 
the print unions towards such developments range from the 
ambivalent to the hostile. 
A SOCIALISED MEDIA 
There is no shortage of ideas concerning the reform or radical 
change of the media industr i~s, what are lacking are the political 
organization and economic resources to achieve it. Most proposals 
involve some measure of state intervention. When considering the 
possibility of state intervention to reform the media two contrasting 
arguments need to be considered. The first is that state intervention 
in the media is dangerous to the freedom of express ion. The second 
is that state intervention in a capitalist society rarely succeeds 
• 
in its declaced objectives, though it may well have other serious 
consequences. The first argument is superficial, is based on the 
experience of the Eastern European countries r~ther than the liberal 
democracies of the capitalist West, and yet has p~otected the 
private own~rs of the press from reforming governments throughout 
this century. Thus the simplistic assumption has been successfully 
canvassed that the only alternative to a commercial press is a 
state controlled press. (Whale,l977,p80) Education, libraries, the 
film industry, radio and television have all been subject to state 
intervention and regulation in Britain, and whatever the shortcomings 
of these cultural institutions, freedom of expression is not notably 
greater of more diverse in the privately owned press. 
The second argument is more substantial~ and is based on doubts 
171 
concerning the method, feasibility, and outcome of state 
intervention. AS Raymond Williams' insists, "There can be no 
useful intervention along orthodox Labour lines ••• No intervention 
within the terms of the late capitalist corporate organization is 
defensible, since the rationale of such organization~is at once 
the reduction of its products to an increasingly standardised 
range and, with this, the reduction oft ,total employment." (l978,p20) 
.. A fatal flaw in the approach of many radical reformers is an over-
emphasis on centrally directed government reform and a neglect of the 
role of media workers. If the desire is to abandon the dinosaurs 
of the capitalist press to extinction, it is important not to 
abandon print workers too, but to elicit,:' their assistance in the 
struggle 'to change the press in order that publicly funded press 
facilities are not monopolised by the middle class as higher education 
and many other publicly funded cultural institutions are. 
Highlighting the limitations of the previous piecemeal approach 
to the teform of the media Murdock and Golding have pointed to the 
variety of Commissions and inquiries into different aspects of the 
. 
mass media which fisstly play down the inter-relations between 
media sectors, and secondly fail to relate questions·of mass 
communications to more general. areas of public policy. (And thirdly, 
it could be added, tend to see the essential purpose of reform as 
... 
to guara~tee the survival and maintenance of existing media structures). 
"This piecemeal approach to analysis and policy has been overtaken 
· .... 'nd.:rendered completely r~dundant by recent developments in the 
structure of British capitalism, and more particularly by the 
rise of communications conglomerates with significant holdings in 
a whole range of information, entertainment and leisure industries." 
(1977a,pp94-9S) Murdock and Golding·' set out eight cr iter la against 
which proposed model~ and reforms can be evaluated: . 
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1. Diversity - the idea that the media should express or provide 
a platform for as full a range of views, and forms of expression 
as practicable. (Though diversity is not guaranteed simply by 
multiplicity). 
2. Accessibility - the principle that communications media should 
be accessible to all modes of expression and all social groups. 
Access is a necessary complement to diversity in confronting the 
problem of cultural restriction that economic concentration has 
created. 
3. Responsiveness - the media need to be responsive to their 
audiences, communication should be two way and economically powerful 
media should be required in some way to meet the wishes of those 
who receive their services. 
4. Cultural production should be separated from its finance. The 
production of mass communications primarily for profit, whether -
selling the medium's output to the largest audience, or rentin~ the 
audience to advertisers, distorts the objective of diverse and 
democratic communications. 
5. Standards of production in some sectors will require large scale 
production facilities which should continue to be available though 
outside the control of the media conglomerates. 
6. Accountability - that the activities of the media should receive 
directly or indirectly some kind of public supervision. 
7. Communications media must be considered in toto, the various 
media industries are no longer distinct and administrative discussions 
must reflect their consolidated nature. 
8. External democracy must be complemented by some form of internal 
industrial democracy. (1977~, pp 106-7) 
A summary of the kind of measures proposed for the reform of 
the press by the Labour Party, IWC, and Campaign for Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom, has been drawn up by James Curran and Stuart 
Holland, which may be assessed in the light of the Murdock and 
Young criteria: 
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1. Press Co-operatative Development Agency (PCDA)- should be 
established to provide start up capital for new publications under 
workers' control. the PCDA would hold non-voting shares so that it 
would not be in a position to influence editorial policy. It would 
play a role in expanding freedom of expression as well as creating 
new jobs. 
2. National Print Corporation (NPC)- should be set up to make 
facilities available at modest prices to newspapers expressing 
minority opinions. 
3 publications Distribution Co-operative (PDC)- should be established 
on a properly funded basis in both wholesaling and retailing to 
facilitate the distribution of minority publications. 
4. Advertising Revenue Board (ARB) - should redistribute advertising 
revenue more fairly between publications. This could be done on the 
simplest model of compensating publications according to a set ratio 
between sales and advertising revenue, regardless of their politics, 
similar to the scheme in~roduced in France in 1913. 
5. Anti-Monopoly Legislation - ownership groups with more than 15% 
of their respective markets - the level at which anti-trust authorities 
in the united States now consider ~prima facie liable for abuse -
should be divested. Joint ownership of press and broadcasting should 
also be prohibited in order to encourage maximum freedom of expression. 
6. The Open Press Authority (OPA) - would administer .the transfer 
of ownership of press conglomerates, broken up under the anti-
monopoly legislation, to co-operatives or independent trusts 
accountable to the staffs of newspapers and magazines. 
7. Press Council - should be set up on a statutory basis, reconstituted 
so that it is more independent of the press and given the authority 
to insist that errors of fact are corrected with equal prominence 
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to that given in the offending article. (1979)· 
Though they represent an apparantly formidable body of 
reform, some potential weaknesses can be recognised in these 
proposals. Examining the first proposal, if co-operatives are 
to be encouraged, the question is what kind of co-operatives·,? 
The lessons of the Scottish Daily News were that transforming an 
existing title was difficult, that advertiser discrimination was 
intense, and that the co-operative newspaper was moulded to the 
dominant political values by a conservative editorial staff. There 
would have to be determined efforts to prevent these kindsof problems 
being reproduced in other co-operative newspapers. In particular 
radical proposals for co-operatives often imply a preservation of 
the separation of intellectual and manual labour in the creation 
of different editorial and printing co-operatives, or in restricting 
the rights of production workers: "The right of non-journalist 
labour to take part in the election to the board of newspapers, 
could be relative. It should not extend to control of the content 
any more than journalists' control should extend to the work process 
of production." (Holland,l978,pl22) The proposal for a National 
Printing Corporation could provide the economies of scale to 
smaller publications now only enjoyed by Fleet Street, but it 
could also raise the hackles of the print unions if it was seen 
as a publicly funded attempt to "assist in the ~ationalization of 
newspaper plant," as the Minority Report of the Royal Commission 
envisaged it. (1977,p246) In the past nationalization ,has proved 
synonymous for workers with redundancies and worsened conditions, 
the NPC would have to show it was something different to this. 
With regard to the proposals on redistributing advertising 
revenue, the question may be posed - why tolerate the pernicious 
influence of advertising upon media institutions.? In the past 
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advertisers have had the power of life or death over publications, 
have dichotomised the national press, and coarsened and commercialised 
the editorial of all newspapers. It is doubtful whether a simple 
redistribution of revenue as proposed could finally overcome all of 
these problems. Therefore it may be asked why keep the media in 
subservience to expensive and parasitic advertisers when the functions 
they perform could be far more efficiently andinexpensively conducted 
by consumer information services? Journalists as well as _artists;'_ 
photographers, film makers, actors and technicians could be freed of 
the golden chains of the adman's demands, and encouraged and funded 
to further their talents in directions other than selling cars, 
tobacco and soapowder. Finally, with reference to the anti-monopoly 
legislation and the OPA, whether any government could proceed with 
such policies against the incensed opposition of capital, would 
depend upon the active support of workers inside the companies 
concerned. 
Conclusion 
The media industries, -",.including newspapers, are as important 
and sensitive as health care or education, and therefore should 
be removed from the iniquities of private ownership and the market 
system. What is being proposed is not state control of the press, 
or BBC type boards of bureaucratic and elitist Oxbridge Fabians, 
or an omnipotent party or vanguard in control of the press. 
What is being proposed is an end to the social and industrial 
apartheid between the few who are allowed to think and express 
their ideas, and the many who are supposed merely to work to 
convey those ideas. Only then could there be the replacement 
of the insanely magnified voices and absurdly cruel economics 
of the capitalist press with a genuine democratic diversity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of Volume One concerned the ex~crienccs of the 
.?cot.ti£h Daily NC\ol!1 co-opcrutivc; und Volume 'I\'lO, .:lfter .. conf.:idednCJ 
the political economy of the press, concluded with an as::>essment of 
the possibilities of media co-operatives. In this final volume an 
attempt will be made to examine the experiences, problems and 
potential of the producer co-operative movement more generally. 
The central focus of the analysis will be upon the question of 
whether the constraints and forces of market systems are structurally 
inimical to the achievement of the· ideals of produc~r co-operatives; 
or \o:hether producer co-operatives operating in market competition 
resolve some of the fundamental contradictions and tensions of 
capitalism as market socialists would contend. 
The historical development of workers co-operatives wi~l be 
considered in Chapter Two, exploring,how the radical ideals of the 
early co-operators became tempered by· the pressures of commercial 
trade. The compatibility of the pursuit of democratic control and 
competitive efficiency will be e~amined. The reasons for the relative 
success of the consumer co-operative movement will be looked at, 
and finally the brief flowering and disappearance of the movement 
• 
for workers control. 
In the following two chapters the careers of the two other 
large co-operatives funded by Benn's Department of Industry are 
studied, KME and Triumph Meriden, revealing the similarity of the 
dilemmas experienced with the Scottish Daily News, 'and the histor ical 
problems of producer co-operatives. In the following chapter the 
attitude of the Department of Industry to the co-operative experimen~ 
it launched is considered, and the official failure to learn anything 
constructive from the endeavours and sacrifices of the workers 
concerned remarked upon. 
Chapter six attempts a critical theoreticnl assessment of 
2 
the contrasting views supporting the growth of producer co-operatives, 
and reveals the different shortcomings of the optimism they share 
concerning the future of a producer co-operative sector. Nevertheless, 
in the final chapter·, the proposition is~: put for~ard that given 
the depths of the present recession and the lack of viable alternatives, 
it is possible that an extensive development of producer co-operatives 
could occur, given the support agencies, facilities and finance 
which they enjoy in other countries where they have flourished more 
freely. However it ~s·lmportant to distinguish the markedly different 
structures and orientations which exist. 
• 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION.? THE POLITICS OF ,-.rORKERS' CO-OPERATIVES 1800-1980. 
1I ••• There was in store a still greater victory of the political 
economy of labour over the political economy of property. 
We speak of the co-operative movement, especially the 
co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts 
of a few bold 'hands'. The value of these great social 
experiments cannot be overrated. By deed, instead of by 
argument, they have shown that production on a large 
scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, 
may be carried on without the existence of a class of 
masters employing a class of hands; that to bear fruit, 
the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means 
of dominion over, and of extortion against, the labouring 
man himself; and that, like slave labour, like serf labour, 
hired labour is but a transitory and inferior form, 
desti'ned to disappear before associated labour plying 
its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous 
heart ••• 11 (Karl Marx, Inaugral Address of the International 
Working Men's Association, 1974,pp79-80) 
Robert Owen and the New Moral World 
The boundless appeal of co-operation was born out of the widespread 
misery and despair at the time of the industrial revolution. Despite a 
growing productive power through the development of mechanization and the 
factory system, private ownership in a competitive market economy meant 
increasing unemployment, degredation ~nd poverty for the working class. 
Robert Owen presented a vision of a new society in which poverty of the 
people was not intensified as the wealth of the proprietors was accumulated: 
"Its basic concepts and its main conclusions, the right of every man to 
happiness, the right to the whole produce of labour, the right to work, 
to knowledge, to social equality, the longing for a social system that 
would encourage man to help man instead of competing against him - these 
and others touched a chord in almost every artisan and labourer who 
lived through the dark days of the industrial revolution." (Pollard,l960,pp89-90) , 
. 
As proprietor of a great spinning mill in New Lanark from 1800, OWen proved 
phat efficient production was possible whilst abandoning th~ worst excesses, 
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of the exploitation of labour prevalent in factories at the time. Owen 
provided better housing, shorter hours of work, improved wages, and educational 
and cultural facilitie.s. In particular he got children under ten out of the mill, 
reduced the hours of labour of older children, and campaigned for a bill to 
secure these conditions for children in all textile factories. Building on 
these practical reforms, Owen published a series of books which proclaimed that 
poverty was a result of the organization of society, not the responsibility of 
the poor; and set forward plans for new model communities based on manufacture 
and agriculture practicing equality and self-government. In 1824 Owen established 
a community, New Harmony in the United States to test his ideas, with largely 
disastrous results. There were many weaknesses in Owen's utopian beliefs, 
but "his true weakness, and one to which his position as manager and employer 
contributed, was his inability to see that the new environment must be created 
by the efforts and struggles of the working people themselves." (Morton, 1969, 
·p.24). A related weakness was a dependence on the wealthy .and powerful to 
assist financially in the creation of his communities, at the very moment they 
• 
were resorting to more repressive measures to control working class protest. 
Frederick Engels deplored this ambivalence: "English Socialism arose with OWen, 
a manufacturer, and proceeds therefo~e with great consideration towards the 
bourgeoisie and great injustice, towards the proletariat in its methods, althou9h 
it culminates in demanding the abolition of class antagonism between bourgeoisie 
and proletariat. The Socialists are thoroughly tame and peaceable, accept 
our existing order, bad as it is, so far as to reject all other methods but 
that of winning public opinion ••• While bemoaning the demoralization of the 
lower cl~sses, they are blind to the element of progress in this dissolution of the 
old social order, and refuse to acknowledge that. the corruption wrought by 
private interests and hypocrisy in the property-holding class is much greater •. 
They acknowledge no historic development, and wish to place the nation in a 
state of Communism, at once, overnight, no~ by the unavoidable march of its 
political development up to the point at which the transition becomes both 
possible and necessary." (1969, pp.262-3). 
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OWen had to accolllinodate however, to thebroader, \'lOrking class oriented 
co-operative movement which was formed among skilled artisans in London and 
other towns during his absence in the United States. Though receptive to 
Owen's ideas these workers were radical and founded the first trade unions. 
As trade unions multiplied, Owen became involved, but he laboured under a 
misconception shared by most co-operative idealists: "He began to dream of a 
society in which the unions became productive bodies, dominating the industries 
which they covered, and ultimately replacing the State by a network of inter-
related producers co-operatives. He believed that this could be done quite 
peacefully, and opposed any idea of class struggle. The workers, in~vitably, 
saw things differently. While they were, many of them, ready to welcome Owen's 
utopian vision with.enthusiasm, they were in practice engaged in class struggle 
every day of their lives and for them the unions remained, as they had always 
been primarily a means of defending or improving their actual conditions of 
life, an aspect of things with which Owen hardly concerned himself at all." 
(Morton, 1969, pp.51-2). 
In 1833 OWen presided at a conference which decided to form the all 
embracing trade union, which later adopted the name the Grand National Consolidated 
Trades Union, and soon had recruited half a million members. The aim of the 
union was not s~ly to raise ~ages, but to replace the existing st~te. The 
government reacted sternly against the growing wave of unionism, the Tolpuddle 
I 
farm workers were deported, and strikes and lock-outs became widespread. At 
this crucial point Owen quarrelled with James Morrison, editor of the Union's 
journal,The Pioneer, and with J. E. Smith, editor of The Crisis, which he 
controlled directly. Owen accused them of advocating crude class hated instead 
of concentrating on the peaceful transformation of society. He declared 
"It is time the official organ of the Consoliated Union (The Pioneer) should 
cease uselessly to irritate other classes of society; this is not the mode to 
serve any cause, but to create unnecessarily greater obstacles to retard the 
progress of the sacred cause of human amelioration, undertaken by the National 
Consoliated Union." (Morton, 1969, pp.S4-S,pl96). A few months later, both 
G 
the journals ... wre closed, and the editors driven out of the mcve..-nent. But ~r.e 
Union was by 110\'1 virt.ually dead, and Owen recognised this by establishing a new 
organization: the Consolidated Association of Industry, Humanity and Y~owledge. 
Owen replaced The Crisis with a new journal to project more accurately his 
philosophy of purely moral revolution, The New Moral World. 
As the general union broke up into small co-operatives and trade unions, 
Owen abandoned trade union action for his "connection with the great trade union 
uprising of these years had been, in a sense, an accident. He was by nature 
neither a trade union organizer, nor a revolutionary leader, but a prophet." 
(Cole, 1953, p.1Sl). The enduring ideal of Owenism was the desire to create 
immediately self-supporting, egalitarian, collectively controlled industrial 
communities, and Owen was reluctant about any efforts to create co-operation 
. 
in more limited ways such as in the form of trading associations. Yet the 
poverty and unemployment which this utopian communism was intended to relieve, 
prevented working people from accumulating sufficient funds to launch the new 
communities, or if they were launched, determined their immediate collapse. 
The new morality could not survive in an amoral economic sytern, and its upholders 
were destined for either total isolation, failure or absorption. 
The Rochdale Pioneers 
Distinct periods in the early history of co-operation have been recognised 
by Pollard: in the first four decades of the nineteenth century Owenist idealism 
was ascendant, with a powerful desire eo escape the ravages of early industrial 
capitalism. Throughout the rest of the century the practicality of the Rochdale 
principles became dominant, with a desire to establish a place for the working 
class wi thin the new-found economic affluence. There was a sharp contrast between 
the firm outline of the New Moral World of the early co-operators, and the 
shapeless yearnings of the later co-operatives once they had departed from the 
day to day business of profitable 'storekeeping: "The former regarded the stores 
. . 
and their associate workshops as temporary means towards thegrancer object of 
the ending of the capitalist social system and its replacement by a New Moral 
world, a type of socialism in which hardly any of the existing institutions and 
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social relationships would survive in recognisable form. The latter saw in 
the stores and works~ops themselves the promises and fulfilment of a better 
world, in ,,'hich to all intents and purposes the continuance of capitalism, 
with all its capital owners and \-lage earners \-las implicitly taken for granted." 
(Pollard, 1967, p.102). 
It is ironic that the Rochdale Pioneers, who are acknowledged as the 
founders of the modern co-operative movement were responsible for the first 
major breach with Owenist, idealism: the decision in 1844 to pay individual 
dividends on purchases was contradictory to the collectivist and egalitarian 
orientations integral to co-operative ideal. This was achieved only by the 
retail members, concerned about the size of their dividend, overcoming the 
workers desire to run their mill as a workers co-operative; and implied members 
needed a monetary inducement to trade with their own store: surpluses gained by 
trade, would be distributed unequally among individuals, instead of being 
retained by the society for use on community projects. h~ilst the OWenists had 
believed their grocery storas were "antechambers to the millenium", the new 
co-operators "became more and more involved in the practical operations of 
their successful store and its branches. At no time was there a deliberate 
break with the past, but the ideals of justice, of fair dealing, of banishing 
poverty and want, were gradually transferred to the day-to-day operation of 
distribution and, before long, product,ion in Rochdale, while the ultimate 
idealof community life receded even farther into the dim future". (Pollard, 
1967, p.97). As idealism evaporated under the weight of more mundane and 
immediate issues, the original co-operative principl .es were revised: the 
commitment to equality became merely a commitment to increasing wages - co-oper-
tion became a lever for rising within capitalism not for abol shing it. Efforts 
to create self-governing workshops became only sporadic, as the movement for 
consumer co-operation developed extensively, with the establishment of factories 
merely to serve the consumer societies needs. Though co-operative leaders 
retained a concern for the welfare of their employees, this was allied to a 
central concern with efficie'ncy and profitability, as in bonu~ sharing schemes 
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,.,.hich were "found to induce zealous co-operation by them (the workers) in thE" 
promotion of tlle interests of the company, to lessen tile chances of disputes 
and strikes, and to result in larger production and greater and more regular 
profits". (B. Jones, 1894, p.499). 
Early industrial capitalism "las synonymous wi t.h exploitation, hardship 
and insecurity for the early co-operators, who looked for its imminent collapse, 
and replacement by a communist system. After 1850 prosperity increased, 
conditions improved and expectations were raised from the spectre of intensified 
exploitation to gradual amelioration. In this context co-operation made the 
grand compromise with capitalist society which enabled it to expand and grow 
rapidly, often by accepting the constrairl:S and orientations of the existing 
. 
system even when they contradicted co-operative principles. "The new Co-operation 
was no longer a gospel of'revolt, much less of revolution. ~took colour from 
its environment, and developed as •.• a field for the investment of working class 
savings as well as an expression of the Victorian ideals of ~elf-help." (Cole, 
1925, ,p.229). Just as the ASE was making trade unionism respectable, so the 
• 
new co-operators sought to make the co-operative movement o~e of the accepted 
institutions of Victorian society: "Profits were in prinCiple fervently defended, 
people 
and co-operation was lauded as making,working respectable, law-abiding, 
and property-owning citizens. Ii (Pollard, 1967, p.109) • 
The Webbs on Associations of Producers: Commercial Survival, Integration, and 
Democracy 
Therefore the history of producer co-operation, unfortunately, was not 
. that of a "peaceful revolution". (C. Webb, 1904). The acquisition of contemporary 
~siness values and org~ization in producer co-operatives, necessary for 
commercial survival, imposed a corresponding degeneration in democratic ideals 
and practices. (B. Jones, 1894). Sidney and Beatrice Webb were the most 
vehement in th~ir categorical· denunication of workers co-operatives: "Democracies 
of Producers, as all experience shows ••• ha~e hitherto failed with almost 
complete uniformity whenever they have themselves sought to win and organize 
the instruments of pr~uction. In the relatively few instances in which such 
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enterprises have not succumbed as business concerns, they have ceased to be 
Democracies of Producers managing thei:r own \wrk,· and have become, in effect, 
associations of capitali·sts." (1921a, p.133). "Moreover, those societies which 
have had any marked financial success, or have gro,~ to any size, prove, for the 
most part, to have departed considerably from the form of the Self-Governing 
Workshop - to such an extent, indeed, that it is not far off the truth to say 
that form is left behind .••• What 'v'le see is that the Self-Governing \'~orkshop is 
hardly ever, for any length of time a stable form. Its essential feature, 
the union in the same persons of manual workers and managers, hardly ever endures. 
It is always tending to revert to the ordinary separation of the capitalist system, 
of non-working capital owners who control, of a manager subject to t~em who 
directs,and of manual working wage-earners who obey.1I (1914, pp.20,22). 
In'1914 the Webbs published a survey conducted by the Fabian Research 
Department to investigate the question, IICan the organization of industry be 
based exclusively on associations of producers?1I The Webbs defined these as the 
lIassociation of workmen to manage their own work in their own workshop, and to 
• 
share among themselves the product of their combined labour.'! (p.13) They 
dismissed earlier utopian efforts as not meeting this definition, and then 
presented a catalogue of disastrous failures of producer co-operatives beginning 
with the Christian Socialists IISociety for Promoting Working Men's Associations" 
! 
attempt in 1849 to establish a dozen self-governing workshops of tailors, shoe-
makers, builders, smiths, printers, bakers, and pianoforte makers. Almost all 
of these associations of producers IIwith melancholy uniformity collapsed" in 
insolvency. The few that became financially successful, became exclusive with 
stringent rules of admission, were mercenary in spirit, indulged in reckless 
internecine competition, and within a few years had become "merely little 
profit-making ventures in the hands of small masters". Though other independent 
self-governing workshops were founded on the same model in different towns and 
trades, they normally experienced a similar fate. A second attempt on a bigger 
scale were the Trade Union Co-operative SOCieties. Successive attempts were 
made by trade unions to establish co-operative workshops: after the strike ~d 
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lockout of 1851 the ABE General Council resolved "that hosti12 resistance of 
labour against capitaI is not calculated to enhance the condition of th~ 
labourer •.• all future 'operations should be directed in promoting the system 
of self-employment in associative workshops as the best means of effectually 
regulating the conditions of labour." But none of the co-operatives established 
in the engineering, iron and textile industries lasted more than a few years. 
During 1871-5 the Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire Miners Unions invested 
in colliery enterprises to be worked by the miners themselves, which failed. 
Finally in 1899-1906 associations were set up in the printing, boot making and 
carpentry trades with assistance from the unions, including .four building 
enterprises, which were liquidated within a few years. A third stream of 
associations identified by the Webbs were joint stock companies set up to work 
cotton mills with one pound shares to attract working class investors. These 
"Working Class Limiteds" hardly differed from joint stock capitalism, but 
became a great feature of Lancashire mill towns. 
It was not usual for workers to have shares in the mill in which they were 
• 
employed but when workers were shareholders in their O\~ mill, they were in a 
strong position to resist management discipline. A fourth stream of co-operative 
producers were those established by the consumer societies to produce exclusively 
for them, which enjoyed a more stable existance. Finally there were the co'-
operatives emanating from the Labour Copartnership Association, after the 
failure of which, the Association became more enamoured to the idea of profit 
sharing between capital and labour. (p.14). 
Out of the thousands of co-operatives established, in the years 1850-1914, 
the Webbs found the results "extraordinarily meagre", with fewer than a 
hundred societies surviving as co-operative associations, though even these had 
drifted a long way from the ideals of COoperation. The Webbs classified the 
survivors as "self-governing workshops, partial autonomies, and dependents of 
the stores". In the self-governing work~ho~s the management committee was mainly 
composed of workers employed by the SOCiety, and at least a large proportion of 
the persons employed were shareholders, free therefore from the domination of 
1] 
outside capitalists. Only one co-operative could be found which fully mel: 
these criteria, a small society of cotton weavers in r. .. ancashire, the Nelson 
Self--Help Manufacturing' Society'. Established in 1888 after a six !uonth strike, 
"It has throughout remained, in the strictest sense, a society for finding its 
own members continuous employment under agreeable conditions, under the mnnage-
ment of a committee of eight,who are all themselves employees, and who are 
annually elected by the other employees who form the shareholding body." 
However though solvent, the society was less productive than other mills, one 
critic maintaining that, "Some of the members ... refuse to accept the ordinary 
discipline which prevails in private factories. The manager's authority is 
questioned, and often not accepted; and complaints of the manager's treatment 
of workers are frequently laid before the committee. As the whole of the members 
of the conmittee are workers for the society they arc easily accessible ••• " 
(p.lS). The Webbs frequent reference to the lack of management authority to 
impose work discipline in producers co-operatives, is remintscent of a Spectator 
report ("a Philistine English periodical") of 1866 upon which Marx commented 
• 
with amusement, "The same paper finds that the main defeCt in the Rochdale 
co-operative experiments is this: 'They showed that associations of workmen 
could manage shops, mills, and almost all forms of industry with success, and 
they immediately improved the condition of the men, but then they did not leave 
a clear place for masters'. What a dreadful thing!" (1976, p.449). A second 
group of self-governing workshops were thirteen boot making societies in 
Leicester and Kettering in which although most of the shareholders were not 
employees, most of the workers were shareholders, and workers composed the 
majority on the management committee. Working conditions in these co-operatives 
greatly impressed the Webbs: 
nWe were struck, on vising several of these societies, 
~ and in talking to those intimately acquainted with 
their working, with the ease, ~ehity and sense of 
freedom that prevails among those who are fortunate 
enough to be employed in them. There is an absence 
of 'drive' and martinet discipline. The men ~nd 
women, who are all on piccc,,'ork rates, can talk and sing 
at theil." worK; they may break off to have tea, or linger 
at meals; they have no difficulty in getting permission 
to abaent themselves for any cause, or to engage in 
public work. 'rhere is great continuity of employment, 
because every endeavour is made to keep on all the workers. 
There is absolute security against dismissal through the 
caprice or tyranny of a foreman or manager. It is, indeed, 
a fixed policy that no worker shall ever be discharged, 
except for grave fault. The workplaces are healthy and 
'well-ventilated, and manners and morals are well above 
the average. No wonder that workers are generally anxious 
to obtain admission, and that L~ere is a long waiting list 
of applicants for employment! With regard to women workers, 
in particular, these sod.eties, it is clear, cffe~ many 
advantages. A competent observer at Leicester laid great 
stress on their superiority 'as places of employm~nt for 
girls. It is true that in private firms girls can often 
earn more on piecework (even up to 30 shillings), but 
this is at the cost of terrible 'drive' and speed, and 
the girls are often sick. Sometimes they are almost too 
tired to speak when they get home, and 'feel disagreeable'. 
They can't keep up the str~in,and come on the sick list. 
Now the 'Productive' girls, on the contrary, have a very 
low sickness rate. They are not kept working at such a 
high speed, and there is no such 'drive' and strain to 
urge them on. Also they have little indulgences, ~~ps 
~ of tea, may chat, are not watched so mucq. All this 
is appreciated.'" (p.16). 
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The Webbs record that one of the costs of this humanity, was a loss of 
economic efficiency in comparison to rivals, due partly to less disciplined work, 
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but also the problem of technological innova.tion when it threatened \'!orkers 
. 
tradi tional jobs, "if a.ny change should be projected which ,vould mean a displace-
ment of labour it meets with such real opposition from the employees that the 
old method is retained and the society finds itself at an economic disadvantage 
in the markets". 
The second class of co-operatives defined by the Webbs were the 'partial 
autunomies', a heterogeneous group of about thirty associations established by 
the Labour Copartnership Association or adopting the constitution it advised. 
The Association had abandoned the principle of self-governing workshops, but 
simply maintained provisions that manual workers should have the right: to 
receive some share in the net profits, after payment of a fixed rate of interest 
on capital; to become to some extent shareholders in the concern if they desire; 
and to have some representation on the committee of management of those employees 
who are shareholding members. The Webbs were critical of these organizations 
in ''1hich only a trifling number of shares were held by worker.s ,and where it 
was usully provided in the rules that representatives of the employees should be 
• 
in a minority on the management committee. The only useful examples of this form 
were print workships set up by the print unions with the desire to get a 
union foqting in a town, set a standard of trade union wages and hours, and 
provide secure employment for a branch secretary, though these societies normally 
remained quite small. The Webbs concluded of the 'partial autonomies,' "\,1e 
cannot refrain from the observation that there are cases in which societies trade 
upon the Co-operative name, or upon their professed adoption of profit-sharing 
or co-partnership, but are, in fact, nothing but little combinations of small 
masters, making a profit for themselves, in salaries and interest on shares, by 
employing subordinate labour at extremely low rates of wages, sometimes actually 
as 'team masters' or givers out of ~rk to be done at home, which is, in fact, 
'sweating'. It· would be a gain if the Co-operative Union and Labour Co-partnership 
Association would 'purify' their lists." Th& final category of co-operatives 
were the 'dependents of the stores'. These still professed to be associations 
of producers, but were "in substance mere adjuncts of groups of Co':operative Stores 
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(associations of consumers), which provide practically the whole 
market, supply t?e greater part of the share and loan capital, 
~~d dominate the ~ccieties' managing committees by their representatives 
to the same extent as, by their orders, they determine its production". 
(p.19) • The twelve co-operatives in this class were large, prosperous 
and stable, but with a management from above, if not from outside. 
Reviewing their survey the Webbs narrowed down the pel:vasive 
difficulties producer co-operatives encountered to three internal 
problems: 
"We are driven to conclude on the evidence, that the 
relative ill success of associations of producers - their 
almost invariable experience of finding themselves thwarted, 
their high hopes disappointed, and their very continuance 
a permanent struggle - is due to something in themselves, 
to be sought for in that which is common to them all, 
. 
whatever their trades and whatever their countries •••. 
• 
We infer that it is the very form of associatio?s of 
producers that is ill-adapted to survive. Applied to the 
democratic control of inqustry, such a form seems to suffer 
inherently from three leading disadvantages which may be 
seen militating against efficiency in practically all the 
recorded experiments. The group of workmen who make a 
particular commodity, though they may know all the technical 
processes of their industry, do not seem able, when they 
control their own enterprise, to secure, in a high degree, 
either (i) adequate workshop discipline; or (ii) the requisite 
• 
knowled~e of the market; or (iii) sufficient alacrity in 
c~anging processes." (p.21. 
Baving attributed the reasons for fa~l~re to the internal operations 
of the producer co-operative themselves, rather than to the competitive 
market system in which the co-operatives functioned, the ·Webbs offer 
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the solution of the integration of the producer co-operatives with 
. 
the consumer co-operatives, which in effect would partially extract 
the producer co-operatives from the market. Thus consumer societies 
would provide the producer co-operatives with a ready supply of 
capital, management supervision, a stable market, and sufficient 
pressure for technical innovation. (p.22) The Webbs seemed unconcerned 
that since the new management committees of the producer co-operatives 
would be drawn from the consumer societies (who were, they claimed, 
"representatives of a working class constituency") there would be an 
inevitable loss of autonomy and democratic control in the producer 
co-operatives. 
D.C. Jones v The Webbs: Survival and Democratic Participation. 
An impressive contemporary attempt to refute the Webb's 
insistence on the invariably disastrous implications of producer 
co-operatives is contained in the work of D.C. Jones (l976a). He 
• 
accurately detects an air of unremitting vindicative dismissal of the 
efforts to create producer co-operatives in much of the Webb's writing 
on, the subject: "All such associations of producers that start as 
alternatives to the capitalist system either fail or cease to be 
! 
democracies of producers." Jone~ takes issue with the Webbs on both 
the ability of producer co-operatives to survive, and their ability to 
sustain democratic participation. Presenting a largely economic and 
statistical analysis, rather than a political analysis, Jones begins 
with the definitional problem of what constitutes a producer co-operative, 
since the Webbs and other critics such as Ben Jones, tended to include 
organisations which possesse~ only the most ~rious claim to be 
producer·co-operatives,by practicing profit sharing for example, therefore 
diluting the participativeness of thei~ sample. However the definition 
Jones offers of "genuine" producer eo-operatives is a relatively weak 
one, with reference to the right of workers to share capita~, participation 
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0:1 the board, and a share in profits, wit.hout any condition as to 
the minimum ·proportion . which workers should enjoy relative 
to outsiders. (p.35). W-ith this definition Jones is able to show 
by a precise compilation of figures from different co-operative bodies 
that the producer co-operative movement, although very small, 
consisting of about 100 co-operatives with less than 10,000 workers, 
was still vigorous until 1918, when it began to gradually decline in 
size at least. 
Tackling the Webb's claim concerning the lack of viability of 
producer co-operatives, Jones aims to show that producer co-operatives 
hav~ survived for longer periods of time than private firms, by 
measuring the persistence and magnitude of the upward trend in the 
average age of co-operatives relative to private concerns. Thus in 
1963 the median age of producer co-operatives was 66 years, and that 
of small private firms 22 years. {p.461. It is helpful to remind critics 
. 
of co-operatives, that small capitalist companies regularly fail too, 
• 
but all Jones is really examining here, are the geriat;ric survivors of 
a decimated movement, since less than a third of the number of co-operatives 
were in existence in 1963 compared to 1895. Jones admits that the 
surviving co-operatives were heavily concentrated in older industries· 
such as clothing and footwear, whereas small capitalist companies 
included those in newer, expanding industries such as light engineering. 
Moreover when private businesses collapse, the normal course of action 
is to start up another company almost immediately, whereas when 
the co-operatives failed, as indicated by the declining numbers, 
producer co-operative initiative was permanently stifled. 
In a sustained critique of the Webbs pessimism about the 
participatory character of producers co-opera~ives, Jones extracts three 
measures of participation from their work: the share of workers in 
the membership of the society, in its capital, and on its organisi.ng 
canmittee. Jones maintains that if the share of workers i$ more than 
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50 per cent on these measures, then a society is highly participative, 
"the logic behind the choice of more than one half to signify high 
participation (equals potential control) is clear when referring to the 
number of employees on the board (more than half gives an employee 
majority, and all gives total employee control) or employees as a 
proportion of membership, or employee ownership or equity". (p.64). 
Yet these measures are highly formal and quite crude, if they are to be 
elevated in this way to statistical tests of participation, they need 
to be supplemented by further empirical analysis, such as the \'Jebbs 
and t~eir investigators make, into the operation of actual co-operatives. 
(Indeed Jones measures are derived from a statement by the Webbs on a 
., 
number of co-operatives: "In all these the share of the workers in 
the membership of the society, in its capital, in seats on its 
managing committee, and, generally, in its control o~ their industry 
. 
is not an effective onei" (19l4,p.l9); which Jones, in something of a 
lapse of scholarship translates as : " control of thei~ industry 
is not an effective one ••.• (because of the low) share of workers in 
the membership of the society •••• (and) on its capital (and) 
in seats on its organisi~g committee." (l976a, pp.48-49). Jones 
recognizes that these are not perfect measures of participation, and 
alludes to the problem of the fair representation of sectional interests 
on the shop floor (which in a reference to skilled craftsmen being 
preferred to unskilled women, the Webbs point out); and also the problem 
of how a dominant chief executive could actually be in control even 
when workers composed the whole of a board. However, Jones concludes, 
"in the absence of acceptable indices of participation the use of a simple 
alternative measure, albeit imperfect, is preferable to no measure at all.·" 
(p.6S). Even with these qualifications, the measures Jones employs 
distort and misrepresent the political reality in the co-operatives, 
and greatly exaggerate the level of worker participation and control, 
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in another academic instance of making what is readily quantifiable 
important, instead of making what is important quantifiable : 
Nevertheless the results which Jones obt.ains utilizing these 
measures of participation do not inspire confidence in the participative 
qualities of producer co-operatives, regardless of Jones claim 
that "the Webbs both misinterpreted the situation that existed when they 
wrote and .•.... their expectations for the future \.,.ere not fulfilled." 
(p. 52) • Tous by 1970 only one society had more than 50 per cent 
of the equity owned by employees, and only one society had employees 
constituting more than 50 per cent of the shareholding membership. 
The most impressive figure which Jones produces, is that by 1970 4G per cent 
of societies had 50 per cent or more worker representation on the 
management committee, and that the historical tendency was for those 
societies to survive with the larger proportion of workers on their 
management committee. (p.50) Jones scupulous concer~with statistical 
accuracy though, is combined with a neglect of basic political analysis . 
• 
He is aware of the importance of empirical investigation: "Notions 
and hypotheses abound in the field but most orthodox doctrine remains 
uqtested by its proponents", (D~C.Jones, 197Gb, p.27), but largely 
confines his study to statistical records, thereby miSSing any appreciation 
, 
of the organisational and structqral constraints which limit workers 
participation. 
The <:Iuestions which would need to be examined if Jones assertion 
of the sustained participation in worker co-operatives were to be 
verified, include the following: 
a) composition: who secured representation on the management board 
b) 
from among the worker,s? For example what proportion of 
different skill groups, and what proportion of administrative 
workers? 
influence: who dominates the decision making of the board in 
practice,· regardless of formal representation or who· formally 
constitutes' a majority? 
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c) issues: which issues are considered or are neglected by 
the management hoard? Which issues are considered realistic 
and which are dismissed as unreasonable? 
d) constraints: how restricted by the ext.ernal environment 
is the board in decision making. Which decisions derive from 
internal choice and which from external influence. 
It is only by analysis of these different areas that any adequate 
assessment of the distribution of power both ,dthin a co-operative, 
and in wider society, is possible. (Lukes, 1974). (Hence at the 
Scottish Daily News, that the workers should have a majority of the board 
representation was at first considered a critical issue. In practice 
what proved more im~ortant was: the unrepresentative nature of a number 
of those who were elected to the Council ostensibly as worker representatives; 
the overpowering influence of Robert Maxwell on the board; the fact that 
due to underfunding, Maxwell, union conservatism, and other reasons, 
many important issues were not properly considered; finally; the fact 
that both the government and the advertising market set such severe 
constraints upon the co-operative that there was little room for 
initiative or determining influence even at board level). In measuring 
the participative character of prpducer co-operatives, Jones places 
undue emphasis upon the articles of co-operative constitutions and formal 
structures: though a democratic constitution is an important condition 
of a democracy, it is by no means a guarantee of democracy, as in their 
different ways, the work of Michels (1962) and Marx (Draper, 1974) reveal. 
Formal democratic structures can often conceal the most oligarchical 
practices. 
Dismissing the Webbs i'spurious claims concerning allegedly 
inherent degenerative tendencies in the participatory character of producer 
. 
co-operatives", (1976a, p.66), Jones maintains that the Webbs unjustly 
stigmatized all producer eo-operatives as frauds or failures because 
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of their "prejudtced position". "Hence their unchanging attitude 
regarding the all~gedly non-participatory nature of producer co-operatives 
is probably largely a product of fixed ideology". (p.S7). This 
ideology, according to Jones, caused the Webbs to chastise producer 
co-operatives for degenerating as self-governing enterprises, and then 
inconsistently to praise the "genuine philanthropy" of the least self-
governing enterprises, thOae integrated with the co-operative retail 
stores. In fact the Webbs interpretation was not inconsistent: the 
features of associations of producers operating in a market system 
which·they objected most t~was that they stimulated self-interest and 
were highly unstable. In contrast associations of producers serving 
consumer associations created a form of production for use, and were 
highly stable, providing the possibility for production control and 
planning, inconceivable in a producer co-operative f],o{lting in a free 
market. The Webbs were right about the commercial hazards of producer 
• 
co-operation, and the tendency for participation to degenerate, though 
it was misleading of them to suggest that these were "inherent" qualities 
of producer co-operatives, rather than the result of being inserted in 
a competitive market system. 
On one point, Jones' critique of the Webbs is perfectly 
accurate: their obvious disdain for workers control, willingness to 
consider seriously themostvacuous bourgeois arguments against democratic 
control, and their preference for the efficiency and order of professional 
bureaucracy. This is apparent throughout their research work on 
co-operatives, where they repeatedly report without strong objection, the 
trivial complaints of disconsolate managers displaced by management 
committees: "The canmitteemen themselves are constantly complaining, 
criticising the m~ager's methods, pOinting out that their way of doing 
things would be more efficient in results than the manager's, staying 
his hand, and crippling his efforts in a manner which makes successful 
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working not quite possible •.. The system of having worker-members 
on the canmittee is felt to be wrong in principle and injurious in 
practice; they rarely possess an aptitude for business, they resent 
and refuse to acknowledge managerial discipline, and by their action 
they encourage workers not on the cOlluoittee to adopt the same course. 
The society has too many masters !" (1914 ,p.16) • The Webbs extend 
this disdain for workers control into a general dismissal of the 
possibility of democratic management in any association: 
"No self-governing workshops, no trade union, no 
professional association, no co-operative society ••• 
has yet made its administration successful on the 
lines of letting the subordinate employees elect or 
dismiss the executive officers or managers The 
relationship set up between a foreman or manager, who 
has throughout the working day to give orders eo his 
staff, and the members of that staff who, assembled i~ 
general meeting, criticize his action or give him 
directions, with the power of dismissing him if he fails 
to conform to their desires, has always been found to be 
an impossible one." U92la,p.166) • 
This bureaucratic elitism was, as Jones argues, an unfortunate Fabian 
influence upon the debate over workers control in the British labour 
movement in the twentieth century, particularly during the period of 
post-war nationalisation when workers were excluded from any formal 
involvement in the 'control of their industries. 
However Jones sweeping references to the implications of producer 
, co-operatives for industrial democracy generally, are untenable. He 
i~sists 'that Clegg was wrong to maintain that only unions can represent 
the industrial interests of workers: . "In British producer co-operatives 
workers' interests have been primarily represented by diverse 
institutions whose members are accountable to the workforce. Among 
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these institutions unions assume a respected but distinctly 
secondary position in importance for directly representing worker 
interests." (D.C.Jones, 1976a, p.59). On the contrary, the 
work of the Webbs and of other invest:igations into producer 
co-operatives, reveals how central trade unions were to maintaining 
acceptable pay,employment and conditions in producer co-operatives, 
which could be defined as the basic "industrial interests" of workers; 
for example in one society, "Adopting the hours fixed by the Factory 
Act,and the scale of piecework rates currently enforced by the trade 
union, questions of administration were minimized".' (S~and B.Webb,l914,p.lS) , 
What Jones fail~ to realise, which Clegg emphasised, is the importance 
of independent trade unions free to represent workers interests without 
assuming the concerns of management. The central weakness of Jones' 
approach to workers co-operatives is the assumption that with the 
acceptance of a formal democratic structure by a co-operative operating 
in a market economy, the control of workers will be enhanced.- In 
reality workers in this situation are even more vulnerable to the 
exploitative pressures of market forces as most research, including that of 
the Webbs, shows. The Webbs believed that integration within the wider 
consumer co-operative movement was a means by which producer co-operatives 
could escape the inimical effects of the market. 
The Consumer Co-operative Movement 
As far as the webbs were concerned "the great and growing 
Co-operative Movement' of Associations of Consumers ••• has succeeded as 
markedly as the Associations of Producers have failed." Apparently they 
were impressed not simply by the huge commercial success of the consumers 
mo~ement, but also by the principle of the consumer co-operatives producing 
to meet their members needs, which the webbs defined, rather deceptively, , 
as production for use not for exchange, and elaborated into a theory of 
consumers democracy, as explained, without false modesty, .by Beatrice Webb: 
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"In great Britain it was nearly half a century before 
the co-operators became aware of their government as 
not one of workers control, but a consumers democracy. 
In the debates of the co-operative congress right 
down to the end of the 19th century, most of the 
intellectuals of the movement, as distinguished from 
the working class administrators, held to the ideal of 
an association of producers. The theoretical justification 
for a consumers co-operative movement organising both 
manufacture and distribution on the basis of supplying 
ascertained wants - to be supplemented by an absolutely 
co-extensive organisation of the workers in trade unions 
and professional organisations, and both to be complemented 
by a national and municipal organisation of citizens as 
such for essentially civic functions - was, I think, 
first promulgated in my book on the Co-operative Movement 
of Great Britain (by Beatrice Potter) published in 1891." (192Ib,p.17) 
Though this theory of consumer democracy earned the Webbs and 
other Fabians the taunt of "consumptive collectivists" frau G.D.B.Cole 
and the Guild Socialists who remained committed to the concept of 
1 
self-government in industry, the Webbs had the satisfaction of seeing 
the consumer co-operative movement grow into massive proportions. 
In the period 1881-1921, though the number of co-operative societies 
remained at around 1,300, the aggregate membership of the societies 
increased from just over half a million people to four and a half million 
people, many of whom represented families; therefore, it was estimated, 
one third of the total population of Great Britain were included in 
membership. During the same period the total sales turnover of the 
consumer societies increased from E18.5 million to £200 million. TO 
supply the co-operative retail societies with goods a fed~ral Co-operative 
Wholesale SOCiety ~as successfully established in England and Scotland. 
24 
The manufacturing activities of the English CWS begun in 1873 were 
considerable, with an output six times as great as that of all of 
the producer co-operatives together; and1with 47,000 workers, 
employing five times as many people. (B.Webb, 192Ib). Co-operation 
extended beyond retail into distribution, importing, manufacture, 
agriculture, mining, transport, insurance and banking. "Whatsoever 
the members desire to have, that the co-operative society of this type 
sets itself to supply, without the toll of profit, at the lowest possible 
cost. It is emphatically a democracy of consumers for the government 
of industry." (p.17). The philosophy and practice of co-operation 
stretched into,almost every sphere of activity in working class towns 
with departmental stores, bakeries, dairies, laundries, tailors, builders, 
funeral parlours, convalescent homes, literary societies and rambling 
clubs. 
Rambling they may not have objected to, but capitalists did not 
welcome the masses doing for themselves what capital could d~ at a profit, 
and this resentment reached fever pitch in the first decades of this 
century when the growth of co-operatives was most rapid. Every obstacle 
was placed in the path of the emerging co-operatives, and it was the 
discrimination of manufacturers, farmers and suppliers which stimulated 
the growth of the cws to replace them. Sometimes big companies joined 
in the attacks on the co-operatives, for example Lever Brothers took 
22 legal actions against the co-operative movement concerning the sale 
of soap. . With the help of a campaign against trusts coming from the 
unlikely quarter of the Daily Mail, Lever Brothers were defeated, and 
the co-operatives set up two soap factories. (Lever Brothers were concerned 
they would lose a large share of the market, but they could not have 
known that having won the case, the co-operatives would later stock 
, 
Sunlight soap !). (Beaverbrook, who had no qualms about trustification, 
later used the Express newspapers in a crusade against the co-operative 
societies). A veritable high street war broke out as the co-operatives 
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secured an ever greater share of the retail trade, and private 
grocers around the country complained bitterly about what they 
considered to be unfair ccmpet.i tion, as The Grocer frequently recorded, 
"We, being a large body of traders in St Helens and district, are 
called upon to pay income tax, whereas the co-operative societies, 
who are crushing the shopkeepers out of existence, are exempted 
from paying income tax out of their profits,and we consider it very 
unfair to the rest of traders." (26 April 1902). Though the income 
tax grievance was constantly resurrected by private traders, the simple 
answer was that co-operative members were liable for income tax as 
individuals on the dividends they received from the co-operative societies, 
but as most members earnings fell below the tax threshold, none was paid. 
Private businessmen were right to feel threatened through, since 
co-operation in this period was certainly on the offensive. 
"There seems at first sight no limit to the scope and 
enterprise of the federated co-operators in pursuit of 
their ideal of bringing under "t:he control of the democracy 
of consumers the whole of the processes of industry, ~ight 
back to the earth itself. The experienced committeemen 
and managers of the Co-opeFative Wholesale Society, as of 
the larger stores, are always yearning to eliminate the last 
remaining capitalist middleman and to get everything at 
its very source, executing by their own agents all the 
processes of growing, harvesting, extracting, transporting, 
converting, mixing, manu fa cturing, preparing and packing 
that the raw material undergoes on its way to consumption, 
and performing every kind of personal or professional service." 
(B.Webb, 1921b, pp. 35-6 
" 
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Perhaps enthusiasm at the conunercial development and prosperity 
of the consumer co-operative movement distracted the Webbs from the 
full significance of the political changes which were taking place 
simultaneously in the co-operatives, and the ensuing effects upon 
employees and customers. Control in the larger co-operatives passed 
from unpaid committees of management to full-time salaried officers; 
democratic participat.ion of members in meetings and elections of officers 
was frequently lower than 5 per cent; which led to the replacement of 
members meetings by the institutionalised passivity of the ballot box; 
and in the larger societies members meetings were replaced by representative 
assemblies which in turn elected executive committees that exercised 
control over the policy of the management committees. In this way a 
direct participatory democracy was replaced by a representative system, 
which encouraged inaction on the part of ordinary members. As for 
co-operative workers, they were in a difficult position: since most consumer 
societies specifically excluded them fram taking part in elect~ons, or 
sitting on management committees, to prevent "a society being run by its 
employees". Under the impact of the. pressure for workers control during 
1900-1920 most societies removed the disqualification of employees from 
voting, though many were reluctant to change the rule about workers being 
I 
disqualified from election to the management committee. Joint advisory 
committees of management and workers were not a satisfactory alternative. 
"As time passed, co-operative employees became less willing to leave the 
question of their political status and economic condition to the chance 
of their employers benevolence ••• The growth of the Amalgamated Union 
of Co-operative Employees during the 1900s and its militancy in the 19l0s -
albeit immediately concerned with wages rather than political status -
does not suggest widespread involvement of employees in retail co-operative 
government." (Rose,1976,p.96). 
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A~ an employer of some 200,000 workers, who were denied any 
other means to influence their pay and conditions, it was inevitable 
that the co-operative movement should encounter independent trade 
union action. In 1899 and 1908 the 'Cb-operative O:mgress accepted 
recommendations of a joint co~~ittee of the TUC and the Co-operative 
Union that "co-operative factories, workshops, or stores should pay 
recognised trade union rates of wages and work the recognised trade union 
hours prevailing in each particular branch of industry in the district." 
However, this did not settle the problem. "Confronted with the constantly 
growing demands of the Amalgamated Union of Co-operative Employees 
and its readiness to use the weapon on the strike, the Co-operative 
Congress in 1916, on the urgent recommendations ~f its own Central Board, 
began, somewhat feverishly, to organise within the co-operative movement 
an efficient machinery for negotiating with the AUCE and simultaneously 
a weapon for resisting its more extravagant demands." (~.Webb, 1921b p.30). 
In fact although the co-operative employers generally paid higher wages 
than capitalist employers, this was in a very low-paid industry, and the 
co-operative employers were at first ~eluctant about a legal minimum 
wage, and then failed to use their influence to improve the minimum' wage 
up to the best wage paid in any establishment. Wages were depressed in 
the co-operative societies to increase profits and dividends,and the bonus 
paid to labour out of profits was small, sometimes less than one per cent. 
Co-operative store assistants worked 56 or more hours a week and lived 
near the breadline: "The co-operative movement is supposed to sets its 
face against sweating, and no doubt does so effectually up to a certain 
point; but this is probably due, not so much to the spontaneous action 
of the societies, as to the fact that in certain departments where labour 
is well organised trade union conditions can be readily secured. It is 
quite evident, however, that there is still great room for further 
improvement, and that the ~algamated Society of Co-operative Employees will 
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find it hard \'lOrk to obtain the qeneral recoqnition and adoption of 
their modest scheme, of minimum wages." (Forrest, 1903). In this 
context disputes were frequent, and sometimes escalated into major 
struggles between the co-operative and the trade union movements. 
Striking workers at the CWS shoe factory in Leicester set up their 
own workers co-operative in 1886, Equity Shoes, rather than be starved into 
submission. (Fletcher, 1976,p.176). A dispute occurred in Oldham 
between the Amalgamated Society of Tailors and the co-operative society 
over the retention of craft work and rates. The co-operative maintained 
that it produced cheaper suits for working class people, and could not 
afford the rates since it operated a factory line with female labour, 
which resulted in the.union declaring the co-operative a non-union workshop. 
(Forrest, 1901). Finally, in 1902 the'CWS acquired tea estates in Ceylon, 
and later in Southern India, and one can only wonder ho~ poor pay and 
conditions were on these. 
Nor were the commercial poliCies of the consumer co-operative 
entirely beyond reproach. There was plenty of evidence that co-operatives 
were charging higher prices and s~curing greater profits than private 
traders, in order to payout a bigger dividend to the members. The 
dividend was regarded by working class members as a means of saving, and 
was often as high as 15% of the amount of the purchases made. Unfortunately 
this practice compelled "the lowest paid workman, to whom co-operation 
should be an especial blessing, to go to the private trader, on account 
of his inability to purchase our higher priced goods." (Ackland, l897,p.346). 
When a dividend was not paid by a co-operative society though, trade 
collapsed, indicating a purely cash nexus between co-operative stores and 
the local community. Another thorny issue was the question of credit. 
The co-operative stores were supposedly ,dedicat,ed to the principle of cash 
sales in order to prevent their working class customers sinking into debt, 
as the private traders often allowed them to do. But at eimes of hardship 
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this priniciple WqS impossible to maintain, as in the course of prolonged 
strikes, when credit was essential to avoid starvation: during the 
General Strike in particular, local co-operative societies covered 
themselves with gloL~ by sustaining strikers with food and other 
supplies. 
Behind the particular problems of the consumer co-operative movement 
was a more general change in organisation and orientation. A distinctive 
feature of the co-ope+ative movement in the nineteenth century was its 
de-centralised structure with hundreds of autonomous local societies. 
Many societies jealously guarded their independence and maintained an 
anti-stat~tradi~alism well into the twentieth century, while the 
formation of the Co-operative Party in 1917 helped revive grassroots 
activism in the movement. Yet the movement as a whole faced an 
overpowering pressure towards centralisation and formalisation during 
this period, which it failed to resist. The influence of the expanding 
• Co-operative Wholesale Society was critical in aggressively encouraging 
amalgamation of local societies, while ,the CWS full time management itself 
was elected only by the executive committees of the constituent societies. 
Many co-operative idealists, like Wolff felt alarmed at this transforma,tion: 
"One cannot attend a co-operative congress without observing 
the cut-and-dried, pre-arranged character of everything that 
1s done, the complete absence of argument, and the forcing 
upon the meeting of a programme which appears to have been 
prepared by very few people, who practically rule the 
proceedings ••• A rise for individuals who make a 'calling' 
of co-operation, railway directorships, seats in Parliament, 
and all the rest of what we hear so much about now, we re not 
to be found in the original Rochdal,e programme.... The movement 
was to bring good, not of one kind only, but of many kinds; 
not to a few people, but to the whole of the labouring 
30 
population. It was not to turn a few into capitalists 
and men of po~ition, but to emancipate all." (1901,pp453-8) • 
others were not so restrained in their assessment, "One after another the 
principles of co-operation have been abandoned, the forbidden fruit of 
profit has been tasted, capital has accumulated,the claims of labour 
have been rejected, and the organisation i,s rapidly becoming a great 
trading corporation like any other joint stock company". (Ackland, 1897, 
p.352). Despite the Webb's championship of consumer democracy as the 
only effective 'collectivist' democratic control of industry, it was 
clear to some co-operators that a consumer movement alone was inadequate: 
"Of all forms of co-operation, supply really appears most to need 
some other form as a complement, to correct its individualist 
and capitalist tendencies. Therefore to have supply 
absolutely supreme in our co-operative movement, means not 
only unduly narrowing a movement which should, and was intended 
• 
to be,broad and varied in its character, but also.allowing 
that movement to be directed by a spirit which, of all 
co-operative, impelling forces, is least co-operative, most 
likely to degenerate into gain seeking. And, unfortunately, 
I 
as we see to be actually the case, being least co-operative, 
it is also dangerously inclined to use its power to obtain 
, a monopoly, and in the exercise of that monopoly to exhibit 
least toleration of others." (Wolff,190l,p.457). 
Workers Control, Revolution and Revision. 
The Webbs myopia towards the degeneration of participatory 
democracy in the consumer co-operative movement, their failure to perceive 
how· the co-operatives were subject to the same process of professionalisation, 
hierarchic~l centralisation, and monopolisation, as were capitalist 
companies, was due to the early Fabian preference for elitist bureaucratic 
collectivism. But the condescension of orthodox socialists towards the 
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concept of workers control was seriously shaken by the rapid spread 
of theories of revolutionary syndicalism and later guild socialism, 
which accompanied mass strikes and violent political disaffection in 
the years immediately before and after the first world war. Working 
people were demanding once again a real share in the control of industry 
and the co-operative movement had to respond. 
The syndicalists rejected the reformism of state socialists such 
as the Webbs: parliamentary democracy was deemed structurally incapable 
of achieving social emancipation for the working class, and nationalisation 
was criticized as likely to produce a coercive state bureaucracy. Syndicalists 
stressed the importance of autonomous direct action by the organised 
working class through mass revolutionary strikes. Industrial unions 
would then provide the basis for workers control of industry and society. 
Trade union activists were heavily influenced by syndicalism, and 
syndicalist propaganda fuelled many of the great industrial clashes of the 
period. However, syndicalist thought underestimated the signiticance 
of two central problems: "The first was the problem Of how trade unions 
might avoid structural tendencies to incorporation within capitalism as 
pe~anent bargaining agents and mediators of conflict, trends which would 
undermine their revolutionary potential. Secondly there was also the 
question of how the ultimate revol~tionary overthrow of capitalism was to 
be achieved in the face of capitalist resistance, in particular resistance 
by the state~" (Holton, 1976, p.204; Brown, 1974). Nevertheless, the 
moral fervour of the syndicalists and the aggressive ambition to create 
socialism immediately rather than postpone it indefinitely, revived the 
hopes and vision of working people, which in the co-operative movement 
had been dulled'by the routine of conventional trade. 
, Almost as ambitious, though somewhat more restrained, was the policy 
. 
put forward by the guild socialists, who declared that the whole of 
industry should be gover~ed by workers in a system of national guilds: 
r, 
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the producers would control production, and the consumers would 
control consumption. The guild socialists respected the rights of 
consumers but maintained that these should not be used as an excuse to 
keep industrial workers in servility. 'I'here was considerable scope for 
mutual assistance between the guilds and the co-operatives, but as Cole 
indicated there was ground for conflict too: 
"Clearly, if the guilds supplant capitalism, they will 
supplant co-operative production as well. The attitude 
then, of productive workers employed by co-operative bodies 
will not differ materially from the attitude of those 
employed by the state or by private employers. In any 
case the goal is the same, and the way to it is by the 
strengthening of trade unionism and the securing for it 
of an ever-increasing share in the control of industry. The 
struggle for industrial freedom will, we may hope, ·be less 
bitter in this sphere than elsewhere; but the normal 
• 
attitude of the co-operative movement today in dealing with 
its employees gives no great ground for the belief that it 
will be altogether peaceful." (l972,p.229) • 
Though the theory of guild socialism was never successfully ~plemented, 
a vital spark within it remained to powerfully illuminate the deficiencies 
of the existing co-operative movement: "The idea of national guilds is the 
quickening spirit of the century, not because it puts forward new 
suggestions with regard to the organisation of industry, nor even because 
it insists on the right of the producer to control his own life, but above 
all because it is a new philosophy - a philosophy of active citizenship 
for every man and wanan in the community." (Cole, 1972, p.23l my emphasis). 
Irooically, one reason why guild socialism fail~d, was that although it 
emphasised grassroots action, as a doct~ine it never permeated further 
than the circles of left Fabian intellectuals and some trade union leaders. 
(Mellor, 1921). 
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A rank-and-file movement which both transcended some of the 
theoretical weaknesses of syndicalism and the practical limitations of 
guild socialism, was the shop stewards movement which emerged during 
the first world war. With a stress on independent rank-and-file 
action the shop stewards movement provided an exercise in participatory 
democracy at the shop floor level. By militant organisation at the point 
of production workers pushed back the frontier of control on a wide 
range of production and managerial questions including employment and 
dismissal; discipline; promotions; methods of payment; organisation 
of work and changes in technology. In this \'lay they defied not simply 
the authority of their own management, but the managerialism of socialists 
such as the Webbs who had dismissed the concept of workers control. 
(Goodrich, 1975; Cole, 1973). The shop ste\'lards movement developed 
syndicalism in the direction of communism: the syndicalist conception 
of trade unions as both the agency of revolution and th~ basic component 
of future socialist society placed undue dependence on the trade union 
• 
bureaucracy and underestimated the problems of sectionalism: the local 
workers committees based directly on the factories were controlled by the 
rank-and-file, and were capable of pressing for socialist poliCies within 
the trade union movement as well as in wider SOCiety, forming the political 
nucleus of the workers state. (Hinton, 1973). The high point of the 
shop stewards movement came with the outbreak of the Russian revolution 
in 1917, which dramatically confirmed the aspirations of the workers 
committees: it then seemed that a determined industrial struggle would 
bring political power to workers and soldiers soviets in Britain. 
Prospects of a workers state were effectively crushed in the dismal 
aftermath of the first world war: the government contained the explosion 
of discontent, and in the ensuing depression shop steward leaders were 
victimised and found' themselves leading the unemployed. Militants 
appreciated too late the importance of the Bolsheviks emphasis on an 
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assault upon state power in revolutionary struggle, and as they 
joined the newly formed COIDrrlunist Party, they looked in admiration 
at the achievements of the Soviety Union. Paradoxically, because 
of their emphasis on the conquest of state power, the stance of the 
Bolsheviks on workers control was ambivalent. The factory committees 
had played a critical role in the revolutionary seizure of power, but 
Lenin viewed them as agencies of opposition to management control,rather than 
as potential agencies of self management. Workplace organisation 
after the revolution was limited to a defensive role, to protect workers 
agains~ unacceptable demands of management and the state bureaucracy. 
(Goodey, 1974; Deutscher, 1950). A terrible inversion of the practice 
and lessons of the autonomous workers movements developed within the 
communist movement, as Hyman explains: 
"The enormous problems confronted by the infant Soviet 
. 
state reinforced this lukewarm attitude towards self-
management, and helps explain why political revolution • 
was not carried through into a revolution in authority 
relations in industry. The inLtial decision on strategic 
priorities facilitat~d the subsequent process of 
bureaucratic distortion and - as economic difficulties 
1 
intensified - erosion of the institutions of even negative 
workers control, culminating in the dictatorial labour 
discipline of the Stalin era. One consequence has been 
the long history of confusion and equivocation in the official 
Communist movement on the question of workers control". (1975b,p.XXXVI). 
Among the most ardent admirers of the highly centralised state planning 
which was imposed in the Soviet Union were, ironically enough, the Webbs, 
who saw in it their vision of an ordered egalitarian and just society, 
without the unnecessary discomfort to professional administrators of autonomous 
workers control. (~, ·19 May 1978). 
• 
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With indepen~ent movements for workers control repressed and 
largely extinguishe;d, complacent and paternalistic views on the 
possibility of re-distributing control in industry flourished in the 
Labour Party in the 1930s and continued through the period of post-war 
reconstruction. Yet as social democrats attempted to slam the door 
on further debate with the achievement of the supposed contentment of 
a mixed economy, increasing industrial conflict indicated the continuing 
dissatisfaction of workers with the existing distribution of control 
and rewards. The response of capital was to withdraw investment 
'to activities and countries in which independent labour action was not a 
problem, with the resulting redundancies and closures, exacerbating industrial 
conflict further. Simulanteously there was widespread disillusion 
with the rigid and authoritarian industrial structure of state capitalism. 
In the context of an industrial economy apparently hur,t~ing towards collapse, 
with an increasingly assertive organised working class, in the early 1970s 
there was a remarkable revival of the debate on workers controi, an 
important component of which was a surprisingly rejuvenated interest in the 
possibility of workers co-operatives.' 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KIRKBY MANUFACTURING AND ENGINEERING 
"All these experts and professors came and told us what's wrong 
with KME. We know what's bloody wrong - we need more products. But 
they say high overheads, not enough output, overmanning. And it all 
adds up to the same thing - redundancies, and those thats left work 
harder. But there's no way 300 people can keep that factory open 
wi th those overhead·s - so it's all nonsense ••• KME could never make 
a profit with those products. We shouldn't have been interested in 
making a profit. We should have showed what a co-operative could 
be. We could have taught people about co-operation and trade unionism. 
It wouldn't have lasted, but we could have done something for those 
that came after us. Now they can only learn from our mistakes." 
(KME shopfloor worker). 
"They say KME's a failure. But KME's kept 750 jobs for years. 
This fella Arnie Weinstock, he had 15,000 employed in GEC on Merseyside 
ten years ago. And now the factories are empty shells and standing 
idle, and there's 2,500 employed. And you read about the enormous 
profits he's making. What a big success he is. Well if that's capitalism, 
I'd rather have the co-operative. They started out with 750 jobs and 
they kept them." (GEC shopfloor worker). 
• 
The history of the Kirkby factory is a modern tragedy: a painful 
biography of the de-industrialisation of the British economy; a classic 
illustration of the consequences of the equivocal, inadequate and 
I 
self-defeating attempts at economic intervention by successive 
Conservative and Labour Governments; a sharp reminder of the lack of 
knowledge and experience of participatory democracy which stretches 
down to the shopfloor union movement; and a chronicle of the rise 
and fall of .the determination and dreams which fuelled the Right 
to Work campaign of the 1970s. 
It was purpose built as a light engineering factory by the 
Board of Trade 1n 1960 to provide employment in the new town of Kirkby. , 
BHe were loaned the money by the government to buy the factory, and a 
succession of private companies have owned the factory, .benefitting from 
government loans ~unting to £3.2 million and grants amounting to £480,000 
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Private companies failed to develop and sustain 'the potential of 
Kirkby, and to an extent this was a deliberate policy of parent company 
boards: it was allowed to decline as an unwanted regional subsidiary 
and its major products were gradually removed or sofd off. BMC (1961-68) 
operated the factory initially as an important domestic products base 
with over 2,000 workers on a three shift system manufacturing the 
Moulton bicycle, stainless steel and vitrous sinks, Bendix washing 
machine and dryer, and radiators. However the Moulton bicycle, the 
first of the modern breed of small wheel bicycles with immense market 
potential, was sold to Raleigh, and by 1966 :the factory was reduced 
to two shifts and a third of the sup~rvisory staff were made redundant. 
BMC sold the factory for E4 million to a major domestic appliance 
manufacturer Parkinson-Cowan (1968-1971) who were unable to stem the 
losses caused by high overheads and inadequate output, which amounted 
to about El million per year, and exacerbated the problem by selling the 
one-piece stainless steel sink to a competitor, Carrons, and ·in 1970 
declaring 300 redundancies. A credit squeeze reduced demand for 
Parkinson-Cowan's products, and in 1971 the whole group was taken over 
by' Thorn Electrical (197~-72r for as little as Parkinson-Cowan had paid 
for the Kirkby factory alone. 
Within two months Thorn announced 50S redundancies among the 
remaining 1,100 Kirkby w?rkers, and it became clear they intended to 
quickly move the last of the profitable products and close the factory. 
A prolonged strike in resistance was embittered by the revelation that 
Thorn had shifted production of the sophisticated Bendix appliance to 
Spain. The possible blacking of the movement of Thorn products, brought 
a reprieve for the Kirkby workers, but only until early 1972 when closure 
was likely. The workers prepared t? defy Thorn's attempt to close the 
factory, and during heated negotiations in January 1972, a largely 
spontaneous occupation of the factory took place in prote~t for the right 
to work. The oc~upation was extremely effective and with the support 
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of transport workers serious pressure was put on the Thorn group 
to concede. The intercession of Harold Wilson, the constituency 
MP, brought a negotiated settlement in which Thorns promised to 
guarantee production for two years. In the meantime the factory had 
been sold through a series of intermediary companies, who extracted 
an exorbitant profit, to International Property Development (IPD) 
who were offered g~arantees by Thorn to maintain production for the 
promised period. IPD (1972-74) introduced only an orange juice 
production line which consistently proved of doubtful viability, and 
was unable to overcome the commercial problems resulting from the 
previous stripping away of the major lines of the factory. Bombastic 
claims of a new profitability and understanding by the managing director 
of IPD, were refuted when, promptly, the company faced collapse early 
in 1974 and attempted to secure government assistance. A refusal led 
to the declaration of closure, but the workers refused-to accept 
redundancy, expelled the receiver, and began their second occppation. 
At this point Benn intervened with the promise of a workers co-operative 
which eventually materialised. 
Extensive media coverage of these events emphasised the management 
viewpoint that the difficulties of the factory were caused simply by 
unviable products and recalcitrant labour. In fact private companies 
have conSistently been reluctant to move to the development areas, 
particularly to unpopular regions such as Merseyside: BMC were only 
persuaded to move from the Midlands by a combination of incentives and 
planning restrictions. Merseyside was unpopular with employers because 
its maritime economic infrastructure was obsolescent, its port related 
industries were in decline, it was remote from the grOWing centres of 
p~sperity in the south, and its casual, unskrlled labour force was 
• less amenable to the diSCiplines of. modern factory production. (MSRG,l980, 
pp.27-43). Frequently when companies have moved, they have simply 
. utilised the full benefit of government assistance and then moved on. 
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lack of investment in British industry in this perjod, and restructuring 
and product development in areas such as domestic appliances \ ... as too late 
and too faint-hearted. Kirkby was one of the first casualties of 
the inexorable decline of manu fact uri rig capacity in Britain relative 
. to other industrial countries. Towards the end Kirkby was not wanted 
for other reasons, particularly the labour militancy and established 
wage levels, (wages were one third higher than Thorn's average). However 
clear evidence that products, plant and most probably capital was being 
syphoned off to larger more profitable concerns in Britain and abroad 
was hardly conducive to industrial peace; in fact the reputation for 
militancy at the plant was largely acquired from 1971 onwards when the 
workforce first become aware of the plans to close the factory completely • 
• 
It was difficult not to agree with the conclusion of one astute worker, 
"I don't think the workforce here is bad. I think management call them bad 
because there's slightly above the average number of blokes thinking for 
them~elves." 
It was the uniqueness of the occupations in 1972 and 1974 which 
accounted for the controversy surrounding the factory: many similar 
factories quietly died, but in Kirkby the workers refused to accept their 
commodity status. It was during the occupations that workers fleetingly, 
but euphorically, sensed the meaning of workers power. "For fifty years, 
whenever there's been any trouble 'it's always the workers who've been put 
out the gate: either made redundant, or a lockout, or they go out themselves 
in a strike.· But here - and elsewhere in the future - it's the management 
who are on the street." A profound excitement and involvement infused 
the organisation of 'the occupations: committees were set up to deal with 
security, finance publicity and entertainment. The local community and workers 
families were drawn into the 'struggle with packed open meetings and shows given 
by local artists. Particularly during the longer occupation of 1972 there 
was the impression that the workers eX1stence had been transformed, and 
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in many respects .it had, though the shift system arranged for the 
occupation had an.uncanny resemblance to previous shifts operated at 
the factory, and one woman actually went so far as to have brought in 
to the stewards a doctor's note saying unfortunately she was too ill 
to take part in the occupation! A great success of the first 
occupation was the sophisticat.ed information bulletin prepared listing 
all of the Thorn products and subsidiaries, which .was widely distributed 
among transport workers, and was instrumental in securing their agreement 
to halt the movement of Thorn products at the docks and airports. 
Support for the occupations came from all sections of the labour movement, 
and speakers were invited to address -factories, colleges and political 
meetings throughout the country. Finally the mass media, from the 
first moment the workers took over the boardroom in 1972, was skilfully 
handled, as sympathetic journalists were given full an~ convincing 
accounts of the workers case, whilst the management scurried away in 
• 
confusion and embarassment. There were problems experienced during the 
occupations,particularly how the senior stewards dominated the organisational 
activity and became distanced from the workers carrying out the routine 
functions of the occupation. (Clarke, 1974). However, generally there 
was a feeling of efficacy and purpose among the workers during the 
occupations, which gradually distintegrated under the co-operative. 
For the remaining months of 1974 the company was run by the 
receiver who the workers allowed back into the factory, and rotating lay 
offs were agreed while studies were conducted into its future prospects. 
In their original submission the shop stewards requested £6.5 million, but 
Benn pointed out that anything over £5 million would have to be submitted 
to the House of Commons for approval, and until the October election, 
Labour were a minority government. ~e management consultants Benn 
commissioned, Inbucon predictably called for 300 redundanCies, extra 
management and ne\-I products, together a new pay, hours, and productivity 
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deal to lower unit costs, which would eliminate all the benefit the 
workers had secure'd from a, decade of shopfloor bargaining. As with 
the SDN, the Department of Industry's own advisers, the Industrial 
Development Unit, were deeply pessimistic about the commercial prospects 
of the factory, and estimated that the proposed co-operative had 
underestimated its cash requirements by £850,000 for 1975 alone. 
(Eccles, 1976, pp. 155-160). Equally IDAB, chaired by a merchant banker, 
concluded that "the objectives of a workers co-operative are commendable" 
but that "there were not enough profitable activities to offer a prospect 
of generating a positive cash flow" and that "extremely tight management 
is needed in the highly competitive contract press work". To their 
lasting fury, Benn overruled his advisers, and announced the grant of 
E3.9 million on 1 November 1974. In the ensuing parliamentory row, 
Eccles sardonically records, "The government was accused of making a 
political decision." (l976,p.l60). During the winter of 1974 about 
• 
two hundred disheartened workers were allowed to drift ,away, though the 
sit-ins were fought and the co-operative founded supposedly to prevent 
redundancies. 
The co-operative inherited the inadequate product base bestowed by 
the previous private owners. Though attempts were made to develop new 
products, the resources were not available to accomplish this properly. 
The co-operative consisted therefore of a large and adaptable factory 
with a willing workforce, but insufficient products to maintain the 
production necessary to cover the large fixed overhead costs. Tony Eccles, . 
who was a management consultant to the co-operative explained: 
"The decade of operations at Kirkby had shown the major 
problem to be that of filling the factory with enough 
work to cover its large fixed oVQrheads. CUtting the 
product range scarcely helped. Reductions in the product 
range and in the labour force helped to cut the overall 
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costs and increased the average profit margin of the 
remaining goods by eliminating low margin or unprofitable 
work - but left the fixed overhead costs to be spread over 
the smaller volume of goods. The net result was a negligible 
change in the overall unprofitability." (l976,p.145) 
Thus in many ways the industrial problems of KME and the policies 
which were adopted to tackle these problems, were a microcosm of ",hat 
was happening in the British economy in general. 
Enveloping commercial problems constantly pressed in upon the 
leaders of the co-operative, and enforced their primary concern with 
the economic survival of the company, encoUraging their neglect of 
democratic considerations. This problem originated with the founding 
of the co-operative: little time was given to thought of how the 
co-operative would be different from a conventional enterprise either 
among management, trade union representatives, or the workers themselves. 
The period of transition in the autumn and winter of 1974/1975 was 
spent desparately trying to produce enough to prove viability and 
justify Department of Industry support. The interest of idealistic 
outsiders in wholesale internal reform of the co-operative work 
organisation and control structure, and the vague, but nontheless 
compelling hopes of many of the workers for substantial change, were not 
! 
shared by the-eo-operative leaders whose primary concern was to maintain 
output, financial stablity, and employment security. The Department of 
Industry itself seems to have concurred with these priorities, and 
given the underfunding of the enterprise could be said to have imposed 
them. 
The outstanding feature of the control structure at KME, was 
what has been described as the 'pivotal position' of the convenor and 
deputy convenor, Jack Spriggs of the AUEW and Dick Jenkinson of the TGWU, 
who also became the sole directors: This arrangement ostensibly 
occurred to prevent any reassertion of control by profes~ional management 
or outside directors, because of the history of irresponsible 
management at KME. It was originally intended that further 
directors would be elected from the workforce, but this did not 
occur. The convenors argued, "The workpeople make the final decisions. 
It is only because of the law that we have a board of directors. It 
is imperative that the union and the \wrkpeople keep control." They 
insisted that as directors they would simply rubber stamp the co-operative 
executive's rulings, and that there would not be two entities but for 
the law. However ·this was before a co-operative executive was elected, 
as the co-operative constitution took six months to finalise. 
A draft constitution was circulated in December 1974 for discussion amongst 
the workforce and "to bring forward their ideas", though "the government 
will reserve the right to accept or reject any items" and they "will 
have to comply with the law - as it stands at the moment." The first 
suggested aim of the co-operative was an amazing one: :"to act in 
conjunction with the company KME and to keep maximum unity over the 
• 
running of the company and not to allow any person to hinder the progress 
thereof". Clearly the co-operative was to be used to elicit from the 
workers greater support for the company. This proposed constitution 
revealed a crude, unitary frame of reference, and provided an opportunity 
for the convenors and senior management to dominate both the co-operative 
and the company. 
The proposed constitution met with a wave of resistance from the 
factory floor, and 25 pages of amendments were submitted to a 3 page 
constitution. The convenors were far from delighted, Jack Spriggs 
said, "The workers don't realise that company law is the law. Therefore 
certain aspects of the co-operative were determined by the law, and once 
this is understood, the formal constitution will be adopted by the 
workforce more readily". The work7rs'amendments disappeared, and though 
the second constitution submitted in June 1975 was a more sophisticated 
. 
document, in democratic terms it was a serious deterioration,not improvement. 
Ther~ was a change in the first aim of the co·-operative which now 
read: "The co-operative will act in conjunction \·,ith the company 
so as to provide a vehicle whereby the employees and shareholders 
of KME will exercise cont.rol over the running of the company with 
a view to making a commercial success •••• " Later elements in the 
constitution, were convincing that this was a change in rhetoric not 
of intent, and that the convenor-directors and senior management 
would still control the organisation. ~1e ten person executive co~~ittee 
was reduced to a seven person council, meeting every six weeks instead 
of monthly. The "powers of the council" were effectively negated: the 
directors were to appoint the general manager; and the company to hire 
and dismiss employees - pO\'lers previously reserved for the executive 
committee. Before the executive committee was to produce to members 
of the co-operative a full statement of the company accounts to the 
co-operative members twice yearly, now the accounts would only be presented 
at the AGM. Under the earlier constitution it was likely that the 
convenors and senior management would have got onto the executive committee 
and thereby controlled the company ~d co-operative, now with a castrated 
council serving basically the role of a consultative works council, the 
convenor-directors and management could afford to ignore it. 
Undoubtedly the major problem of democratic representation at 
KME was caused by the absence of independent trade union representation 
at the highest level with the merger of the convenors role into that of 
directoral management. Given that the majority of the convenors time 
was taken up with commercial business, it was inevitable that union 
representation should suffer. The convenor-directors showed a capacity 
to rapidly acquire business acumen, and with some management and consultants' 
advice, steered the co-operative for four years through extremely difficult 
market conditions. However time spent on commercial decisions reduced 
the possibility of adequate representation of union members interests, and 
proper considera~ion of their grievances. Some workers were 
initially critical of the co-operative idea, for fear of losing 
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their trade union leadership to management, and these fears were 
largely justified. Other senior stewards were drawn into this system, 
in both the works cOID1cil anq shop stewards committee. The works 
council played a nominal role, was never taken seriously, and was soon 
defunct. The shop stewards committee could potentially have been 
an arena in which important decisions were negotiated with the convenor-
directors, however, with a few explosive exceptions, resistance was 
normally contained by the convenors. Indeed many of the senior stewards 
had come to see themselves as representatives of the co-operative and 
company, rather tha~ of their members. This tendency was confirmed 
by the promotion of several active stewards into the posts of foreman 
and superintendent. 
Mass meetings of the workforce, which were supposedly the ultimate 
governing body of the co-operative, were held every few months, but on 
an irregular basis, and usually in response to some fresh crisis, for 
which the convenors normally had already a proposed solution. Meetings 
tended to be of short duration, insufficient information was imparted 
either before the meetings or during them with which workers could form 
an independent judgement, and the meetings were normally swayed by 
the platform, with only sporadic, and often muffled, outbursts of 
resistance. Shop stewards and workers were reluctant to question 
or oppose decisions because of the intense loyalty which had been forged 
in the past by the union organisation when in conflict with management. 
The convenor-directors readily transferred this loyalty into the 
co-operative's struggle against the external environment which seemed 
to constantly threaten. Thus any f9~ of dissent was treated as 
dangerous disloyalty which risked the survival of the enterprise. Coates 
and Topham had earlier "recognised this problem: "On the.workers side, 
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the development of democratic ideas under capitalism is inseparable 
from the development of solidarity. Yet this solidarity is ~ot to 
be interpreted, as it has been on many occasions, as a founding 
charter for monolithic discipline in socialist factories. 1I (1970,p.439). 
At KME workers were more informed about the finances and commercial 
activities of their company than in a conventional company, and discussion 
frequently took place on almost every subject on the shop floor; ho\-,'ever 
little opportunity existed to translate this discussion into influence 
on company decisions, or to channel it through the existing decision 
making structure. Rumour, suspicion and intrique were as prevalent 
as on any factory floor, compounded by the consistent commercial insecurity 
of the company, and the contradictory control structure of the co-operative. 
The convenor-directors also were closely involved in the day-to-day 
management of KME. Originally the possibility of bringing in new senior 
management was mooted, but after some disagreement with a manager 
seconded from the Department of Industry, the remaining management of the 
• 
old company were appointed the senior management of KME by the convenor 
directors, to the shock of the workforce , who learned the poignancy of 
Pett:: Townshend's lyriC, 'Meet the "new boss •••• same as the old boss •••• " 
Given the inherited commercial problems of the enterprise, in particular 
, 
the need to develop and market new products, further engineering, technical 
and financial and marketing skills were required, without the resources 
to attract these, or the time and facilities to train existing members of 
the co-operative in such skills. The occasional advice and assistance 
of management consultants, whether sympathetiC, or hired, was no substitute 
for the complete involvement of skilled and experienced people necessary 
to resolve the company's" problems. The general manager originally accepted 
the importance of training the co-operative leaders in management skills, 
and efforts were made to do this, thougn.the constraint of time spent on 
urgent business, or essential but routine tasks, was impossible to overcome. 
" 
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It was accepted that there was little need for an elaborate managerial 
hierarchy at KME, but the performance of managerial duties by union 
representatives was partly accountable for this assumption. The general 
manager in 1975 declared that, "As we proceed with the education programme 
of the executive committee, in management accounting and so on, they will 
shape the policies more and more, the executive criticisms will develop 
their foundation and fact. The autonomy of the dif'ferent management will 
gradually come under attrition". However there was to be no education 
programme; no executive committee; workers cr.iticisms were ignored 
if possible; and whatever attrition of management powers occurred due 
to the dominance of the convenor-directors, or alternatively, traditional 
shop floor resistance. The line management at KME did not absorb the 
public relations stance of the senior management and persisted with more 
traditional attitudes and practices, which often caused bitter indignation 
on .the shop floor. 
• 
The predominant feeling among shop floor workers at ·KME was that they 
were glad to be in employment in Kirkby, an area of over 20% unemployment, 
which was as high as in the 1930s and one of the employment blackspots of 
the whole of Europe. The workers were proud that it was a co-operative 
I 
and quite a famous, if controversia~ enterprise. However they were 
deeply disturbed and disillusioned that little in the co-operative seemed 
to have changed. The initial goodwill and enthusiasm, with the ensuing 
increase in output and flexibility was broken by the realisation that the 
division of labour, work intensity, supervision, pay, hours, holidays 
and other conditions of work were just the same as under a private company. 
There was initially serious resentment of the retention of foremen: if 
the workers. owned and controlled the factory, why did they need foremen, 
they asked? Similarly the pressure and arduousness of the work remained 
in the press shop, welding shop, paint shop and assembly. It was 
difficult to convince oneself that one was part of a great "social experiment", 
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if one's previous e~pcrience of work was constantly spot-welding 
hundreds of sharp, dirty metal objects in a hot, dusty, noisy atmosphere, 
and one's present experience of work was just the same. 
The absence of any significant improvement in the conditions of 
work in the co-operative was initiated with its hasty and ill-equipped 
establishment, but later largely conditioned by market constraints: 
the imposed necessity to compete immediately and efficiently with other 
manufacturers provided little time or money to experiment with arrangements 
. which would give workers greater opportunities to develop their skills. 
Stewards' who wanted to battle these constraints, and have factory se .... ninars 
in which the shop floor could discover and come to understand the problems 
that the co-operative faced both commerci~lly and politically, were met 
with the simple retort, "We can't afford it". Co-operative 
participation, as far as the majority of the workers were concerned, consisted 
of attendance at a few short mass meetings at which the convenor-director 
loudly demanded that they work harder to save the firm. Levels of output, 
intensity of.work, type of product, and wage rates had to be geared to 
the performance of other companies in the market, and indeed, the le~el 
of performance previously achieved at the factory under private ownership, 
had to be equalled and exceeded. In reaction workers absenteeism and 
labour turnover were as high as in other engineering factories. 
Significant improvements in work experience under co-operative production 
are usually assumed rather than rigorously examined by co-operative 
advocates: existing economic, organisational and technological constraints 
are underestimated, and in particul~r, the capacity of competitive market 
forces to impose restrictive and debilitating conditions of work is not 
appreciated. Even the most basic desires of the KME workers - for 
reasonable pay and secure employment - remained largely unfulfilled. 
Shopfloor bargaining in the days of private ownership had achieved top rates 
in the area for the Kirkby workers, and in a notable coup a 35 hour week 
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had been successfu~ly negotiated with IPD. Though the co-operative 
retained the 35 hour week, pay was progressively eroded, a process 
exacerbated by government incomes policies, until the workers were 
dependent upon"excessive overtime to make up a living wage. They hoped 
that they had escaped the insecurity and irrationality of the past under 
capitalist ente~prise, but they found that they were still confronting 
similar problems: an unpredictable market; fierce competition, including 
from overseas; persistent financial difficulties, particularly cash 
flow and lack of capital for investment. The result of these probl~Qs 
were constant exhortations for greater output, occasionally interspersed 
with abrupt lay-offs. 
The majority of the workers at KME were semi-skilled, and they were 
given a very limited opportwlity in the co-operative to develop their 
knowledge or skills. A widening gap of information and expertise opened 
up between the convenor-directors and the semi-skilled workers, from whom 
they were originally drawn, which was only bridged by the residual loyalty 
from the struggles of the past, and the aggressive charisma of Jack Spriggs. 
The control structure at KME, therefore resembled TUrner's category of a 
'popular bossdom': the convenor-directors were undoubtedly popular, but 
they were bosses. (l962,p.267). ~ough the convenor-directors prevented 
the accession of a new managerial elite at KME, their dominant role 
inhibited democratic involvement, and encouraged passivity on the part of 
the rank and -file of the co-operative, thus suppressing the understanding and 
activity which could have been an important means to promote the revival 
• 
and development of the enterprise. Moreover the convenors deliberately 
• 
created a well-acknowledged problem of succession, when under pressure, they 
could threaten to abandon the co-operative to an uncertain future given the 
lack of training and experience of other co-operative members and their 
dependence on the convenors leadership. 
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Many commentators failed to penetrate the public relations shield 
of KME, and were easily misled by the favourable accounts provided by 
the tame shop stewards which the convenor-directors called upon for 
interviews, for example a nunmer of sympatiletic reports appeared in the 
Guardian. But for those who delved deeper the neglect of basic 
democratic procedures in the co-operative was profoundly disappointing. 
The cursory conduct of the mass meetings was an affront to the tradition 
of Citrine's rule s of chairmanship in the labour movement: Spriggs 
would stand alone on the stage at the microphone as chairman and speaker 
and blast anyone who had the temerity to protest. Minutes of meetings 
were neither kept nor circulated, and when one steward dared to take 
minutes of a Shop Stewards Meeting and posted them on the factory 
noticeboard, they were torn down by Jenkins in anger. When people 
complained that they were bei~g kept deliberately in ignorance, the standard 
response of the convenor-directors was that if they imparted sensitive 
iriformation, then the next day it would appear in the Daily Express or 
Daily Telegraph: there was an element of truth in this assertion, but 
it was symptomatic of the lack of trust which pervaded the co-operative. 
People who asked awkward questions were sent to college, promoted, deported 
to obscure parts of the factory where they could have no influence, or 
found that their names were absent· from the overtime roster with surprising 
regularity. The convenor-directors effectively used managerial methods 
to defeat resistance and ridicule opponents, as one steward explained: 
"Whenever we tried to do anything on the Shop Stewards Committee, y'know 
question a decision, 'or demand something, Jack would turn on us, and 
• 
call us left-wingers or Trotskyists.~ •• Who was Trotsky?" 
A thorough survey conducted by two MBA stUdents found: that there was 
a lack of basic financial information throughout the factory; that there 
was widespread concern at the dual roles of the convenor-directorsJ a desire 
for a proper council; a.lack of confidence in the commercial expertise 
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of top,management; disappointment at the lack of representation by the 
shop stewards; and a general disillusionment with the lack of change and 
open discussion. They presented clear recommendations to the convenor-
directors, (marked "Strictly Confidential"), which called for fuller 
discussion and information dissemination (with the emphasis on financial 
information a~d performance reports); an extended beard; proper 
procedures and records of shop stewards meetings; extensive training; 
an incentive scheme; observance of disciplinary procedures; greater 
communication from management; and the development of autonomous work 
groups., The aim of these proposals was to involve the workers more 
closely in the running of the company to increase efficiency and discipline. 
The convenor-directors refused to accept the recommendations and none 
were implemented; presumably because of the implied reduction in their 
own powers, though the result was that the confusion and lack of motivation 
of the past continued. (Chaplin and Cowe, 1978) 
This state of affairs at KME was an embarassment to its supporters, 
(though some opponents of co-operatives found it reassuring that KME was 
indistinguishable in many respects from a private company). In one notable 
analysis, inappropriately ,titled, "Control in the Democratised Enterprise", 
Eccles attempts to extricate himse~f from distressing criticism of the 
co-operative's autocracy by adopting a strange ,subjunctive tense: "There 
was a way out for the convenor-directors. They could try to create ••••• 
commitment. They could seek to become heads of a movement in which 
power and knowledge were widely dispersed throughout the co-operative. 
This was not to suggest that they would cease to be leaders or that their 
• 
executive authority would be undermined by appraisal, even opposition from 
their colleagues ••• The convenor-directors needed to became the 
representatives of the workforce, accountable for their stewardship to the 
knowing co-operators who would also 'own' the problems of running the 
enterprise" (l979,p.17l). ' Eccles then outlines a number of reforms 
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includi~g the provision of information~ creation of autonomous work 
groups~ and development of the shop stewards committee into the 
policy making body~ and an expanded board; without making it quite 
clear whether he is describing changes which have taken place in 
response to a real need for them, or merely proposals for consideration. 
He concludes: "nle extent to which these measures will succeed in 
diffusing power and responsibility effectively is not yet clear ••• " 
It is not surprising that the effect of the measures was not clear, since 
they were never successfully introduced. 
Workers who found it difficult to exert influence through the 
established formal channels of the co-operative, re~orted to traditional 
means of expressing grievances. There were a number of industrial 
disputes at KME, several of which led to strike action, though of short 
duration. Workers were extremely reluctant to damage the good name of 
the co-operative, and this inhibited outbreaks of industrial conflict which 
might otherwise have occurred, and reduced the intensity of those strikes 
which did take place. However resort to union militancy indicates 
the inadequacy of the democratic control structures at KME and reveals 
the importance of the retention of some form of independent shop flOor 
organisation to defend workers rights, even where there is, ostensibly at 
least, a formal system of workers control. To an extent the disputes at 
KME reflected sectional grievances which the majority were unable to 
resolve; but strong criticism was levelled at the contradictory position 
of those in controlliag positions in the co-operative. Though the 
convenors were instrumental in bringing the disputes to early settlements, 
• 
in their dual roles as representatives of the union and of management they 
were severely compromised. 
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The first serious dispute at KME proved to be the most intractable, 
and illustrated ·the complexity of handling the disputes \olhich 
followed. In 1975 about twenty setters \Olere asked to accept mobility 
from the press shop to the radiator shop, under the mobility agreement 
of the old company. The setters had been semi-skilled but were made 
up to factory skilled status and pay some years before. They refused 
what they saw as permanent demotion to semi-skilled work, and offered 
to accept work sharing or a temporary layoff till more work arrived. 
Many workers were furious at the elitism of the setters, who were 
refusing to work alongside them, even for higher pay; however a general 
meeting tolerantly agreed to the setters request. The next day a row 
broke out in the shop stewards committee about the precedent of bowing 
to anti-coperative impulses among L~e workers when labour was needed 
elsewhere, and the setters request for a lay-off was refused. The 
setters began a sit-in, which lasted a week, and resulted in seven of 
\ 
them being sacked, supposedly for misconduct, but on a last in, first 
out, basis. The seven setters appealed to an industrial tribunal 
pleading ~fair dis~issal, but their star witness from the company was 
promoted, and refused to appear in their defence. other disputes 
revealed similar structural problems in the co-operative: sectional grievances, 
particularly among skilled workers who felt the co-operative was a 
great threat to their position; the refusal to accept mobility, partly 
because of the arbitrary way in which it was handled; the absence of 
an effective grievance procedure or any clear lines of authority; the 
unpredictability and reversibility of decisions by the convenor-
directors. In this context th~convenor-directors responded to each 
sectional grievance by making particular concessions, which alleviated 
the immediate problem, but compounded the structural malaise. 
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. The kind o~ restructUring of work organisation necessary to 
alleviate the "lorst problems of exhaustj.on, repetition and frustration, 
was difficult in a co-operative in competition with other manufacturers, 
but in any case, was never attempted. Understandably work effort 
rapidly fell away from the euphoric heights it initially achieved: 
people completed their 'scores' (under measured day work) and then 
downed tools, ·and waited for overtime to arrive before they started 
up again. This:" practice meant that the kind of increase in output 
necessarily for viability was only achieved during brief periods in 
response to desperate appeals and promises, though productivity fell 
off rapidly when promises were,found to be empty~ One incentive 
scheme proposed by management consultants was ~ejected at a stormy mass 
meeting as inequitabl~, and one dramatic increase in output in the 
radiator shop after a few months collapsed in recr~ination when the 
additional payment the workers thought they had been promised failed to 
arrive. Towards the end, in 1978, the problem of the 'scores' 
proved critical, customers were eager for the radiators and advance 
orders approached £2 million, though as a worker explained: "We could 
sell every radiator we could make, but we just couldn't make enough 
of them. The problem was the scores. The men in the radiator shop 
would just finish their scores and then stop •••• But there was nothing 
Jack could do about it. He had negotiated the scores for the shop floor 
when he was working on the radiators at Fisher Bendix. We'd had the 
scores for years." The antipathy of suppliers, who associated the 
co-operative unfairly with the bankruptcy of the previous private 
• 
company, and who were resentful of the co-operative status of the present 
company, contributed seriously to commercial difficulties. 
"We kept running out of stuff because we didn't have the 
money to pay right away. CUstomers were begging for 30" 
radiators off us, and we were having to make 12" ones, which 
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. weren't very popular, because \-Ie didn't have the 
right length steel. The British Steel Corporation 
wanted the money off us, before they \'lould let us have 
any more. It was the same with the oil .•• and the glass." 
Labouring under these problems KME was never profitable for any 
length of time, despite the eternal optimism and deft euphemisms 
employed in public relations exercises. From the start KME experienced 
a continual financial crisis: of the E3.9 million grant, El.8 million 
went to the receiver for the factory lease, plant and stocks (an 
infla.ted figure partly caused by unhelpful attitude of the Dol); 
£1.2 million was needed as working capital (£100,000 of which had to be 
paid as a deposit to International Property Development as a deposit 
on the lease of the factory which they still owned); this left only 
£900,000 to cover the deficit on the first year of operation, together 
with the cost of any new capital equipment or product development. In 
-fact, in the first 15 months of trading a net loss of El.5 million was 
recorded on a turnover of £6.5 million. In 1976-77 there was a 
net loss of E380,000 on a turnover of E7.1 million, though during this 
period KME received £680,000 in temporary employment subsidy from the 
government. Because of the critical underfunding of the project, the , 
concern of the Dol that they had taken on board a "permanent pensioner" 
proved a self-fulfilling prophecy. In 1977 another E860,000 grant 
was necessary to enable the co-operative to continue trading, which was 
only secured because the government could not risk another controversy 
at the time of the sensitive devolution debate. No AGM was held in 
• 
April 1978, to the workers distress, and by September 1978 it became 
clear that the co-operative was again at the edge of a financial precipice. 
With the Department of Industry making threatening noises in the 
background, a team from PA management consultants were called in 
during the winter of 1977/78. The consultants maintained that KME 
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could become profitable by increasing its 10% share in the central 
heating radiator market which was then expanding, but recommended 
immediate closure of the· unprofitable night storage heater and 
orange juice lines with the accompanying redundancies. But the 
orthodox strictures of management science contradicted the fundamental 
philosophy of the co-operative to maintain employment. The 
irony did not escape the workers, "We sat-in to stop production 
lines being taken out, and now we're selling them ourselves. The 
fitters were worried when they were dismantling the lines, they were not 
sure they should be doing it." The workers pointedly refused to 
accept "paid sackings" which meant that, "when the orange juice line 
• 
closed, the women were kept on, but there was no work for them. 
Knitting clubs started. They shouldn't have got .rid of the product 
till they got something to replace it. Now they can say the workers 
have got to go because there's no work for them". In desperation, 
·the KME convenor-directors approached the Dol in September 1978 with 
the plan to restore profitability prepared by PA, and a request for a 
further £2.9 million over three years. The Department refused and 
attempted to manoeuvre the co-operative into a takeover by a private 
company, Stelrad, a subsidiary of Metal Box, which already had a majority 
share of the radiator market. Stelrad refused to discuss a takeover 
of the co-operative, but insisted that KME go into receivership, to 
facilitate ·500 redundancies, making it clear that Stelrad was primarily 
interested in KME's 10% share of the radiator market. A mass meeting 
of the co-operative· overwhelmingly rejected liquidation, (though as 
• 
a worker later laconically remarked, "You can't reject liquidation. 
put you into liquidation"). 
Alan Williams, a junior minister at Eric Varley's Dol, justified 
the decision to refuse further assistance to KME in the House of 
ColIIDons: "Even if KME .succeeded on the E2.9 million, it would make only a 
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minute surplus, .if any surplus at alL .•• Even if that surplus \-lere 
earned it would not be adequate to provide for future capital 
equipment and product development". No clearer indication could be 
given of the rejection of the social considerations which had prompted 
the original Dol intervention, as the New Statesman scathingly commented: 
"The statement shows just how far away the government is 
from any idea of a socialist system of accounting. 
Throughout the history of the co-op the government and its 
advisers have judged KME's prospects by applying a normal 
.capitalist criteria of profits. There has been no 
systematic attempt to establish what sort of trading 
loss might be acceptable, given the cost of making more 
unemployed in an Qrea of high unemployment, the danger of 
a sharp increase in imports following the closure of the 
factory, and the loss to the local council of rate-~ncome 
if the factory was closed. It would almost certainly' 
cost the government less money to finance KME's capital 
spending and product development than to allow the factory 
to close, but at t~e moment that is not how the 
government does its sums." ~5 January 1979). 
The logic of fighting redundancies previously displayed at the Kirkby 
factory had impressed many people, as a local GEe worker put it 
"They say KME is a failure. But KME kept 750 jobs for four years. 
This fella Arnie Weinstock, he had 15,000 employed in GEe on Merseyside 
ten years ago. And now the factories are empty shells and standing 
• 
idle, and there's 2,500 employed. And you read about the enormous 
profits he's making. What a big success he is. Well if that's 
capitalism, I'd rather have the co-operative. They started out with 750 
jobs and they kept them." In fact an employment holocaust had it 
Merseyside by 1978 with une~oyment at 11.7': 88,000 people, 52,000 
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of whom were young people. By 1979 unemployment had risen to 12.3%, 
100,000 people offici.ally out of work, and with redundancies on 
Merseyside running at over 12,500 each year, the prospects were 
becoming progressively bleaker. As one optimistic TG\\1U official 
maintained in an ironic slip, "For every door that shuts, another one 
closes." (MSRG, 1980, pp.9-·26). Kirkby was the epicentre of the 
holocaust \vi th 20% unemployed. Tower Hill, a council estate adjacent 
to KME, was believed to have 50% unemployment, which must have been 
one of the worst levels of the industrial world. One local councillor 
insisted, "Kirkby is a disaster area and KME was just a palliative. 
We needed general employment measures for K.Lrkby,. not assistance to just 
one factory." The banner headlines of the Liverpool Echo had become 
a painful catalogue of corporate aggression: in just one typical 
week in November 1978 there was, "BL Ready to Sack Speke Men"; "Axe 
Looming for Kirkby Worker Co-op"; "Dunlop: 2,400 to be Sacked." 
(On the same day as the Dunlop redundancies were announced, the other 
headline was that Edmund Dell, the Trade Secretary,and Merseyside's 
only Cabinet Minister, was resigning from Parliament to become a director 
of the Guiness Peat merchant bank). 
Appreciating the necessity to defuse the KME crisis, (dangerously 
close to the Labour Party's 1978 annual conference) and add a veneer 
of legitimacy to the effort to push KME back under private ownership, 
the Dol arranged a working party to explore possible alternatives, with 
the Department covering running losses in the meantime, which amounted 
to some £200,000 over three months. A critical factor which influenced 
• 
the inquiry, was the extent of the determination of the KME workers 
to resist a private takeover and the ensuing redundancies. Though 
the shopfloor had rejected liquidation, the workers were demoralised 
and divided. During the years of the co-operative, trade union 
organisation had been g~adually run down: "There's no union in that place, 
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you pay your sub and you have a card, but there's no union I 
• I 
said to Jack Spriggs, 'I want a shop steward', he sa1d'Im your 
shop ste\-1ard'. But he's my director and manager as well. That's 
wrong". He.had succumbed to the systematic pressures which 
constantly threaten every trade union leader, particularly upon assuming 
corporate responsibilities, "Jack doesn't realise that it ... ,as us that 
put him there where he is. He thinks he did it himself. But it \"as the 
shop floor organisation and strength. He I S on his own no;'1, he I s got 
nothing standing behind him." Even the KME workers connections 
with wider union organisation externally h~d been allowed to '-lither: 
relations with local union branches were not good due to the dubious 
practices at KME, and local ~ull-time officials regarded representation 
and conditions generally in the organisation very sceptically. Eddie 
Roberts, the celebrated TGWU full-timer (ex-Fords) had SOGe stand-up rmlS 
with the convenor-directors. 
Most acutely the convenor-directors had come to accept tbe 
capitalist commercial criteria liberally proferred by the co-operatives 
many advisers, which insisted that production lines be torn out and 
that the factory was overmanned,as one commented to the press, 'The 
thing is we know we have too many workers, but it is hard to decide 
which of the people who helped form the co-operative will go". 
(Such attitudes endeared the co-operative to the Tory County Council 
who supp~rted KME's application for more funds). Both in the submission 
to the Department and to the working party, the co-operative leaders 
accepted the rationality of large scale redundancies, which gravely 
• 
undermined the defence of KME j cbs. Similarly the shop floor workers 
were badly compromised: 
"The shop floor is still hoping it won't'happen. Hoping 
, 
it won't happen to them. Y'know, that it's not going to 
be wall to wall redundancy. A few hundre e out, 
I 
but not them. It's like everywhere they accept redundancy -
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-it's going to be someone else thats made redundant, 
but not them. And then it happens to them, and they 
don't know what's hit them. It wasn't like that a 
Ftsher Bendix though. We fought against redundancy 
and we destroyed those attitudes. We were all 
fighting together". To the few young activists who were 
still eager to try to resist the closure of the 
co-operative, Jack declared, "Don't cause trouble 
unless you have an alternative. The bank is ready 
to foreclose. So could BSC. The government could 
stop funding the losses and we would fold immediately. 
What can we do? This is the only alternative." 
The working party, composed of professional men, and led by 
Professor Douglas Hague of the Manchester Business School, (who 
later emerged in the 1979 general election as a chief economic 
adviser of Margaret Thatcher), recommended that KME be taken'over by a 
small private company Worcester Engineering with the loss of 260 jobs. 
The report of the inquiry stated, "l'be problem which the Dol has 
continually faced with KME is that KME has lacked decisive 
management. Unpleasant decisions have been postponed; forecasts have 
! 
not been achieved. As a result, management has lost credibility ••• 
KME can survive. A strong market oriented management with a good 
record in production could succeed." When Professor Hague was asked 
on Radio Four, "Does this mean the return of the bosses?", he replied, 
"The lesson is you can't even run a workers co-operative without 
• 
management. If you want to call them bosses you can". Later he 
contributed on BBCl Nationwide: "Management is a very professional 
--I 
activity. You need to be trained in it. Workers are good at making 
things. But they may not know the right product for the market ••• 
We"ve tried various solutions. We felt that the Dol was not the right 
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body, since the co-operative needed closer supervision and monitoring. 
The money was needed quickly. We weren1t able to persuade the 
NEB to help. Worcester Engineering was the next best thing. The 
problem with" the co-operative was that it spent too much time 
producing, and not enough thought on '''hat it was producing and ,,,hy, 
Marketing is the key to a successful company." Hence the co-operative, 
with a turnover of £8 million, was to be taken over by a company with 
a turnover of £2.6 ~illion, because of the management expertise the 
smaller company could supposedly provide. The co-operative had been 
denied assistance of £2.9 million, but the" Dol was prepared to provide 
worcester EngiReering with £4.3 million in loans and grants. 
FUrthermore the company could raise an additional £4 million from the 
banks who had refused any further assistance to KME. The minister, Eric 
varley, reminded the co-operative members that they had agreed to abide 
by the recommendations of the inquiry. But the working party had 
approached the NEB several times to request that it take over KME, 
and Varley refused to direct the NEB to comply. As Bob Cryer, who 
resigned as junior industry minister over the affair declared in the 
commons debate, "Failure to support KME ••• repl.-esents an ideological 
victory for those civil servants ~ho believe purely in the profit motive." 
Exploratory negotiations were held between Worcester Engineering 
and KME, and Cyril Duckworth the managing director of WE, was particuarly 
keen to meet the union stewards who took some satisfaction in offering 
him a lively reception at the factory. However negotiations broke 
down irretrievably over the IDAB;S insistence that Stelrad take a 
20~ share in WE, disagreements over who should benefit from the large 
tax losses in KME, and the position of the convenor-directors who WE 
wanted out, and who the Dol were prepared to shUnt to some remote ~ango. 
, 
DUckworth had the impression that the convenor-directors were only going 
through the formality of negotiation, before submitting a final bid for 
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aid to the Dol ~n January 1979, supported by PA's readiness to take 
up management of the company. A final refusal from the Dol left 
the convenor-directors attempting to stave off imminent bankruptcy, 
while appealing to financiers and private businessmen to rescue KME 
on any terms. Finally at a confused EGM on 27 March 1979 they put forward 
a resolution that a liquidator be appointed which was accepted, 
announcing vague and conflicting possibilities of a future takeover 
deal. An angry steward explained, "The people have been eased out 
the gates. Jack and the liquidator's statements about the imminent 
possibility of a 'consortium' taking over 'have all been designed to 
get people oub the gates, without wrecking the place, and without any 
redundancy money." 
The commercial failure of the co-operative, should not be 
dismissed simplistically as proof of the economic inefficiency of workers 
control for many reasons. One of them being that the workers at KME 
never had control. If a private company had taken over tbe factory, 
it would have represented the 'return of the bosses', but only in a 
sharper and more immediate form. For the truth was that they never 
really went away: market imperatives, government officials, bankers, 
suppliers, and management consultants, always dictated to the co-operative , 
through the medium of the convenor directors. The resulting experience 
for the co-operative workers involved the decline of a strong, cohesive 
union organisation, composed of workers with a pride in their factory 
and their skills, to be replaced by disorganised, dispirited individuals. 
In the event most of the KME machinery was auctioned in June 1979, 
• 
before the potential saviour the convenor-directors had promised arrived 
in the shape of a Californian scrap maChinery dealer Joe Epstein who 
took over the lease of the factory and paid a deposit on the presses • 
• 
Acknowledging their true role, Epstein kept on the convenor-directors 
as his agents, whilst they also represented the interests of the landlo~ds 
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International Pr?perty Development. Meanwhile the shop stewards 
who had continued to hold meetings with the convenor-directors after 
the closure drifted away in disillus ionment and began the search 
for work, which for many of their colleagues had simply resulted in a 
place among the long-term unemployed. A year later, in the summer of 
1980 the enormous KME factory was still deserted and idle, like many 
others on the Kirkby industrial estate. 
postscript: Under New Management? 
Tony Ecccies account of the KME saga, Under New Management, Pan, 
1981, represents the most detailed and informed assessment to emerge 
. 
by someone who who was actively involved in the attempt to manage and 
sustain the co-operative. The factual ~nalysis contained in the work 
is authoritative and accurate, and most of the judgements are quite 
fair. However both some of the underlying assumptions and the broad 
conclusions to emerge from the work may be contested. It would be 
helpful to consider the views put forward in the final theoretical 
chapter of the book, -Refutations, Judgements and Conclusions," 
beginning with a series of major I fallacies I concerning the 
co-operative. 
The first central 'fallacy~ Eccles considers is the belief that, 
"It wasn't a real co-operative. That1s why it failed and that's why 
we can ignore it." (p3Sl) Whilst some of the absurder views of 
co-operative purists may be rejected, that given a true co-operative 
• 
structure, democratic participation would automatically follow, 
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yet to seek to defend the K~m structure is iffiplausible. Eccles 
contends that i~ would be too easy to place the blame solely upon 
the convenor-directors Spriggs and Jenkins, and that without their 
"relentless, politically ernbarassing tenacity", KME would never have 
. 
happened. Furthermore he maintains that, "There is nothing inherently 
undemocratic about KME's equal voting rights leading to control by an 
autocratic elite. People sometimes voluntarily choose strong leadership 
and centralised authority. The convenors dominance was repeatedly 
legitimised in votes and elections ••• the co-operators didn't have to 
remain disorganised and ignorant of the business position ••• " (pp3S2-3) 
. There certainly was an autocratic elite at KME but whether the 
workers voluntarily chose this may be disputed. (Most autocratic elites 
succeed in cloaking their rule with some semblance of legitimacy, 
however manipulatory and unconvincing). What regra±ably occurred at 
KME was that two oligarchical union leaders of a body of predominantly 
semi-skilled manual workers sudde .nly had their power dramatically 
. 
enhanced when control of the KME co-operative and business was bestowed 
upon them by Benn and the Dol. (Benn seemed not to be aware in his 
pursuit of democratic change that bureaucracy begins on the shop floor). 
Subsequently the convenor-directors retained their power by reducing 
the few democratic formalities of the union and co-operative structures 
to a mere charade: by repeatedly calling upon the personal loyalty and 
commitment they had secured for themselves in past struggles1 by 
monopolising information, contacts, and expertise and excluding worker 
involvement from decision making1 and finally by remaining essentially 
benevolent dictators. (The basis.of their power was so precarious that 
they were precluded from making deeply unpopular decisions even if 
they had wanted to). Eccles is nearer to the truth when he states, 
"the leaders were ~ccidental autocrats who used democratic systems in 
the quest for power." That this situation arose and continued for the 
five years of the co-operative's existence is a sad reflection on the 
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democratic awareness and impulses of the Labour Government and the 
trade union move~ent. (Indeed it was management consultants' reports 
that consistently stressed the lack of democratic involvement in K~ffi 
and the need for radical change in the organizational structure). 
However, in the last analysis, the failure of the few rank and file 
revolts that took place at KME to make any permanent impression upon 
the power structure, reveals the incapacity of workers untrained in 
democratic procedures to deploy them effectively rather than resorting 
to more traditional, negative, methods of resistance. 
Most of the other 'fallacies' Eccles refers to concern the 
business performance of the co-operative in one way or another: 
KME was underfunded and sabotaged from London; no matter what they had 
done towards business efficiency they would still have been killed off; 
there wasn't a business there and so KME shouldn't have received backing 
because it was bound to fail; KME wasn't worth supporting because the 
co-operators didn't put any money into it; we could not interfere, it 
was an experiment (Dol); workers cannot manage and KME's failure proves 
it; only liberate workers from their shackles and tremendous progress 
will occur. In turn,Eccles rejects ·each of these views, however the 
kernal of his argument, underlying the analysis presented throughout 
the book is that \ though the commercial prospects for the co-operative 
were reasonable, the systematic failure to take essential management 
decisions in response to the market, determined the continual losses 
sustained by the co-operative. This failure was due to the obduracy of 
the convenor-directors, the weakness of the KME management, the incapacity 
of the stewards to grasp the funqpmental commercial problems or solutions, 
and the refusal of the workforce to accept any commercial responsibility 
whatsoever. "The KME story illustrates the difficulties of inducing 
workers to accept ~eavier loads of responsibility even when self-interest 
would seem to be an important dr.iving force." (pp 361-2) 
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Eccles I solutions to the commercial dilemmas of KME \olere the 
orthodox, market: determined ones of 200 redundancies on the orange 
juice line; improved productivity and demanning on other production 
lines; improved financial controls: and increased prices. If KME had 
been a conventional company then it is likely that efficient adoption 
of these policies would have brought commercial viability. However this 
ignores the unique history, organization, and political ideals of KME. 
Founded as a monument to the fight against mass redundancy, it was too 
much to expect the convenor-directors to impose it themselves (though 
in the end they agreed it should be imposed by the DOl): it would have 
stretched the residual loyalty towards them amongst the workforce to 
breaking point. Equally speed up and demanning on what were already 
arduous lines was fiercely resisted by the shopfloor. The irony was 
the democratic shortcomings of KME dictated the incapacity to tackle 
the companies commercial difficulties. In the absence of any realistic 
opportunity for positive participation the shopfloor unions resorted 
to traditional defensive practices. If . the effort had been made to 
fully involve shopfloor workers in knowledge of the business and 
decision making then it is possible that clock watching and card 
schools could have been replaced by a more sustained commitment to 
output. 
As for Eccles' general conclusions and recommendations concerning 
industrial democracy and workers co-operatives: KME certainly represents 
a catalogue of things to avoid in any further efforts in this 
direction, but whether any positive lessons can be learned from the 
KME debacle is open to doubt. Eccles states: "Putting together the 
problem of this antipathy towards acquiring managment skills, the 
insistence on a single channel of representation, and the limited 
inter-union integration at the workplace, we have a huge obstacle to 
the progress of workers' control. Indeed, I now see these long-standing 
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policies of the TUC and the Labour Party as major impediments to 
the growth of wo~kers co-operatives - or P?rhaps even to any serious 
attempt to democratise work. There needs to be a different way of 
reconciling the twin needs for employees to have business competence 
and also good representation." (p401) 
What Eccles fails to u·nderstand is that there is antipathy in 
the union movement not towards management skills as such, but market-
determined conventional management rationality. ( " ••• Unions have set 
their faces against the acquisition of business skills in case their 
members might become more more sympathetic to management's case."(!) 
He prefers to treat management as a strictly technical function -
finding the most rational solution to resource problems within the 
constraints of an unpredictable environment. On the contrary, it could 
be argued a commitment to industrial democracy involves questioning 
the assumptions of orthodox management and exerting some form of 
strategic control on the market environment. As for the insistence 
on a single channel of representation, this represents an awareness 
that if industrial democracy schemes are intended as a means of 
extending workers influence, rather than dividing it, representation 
must be through the union movement. Eccles belief that lithe requirement 
is for a separation between the workers role in promoting the overall 
health of the business enterprise and the mechanism by which collective 
ba~gaining intersects with the management of the enterprise," without 
further structural changes in the direction of public ownership and 
a socialised, planned economy, sounds rather like the German system 
of co-determination, and a mecha~ism for undermining workers direct 
influence rather than extending it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Meriden Motorcycle Co-operative . 
. 
The most distinguishing feature of ~~e Triumph Meriden workers 
co-operative was that it was primarily a result, not of a desire 
to create a. co-operative, nor a demand for the right to \'Iork, but 
simply a demand to build motorcycles at Meriden. At the time 
of the closure in September 1973, many of the Trium~h workers could 
have continued with their trades in the local car industry, if they 
had been prepared to endure the indignities of redundancy. (Though 
as the factory occupation and negotiations dragged on through 1974 
and 1975, the employment stability of Coventry was seriously disturbed, 
particularly by the Chrysler and Alfred Herbert redundancies). 
It was not difficult to find out what was special about Triumph 
Meriden which made the workers determined, and able, to keep it open: 
firstly, the peculiar fascination of the product: the workers identified 
closely with the tradition of the production of an internationally 
famous motorcycle; the lasting attraction of the motorcycl~ is 
difficult to overestimate, its beauty and excitement, combined with 
an inexpensive practicality. Secondly the Meriden factory was in 
an unusually pleasant rural setting, close to village communities 
in Warwickshire, and some distance away from the industrial bustle 
and overcrowding of Coventry anq Birmingham. An active and resilient 
shop floor trade union organization had been built up at the factory, 
possessin~ experience of disputes and negotiation with obdurate 
through frequently ineffective management. Finally the Meriden workers 
could call upon the extensive resources of the trade union organisations 
• 
of the Coventry engineering industry. 
Though they had been ve.ry anxious about the state of the industry 
for some years, the announcement of closure of Triumph Meriden came 
as a great shock to the workers there. The previous employers, BSA 
Triumph had commissioned a consultancy report prepared by accountants, 
- 1 -
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which maintained their production should be centred on Meriden; 
(a previous repprt, however, prepared by engineers maintained that 
production should be based at the Small Heath factory). However 
after three consecutive years of losses amounting to over £12 million, 
BSA were in danger of financial collapse, when a government sponsored 
merger with Norton Villiers - who at that time were breaking even -
took place. With £4.8 million government aid,Norton Villiers 
Triumph (NVT) set about the daunting task of res~ructuring the failing 
motorcycle industry: as the managing director of Norton Villiers saw 
it "an opportunity to grow bigger with government backing". 
(Business Administration, November 1975). The Conservative government 
assistance was the first use of Section 8 of the 1972 Industry Act 
designed to promot~ an industry in the national interest when adequate 
funds could not be obtained from the private sector: previous 
government intervention had been under Section 7 of the act, to preserve 
employment in development areas. Ironically an explicit intention 
. 
of the NVT assistance was to close one of the two existing BSA Triumph 
motorcycle factories with the loss of jobs resulting. Norton Villiers 
were concerned about the political consequences of this act, but the 
DTI was sanguine, since the factory was in an area of labour scarcity. 
As indicated in the revealing NVT Historical Summary (1974) of the 
affair NV suggested that it might be easier if BSA Triumph were put 
into receivership, and then NVT could emerge as saviour of one of the 
factories, rather than vindictively closing a factory that was still 
in operation. The purely market consideration of preserving the 
continuinity of business led to.the merger decision. The NVT report 
acidly commented, "Later events proved this decision a mistake since, 
in the absence of an actual receiver, it was too easy for the Meriden 
lobby to cast doubt on the fact that the business had failed and 
question the need for the closure decision." (l974,p.4). 
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Prior to the closure, Meriden had experienced serious production 
problems due to. technical difficulties with the cycle frame, 
irregularity of supplies and finance, and management by threats and 
exhortation. However lay-offs did not occur, as there was a union 
agreement that waiting time should be paid at average piecework 
earnings, if production loss was due to management error. Meriden 
workers believed that this militancy was instrumental in the closure 
decision, since at Small Heath wages were lower and the labour force 
more docile. Dennis Poore, the chairman of NVT, later claimed 
in exasperation: "The bad labour record at Meriden was sort of 
only incidental .••• Although I must say the record was absolutely 
terrible - I have never seen the sort of general practices which had 
been built up in the place. I mean, the full bonus was paid, whether 
they'd produced anything or not. Because they always managed to 
prove that it was the management's fault. People would get a full 
bonus week, which was £58-£59, back in 1972-73, even if they'd produced 
. 
nothing." After the merger in July 1973 the new management were 
met by a three week strike, though in retrospect, Meriden workers 
believed that the NVT management were happy to exploit the conflict that 
existed, as a justification for closing Meriden and moving production 
to BSA Small Heath. The abruptness with which Dennis Poore announced 
the closure of Meriden, pausing briefly on his way down to London, and 
the lack of concern he exhibited for the loss of the livelihoods of 
all the 1,750 workers, provoked intense anger. The workers knew that 
the factory had a large order book, and they were sure that, with 
more careful management, Triuman motorcycles could be restored to their 
earlier pre-eminence. A blockage on the movement of all motorcycles 
and parts from the factory was imposed, and the NVT senior management 
were kept out. When this result~d in an announcement of immediate 
closure the work-in became a sit-in. Within a month the idea of the 
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co-operative emerged from talks between Bill Lapworth, the Coventry 
District Secret~ry of the T~~U, and Leslie Huckfield, the Labour 
MP for Nuneaton. The workers readily agreed to the co-operative 
plan when it was put to them as a way out of the impasse: they 
. 
had witnessed the rapid decline of the British motorcycle industry, 
almost consciously run down by an uncaring or incompetent management, 
and found it difficult to imagine that they could not do better. 
The Destruction of the British Motorcycle Industry 
As the shattering report of the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
strategy Alternatives for the British Motorcycle Industry (1975) 
revealed, the British motorcycle industry, once by far the largest 
, 
in the world, had been virtually destroyed: in 1974-75, sales of 
Honda, 'the biggest competitor,were 2 million units; sales of the 
British industry were approximately twenty thousand. The Boston 
report was quite clear on the cause of this disaster: "The loss of 
market share by the British motorcycle i,ndustry over the la~t fifteen 
years resulted from a concern for short term profitability." 
Management gave priority to dividend payments over capital investment 
tor the sake of company share value. Norton Villiers and BSA Triumph 
spent too little even to replace fixed assets, and had been running 
down working capital, keeping stocks to a minimum. Geoffrey 
Robinson, who became the managing director of the Meriden co-operative 
declared,. "Blindness, selfishness, and incompetence of management -
the venal aspect of management - caused the decline of the British 
motorcycle industry. Dockers era (the ex-chairman of BSA) was one 
• 
of complacency, feebleness and gross incompetence. There were racial 
overtones too, in the beli~f the Japs could not compete with British 
products". The only reason why BSA and NV were able to record the 
p~ofits of the 1960s was that they·were arrived at without setting 
aside funds for replacing a substanti~l part of their plant. 
Eighty per cent of NVT's equipment liquidated in 1975 was over 
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15 years old, and sixty per cent of the equipment was more than 20 
years old. It was general purpose, labour intensive manufacturing 
plant, much of which was obsolete; and Meriden acquired, at some 
cost, similar outdated equipment. The capital investment of NV 
during 1966-73 was negligible, and except for a brief effort at 
recovery in 1971, was as low at BSA Triumph.· The net fixed investment 
per man of the Bri'tish industry was little more than 1/5th that of 
the Japanese industry: £1,300 compared to £5,000. The Boston study 
sombrely concluded: "The British motorcycle industry has three 
rather antiquated factories in the M~dlands. Investment has been low 
for many years and the equipment in the factories is old and mostly 
general purpose in nature. As a result it is difficult to maintain 
product reliability and impossible to use modern, high volume, highly 
automated, low cost methods." (1975, Appendices, p.2ll). 
The Boston report maintained that: "The motorcycle industry is 
exhibiting the classic effects of differences in growth, volume and 
investment on the relative cost effectiveness of the competitors." 
(p.xiii). These differences were based on two fundamentally distinct 
manufacturing and marketing policies. The British approach was to 
concentrate on earning a profit from existing business and facilities 
of the companies, rather than on the long term strength of the industry. 
A proliferation of motorcycle models, engines, components, production 
methods and factories were allowed to continue without any significant 
attempt at integration or standardization, until they became 
unprofitable, and were quietly extinguished. Under competitive 
pressure this led to a focus on high cost, ~igh margin business 
regardless of volume or market shar~. In contrast the Japanese policy 
was based on the concept that high volumes per model provided the 
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potential for high productivity, which was realised by using 
capital intensive and highly automated techniques. Factories 
specialised by models and components and function, together with 
designS suitable for high volume production, permitted the reduction 
of production costs. Low costs allowed low prices for their 
products, and the pursuit of a larger market share. "It is therefore 
clear that the result of the British industry's historic focus on 
high short term profitability has been low profits and now losses 
in the long term. The long term result of the Japanese industry's 
historic focus on market share and volume, often at the expense of 
short term profitability has been the precise opposite: high and 
secure profitability." (BCG, 1975, p.xv). Another classic process 
had occurred to which the Boston group, understandably,do not refer -
the concentration, centralization and monopolisation of the motorcycle 
industry. 
From a commanding position of holding a majority share of both 
the domestic market and the world market as recently as the mid-1950s, 
as thes~ markets grew extremely rapidly by as much as 20 per cent 
per annum, British manufactur~rs suffered a catastrophic loss of market 
share: in 1968 British bikes still had 11% of the huge US market, 
by 1974 it was 1%; in the domestic market they had 34% in 1968 
and 3% in 1974. (BCG, 1975,p.5). While the Japanese and other 
foreign manufacturers progressively developed production volumes 
and experience in higher displacement classes of motorcycles, the 
British management response was to withdraw and shut down production: 
first of their lightweight lOOCc and l75cc bikes, then the medium 
2SOcc and 359Cc, then the large SOOcc and 65Occ, until isolated in the 
low v~lume, high premium 750cc superbike range. Management failed 
to secure the finance necessary for '. improv~d production technology, 
to develop new models, or to promote production efficiency or 
marketing expertise. 
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The advantage of the Japanese, moreover, was based on higher 
productivity, not lower labour costs: "Japanese labour costs have 
exceeded those in British factories for a number of years and 
have consietently risen more rapidly on trend" (BeG, 1975, p.xiv). 
In 1973-74 Honda paid £100 per month more than the average wage in 
the British industry. Similarly, expanding volume enabled the Japanese 
industry to avoid any redudancies despite constant increases in 
capital intensity; in contrast the highly labour intensive British 
industry was confronted with repeated redundancies as relative costs 
escalated and profitability collapsed. . BSA Triumph attempted a 
slighly pathetic revival in 1971 when to a publicity fanfare 13 new 
models were announced, none of which were to go into production due 
to a cash crisis; they completely missed the US summer sales 
season, and of 4,500 workers at BSA Small Heath, 3,000 were made 
redundant. Having failed to close Meriden,a desperate restructuring 
attempted by NVT in 1973-74 proved far too little and too ~ate. 
Commissioned by the Department of Industry to evaluate commercial 
strategfes for the industry, the Boston group produced three: a low 
volume, high premium strategy costing £15 million; a medium volume, 
low premium strategy costing £38 million, and a high volume, low 
premium strategy costing £51 million. They were not confident about 
any of these alternatives though, and emphasised the bleak prospects 
of the industry: 
"The possible courses of action now open to the industry 
are few. The low volume alternative offers the industry 
a future on a reduced scale, with low profits and limited 
prospects. The high and ~edium volume alternatives 
recognise that long term commercial viability depends on 
retrieving the industry's competitive cost position, and 
represent the most commercially feasible means of doing so. 
The gap to be made up is now so wide, however, that both 
these alternatives involve very considerable expenditure 
and risk ••••• It is most unlike~y that private capital to 
fund the necessary investment would be forthcoming given 
these prospects. (1975, p.xxiv)". 
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Eric Varley, the new Secretary of State for Industry, exercising 
similar commer~ial prudence, decided on no strategy for the 
industry at all: he refused further goverI~ent assistance, which 
prompted the collapse of NVT in late 1975, having swallowed E4.8 million 
provided by the Conservative Minister for Industrial Development, 
without having notably contributed to employment or production in 
the industry. 
The Struggle to Survive. 
In these profoundly inhospitable market conditions the marathon 
struggle to establish the Triumph co-operative took place from 
September 1973 to March 1975. The picket began on a nine shift 
system in November, seven days a week, 24 hours a day, through two cold 
winters. About 700 workers joined the picket originally, and 120 
survived to the end. Some workers left to take other jobs, but were 
keep to return to Triumph when production resumed; some pickets 
took part-time jobs to keep them going; but a lot of people spent 
the whole of their savings in the fight to establish the co-operative. 
The pic~ets huddled around their brazier became part of the myth~logy 
of the local labour movement, and the righteousness of their cause 
was emphasized by frequent public events including a religious service 
and a children's party in the factory canteen at Christmas. Dennis 
Poore was tmmensely piqued at the public support the sit-in attracted, 
and at the criticism directed at NVT: 
"The greatest news appeal was undoubtedly the glamour of a 
workers co-operative and its large scale defying of 
authority and the establishment, particularly with the added 
spice of government investment. The pickets succeeded in 
getting several television-programmes and feature stories 
emphasising their dedication to motorcycle manufacture 
and glorifying the machines which they made. If the 
previous history of losses and industrial militancy were 
omitted, it was possible to make a convincing picture of 
an apparently undesirable capitalistic effort to destroy 
a thriving industry with a band pf unusually loyal and 
enthusiastic workers." (NVT, 1974, p.l2). 
What particularly distressed Poore, in a fascinating insight into 
corporate values, was how the public ~eemed to accept the pickets 
argument that they were seeking to defend an important industry 
from being short sightedly dismantled: 
"No gr~at experience of business management was required 
to appreciate the argument that, with a given volume 
of work spread between two factories, a concentration 
into one of them saving the overheads of the other would 
be beneficial. The majority of people had not been 
trained to appreciate this logic automatically, and the 
commercial argtwents were lost in the overall excitement. 
As a result, NVT appeared continually on the defensive." 
(NVT, 1974, p.13). 
Poore was so upset because the workers were blockading 2,650 
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motorcycles, with a market value of several millions, and production 
tools and other components for the Triumph Trident; which meant 
that NVT was short of finance and unable to start the planned 
manufacture of Tridents at Small Heath. 
The principal re~son why the negotiations to set up the co-
operative were so protracted were the obstructive tactics adopted 
by NVT which led to indefinite delays. The workers believed that 
. 
Poore was simply attempting to exhaust their efforts so that he 
could reclaim the Meriden assets intact. Geoffrey Robinson, used 
to difficult commercial negotiations, insisted the Meriden negotiations 
involved the greatest legal compexity and technicality he had ever 
witnessed. At first the company refused to negotiate the sale 
of Meriden while the workers werp. in occupation, but agreed to the 
suggestion of the Conservative Minister Christopher Chataway that 
NVT buy the bikes made at Meriden until July 1974, when the co-operative 
could have an option to buy the factory. However NVT delayed agreeing 
• 
a price for the bikes, and then in January 1974 reneged on the 
agreement, maintaining that it no longer had the necessary funds and 
offered to sell the Meriden factory to the co-operative. During 
this time Poore seemed to prefer recourse to legal action to evict 
the pickets, but strangely, was held in check by the Conservative 
government: "The company was surprised to learn that the Minister, 
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was adamant that there should be no r.~course to the law and that he, 
the Minister, would see what he could do. It appeared later that 
he had been under considerable pressure from the Department of 
Employment not to allow the use of any force at Meriden and had been 
told that the pickets would be able to mass up to 5,000 supporters 
from other factories in Coventry \V'ho would arrive on the site in 
coaches within the hour if there were any signs of the use of 
police!" (NVT, 1974,p.l4). Regardless of whether there was 
any truth in this', it was clear that the experience at Saltley gates 
during the 1972 miners strike, and the consequences of the jailing 
of the Pentonville dockers, had certainly rattled the government, 
and discredited any use of the law in critical industrial disputes. 
The reluctance of the government to risk escalating the dispute, 
despite Poore's repeated pleas to go ahead with a legal injunction, 
was emphasised by the fact that many of the negotiations between NVT 
and the co-operative advisers were conducted in candlelight at the DTI 
during the three day week called because of the second miners strike 
in 1974·. 
Another reason negotiations were difficult, was that any 
commercial dispute between the two parties was immensely compounded 
by the political conflict that'existed between them: Poore had 
never conducted an important commercial transaction with trade 
unionists before, nor had they bought a factory. This tension gave 
rise to some explosive moments. At one point in the negotiations 
Geoffrey Robinson, acting for the co-operative, had agreed to a 
release of the bikes held at ~eriden to entice Poore into an early 
settlement. Bill Lapworth, arriving late at the meeting, sensed 
-that once he had the bikes, Poore would beqome even more obdurate, 
so rejected outright the proposal, ~s he explained: "I don't say 
I solemnly sat down and thought I've got to reject that - really it 
was just a natural reaction. Poore swore for the first time in our 
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presence - 'If anybody is going to fuck it up, I will'. I 
just hit him w~th, , well, you'll have to be quick, 'cos I'm 
doing my best , , ••••• Sometliues you have to go in with both feet, 
just to upset the meeting, to get the ball back again •..•• " The 
election of a Labour government in February 1974 brought the 
possibility of state aid for the co-operative, but the selling price 
of NVT began to rise. Poore was prepared to sell the assets of 
Meriden for between £2 million and £7 million, depending on what 
the co-operative required. Six months_before, Manganese Bronze 
Holdings, the parent company of NVT had received a government grant 
of £4.8 million, and paid only £3.6 million for the two motorcycle 
factories of BSA Triumph. Small, Heath was three times bigger than 
Meriden, so it co?ld be argued MBH had paid less than El.8 million 
for Meriden. Management Today said of Poore, "His approach vias that 
of an investment banker, and he maintains a small head office in the 
City of London." (May, 1976) • Poore had made another coup in 
acquiring the valuable non-motorcycle assets of BSA; as one worker 
put it - "Poore made a lot of money out of the motorcycle industry 
though he did not make any motorcycles." 
The Meriden co-operatives future began to look very dubious when 
in the summer of 1974 opposition by workers at the Small Heath NVT 
plant to the co-operative scheme grew, since they saw it as a threat to 
their own jobs. The Meriden workers believed that Poore had 
encouraged this fear. Relations between the people at BSA Small Heath 
and Triumph Meriden had never been good, stretching back to the days 
of company rivalry before the merger in 1952. 
. . 
Instead of 
encouraging unity the common threat of the decline of the industry 
increased the distance between the two plants, and relations were 
soured when Small Heath bore the brunt of the 1971 redundancies. 
As Joe Ward, a steward at Small Heath until 1971 explained, there was 
no serious trade union effort to build links: 
The trade unions in the various plants were never 
brought together and no serious attempts were made 
to form alliances beb.'een the factories in the 
establishing of a combine committee or any jOint 
working arrangement •.•• No alternative strategy from 
within the group could be put as there was no 
organisation to promote such an alternative. The 
negotiations which were later necessary to form the 
co-op took place with a weak and divided organisation 
because even under NVT the factories' organisations 
were never united." (l979,p.3,23). 
The demand for nationalisation of the industry was made by the 
Birmingham Confederation of Engineering Unions, and the Meriden 
workers finally agreed to support nationalisation as the price of 
the Small Heath support for the co-operative. But there was no 
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sustained campaign or mobilisation in favour of nationalisation, whlch 
could have secured a three factory solution, and, with considerable 
investment, set the industry more firmly on a path of recovery. 
Yet again, the highly vulnerable co-operative solution was a :result 
not of trade union strength, but of ",eak and divided union organisation. 
Continued antagonism of the Small Heath workers towards any 
preferential treatment for the Meriden co-operative made negotiations 
at the ~epartment of Industry even more difficult than they had 
previously been. Benn expressed commitment to the whole of the British 
motorcycle industry, but found it difficult to convince the Small Heath 
stewards that a three factory solution was feasible. He maintained 
at a Dol meeting on 5th November 1974 with the stewards: 
-
"I have not guaranteed the co-op no redundancies nor have I 
guaranteed the co-op further finance after the initial 
grant. I will pledge no discrimination ••••• I cannot 
guarantee your jobs beyond tomorrow but I can ensure 
my policy towards a three factory motorcycle industry, as 
I see a great future for it. Meriden will have no 
privileges over and above ~. There will be no 
discrimination. Every endeavour will be made to promote 
full employment in the three factories." (Small Heath 
Shop stewards minutes) • 
A visit by Benn to Small Heath on 8th November received a rough 
, 
reception, and the celebrated indictment of one worker, "You can't 
eat socialism'" (Capitalism has no nutritional value either). 
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At Wolverhampton NVT there was a great deal more sympathy for the 
co-operative, though there \"as fear that_ they would be closed to 
preserve Small Heath. Benn could not be blamed for the general 
disunity of the union organisation, nor the susceptibility of the 
Small Heath workers to the promptings of their NVT management. 
However, in the context of such fundamental doubt about the future of 
the industry, it does seem wrong to have pressed ahead with the 
co-operative assistance without first securing the survival of 
the other two factorias. In late 1974 nationalisation of the industry 
was still a possibility, and was recommended, after a detailed study 
by NVT itself: 
"Either the government must inject a further sum, estimated 
at £12-£15 million into NVT to enable it to operate within 
a three-factory industry, which would be tantamount to and 
better achieved by public ownership, or the Meriden men 
must go home and NVT revert to the original two factory 
plan with proper compensation for losses incur+ed at the 
behest of the government." (1974,p.34). 
Presumably hoping to establish Meriden first, before tackl~ng the 
problems of-NV T, Benn pushed through the co-operative assistance. 
Even this limited aid was resisted by the Treasury, and by the Export 
Credit Guarantee Department which is controlled by the Treasury·, and 
instructed to operate on normal commercial lines. Triumph Meriden 
I 
finally started production on 6 March 1975. Benn commissioned 
the Boston report into the whole industry in March 1975, but was 
removed from office in June 1975, before he could do anything further 
for the industry, and was replaced by Eric Varley who had a very 
different brief. In the summer of 1975 NVT requested government 
• aid of £30-£30 million, (the medium volume low premium strategy for 
two factories). Varley refused any further assistance; and, 
disastrously, the ECGD support of £4 million to NVT to cover its US 
business provided by Benn, was withdrawn. A merchant bank would make 
a phased withdrawal of credit in the Circumstances, but the ECGD action 
was instant, presumably with Dol agreement, which meant that NVT 
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immediately was put into receivership. 
Co-operative Organisation and Control. 
The Department of Industry provided Meriden with a loan of 
£4.2 million and a grant of £750,000; however the co-operative 
paid NVT £3.9 million for the site, plant and work in progress, 
and had to pay £200,000 to the government for accounting services. 
With 50 little working capital remaining, the co-operative members 
knew that it would be a struggle to survive. Triumph Meriden was 
established as a limited company, Synova Motors, with three shares 
held by outside trustees. The trustees held the shares sub ~ct to 
a trust deed that they would not act or vote except in accordance with 
the beneficiaries wishes, who were the workforce. The board of the 
company consisted of eight elected union convenors, four other elected 
representatives, and the managing director. At each AGM one third 
of the board were to stand for re-election. Originally there was 
only one full time professional manager, the company secre~ary, 
however later the co-operative acquired several more managers. The 
first two years of operation of the co-operative were on very much a 
seige footing: production had to be re-activated on a shoe-string 
budget, and the dependence on NVT marketing seemed to leave the 
, 
co-operative under Poore's con~ol. It was the enthusiasm of the 
people who had picketed that brought the co-operative through this 
difficult stage. 
In a number of important ways Triumph Meriden achieved a 
co-operative stature denied the Scottish Daily News or KME, yet the 
• 
workers at Meriden did not see their enterprise as a political 
experiment, but simply as an industrial experiment. Moreover, the 
remarkable ~alitarian features adopted initially at Meriden did come 
under a process of erosion, and the·.practice of workers control became 
somewhat attenuated. Thus the control structure was seen as a 
representative. one: there were few meetings during working hours 
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since the prevalent view was that people should 'get on with the 
job' ; meetings held monthly on Saturdays, were presented 
with policy decided between the board and management; and 
infrequent mass meetings were called normally only in response to 
crisis situations. One explicit distortion of the democratic 
process, which fortunately had little real effect, was a system of 
multiple votes, whereby workers voting power increased according 
to the number of years they worked at the co-operative up to a 
maximum of five. This was designed to ensure that the pickets who 
had sacrificed so much in the struggle remained the ~ajor influence 
in the co-operative, which they effectively achieved by more informal 
means. The quiet charisma of the co-operative chairman was central 
to the decision making process, and there was a tendency towards the 
unitary authority structure seen more starkly at KME, as Dennis Johnson 
admitted: 
"When I was there, if a problem could not be resolved it 
would come to me as chairman and I would attempt to resolve 
it •••• I was sort of running the whole plot, if you like 
as managing director - although we did not use these 
titles - and at the same time I'was a representative of 
the board and of the TGWU. So it was a mixed role in 
many ways. As time went by ••• we thought it was sensible 
to introduce an appeals committee, that meant if a person 
was disciplined, using the horrible old word for 
convenience, whenever that person had a grievance, and he 
thought in any respect it had not been resolved correctly 
.or properly, then he could put that problem to the appeals 
committee." (Ward, 1979, p.3). 
In fact the appeals committee was composed of the same union 
convenors: there was little serious conflict or dissatisfaction 
at Meriden, and most workers who felt a grievance sUnply left for 
better paid jobs elsewhere, but if there had been any critical 
problem, it is highly unlikely it could have been satisfactorily 
·resolved within the existing co-operative decision making structure. 
Workers were uneasy about this, ?ne'said: "The appeals committee 
is the same as the shop stewards committee: they're on both sides 
again. You can't be both. It works, but there's something wrong. 
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There's something missing. There is still some agitation, you 
still feel some difference between the men and the directors. 
If you approach Dennis Johnson and say 'You've got a problem' 
he says 'It's ~>ur problem, not mine. ' " That this system contained 
the seeds to degenerate into something less tolerable was indicated 
by the fact that in the first two years none of the convenors 
positions were contested at annual elections, because it was felt 
that it would be disloyal to foment disunity while the co-operative 
was barely surviving. An early critic was Bill Lapworth, who 
resigned as an outside director because he felt responsibility was 
vested too firmly at the top and was not being passed down to the 
grass roots. 
Bill Beatie one of the shopfloor directors maintained that the 
directors job was lito act as a go between for the workforce and the 
management team. So that I!:anagement time is not take.'l up with 
industrial relations." The equivocal position of the shop steward 
... 
directors was recognised fram the start and caused a lot of strain 
for them. Geoffrey Robinson later admitted that he was pleased at how 
they developed under this pressure, "There was a gradual realisation 
of responsibilities. When the concept of ownership was first mooted 
it was much stronger than Bullock, the whole board was elected from 
the trade unions. Inevitably and predictably, the elected members 
would see problems in precisely the same way as shop stewards - 'how 
, 
will this effect my members'? They are now maturing into responsible 
directors, and it is accepted that the trade unions employ management 
to work for them. II Under Ro~inson's influence there was eventually 
a move towards a Bullock style board, with selected members drawn 
generally from the shopfloor, not particular unions; four members 
, 
from those in 'executive positions', plus one external director, 
Robinson. This represented a big shift from union control of the 
co-operative. Robinson said, lilt is not anti-trade union, but in a 
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really co-operative environment, trade unions have no role to play". 
The outstanding aspects of the industrial relations at the 
Meriden co-operative were the low map~ing, equal wage, and abolition 
of foremen. In the original Meriden submission to the Dol it was 
proposed that 879 workers could produce 24,000 machines a year, 
which civil servants found difficult to believe since in the previous 
year NVT had only produced 28,000 machines with 1,750 workers. 
In fact previously at Meriden 60% production had seldom been achieved, 
and the submission was simply the old piecework times plus 16% 
wai ting time. The workers wanted more ambitious targets but Geoffrey 
Robinson insisted that they should be toned down to avoid taxing 
credibility too far. The submission condemned the previous 
organisation of production: 
"The 'them and us' problem in the private sector is inherent 
in the conflict of interest in the division of a company's 
earnings. At Meriden, this was exacerbated 'by inadequate 
consultation procedures and by the fact that the plant was 
constantly under threat of closure. The result was an 
entirely unco-operative attitude from labour, maximising 
piecework earnings and causing repeated stoppages, 
overmanning and low producti vi ty. " (Business Observer, 
23 ,June 1974). 
Obviously employers elsewhere seized upon this, and upon the later 
proof of higher productivity at Meriden, in their attack upon shop floor 
practices, (without, of course', making any reference to the implied 
criticism of the ownership and control structure of private industry) : 
"If there is a significance in the Meriden experiment it 
lies less in the principle of worker democracy than in 
the attempt to demonstrate that the 20-30 percent overmanning 
which is so common throughout engineering can be overcome 
if the men on the shop floor are motivated correctly". 
(Financial Times, 7 March 1975) • 
• 
When the co-operative started in 1975 the common wage was E50.00 
per week, paid to all except the company secretary. In fact the 
loan agreement with the Dol stated that wages must not exceed E50 
per week per worker on aggregate, and that overtime had to be agreed 
directly by the Secre~ary of State for Iadustry! The acceptance 
of this very low basic wage was convincingly proof of the dedication 
of the Meriden workers, since it was less than they had been 
earning bllo years previously I and at a time of high inflation. 
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In an industry with an elitist craft tradition it was a r.emarkable 
achievement to have a common basic wage for skilled and unskilled, 
men and women, white collar and blue collar. (Fleet, 1976, p.103). 
During the next three years only the increases allowed by government 
pay policy were allowed: £6 in 1976; £2-50 in 1977; and 10, in 
1978. Therefore pay in the co-operative remained £20-£30 below the 
coventry engineering industry, yet workers were prepared to stay at 
Meriden "because they like bikes". Some of the problems the low pay 
and common wage created were relieved later by overtime payments, 
and to overcome the rigours of the pay code between 4 and 8 hours 
of overtime were "regularly awarded, though this was a widespread 
practice in industry. Work effort was maintained on the equal 
wage for over two years, until the end of 1977; however same workers 
claimed that since there were differential demands there should be 
differential rewards. The problem was, of course, how to determine 
what d~ands should receive what rewards, without slipping back into 
traditional discriminatory p~actices as some more conservative workers 
wanted. Many people' were committed to the equal wage as a foundation 
of the co-operative and a plan' to introduce a three grade bonus system 
produced in october 1977 was resented by many, and quickly dropped, 
though this was in the context of government pay guidelines. It 
was replaced by a factory bonus scheme linked to weekly output. 
The adoption of an equal wage revealed an admirable practical concern 
for equality, however the re-tntroduction of monetary incentives 
revealed hO~inadequatethe basic wage was, and that the work at 
Meriden was not sufficiently stimulating in itself to dispense 
with incentives. 
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Finally, there were no foremen or supervisors in the co-operative, 
only 'organisers' who were seen to have.a co-ordinating rather 
than authority function. There was a distinctly more open 
authority structure, though most of the 'organisers' had been 
foremen in the past, and they still wore white coats! Efficient 
utilisation of labour was greatly assisted by the flexible demarcation 
and willing mobility of labour: although people were assigned 
to particular jobs and departments, inter-job and inter-departmental 
mobility took place to ease bottlenecks. Despite the lack of close 
supervision and piecework, work discipline and output were maintained 
by work groups. However, naturally enough, lateness and absenteeism 
did occur. As at KME, clock cards were retained, ostensibly a 
fire precaution requested by the insurance company, but clearly 
serving other purposes. 
There was, undoubtedly, an exceptional working atmosphere at 
Meriden. A good deal of the work involved dexterity, and a 
significant amount of craft work remained, although this was more due 
to undercapitalisation than deliberate choice. Workers were free 
to leave their jobs for a few minutes if they chose to, and most took 
an interest in the work, and identified strongly with the product. 
The co-operative proudly displayed the factory, bikes, and the 
workers themselves, to frequent visitors, many of whom were lifelong 
, Triumph owners, and to trade delegations from Britain and overseas. 
Time off was allowed relatively freely, and the co-operative 
generally took a paternal attitude towards its members. However 
the enlightened poliCies, in hormal terms, towards supervision, 
hours and days off, were contradicted by the repetition, limitation 
and boredom of much of the work. Though the assembly line at 
Meriden was a pleasant place in comparison to the nOise, heat, and 
speed of other production lines; it was still subject to a detailed 
division of labour with the resulting lack of control and satisfaction 
which production lines entail. It was difficult to sustain 
a keenness about work effort, whatever the level of commitment 
to the co-operative and motorcycle, if the same, or similar, job 
tasks were performed over 1,000 times a month. If the work had 
been more interesting and fulfilling, there would have been 
greater enthusiasm and less inclination to abuse flexible \'lorking 
arrangements. Some workers believed that work effort was 
slipping, and that apathy and disinterest was beginning to creep 
in by the second year of production. 
This was reflected in what was at times the major problem 
of Triumph Meriden: how to maintain the high levels of output, 
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and increase them further. During various periods the order books 
began to fill up"months ahead, but as production runs fell behind 
schedule, some orders had to be turned down because delivery dates 
could not be met. There was considerable good will shown towards 
the co-operative and the Triumph Bonneville from dealers in Britain 
and abroad, and delays were tolerated, though this could not be 
relied upon indefinitely. A related problem was that one of the 
finest selling points of the. bike was that it was craft built, 
with attractive styling, handling, and performance, in contrast 
to the standardized mass production of the Japanese industry, which 
made for a blander product. However the combination of outdated 
and inefficient machinery, and the erosion of pride and interest 
in the work, meant that faults occurred later in the motorcycles 
~uch as oil leaks, gaskets, and broken spokes, which were expensive 
to repair under warrenty, and-damaged the good name of Triumph. 
oue to dism~y at this, and at a few of the organisational changes, 
some ~f the original pickets left, who were the backbone of the 
co-operative. The workforce increased frqm the 162 who started up 
to about 700, which was a considerable achievement in difficult 
economic conditions. However many of the workers taken on were not 
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fired, in the same way as the origin~l workers, with enthusiasm 
for Triumph; ·and having not experienced the traumatic struggle 
to create the enterprise, their commitment to it was less intense. 
Meriden had by far the slenderest,management structure of the 
three Dol co-operatives, consisting in the first two years of one 
professional manager, Brenda Price, the company secretary who 
returned from NVT. A general manager, David Jones a former Jensen 
executive, was appointed during this period but soon left after 
disagreements with Dennis Johnson the co-operative chairman. The 
other managerial functions in the co-operative were performed by the 
worker directors and clerical workers. Given the considerable 
• 
commercial hurdles Triumph had to overcome, the co-operative seemed 
to survive remarRably well with essentially no formal administrative 
management. Dennis Johnson was particularly proud of this, and was 
not happy with the gradual accretion of a management structure from 
both inside and outside the co-operative. In August 1977 he resigned, 
and later explained: 
"The reason for my departure from the co-operative was I 
believed that the most important value of the co-op was 
that of its experimental·nature. The industrial and 
social experiment to see if, with a different form of 
ownership, a much wider industrial democracy, whether 
in fact you could not simply attain high levels of 
productivity and effiCiency but maintain these levels. 
I believe we did. To introduce professional management 
into it in my view ruined that experiment. Also I 
feel there are great dangers. The co-op was paid on 
an egalitarian system with everyone getting the same 
rate of pay irrespective of responsibility for your 
particular workload or type of job classification 
and skill ••••• The danger is that you move to an us 
and them sit~ation again where people see after all 
we went through, on the gates for eighteen months, 
struggling on E65 a week ~r whatever'it is, and we have 
managers now on X thousands or so many hundreds per 
week, and we used to do it ourselves anyway. I don't 
think it is going on as a co-op as it ought to, but 
nonetheless this is what the people elected for, a 
professional management ••• I thought we were going along 
a road that was no longer comme~surate with what we set 
out to do. But that is democracy the people decided to go 
along that route." (Ward, 1979, pp.7-9). 
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There was always a well-acknowledged need for more technical 
specialists at Meriden, in engineering design and development, 
as well as in commercial activities, such as financial control 
and marketing. John Rosamund, the new chairman, was one of 
the workers who adopted a more pragmatic approach, "At one 
time we were selling bikes at a loss, because we did not know 
our production costs. And yet the assumption was that 
management and office staff \'lere an unnecessary evil." It was 
difficult to find people with such skills, because of the high 
salaries demanded by profeSSionals, the constraints on executive 
authority imposed by the co-operative structure, and the insistence 
on a commitment to motor cycles, 'and, in particular, Triumph. 
During the life·of the co-operative, managerial assistance came from 
a number of outside sources. Geoffrey Robinson, the chief 
executive of Jaguar cars, and later Labour MP for Coventry, provided 
valuable commercial guidance to Meriden from the beginning • 
. 
In 1976 a three man team from GKN attempted to assist with the 
comme~cial problems. Finally in 1977 as part of a rescue package 
arranged by Harold Lever, A~nold Weinstock, the GEC managing director, 
provided a management team. Whilst the team ostenSibly were aware 
of the delicate nature of their role as advisers to the co-operative, 
and wanted to study aspects of the expertment to consider 
applications for their own company, they undoubtedly exerted a 
strong influence upon the co-operative organisation and orientations 
as representatives of a company regarded in the labour movement as 
possessing a fairly ruthles~managemen~ approach. There was 
much appre~iation in the co-operative of the technical skills and 
bac~-up resources of the GEC men in tackling long standing problems 
such as the cycle's vibration fau~t. The GEe team had little 
compunction in "laying down the law· at mass meetings, listing 
the technical, production, and commercial problems which had to be 
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overcome, as one worker said, "no one had ever spoken to us 
like that before". Due to the financial straits of the company, 
workers were vulnerabl,.e and receptive to such commands, and 
underestimated their previous achievements. By 1978 the 
co-operative had established its own management team, including 
a managing director, financial controller, and marketing director, 
the influence of the worker directors became more limited and a 
new stage in the control of the enterprise was embarked upon. 
An indication of the new approach was given by Brian Jones the 
Chief Engineer, who left a better paid job to join the co-oper~tive, 
"We know we can produce a product to fill a gap in the market. 
We can generate and sustain a market share." 
The Co-operative Performance in a Competitive Market. 
The commercial fortunes of Triumph Meriden have been highly 
unstable. Though the workers set about rebuilding the reputation 
of the Bonneville motorcycle with great eagerness, the market 
for bikes in America in 1975 was overwhelmed by a glut of cut-price 
Japanese models. The market in 1974 had proved slower than 
expected, and having built up production for the anticipated increase, 
manufacturers were ieft with huge stockpiles, Honda alone had 
472,000 machines in May 1975,' worth £300 million. (Management Today 
May 1976). The recovery of the market was slow, and Triumph 
had the acute problem of re-estab1ishing commercial confidence 
through the agency of NVT's marketing outlets. Losses in the first 
year of operation were predicted, but axceeded projections, amounting 
to £1.2 million. By Januart 1977, 2,000 motorcycles were stockpiled 
and the company had run out of working capital. At this point the 
GEC deal was negotiated. GEC advanced ~ notional payment of 
£1 million for the 2,000 bikes, a~d the Department of Industry agreed 
to provide £~ million in order to buyout the Triumph marketing 
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rights of NVT, which would be paid back to the Department by 
NVT in return· for NVT shares. The co-operative workers agreed 
to a lay-off without pay, in order to restore the company 
finances, which lasted for six weeks. The same workers who had 
fought and eliminated lay-offs under private ownership, volunteered 
to be laid off - seemingly unaware of the i~ony, Dennis Johnson said: 
"In February 1977 \ole had to have a meeting with our 
people and decide to lay ourselves off. So having taken 
the decision that we just could not continue to buy ~n 
raw materials and to make British motorcycles to simply 
stock them because of the finance position, we decided -
and again another tremendous democratic decision to take, 
and they were not told as employers often do ' you have 
got to be laid off', it was a genuine decision, 'that's 
the problem lad's, there is only one way out to go on the 
dole' •. We decided we would do that, but even having 
done that, in honest terms we had got to pay our suppliers, 
and clearly because our money was tied up in stock we could 
not. It was on that occasion that Weinstock became 
involved." (Ward, 1979,p.6). 
The marketing deal with NVT was finally negotiated, after some 
delay, in June 1977, and the co-operative workers felt that they were 
free at last to prove, unhindered, the worth of their enterprise. 
(Though final acquisLtion of the name Triumph was only achieved in 
1980, before that it ~as on licence from NVT). Sales increased, the 
order book grew, and.in 1978 a trading profit was briefly made. 
The GEC bikes were sold, the ~oan repaid,and Triumph began to open 
up further export markets. A United States subsidiary was opened 
up in California, with five depots throughout the States, since 
about 75 per cent of production was for the American market. 
There were agencies in other countries, and exports to Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East, and strangely enough, Japan. 
• 
There was no 
attempt to disguise the thoroughly commercial orientations of the 
co-operative, such as in the manufacture of a iimited edition of 
Jubilee celebration bikes in 1977; the completion of a large order 
• 
from the Ministry of Defence for NATO forces; and in the effort 
to regain police force contracts. 
Motorcycle production, during the periods Meriden was 
allo\'1ed to produce unhindered, ",as sustained at about 330 per 
week with 700 people, which was a fifty per cent improvement on 
productiv~ty achieved under private ownership. Dennis Johnson 
proudly claimed: 
"It was written in the (Boston) report that Meriden in 
1972 under the old conventional management were 
producing 14 bikes per year per man. Now under the 
co-op system, and bear in mind nothing had changed except 
the type of ownership, and the method of work, on the same 
plant, the same equipment, the same model: under the 
co-op system by November 1976 (at the time we had to cut 
back production because of stock build up), with 700 people 
we were aiming for a production target of 350 bikes per 
week. I have done the figures and over a reasonable 
period of time, three months or so, our average was 330, 
we had hit 350, and then fell short so the' average was 330 
bikes. With 330 bikes and 700 people, if you project that 
through an ongoing year, that equals 21 bikes per man over 
the year, and that is a 50 per cent increase, and the only 
thing that had changed was the form of ownership and the 
style of running the place, everything else was the same, 
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largely the same people had come back to us.", (Ward,l979,p.6-7). 
Even the co-operative's greatest adversary, Dennis Poore, the NVT 
. 
chairman, in a letter to shareholders at the time of the marketing 
deal, was forced to admit, "It is fair to say that the co-operative 
has achieved a remarkable success as an efficient manufacturing 
unit." (The Times, 5 May, 1977). In fact Meriden productivity 
far exceeded that achieved at NVT, and equalled that of European 
competitors, though it paled into insignificance compared to the 
Japanese industry's output as Table 1A reveals • 
• 
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Table 1." Motorcycle Industry Productivity Comparison (1975) 
Britain 
NVT Small Heath 1975 
Number of 
Employees 
1,245 
NVT Wolverhampton 1975 1,115 
BSA Triumph Meriden 1972 1,750 
Meriden Motorrycle 700 
Co-op. 1976 • 
Europe and United States 
Moto-Gjuzzi/Benelli 
BMW 
Harley-Davidson 
2 Japan 
Honda Suzuka 
Honda Hammatsu 
Yamaha 
Suzuki' 
Kawasaki 
(* estimate) 
8,500 
3,100 
5,500 
10,000 
1,100 
l>lotorcycle 
OUtput 
10,500 
18,000 
28,000 
- * 15,000 
40,000 
25,000 
* 50,000 
1,500,000 
500,000 
1,000,000 
800,000 
300,000 
Motorcycles 
per Man-Year 
10 
18 
14 
* 21 
13 plus 20 mopeds 
20 
* 15 
* 350 
174 
200 
114 
159 
1. Although this output per man figure of 21 motorcycles was sustained 
at Meriden for long periods, the final total production fell short of 
15,000 because production had to be cut back in November 1976 due to build 
up of stocks and shortage of working capital. Similarly the Boston figure 
for Harley-Davidson was estimated upwards to take account of the production 
loss du~ to a lengthy strike. 
2. This comparison is deceptive since a high proportion of the Japanese 
cycles were of small displacement with lower labour and other input, 
whereas the Euro~ean cycles contained a high proportion of larger bikes 
(and in the case of Meriden they were all super-bikes). Therefore the 
Japanese motorcycles per man ~ear could perhaps be divided by three for 
fair comparison. Of course, the productivity difference remains startling. 
Source: Derived from Boston Consulting Group, 1975, p.53,Exhibit 21. 
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The obvious reason why Meriden could not match the productivity of 
Japanese comp~titors, despite the great dedication of the 
co-operative workers was the lack of capital investment in new 
machinery necessary to increase output. From the start Meriden 
was critically under-capitalised. Meriden achieved twice the 
productivity of the low volume high premium strategy of the Boston 
study, but with half the manpower, and a fraction of the capital thought 
necessary. 
Table .loB Comparison of Boston Low Volume Strategy and Meriden 
Achievement. 
Sales 
Employment 
Productivity (Motorcycles 
per man year) • 
New Cash Requirements 
Interim Capital 
New plant 
(* estimate) 
Boston Low Volume 
16,700 
1,576 
10.6 
£11 million 
£4 million 
Source: BeG, 1975, p. xxv. 
Meriden Co-operative 
* 15,000 
700 
21 
£850,000 
Thus the low volume strategy of Boston called for intertm capital of 
£11 million, and new plant of ,£4 million, for the existing manufacturer 
NVT. The purchase of the Meriden factory from NVT used up most 
of Meriden's capital before production commenced, leaving it with 
£850,000 later supplemented by the Dol grant of £~ million, which 
again was paid to NVT. The Meriden co-operative therefore did not 
have any capital to deve~op t~e plant or. tmprove the product, and more 
critically, did not even have enough working capital to sustain 
production and stockpile for the new selling season. At the same 
time the major competitors of Mer~den, the Japanese manufacturers, 
were investing hundreds of millions of pounds each year in automated 
production plant. The co-operative was painfully exposed to the 
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cyclical pattern of trade, without any means of protection, which 
. 
meant that production and effort could not be regulated. The 
frustrating cycle went: 
~uild up of stocks/lack of working capital/lay-off/ 
increase in demand/inadequate production capacity/excessive overtime. 
(sometimes without pay)/loss of sales through failure 
to meet delivery dates/ fall in demand/ build up of 
stocks ••••••• 
Meriden workers had to persevere with worn and obsolete plant, 
much of it a relic of wartime, one explained, "Our machines are 
outdated, it's all wartime machinery, you can see the stamps, it's 
utility stuff. But a lot of the men are as old as the machines, so 
they know how they work - you've got to allow 5 tho' on this machine, 
or stick a fag packet in a jig to make it right. The machinery needs 
replacing, but it's the same in all this country's industry - not 
enough is ploughed back." It is plain that if British i~dustry 
has to attain industrial recovery by the use of strategically placed 
fag packets in industrial machinery, then the chances of sustained 
improvement are remarkably slim. Batch production of parts at 
Meriden caused inte~ptions in production, and generally there were 
not the resources to plan for a continuous flow of production which 
meant further track stoppages, and a lower level of mechanical efficiency 
, than that maintained by competitors. But many Meriden workers 
would not wish to experience the ravages of mass production, even if 
it did produce cheaper bikes. The Boston report reveals, in contrast, 
• the devotion of Japanese manufacturers to high technology as a means 
to expanding market share: 
"The Japanese factories all tend to reflect an ardent 
focus on production engineering in their operations. 
Investment is made in capital intensive highly automated 
equipment which can be justified because the marketing 
approach is designed to generate the very high model 
volumes which render these methods economic ••.• The 
focus on advanced technology and high productivity is 
apparent to all stages of the production process, from 
metal forming (casting and forging) right through to 
final assembly ••• There is no evidence of any relaxation 
. of the Japanese motorcycle industry's traditional 
passion for aggressive cost control through efficiency 
and automation." (1975, Appendices, pp 216,223). 
What this means for the Japanese motorcycle worker, frequently 
96 
isolated on a production line with only robots to talk to, is that 
w6rk tasks are broken do,m into 20-60 second units, \Olith up to 180 
engines or models passing along the conveyorised track per hour. 
Instead of performing work tasks 1,000 times a month like the 
Meriden workers, the Japanese worker performs the same task 1,000 
times a day. The same ruthless efficiency is shown in model change 
on the Japanese assembly line, which is accomplished within 5-10 
.. 
minutes, meaning that there are practically no intervals in work effort. 
Even tQe Boston consultants, seduced as they were by the market and 
production aggression of the Japanese manufacturers,were forced to 
concede: 
"It must be noted that there is some concern in Japan 
at the psychological strains imposed by highly 
automated operations and conveyorised assembly techniques. 
Honda at their Kumanoto factory are installing a so-
called 'free-flow' assembly line in which any worker can 
stop the line if he feels it necessary. This has 
apparently worked successfully in other industries in 
Japan and contributes greatly to humanizing the working 
conditions." (1975,Appendices, p.230). 
It is likely that Meriden workers, having experienced the relative 
freedom of their production system, would question how humane the new 
Honda assembly line was. However faced with competition at this 
level of production efficiency, the Triumph bikes were constrained 
within the low volume high premium category, and to succeed in this 
category required a high quality product. The lack of capital meant 
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that essential equipment necessary to improve the Bonneville 
could not be obtained, and research and development was severely 
inhibited. The capital necessary to develop a full product range 
remained ~ dream. Whereas Japanese manufacturers had over twenty 
models on sale in major markets, Triumph had two. This was a 
critical commercial weakness since cyclists tend to trade up from 
lightweight bikes through a manufacturers produce range as they become 
more experienced. Not having any small bikes, Triumph was isolated 
in the expensive superbike sector, and customers had to make a 
conscious decision to change marque. 
The reason the Boston report had included in its assessment 
of the capital requirements of each strategy such large amounts of 
interim cash, (in the case of the low volume strategy £11 million), 
was the belief that large losses would be incurred before operating 
efficiency and new models could be established: "Under any of the 
strategy alternatives considered ••• it must be accepted ~hat 
approximately three interim years of heavy deficits will need to be 
financed in addition to the investment required for implementing 
the strategy itself." (1975,p xxi). This prediction proved 
depressingly accurate. In 1977-78, for the third year running, 
Triumph Meriden made a substantial loss, of £1,290,000. But Meriden 
did not have the reserves deemed necessary by Boston, and survived 
only by sliding deeper into debt, and extracting more sacrifice from 
the workers. A price rise of 35\ stemmed losses but depressed 
'sales; and the·introduction of an incentive scheme restored 
• productivity, but simply increased stocks. The re-introduction of 
skill differentials slow~ the loss of skilled craftsmen to 
neighbouring factories but illustrated how far the co-operative had 
drifted from its original brave ideals. The Labour Government, 
having supervised the closure of NVT Small Heath and Wo1verhampton, 
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(despite a cO\lrageous sit-in at Wolverhampton, and the attempt 
to launch a co-operative with new products), responded coldly to 
Meriden's approaches for further aid. Meriden had proven it was 
a viable manufacturing unit, and had made a significant 
contribution to exports, since 75% of the bikes were sold in the US 
and Australia, but the government seemed determined to eradicate 
the last example of Benn's influence at the Dol. Meanwhile the 
Meriden workers ~ere being asked to work long shifts and whole weekends 
to complete rush orders, when there was no cash left to pay them. 
Understandably, they became very distraught: "We're fed up working 
ourselves to the bone, unpaid, and we're tired of the attitude of 
those outside, including the government." 
The election of a Conservative Government in May 1979 seemed 
to seal the fate of the co-operative: not only did the possibility 
of further aid seem finally eliminated, but interest charges from the 
£4.2 million loan were due at the end of June 1979 amounting to El.25 
million, which it was unlikely the ,DOl would waive. (t'lhy the original 
assistance was in the form of an interest bearing loan instead of a 
grant is difficult to fathom when NVT had received a grant of simi~ar 
proportions from the previous Conservative Government : presumably 
the Dol regarded it as unethical to provide a co-operative with a large 
grant, even though it was standard procedure to provide such grants 
to private companies). The new Secretary of State for Industry, 
Sir Keith Joseph, had written a glowing forward to the crude and 
flimsy lambast Meriden: OdyssiY of a Lame Duck (1976) by Jo=k Bruce-Gardyne, 
in which Joseph attacked Christophe¥ Chataway for providing the 
original aid to NVT. Since his visionary conversion to monetarism, 
Joseph had come to the tortured conclusion that the industrial , 
. 
intervention practiced by the Heath Government of which he was part, 
was "sort of semi-socialist". Joseph put this little diatribe against 
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the Meriden workers efforts, in the reading list on free market 
ethics which he presented to the civil servants of the Department 
of Industry upon his arrival there. The irony was that the current 
. Meriden dilenuna, besides the outstanding interest payment., was 
basically a crisis of overproduction: during 1979 sales of 750 cc 
motorcycles fell by 39 per cent in the UK, and 30% in the US, due 
to the severe winter, and Meriden accumulated a stock of over 3,000 
unsold bikes. As if to impress upon the new government that they 
could take tough commercial decisions themselves, at the end of May 
t~e Meriden management team, headed by Geoffrey Robinson, who had 
become managing director in November 1978, decided that redundancies 
were inevitable and informed local union officials. At a stormy 
meeting between Robinson, the co-operative board and the full-time 
union officials, the unions said that they would fight the 
redundancies, and issued press statements to that effect. At a mass 
meeting of Meriden workers, which Robinson was not allowetl to attend, 
they were confronted with three choices: 150 redundancies, a complete 
shutdown for four months,or a three day week for 18 months. The 
workers rejected redundancies and opted for a three day week, however, 
at a later mass meeting in a display of executive power and charisma, 
I 
Robinson persuaded the workers to reverse their decision and accept 
redundancies. (Observer,_ 27 May 1979) Robinson said to them, "All 
the companies that are interested have said that they don't want 
to come in and have to make redundancies. 
the guts to do it ourselves" • 
• 
Why should they? Let's have 
Having reduced production from 300 to 200 bikes per week, Robinson 
insisted that Meriden was breaking even, and pleaded with the company'.s 
bankers, suppliers, the government, and the ECGD for the time to prove 
this. Sir Keith Joseph rejected the request to waive interest 
charges, which Robinson accurately depicted as "an act of political 
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spite". This should have been the signal for the ~losure of 
Triumph Meriden, when rescue came from an extremely unlikely 
quarter: 300 creditors met at the factory and appointed a 
committee to consider what could be done to save the business, 
short of receivership. The chairman of the creditors committee 
said "It's the easiest thing in the world to close a company down. 
But if you can save a ccmpany that is all to the good of the country." 
Meanwhile the realisation that the government would not recover its 
money if it put Meriden into receivership, prompted the Dol to grant 
a reprieve to allow Robinson to pursue the possibility of a link with 
a foreign manufacturer. "We need money and an association with an 
internationally based company" Robinson declared. John Rosamond 
the new chairman of the ailing co-operative contributed, "We live and 
work in a commercial world: to run a business you must achieve a 
profit." (Observer, 29 July 1979). As the search for a financial 
backer continued, a further 60 redundancies were declared in August 
1979,together with an early retirement scheme. The retirement scheme 
caused particular heartache, since the'people who were asked to go 
were among the most.loyal supporters of ' Triumph, many of them had been 
with the company for the whole of their working life, and when the 
co-operative had started up they were promised a job for as long as 
they wished. Some of the older workers felt betrayed "I think they 
• 
should have honoured the agreement - the promise of a job. When you 
think of the people among us who picketed. Our noses have been 
rubbed in the dirt by the Board of Directors." Another man of 66 who 
had spent 40 years in the motorcycle industry said he had "Nothing 
to grumble about", but walked away in tears ~fter he 'had received 'his 
few extra weeks wages and £500 gratuity. A third retiring worker 
revealed the depth of involvement many of them had, "I haven't got any' 
bitterness. I love Triumph, I always have, and I always will. Triumph 
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is my life, e;:;pecially since the picket days." One worker 
in his sixties spent the whole of his gratuity on a new 
Bonneville and roared out of the gates on his 750cc bike 
For those who remained working at Meriden, under the threat of 
imminent closure, the self-imposed regime became harsher. A large 
order from the Nigerian Army for over 1,000 bikes meant a financial 
breathing space but production bottleneck. John Rosamund had a 
difficult job persuading the co-operative board that the order could 
be met in time, "We have got to get 300 bikes in Nigeria by October 1. 
That means we have to get the bikes to Liverpool docks by next 
Wednesday. . There will be no pay for weekend work. Time off in 
lieu is becoming a sick joke, so there's no point in that. We are 
going to have to work to get this order." One steward responded, 
"We always seem to be asking people to work for nothing." Another 
shop steward insisted, "People are working under protest. They 
know that either they work for nothing or they are out of·a job. 
Were the people who undertook these negotiations aware of what they 
were doing? Did they know the material position?" In the event, 
110 people came in to work on Saturday without payor time off in 
lieu, and 80 people came in on Sunday without payor time off in lieu. , 
The order was met, and led to another large order from Nigeria. 
Robinson commented, "There is always a major rush with any company 
to meet the first consignment of a new order." Of course. 
normally workers receive some payment for their effort. The single 
minded effort to save the factory had impaled the workers on the horns 
• 
of a dilemma: Robinson said "It is often put to me by senior trade 
unionists, 'Why don't you liquidate the project?' But the courage 
of the membership, and shared sacrifice carried us on" • 
• 
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Robinson toured all of the European and Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers in search of a financially stronger partner for 
Triumph Meriden, and although they all expressed an interest in 
the struggling co-operative, no deal materialized. A previous 
link with Moto-Guzzi, whereby Meriden assembled Moto-Guzzi 
mopeds, had indicated some of the difficulties of dependence on 
such links, but the co-operative was forced to plead for another 
similar relationship. By May 1980 only Suzuki were still interested. 
If the government would write off the money Meriden owed, there 
seemed a possibility of a partnership deal with Suzuki; in which 
Marubeni, the parent company, and Suzuki would have two thirds of 
the seats on the board, and Triumph Meriden one third. Meriden 
would produce bikes made up mainly of Suzuki parts, but carrying the 
Triumph name. Robinson insisted that there was· no question of 
Meriden becoming merely an assembly plant for Suzuki machines, and 
. 
that a distinctive Triumph identity should remain, however the 
co-operative was in a weak position to bargain. Any deal with a 
major company would mean the end' of the co-operative structure at 
Meriden, as GeoffreY'Robinson later admitted, "That we were looking 
for a 'business partner' was a euphemism. We were looking for a 
takeover, a sellout. But we had to soften the blow on the co-operative." 
Discussion among the co-operative board of directors of what their 
role would be in the event ofa takeover was heated. Robinson said 
that "Every prospective buyer insisted that in terms of commercial 
realism they would have to bewin control.- Rosamund, the chairman 
argued that, "We could still have participation - it would not have 
to be a charade." But a concerned director who was a shop steward 
saw that "They'.re not going to do it for nothing. They want a tame 
labour force, and we're going to be the tamers. Will we represent 
the workforce, or will we be policemen over the workforce?". 
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The Boston report had considered the merits of associations 
with overseas companies. The basic dilemma was the massive 
investment necessary to bring British production costs into line 
with those of foreign companies. One way around this was to buy 
Japanese components at a competitive cost and assemble these 
into bikes. A problem was that if the bikes were successfully 
marketed, then supplies would be withdrawn by component manufacturers 
in competition with Triumph who also made motorbikes! An armis 
length relationship was not possible therefore, only a mutual 
commitment. One reason why a Japanese manufacturer might consider 
such a commitment was that assembly was the least automated part of 
the existing production process, ~nd therefore could be more readily 
transferred to British factories. There was also the possibility 
of full-scale manufacturing in Britain for a Japanese company. 
This would allow access to the volume production and large market share 
of the Japanese, and the use of Japanese proprietary manufacturing 
technology. However, as with the proposed BL link with Honda, there 
were d~ngerous implications in this approach: 
"While this strategy mig~t allow continued manufacturing 
of motorcycles on a large scale in the UK, it would probably 
involve almost total dependence on Japanese skills for 
design, production engineering, marketing and overall 
business development. The status of the British industry 
would be little more than·that of a subcontractor, quite 
possibly not even allowed to participate in the technically 
most advanced and productive areas of production, such as 
engine manufacture." (BCG, 1975,p.118). 
The reasons offered by Boston why the Japanese might consider this 
arrangement, even though they already had almost total market 
dominance are interesting. Firstly the possibility that import 
controls might be applied in the UK, or the EEC generally, in order 
to penalise Japanese' motorcycles - which a British manufacturing 
base would evade. (Already in It~ly, Japanese imports of machines 
less than 380cc is prohibited. Above 380cc there are tmport 
duties on Japanese bikes; and the Italian Government has taken public 
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ownership of .the major superbike manufacturer, Ducati.) Fears 
of wholesale controls on Japanese goods entering EEC markets haunted 
the Japanese manufacturers. Zenko Suzuki, the Prime Minister 
declared on a tour of Europe, "Protectionism would be nothing short 
of a suicidal pact. Its outcome would be the loss of vitality, 
and the stagnation of the free economic systems of the West." 
He went on, that there were binding links between the US, Western 
Europe, and Japan, based on "shared values of liberty and democracy 
and a free market economy", which he traced back to the year 1871 
when John Stuart Mill and Rousseau were first translated into 
. 
Japanese: He concluded, "The urgent task facing us at present 
is to strengthen the third side of the triangle - relations between 
Japan and Western Europe." A second reason why a Japanese company 
would consider manufacturing in Britain, is, ironically enough, 
that as labour costs continue to rise in Japan, it becomes cheaper 
for assembly to be done off-shore in the local markets. 
The adoption of this strategy would undoubtedly mean the end 
of the British role as an independent motorcycle manufacturer, 
indeed, Boston sinisterly infers, "it is likely, for example, that 
a quid pro quo for this type qf arrangement might be that the Japanese 
ccmpany would insist on the British phasing out their superbikes" 
(l975,p.118) • Regrettably, the only link-up which appealed to 
Dol civil servants, concerning the motorcycle industry, was one which 
did involve the closure of Meriden. In 1978 a deal was considered 
with Kawasaki to build a motofcyc1e assembly factory in the North East, 
in partnership with a private engineerinq company and the NEB, 
which would receive substantial reqional aid. This was considered 
the most exped~ent way to attract the Japanese motorcvcle industry 
to Britain,and to close the Meriden co-ooerative. The proposal 
failed, but showed the Dol opposition to any conception of Meriden 
as the nucleus of a future motor cyc1~ industry. 
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Thp failure to find a oartner established in the motorcycle 
industry for Meriden, when negotiations with Suzuki finally 
co-lapsed in June 1980, led to a more desperate search, as with 
KME, for any private company willing to take over Triumph Meriden, 
on almost any terms as long as the Triumph motorcycles were still 
produced. Bill Beatie a director from the gear assembly section 
described the profound insecurity of the work~rs at Meriden during 
this period, "The turmoil in our minds is the uncertainty of what 
we are doing. We don't know if the government will allow us the 
time to secure an interested party. We don't know if we can find 
" an interested party ••• Talks were held with more than 100 interested 
part~es, including the betting group, Ladbrokes,and the Transcendental 
Meditation Movement, (who had also shown an interest in KME), and 
who wanted to replace the traditional tea break with 10 minutes 
of meditation The company that turned up was Armstrong 
Equipment whose chairman Harry Hooper wrote to Sir Keith Joseph 
propos~ng his company takeover Meriden: if the £4.2 million loan 
and £1.65 million interest owed by the co-operative were waived; 
together with the £5.34 million owed to the ECGD: which included 
giving up recoveries from sales of 2,000 motorcycles held in stock 
in the US, and returning two million dollars from the proceeds of 
sales already made. Hooper proposed to cut the workforce by two 
thirds, down to 150, and sell off the main factory, continuing 
production at 100 bikes a week in a small adjoining building, with 
a job evaluated wages structur.t!. He e~ded with an extraordinary 
nostrum, given the record of the co-operative, which nonetheless 
must have been music to Keith Joseph's ears: "The problem with 
Triumph has essentially been tha~~f much.of British industry, in 
being grossly overmanned. The accumulated losses would not have 
arisen had manning been at the levels which my own survey has 
105 
indicated would have been possible." (Financial Times, 14 July 1980) 
Despite Hooper pointing out that if the government put Meriden 
into liquidation there,would be less than £1 million left against 
government loans after redundancy payments, bank charges, and 
£1.3 million owed to creditors, Joseph refused the offer, to the 
relief of many at the co-operative. 
In August 1980 a further 300 redundancies were agreed at 
Meriden, to prepare the ground for any last minute acquisition, 
maintain production on a skeleton basis, and stem the financial 
haemorrhaging. However final closure seemed imminent. The 
overseas market for the Triumph had disappeared almost entirely. 
Robinson explained: "We were going well early in 1979, then in 
, 
April 1979 was the election of the Conservative government. Eighty 
per cent of our production was for export and 70% was to dollar 
markets. Within a year the pound sterling increased from $1-90 
to $2-40. We were forced to come down to the home market." 
During this period Robinson and the other co-operative leaders acted 
out an elaborate charade with the Conservative government. Lord 
Trenchard, the Minister of State for Industry, in July 1979, had 
imposed a three week deadline' on the repayment of £1.2 million then 
due. But as long as the co-operative seemed to be making progress 
with what were largely fictitious partners, then the government did 
not want to face the acrimony of forcing closure. 
In September 1980 the Conservative Government finally decided 
that there was no possibflity of recovery of the money owed by 
Meriden, and to the surprise ~f everyone, agreed to write off £9 million 
loans and credits, on condition that Meriden raised at least £2 million 
from the £4.4 million worth of motorcycle stocks in the United States 
in order to repay the Exports Credits Guarantee Department. The 
Meriden management were confident of being able to do this, though 
as the recession in the US worsened motorcycle sales fell off, and 
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an extension of the repayment period __ to April 1982 had to be 
granted. The government had opted for what they saw as the 
lesser of two expensive evils, either write off the debts, or 
put the co-operative into liquidation with the resulting costs and 
further blow to the morale of industry. However they were at 
least prepared to be magnanimous, "We wish them every success", 
Lord Trenchard declared, and Margaret Thatcher added, "We wish them 
well." This contrasted with the permanently frosty reception 
Eric Varley had offered to the Meriden people at the Dol under the 
previous Labour Government. Geoffrey Robinson said, "Despite six 
years of tremendous struggle, we were always pleading on our knees. 
The negotiations for a relaxation of the loan terms went on for 
two years and reached an inconclusive, abortive result. Finally 
after sixteen months of struggle with the Tories,we got the government 
to write off the debts". If the hostility of the Labour Government 
could be explained by its conviction not to encourage anything which 
• 
smacked of Bennery, the reluctant support the Conservative Government 
was prepared to grant the co-operative can only be explained by the 
fact that there was something attractive in the Meriden worke~s 
determination to survive as a manufacturing unit whatever the 
sacrifices involved. 
The Meriden co-operative was left to limp on therefore, with 
, 200 workers producing about 100 bikes a week. Orders picked up, 
but disaster was never far away: "We are living and dying on 
£30,000 at the moment", Robinson said. A new Bonneville model with 
an electric starter was 1aunc~ed in 1980 and other model improvements 
and diversifications were made. The Meriden management remained 
confident about the recovery of exports: "There is nothing 
inherently wrong with the Triumph, and it has a marvellous name. 
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It now has an electric start; an isolastic system to get the 
engine balanced, and for balancing the shaft. That basic design 
should be totally competitive. The Triumph handles better, and 
looks better with two cylinders. Four cylinder models are bulky 
in comparison and add weight and complexity". Despite this 
bullish attitude, the prospect of further plant or product 
development remained as remote as ever, as Robinson explained, "To re-tool, 
volumes of 50-75,000 per annum are needed,with a higher break-even, 
and smaller unit profits. We should not have to pitch as the 
Morgan of the motorcycle industry. Product development is the 
he·art of any industry, in product value terms. Yet the cost 
of tooling up for a 500cc engine at 25,000 a year would be £60 million." 
The years of struggling against impossible odds had brought 
some hard lessons home to the co-operative. Geoffrey Robinson 
maintained: 
"As a Labour MP considering the relevance of co-operatives, 
the first lesson of Meriden is that: If you are faced 
with the total collapse of an industry, - and the government 
does not want to back it, 'but if the lads want to set up a 
co~operative', then it will give them inadequate funds, -
then I would not accept. Because it only devalues the 
concept of a co-operative to·be set up with no money, and 
all of the civil service against it. They need to be set 
up properly. The end is fine, but they need a proper basis. 
They need a good structure - there is a role for co-operatives 
if properly structured. Not inadequate funding against 
monopoly competition. Of the money given to Meriden, 
£4.15 million went in compensation. We once had 80% of 
the world market, now the Japanese have - but they are 
sitting on the most sophisticated, capital intensive 
factories, with the most cost-effective products ••••• After 
the 18 months sit-in by very determined, politically 
motivated workers, we were in a post-revolutionary situation. 
We found ourselves in charge of the factory. This was the 
Phoenix of British manufacturing industry. Yet we found 
ourselves with a clapped-eut old factory, no money, and 
no management." 
In the early 1980s, with the British economy in the grip of 
recession, people were retreating en masse towards cheaper forms of 
two wheel transport. (Whereas in the US recession had depressed 
. motorcycle sales beca.use these were owned in addition to cars). 
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In the first jour months of 1980 sales of motorcycles increased 
from 62,000 to 92,000 over the previous year, and while car 
manufacturers were revising sales predictions downwards, motorcycle 
manufacturers witnessed a major revival of interest, with 
anticipated registratons of 331,000 new bikes for 1980, equal to 
the record year of 1959. By now Japanese manufacturers accounted 
for 88.9% per cent of the British market, and British manufacturers 
only 1.6 per cent. Domestic production accounted for 19,500 two 
wheel machines, most of which were exported, whereas the Japanese 
motorcycle industry manufactured 5.5 million. (Guardian, 30 June 
1980) • A terminal lack of,industrial investment was not restricted 
to the British motorcycle industry: there were other traditional 
British industries in a similar state of catastrophic decline. 
A final irony was that, as Triumph Meriden barely survived 
in the middle of a boom in motorcycle sales, the surrounding 
. 
local economy, based heavily on the depressed car industry, was 
in a state of structural decline. With closures or mass 
redundancies at BL Canley, Jaguar, Alfred Herbert, and Massey Ferguson, 
unemployment in Coventry had risen to 15 per cent by August 1981. 
Similar redundancies in Birmingham accounted for a total of 300,000 
people out of work in the West Midlands. The fatal combination of 
the movement of production abroad by multinationals, the lack of 
state aid, and a sustained neglect of industrial investment, had 
left the West Midlands dependent upon out-dated industries, obsolete 
plant, and ancient factories.. The heartland of British manufacturing 
industry seemed "locked in irreversible decline". (New Statesman, 
29 August 1980). A special case had to be made to provide aid to 
Triumph Meride~ in 1974 under the Industry Act; as the West Midlands 
join the depressed regions, that will be unnecessary in future. 
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The Final Breath of the British Motorcycle Industry 
Somehow the ~riumph Workers found the courage and optimism to limp 
on for another two years. Orders dried up under the impact of unfavourable 
exchange rates, the withdrawal of Export Credit Guarantee Department 
credit facilities, and a lurch towards protectionism in the United 
States market (Harley Davidson appealed to the US International Trade 
Commission, which agreed that motorcycle imports from Japan and other 
countries posed a threat to injure American manufacturers) • (Guardian, 
27 January 1983) Reduced to 180 workers producing barely 80 Bonnevilles 
a week, the debts of Triumph Meriden continued to mount until £2' million 
was owed: £1 million to components suppliers, and the rest in rates and 
electricity. An injection of £465,000 over two years early in 1983 from 
the West Midlands County Council served to revive production and stave 
off bankruptcy, but it was clear radical measures were necessary. Bill 
Beatie a worker director said, "We were working in the factory in mid-
November with no heating on, the guys on the shopfloor wore overcoats. 
Yet we can't find someone to back us with finance. People are screaming 
out for work here. Yet no one will back us in government or the banks, 
except with moral support." 
The decision was taken to sell the 22 acre Meriden site, which 
it was hoped would raise in excess of £1 million if it could be redesignated 
from industrial to housing use, and to move back into a small disused 
D~nlop factory in the centre of Coventry froa wHere Triumph Motorcycles 
had moved following the second world war blitz. In this way it was 
hoped to dramatically reduce overheads, and rebuild the company around 
a new model and engine called the Diana, after a princess of the same 
name. The bike was an impressive, streamlined new design and it was 
hoped could provide a bright future with production of 10,000 bikes 
within three to four years. John Rosamund maintained, "We are at the 
crossroads. We have the nucleus of a very fine business, and we are 
negotiating for the money which could turn it into a profitable one." 
(sunday Times, 13 March 1983) 
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The West Midlands County Council with the West Midlands Enterprise 
Board offered a £1 million investment package over 5 years if this was 
matched by private investment, to retool the new factory and start up 
production again. Michaei Jordan, a senior partner in Cork and Gully, 
a City firm,' attempted to raise private investment and commented: "They 
need help in management, production, marketing, and finance - where 
cash flow is so important. But there are positive signs in the American 
market and in exchange rates. Triumph has its o,~ cult following and 
charisma. The City will be able to put up the sort of money the West 
Midlands Enterprise Board want to bridge the gap." (Money Programme, 
BBC 2, 3 April 1983) 
While negotiations continued, the Triumph workers agreed in March 
• 
1983 to an indefinite layoff to conserve the meagre company resources, 
falling somewhat poignantly on the 8th anniversary of the co-operatives 
foundation. Yet the devotion to Triumph continued, when asked for 20 
unpaid volunteers to clean up the Dunlop site as an act of faith, 38 
people came forward to scrape the floors and paintwork of the derelict 
plant. Misgivings that ~eer desperation was the only motivation grew, 
and the direction of the co-operative in crisis had fallen almost 
eXClusively into the ha~ds of Bill Beatie and John Rosamund the 
worker chairman, with Geoffrey Robinson as managing director. The 
I 
proposed move to Coventry disturbed a lot of the remaining workers, 
and the plan to sub-contract some of the machine work caused further 
insecurity~ As one steward put it, " We're sick of being told to "do 
this or else." Bill and John are always saying it. We should talk these 
things over and let the shopfloor have a say on sub-contracting. We're 
• 
not here to hinder, we're here to help." 
Predictably private sector finance was not forthcoming to rescue 
the Triumph legend, and even the sale of the site proved difficult. Five 
months later, an exhausted and demoraiised group of Meriden workers held 
a mass meeting to consider liquidation. After three hours of debate, the 
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following terse statement was issued by .. John Rosamund 'flhich ended 
almost ten years'of unflinching struggle since NVT declared closu~e 
of Triumph Meriden in November 1973: 
"The beneficiary owners (the workforce) of Triumph 
Motorcycles Ltd voted in favour of the voluntary 
liquidation of the company thus authorising the trustee 
shareholders to proceed with that course of action 
at the meetings of shareholders and cr·editors on 
August 26, 1983." 
• 
• 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSrRY CO-OPERATIVE EXPERIMENT 
Potentially the three workers' co-operatives established with 
the assistance of Department of Industry funds could have proved of 
considerable theoretical and practical importance as experiments in 
industrial organization: unsettling the complacency and ccnservatism 
that is pervasive in British industry, and showing that significant 
changes could be made in the control of companies without disastrous 
consequences. Regardless of the limitations of the innovations attempted 
. 
by the co-operatives, their most important achievement could have been 
their demonstrative impact. Before the co-operatives were founded, 
conceptions of workers control could be readily dismissed as utopian. 
These were the first large scale manufacturing organizations dedicated 
to co-operative principles to be established in the post-war period 
largely through workers own efforts. Their creation took place in a 
blaze of publicity, which could not have failed to impress managers, 
trade unionists, academics, and not least of all shopfloor workers, 
that alternative forms of control ~ possible,whatever doubts 
surrounded them. 
Critical attitudes towards the idea of workers control certainly 
exist among workers, (though the origins of, and the reasons for these 
attitudes need to be examined), and the public impact of the 
co-operative experiment must be understood in this context: "The 
success or failure of recently established and highly publicised 
workers co-operatives over the next few years ••• will probably have 
~widespread effect in the belief of employees in their own ability, 
or lack of it, to control their own tndustrial destinies." (Rarnsay,l977) 
Due to the severe conditions the co-operative laboured under from their 
inceptio~ they did not prove, in strictly commercial terms, particularly 
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successful (except compared to the performance of their previous 
private owners and management). However, perhaps they achieved 
enough to shake the confidence, temporarily at least, of professional 
management in therr own infallibility and irreplaceability, and to 
justify workers confidence in their potential ability. Unfortunately, 
whatever elements of success and failure constituted the results of 
the co-operative experiment, it was: the interpretation of the media 
which determined the lasting impression made by the co-operatives, 
and the critical assessments of the media were in turn strongly 
influenced by the objections to the co-operatives raised within the 
Department of Industry itself, and within other government bodies and 
Parliament. 
At the beginning much astonishment was expressed at the Dol's 
decision to extend some £10 million in grants and loans to three 
co-operative enterprises under workers control, and certainly it was 
a novel departure. But when the extent of total government aid to 
private industry is taken into account, the funds provided to the 
co-operatives pale into relative i~significance: for example in 
1976-1977, a typical year, £1,332 million of state aid was provided 
to private industry. However direct state aid is only one element of 
public assistance to private industry: generous tax concessions, 
including stock relief and 100% depreciation allowances mean that 
many companies pay no mainstream corporation tax on profits. 
The provision of public services and facilities free, or at heavily 
subsidised prices amount in money terms to several times the sum of 
• 
direct aid. In addition there is the extensive support available 
through employment creation schemes, which subsidise the labour costs 
of companies. Finally the present Conservative Government has seen fit 
to bestow immense largesse upon the private sector in its privatisation 
programme which amounts. to thousands of millions. Thus vast amounts of 
114 
public money is being used to sustain private industry, and the 
ultimate control over the benefits derived from such public investment 
remain in the hands of private ~~ners, who are assisted in the 
accumulation of large concentrations of private wealth. 
A fact which received little comment was the considerable 
extent of government financial support for the previous private 
companies that owned the Kirkby and Meriden factories. The series of 
private companies at Kirkby received £3.8 million in grants and loans, 
whilst NVT alone received a grant of £4.8 million in 1973 from the 
Conservative Government. Allowing for inflation, these amounts are 
similar to the full extent of the aid to the co-operatives. (Governments 
do not offer assistance to the newspaper industry in this way, but 
the loan to the SON was comparatively small, was secured and interest 
bearing). Therefore one is not by any means comparing co-operatives 
dependent upon public finance with private companies that are financially 
independentf one is simply comparing co-operatives in receipt of state 
aid with private companies in receipt of similar aid. The question then 
becomes, who utilised state aid mos~ effectively to maintain and improve 
manufacture, and to promote employment and other social benefits ? 
One might have assumed that the use of public money to fund co-operatives 
I 
rather than private concerns would have been widely welcomed as a just, 
and logical, reform. Howevever this was not so. 
One original basis for the criticism and antagonism directed at 
the co-operatives were the unsympathetic IDAB reports that strongly 
advised against government assistance. The Industrial Development 
• 
Advisory Board was established by the 1972 Industry Act (Part II, 
section9 ), and maintained by the 1975 Industry Act. Members of the 
Board included "persons who appear to the Secretary of State to have 
wide experience of, and to have shown capacity in, industry, banking, 
accounting and finance.~ There was therefore a traditional business 
orientation .in the composition of the Board, and although there was 
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a nominal trade union representative, in the shape of Harry Urwin of 
the TGWU, this in itself caused difficulties. Sir Peter Carey, the 
Secretary of the Dol pointed out that "in certain of these cases the 
advice of the Board was not wholly unanimous." (Minutes of Evidence, 
Committee fro Public Accounts, 17 May 1976, para 2614,p374). Thus it 
is quite conceivable that the trade union representative on IOAB could 
have voted in favour of the co-operatives receiving funding, yet 
Conservative MFs were able to argue that 'IOAB, on which there was 
trade union representation, had rejected the co-operative funding.' 
If the the composition of the IOAB was inherited by the incoming 
Labour Government in 1974 from the previous Conservative administration, 
precious little chapge had occurred in the composition of IOAB by the 
end of Labour's term of office in 1979. 
IOAB received the highly critical reports on the co-operatives 
prepared by the Industrial Development Unit (IDU) which focussed on 
the weaknesses of the three enterprises and ignored theit strengths; 
some of the civil servants who composed the IDU were present at the 
deliberations of IDAB, and so there was little chance of their case 
being refuted. IDAB noted that these were failed businesses trading 
in depressed markets which rendered the commercial prospects of the 
co-operatives doubtful and therefore disqualified the possibility 
of aid. However the Board could not have made a rigorous examination 
of the historical reasons for the failure of these concerns. An 
inadequate product base and conflictual industrial relations were 
the obvious problems the Board ~ecognised, but this ignored the long 
record of lack of investment, high dividends, lack of prodact 
development, and general mismanagement at each of--the plants. All 
these problems were remediable, es~cially with a willing workforce, 
a factor which the Board refused to take properly into account. 
Many companies which approached the Department of Industry for assistance 
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are in some kind of commercial difficulty. There is no acceptable 
reason why, if state aid is allowed to private companies in difficulty, 
it should not be allowed to companies I?x~eriencing similar difficulties, 
whose workers wish to convert it to a co-operative. 
Another IDAB claim was that the co-operative venture was an 
expensive way to preserve jobs, however this is highly dubious. The 
rate of investment assistance per job is difficult to estimate 
accurately, however in advanced technology industries, and most 
manufacturing industry is moving in this direction, the rate of 
investment per job is currently as high as £20,000 - £100,000+. 
In some spectacular cases the Department of Industry granted extremely 
large sums for what seemed the creation ofcomparatively few jobs by 
private companies, such as the £147 million granted to Ford Motor 
Company to build theengine plant at Bridgend. Furthermore, private 
employers have shown an ample dexterity to utilise the full benefits 
of government aid, and then to move their accumulated capital elsewhere, 
something. a co-operative would never do. (Craig et aI, 1979) The 
IDAB reports dogged each of the co~operatives throughout their lives, 
and set the tone of much of the media treatment of them. The attitude 
of IDAB also reinforced the hostility of the Cabinet Committee which 
dealt with industry affairs, and when asked ~ Kilroy Silk, the MP 
f~r Kirkby, how many companies were barred from further assistance 
under the Industry Act, an embarrassed Eric Varley, the Secretary of 
State for Industry, had to admit only three - the three Benn co-operatives. 
(EoCles,198l, pp 129-132) • 
A particularly fierce echo of the critical IDAB reports on the 
co-operatives occurred in the House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, chaired·by Edward du Cann, an MP and merchant banker. The 
Committee agreed that it was unwise toaid failed enterprises, and 
establish co-operatives with poor prospects, and implied it was to 
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do t~e co-operative movement a disservice and prevent experiments 
with more chance of success: "We recognise the co-operatives role 
as experiments in industrial organization, but in our view their 
inheritance.of the problems of failed enterprises and the adverse 
economic climate in which they came to life reduced their. value in 
this respect, and may well have harmed rather than furthered their 
cause." (Sixth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, 1975-76, 
pXVI,para24) The crucial question which the committee did not 
accurately address was why, given that the co-operatives faced the 
inherited problems of failed businesses and depressed markets, the 
Dol compounded the commercial problems of the c070peratives 
immeasurably by under-funding the enterprises. The Secretary of the 
Department admitted to the Committee, that the Department itself 
thoug~that the funding applications of Triumph Meriden and KME were 
"tight", and with KME drew "attention to the fact that insufficient 
allowance had probably been made for inflation in arriving at this 
figure (£3.9 million) and that in the circumstances, when the 
co-operative was starting work, and. we knew that there were going 
to be very heavy losses at the beginning, the provision of working 
capital was probably insufficient." (Minutes of Evidence 0 f the 
Committee of Public Accounts, 17 May 1976,p379, para 2675) Indeed 
both IOU and IDAB had felt that £4.75 million was nearer to KME's 
real requirements than the £3.9 million awarded. (Eccles,198l,p8l) 
Yet the members of the negotiating teams of the co-operatives 
were firmly convinced that the Dol civil servants were extremely 
• 
reluctant to il'l7est the sums originally requested. let alone greater 
sums, however essential this might be for the viability of the 
enterprises. The civil servants, influenced ~ the controversy 
which surrounded the co-operatives, but also by their own values 
and practices, did nothi.ng to dispel the co~rators fears. KME 
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suffered the co~sequences of its original underfunding which 
prevented essential product development; with outdated product and 
plant Triumph Meriden survived purely due tothe self-sacrifice of 
the workforce; and the failure of the Scottish Daily News, upon which 
the gloomy assessment of the committee was particularly based, did 
not occur for the reasons offered by the committee. 
However well disguised, it seems that the origin of the 
committee's objection to assistance for the co-operatives, as indeed 
the objection of IDAB, and other government bodies, was the nature 
of the stewardship the government funds would receive: that is a 
profound hostility to the idea, that .workers representatives should 
be responsible for ~he direction of a company, and the control of 
its finances. Although therew~ an admitted shortage of specialist 
personnel in the co-operatives, which they did not have the resources 
to recLUit. other elements of management apparatus, particularly at 
executive and first line management levels, were consciously· dispensed 
with at the co-operatives. Yet the committee translated this into what 
it simply described as a "weak" management structure, and the Secretary 
0'£ the Department of Industry reached the somewhat unimaginative 
conclusion that "as far as monitoring is concerned, we have learned a 
considerable amount from these particular cases and this particular 
form of organization. One of the lessons is that good professional 
management is a sine ~ nQn for success." (Minutes of Evidence, 
Committee for Public Accounts, 17 May 1976,p386. para 2747) • 
• 
119 
CHAPTER SIX 
CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: THE MARKET CONSTRAINTS TO SELF-~urnAGEMENT 
Introduction 
The resurgence of intellectual interest in workers co-operatives 
over the last decade has greatly outstripped their practical achievements 
so far, with a proliferation of bodies advocating, studying and assisting 
thei~ growth. Despite their seemingly radical connotations support for 
workers co-operatives stretches across the political spectrum, though 
conflicting orientations conceive of widely divergent implications of 
co-operatives. Several distinct political approaches to co-operatives 
are discernible including socialist, utopian socialist, and utopian 
capitalist. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the validity of 
each of these approaches to co-operatives in relation to the contemporary 
experience and debate concerning workers co-operatives. 
Beneath the heady rhetoric a number of general assumptiofts are 
shared by most advocates of workers co-operatives: 
a) co-operatives provide greater securi~y of employment, by investing 
people with the ownership and direction of their own employment organizations: 
b) co-operatives provide better pay and conditions for all by eliminating 
profit, wasteful overheads and extravagance. Alternatively, if improved 
material rewards are not possible, there is greater intrinsic satisfaction 
in more meaningful work. 
c) co-operatives allow democratic control by enabling workers to participate 
in decision making, creating the opportunity for personal development as 
• 
partners in production rather than wage labour~ 
d) co-operatives stimulate increased production and efficiency by encouraging. 
the commitment of workers. Alternatively co-operatives produce better 
products which are more socially useful. 
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e) co-operatives make capitalism less conflictual, more rational and 
tolerable. Alternatively, co-operatives are productive prototypes of 
a socialist pluralism of the, future. 
The achievement of each of these benefits by co-operatives, is often 
treated almost as an article of i: faith by co-operative theorists, yet 
the contention of this chapter will be that the achievement of these 
benefits by co-operatives is prob1~atic and cannot be assumed. In fact 
the historical problems of producer co-operatives, wh1ch have traditionally 
limi ted their growth and distorted their form', are frequently reproduced 
in contemporary co-operatives. However, if as in other periods of 
protracted recession in the 19th and early 20th century, there has 
recently been a large wave of producer co-operative development, the 
question to be asked is"whether this is based on a firmer foundation 
and will prove more durable than in the past ? 
.Socialist Political Economy: Productive Prototypes of Socialist Pluralism 
"It is the business of the International Working Men's 
'Association to combine and generalise the spontaneous 
movements of the working classes, but not to dictate or 
impose any doctrinary system whatever. The Congress should, 
therefore, proclaim no system of co-operation 
but limit itself to the enunciation of a few general 
principles. 
a) We acknowledge the co-operative movement as one of the 
transforming forces of the present society based upon 
class antagonism. Its great merit is to practically 
show, that the present pauper ising and despotic system 
of the subordination of labour to capital can be superseded 
by the republican and beneficent system of the association 
of free and equal producers. 
b) Restricted, however, to the dwarfish forms into which 
• individual wage slaves can elaborate it by their private 
afforts, the co-operative system will never transform 
capitalistic society. TO convert social production into 
one I,large and harmonious system of free and co-operative 
labour, general social changes are wanted, changes of 
the general conditions of society, never to be realised 
save by the tr ansfer of the"" organised forces of society, 
"viz., the state power, from capitalists and landlords 
to the producers themselves. 
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c) We recommend to working men to embark in co-operative 
production rather than in co-operative stores. Tne latter 
touch but the surface of the present economic system, 
the former attack its groundwork. 
d) We recommend to all co-operative societies to convert 
one part of their joint income into a fund for propagating 
their principles by example as well as by precept, in 
other words, by promoting the establishment of new 
co-operative fabrics, as well as teaching and preaching. 
e) In order to prevent co-operative societies from 
degenerating into ordinary middle class joint stock 
companies, all workmen employed, whether shareholders 
or not, ought to share alike. As a mere temporary 
expedient, we are willing to allow shareholders a low 
rate of interest. 
(Karl Marx, Instructions for Delegates to the Geneva 
Congress, 1974, p 90). 
Socialist advocates of workers co-operatives often claim the 
endorsement of Marx, who offered critical, but enthusiastic, support 
for the co-operatives of his own time, which he maintained, like the 
Factory Acts limiting the hours of labour, represented importan~ 
advances of the political econo~ of the working class. But this address 
was intended for continental socialists drawn largely from an artisan 
bacKgtound and committed to,co-operative production. Socialists in the 
last decades of the 19thC faced with ,the concentration and centralisation 
of capital came to advocate the socialisation of ownership on a collectivist 
basis, and regarded producer self-management as an archaic view, encouraged 
by the conservatism of its surviving exponents. (Hyman, 1981) Yet the 
othodox authority structures and traditional division of labour adopted 
by the nationalised industries in the 20thC persuaded some socialists 
. , 
that workers co-operatives held out the hope of rekindling the essential 
democratic basis to a socia,list 'economy which was srothered in the 
authoritarianism of centralised state capitalism. They ~e9arded the 
struggle for workers co-operatives as an important working class 
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initiative, that demm~rates the practical relevance of socialist ideals 
for employment and work organization. Whilst the limitations upon the 
achievement of a co-operative economy within a capitalist market system 
are appreciated,· it is conceived that co-operatives, primarily 
demonstratively, can both contribute to the struggle to transform 
capitalism, as well as providing productive prototypes for a socialist 
pluralism of the future. 
The most active and influential of the socialist supporters of 
co-operatives is the Institute for Workers Control (IWC), which since 
1968 has disseminated a wide range of publications demanding workers 
control throughout. the labour movement~ won the sympathy of a number 
of trade union leaders and Labour MPs, particularly Tony Benn, and 
was closely involved in the fortunes of the three large co-operatives 
established with the assistance of Department of Industry funds in 1974-75: 
Triumph Meriden, KME, and the Scottish Daily News. The leading exponents 
of the IWC's approach have explained the role of the Institute i~sisting: 
"We do not see this role as one of,intervention, from outside 
so to speak~'but ~ather'as a participant educational; and 
self-educational, interpretative and analytic one ••• Our 
commitment is ••• basically an educational one, in that it 
leaves workers to develop their own theoretical apparatus, 
from what they have learned of past experienceJ and from what they 
,reject, as well as what they assimilate, from accumulated .'" 
socialist theory, in their efforts to find solutions 
for practical problems ••• 
• 
The IWC is not a sectJ 
·it is.primarily. an organiser of discussion and a movement of 
. 
ideas. Our own ideas •• are but one part of that llDvement. 
They are but a conscious distillin~ of the experience of 
working class struggle; their test must always be how far 
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. 
they "take" and are found to be useful in that struggle". 
(Barratt Brown, Coates and Topham, 1975, pp. 294,306). 
But the influence of the IWC on the formation of the three government 
assisted co-operatives was more instrumental than simply educational: 
they encouraged Benn to make the experiment, helped to create a favourable 
climate of support among left-Labour MPs and trade union leaders, and 
nourished whatever inclinations towards the co-operative alternative 
they discovered among the leading shop stewards of the tnree organisations. 
In the celebratory account and analysis published by the IWC The New 
Worker Co-operatives, (1976), the impreSSion is firmly conveyed that 
the three co-operatives were the result of a victorious workers struggle: 
"The great strength of the present movement, unprecedented in our 
earlier history, is the largely spontaneous demand from the shop floor 
for the co-operative organisation of industry as a response to the economic 
crisis." (p.185) • Benn maintained that these particular factory 
.. 
closures led to the formation of co-operatives, whereas others at the 
time did not, because of the determination and resilience of the struggle 
by ,the workers involved. This analysis conflates the workers occupation 
of their factories in demand of the right to work with the establishment 
, 
of the co-operatives, whereas it ~ould be argued that the decision to 
establish co-operatives was grafted on to the workers struggle as a 
pragmatic compromise, attainable due to the temporary strength of the 
left of the Parliamentary Labour Party • 
. There is little evidence that the workers involved willingly chose 
• the co-operative alternative, or were originally ccmmitted to specifically 
co-operative principles: th~y wanted secure and useful employment, 
recognised that some form of workers control was necessary, and were 
exasperated by the poor performance of',the private companies they had 
experienced. The decision to set up co-operatives was a pragmatiC 
choice under the ·influence of Benn and ether advisers. Nationalisation 
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was favoured by more militant workers, and others at Meriden and Kirkby 
favoured a takeover by a large company such as British Leyland. 
The interest and enthusiasm which the co-operative idea eventually 
evoked among the workers did not originate with them. The consultations 
which Benn, as Secretary of State for Industry, had with the senior 
stewards of the co-operatives were a major innovation in the relations 
of government with the trade union movement: barely a decade before 
shop stewards had difficulty in some industries securing recognition by 
their own trade union leaders. However, the secrecy and sensitivity of 
the negotiations at the Department, precluded the involvement of the 
majority of workers in the co-operative decision, and although the idea 
was welcomed, through not uncritically, when it was put to the workers, 
it was a relatively strange concept. The workers raw commitment to 
the co-operative ideal rarely became completely coherent, however their 
involvement in founding the co-operatives was limited anyway by the 
weight of outside influence. For example,in framing the co-operative 
constitutions, the Department of Industry with legal and accounting 
advisers, drawing upon existing company law and practices, exerted the 
gr~atest influence. 
The manner in which the co-operatives were introduced highlights 
a number of serious weaknesses in ~he IWCs approach to workers control. 
Firstly, and most obviously, for a body which expresses an unfailing 
commitment to workers control, the adulation it devotes to labour leaders 
who express a similar commitment, in this case Tony Benn, suggests 
that·the IWC might be as happy with hagiocracy as with workers democracy 
• (Hyman, 1974, pp.26S-9). This adulation was extended to all those who 
assisted the co~operatives, and to the co-operative senior stewards who 
were active in the formative stages. It might be helpful to offer 
strong moral support to· labour leaders ~onstantly under attack from the 
capitalist press, but n~t to focus on them to the exclusion of the ideas 
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and activities of the rank and file. ~be reorganisation of the 
shipbuilding industry and the resulting UCS work-in had painfully brought 
home to Benn the problem of corporatism: "I think we would be very 
wise •••. to b~ alert to the danger of corporatist solutions organised 
and engineered at the top which many Tories would like to see occur •• 
an incoming Labour Govern~ent could not, and should not, think of its 
industrial policy simply in terms of what a Labour Minister might do in 
his office, but rather in terms of a partnership between the trade 
union movement and a Labour Government •••• It was out of determination 
to maintain the Government-Trade Union partnership in being that we 
began the first experiments in workers co-operatives." (1976,pp.72-6) • 
Unfortunately Benn seems blissfully unaware that he could be merely 
substituting for a right corporatism (leaders of the state and capital) 
a left corporatism (leaders of the state,capital and trade unions) 
in industrial policy. (According to Panitch the corporatist paradigm 
is understood to connote "a political structure within advance.d capitalism 
which integrates organised socioeconomic producer groups through a system 
of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the leadership 
level and of mobilisation and social control at the mass level." (l977,p.66).) 
It is true that Benn was careful to negotiate extensively with the senior 
stewards from Meriden, Kirkby and Glasgow, and in the case of KME actually 
excluded the managing director of the previous company from the talks. 
Yet the participation of the shopfloor workers in the decisions concerning 
the formation of their co-operatives was brief and formal, and in the 
case of KME at least, completely nominal. Regretably, the realisation 
• 
that the bureaucratic process begins with shop steward organisation has 
yet to be accepted in the IWC. 
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A further weakness of the IWCs approach is the emphasis on 
parliamentary action to secure reforms developing workers control. 
In this instance whatever militant orientations existed towards 
nationalisation under workers control were diverted to\l1ards the pragmatism 
of the more immediately feasible co-operative form. Ken Coates was 
aware that the co-operative could not be considered outside of the general 
workers struggle at the time: "In general, the movement to establish 
co-operative factories cannot be evaluated outside the context of the 
labour movement which gives rise to it. If producer co-operatives are 
part of a wholesale onslaught upon the powers of capital, in a dynamic 
upsurge of trad~ union and labour action, then they have a quite different 
meaning, as stimuli and examples, from which they may come to acquire 
in periods of recession in militant labour activity." (1976,pp22-3) • 
The difficulty with this, is that if the co-operatives were depende~t for 
their survival upon an escalating class struggle externally, the verI 
procedure of establishing the co-operatives defused rank and~file 
activism within these three organisations and discouraged any militant 
participation in the broader struggle. Indeed in a paper on "The 
Role of Relaxing Constraints on Government Intervention" (1978), Bradley 
and Gelb have cynically argued, "In the light of our results, it seems 
not unreasonable to suggest that attitudes to 'worker control' should be 
reappraised, not necessarily on ideological grounds, but because of its 
potential, in certain circumstances, as an effective factor screening 
and project control mechanism. Worker control may be a useful managerial 
strategy for the state." (p.4) • 
• 
Bence the emphasis in IWC literature on finding immediate 
practical solutions to workers problems, such as in the creation of 
co-operatives, tends to connect tenuously with the central long-term 
, 
objective of developing rank and file militancy and working class 
consciousness necessary to present a general challenge to capitalism. As 
Hyman has maintained: 
"'Socialism in one industry' is an illusion because each 
industry is a component of an environing political economy, 
a structure of political and economic domination. 
Whatever control structures are attained on a local or 
sectional level are subject to virtually irresistible 
pressures to accommodate 'realistically' to the coercive 
demands of market forces or government requirements. Yet 
the perspectives of trOade unionists confronting the problems 
of their own industry or enterprise do not lead naturally 
to a focus on the questions of state power or of capitalism 
as a total system: and a lack of attention to these 
questions is characteristic of many of the IWC publications." 
(1974,p.252) • 
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Coates has acknowledged the validity of this conception, "the 
reforms must not be within, but of the power structure. Its dismantling 
is the prior necessity, outside which lesser reforms are all too apt 
to come to grief, or even to aggravate the problems they were designed 
to solve.'~ (l968,p.l4). In this light the practice of the IWC might 
be dismissed as irremediably reformist. However the transition to 
socialism is not so simple: what of the dilemma of workers faced 
with closure, and determined to fight redundancy by engaging in protracted 
occupations? In the absence of a general working class mobilisation 
against capital, which they alone cannot promote, and with a Labour 
Government fastidious in its concern not to be associated with random 
nationalisation, they confront the complex question of what to do next? 
In the three organisations under-discussion this was fatefully resolved 
in the co--operative compromise. Such occurrences have been elevated 
by. the IWC into an essentially voluntaristic ~eory of socialist change, 
as Boddington eloquently affirms: , 
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"Production for social use will long have to live 
alongside production for money, profit and the market. 
Co-existence of differently structured, differently 
motivated economic activities is for long inevitable 
for two very simple reasons. First, economically the 
world - thanks to the pervasiveness of the capitalist 
market - is one world and social change cannot wait 
in the wings until some supposed day of universal 
conversion. Second, and more importantly, by its very 
nature democratic grass roots control cannot be ~iversalised 
by external decree but must await the readiness of people 
at the grass roots to exert for themselves control over 
their circumstances. When the impetus of the new has not 
brought about change, old ways and structures will persist." 
(l979,p.24) • 
Even if operating within this perspective, it is still important 
for the IWC to conceive precisely what form of change it seeks to promote 
in its support of co-operative projects. Hyman has isolated three 
possible objects of the workers control movement: a means of raising 
consciousness, a source of viable extensions of workers control, or a 
, 
means to provoke a crisis of dual power. (l974,p.249). Each of these 
objects requires different strategies: a focus upon raising 
consciousness would demand an exhaustive propaganda effort which would 
distract workers from commercial concerns and questions of internal 
organisation; a focus on extending workers control within an organisation 
would involve a concentration up~n internal questions of commercial 
performance and democratic organisation; the attempt to provoke a crisis 
of dual power would necessitate a commitment ~o contribute towards a 
general mobilisation against capit~l *hatever the consequences for the 
organisation itself. The failure to distinguish clearly between 
strategies reveals an ambiguity in the aims of the lWC, and an uneasy 
oscillatiqn between refOrmist and revolutionary ramm 
... prog es: 
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"It seems to us that there have to be very consi,1erable 
changes in the balance of power, including a pOu~llJly 
extended, if unstable, situation of dual power, hefore any 
revolutionary social transformation comes onto thl:l agenda. 
Extensions of workers control from wages and conctltions 
to employment and investment policies are all aspects of that 
changing balance; and while they raise conSCiO\l~\\esS, they 
do also have a certain viability before they are sufficiently 
widespre,ad to provoke a crisis of dual power. 'I'he 
encroachment of workers control is not regarded l~y ourselves 
as a gradualist recipe which can avoid violent r~sistance 
at some stage; but this is just because each ne~ encroachment 
is seen as moving towards a real abrogation of tl\e power of 
capital." (Barratt Brown, Coates and Topham, 197~t p.304). 
Leading members of the IWC seem to have a similarly elastic conception 
'of the functions of workers co-operatives: promoting ,-'Onsciousness 
of the possibility of workers control; providing a v~lid exercise in 
workers control; and contributing to a mounting strug-.;le in opposition 
to capital. Whatever reservations existed about the ~harx::es of survival 
of the co-operatives were subordinated to the belief ~~ the impressive 
demonstrative impact the co-operatives could achieve~ 
"Those socialists who say wryly that it is not p('~sible 
to build socialism in one factory are, however, ~ry wide 
of the mark. Of course it is not. It is not ~~sible 
to build socialism in one country either. But i~ the 
• 
revolution breaks out in one country, one tries t~ defend 
it there.' And if we can defend a transformation ~ the 
power structure within an individual plant, of ~e we 
should try to do so. Such a transformation will ~ve 
far less social c~nsequences for being a partial ~e: 
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but it will. still provide a p~/erful inducement to throught 
for people outside its immediate range." (Coates, 1976,pp.31-2). 
Though influenced by D.C.Jones'critique of the Webbs pessimism 
. 
concerning producer co-operatives, Coates was aware of the dismal 
life-cycle which many previously experienced: from idealistic 
partnership, through capital starvation and intense competition, either 
to bankruptcy or conversion to joint stock company status. (1976,p.29). 
Obviously the demonstrative impact of the neW workers co-operatives 
would be drastically diminished if they endured the same fate as their 
ill-starred predecessors, which was a risk'the IWC was prepared to take. 
Of immediate r~levance in the assessment of the possible demonstrative 
effect of the co-operatives, was the question of the nature of a 
"partial" transformation of the power structure in the plants. Coates 
makes reference to the socialist criticism of the severe limitations 
upon possible reforms attainable in co-operatives due to the insistent 
. 
pressure of competitive market forces: "it is of course true that the 
market mechanism must constantly be i~ tension with any elements of 
industrial democracy whatever. OVer long periods of time the process 
of democratisation must be seen as a process of limitation, and ultim~tely 
of anulment, of blind market powers." (l976,p.l9). However Coates 
optimistically hoped that this problem would be alleviated in the 
co-operatives by the compensating support of the wider trade union 
movement; in the case of KME by trade unionists pressing their employers 
to conclude contracts with KME, which was an observation of little 
substance based on a casual refe.ence in a television interview. (l976,p.3l). 
A similar optimism pervaded the description and analysis of the 
t~ee co-operatives in the IWC study. That they were inherently democratic 
organisations was treated as an article of faith: , "None (of the 
three workers co-operatives) became registered under the legislation 
governing the formation of co-operative societies, for a variety of 
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tec~ical and legal reasons. All chose instead to register 
as companies under the Companies Act, having provided themselves 
with statutes, Memoranda and Articles of Assocjation which enjoined 
the strictest participating democracy.1I (l976,p.16) • This rhetorical 
flourish by Coates was far from the truth, a rationalisation based 
on ignorance rather than a desire to mislead: there were democratic 
shortcOmings in each of the co-operative constitutions and they certainly 
did not promote a participatory democracy. The exaggeration of the 
level of democratic control in the co-operatives was accompanied by 
a general exaggeration of the degree of change introduced in each of 
the co-operatives in work organisation and job control. Confronted 
by the necessity to produce immediately for the market, only a few 
i~portant changes were actually attempted or successfully implemented, 
especially at KME. The fact that immediate commercial difficulties 
were faced in each o'f the co-operatives, which proved almost impossible 
to overcome with the resources available, reveals another shortcoming 
i n the analysis of the IWC: the idea that the main reason for closures 
is often management negligence or in~fficiency, which therefore makes 
possible dramatic improv~ments when the workers take over control of 
production. (Clarke, 1974). Regrettably the reasons for factory 
! 
closures run deeper than management failure: not simply in the 
structural lack of industrial investment in the British economYJ and 
periodiC economic crisis; but in the fact that in restructuring capital 
managers often make conscious decisions to close plants as part of 
corporate plans made in response to the competitive market position • 
• 
(Wood, 1978,pp. 405-6). In this context it is utopian to expect 
workers co-operatives emerging out of closures to do anything but battle 
for survival. A final weakness becomes apparent, in the strategy 
of the IWC of opening the books' to workers. As Barratt Brown, Coates 
and 'Topham claim, "large numbers of workers have indeed come to 
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understand the books. The history of industrial relations at fords shows 
this very clearly, as also do the successful struggles to found worker 
co-operatives tn liverpool, Meriden and Glasgow." (l975,p302). Nevertheless, 
the dubious implications of this achievement identified by Hyman, were 
painfully brought home to members of the co-operatives: firstly the books 
placed sharp restrictions upon the possibility of internal reforms; and 
secondly, knowledge of the books dichotomised the co-operative members 
into those privileged with the information that structured decisions and 
the great majority without information or influence.(l974,pp 245-7). 
Demoralisation ensued, with internalisation of the reasons for failure, 
rather than attributing them more accurately to the irrational operation 
of a capitalist economy. Thus the political support of the IWC for the 
launching of the three large co-operatives amounted in practice to abandoning 
workers in these organizations to take responsibility for the previous 
mistakes, neglect or deliberate rundown of their respective companies by 
private enterprise. As the person most responsible for a unique 
"social experiment" Benn emphasized th~ importance of proper empirical 
investigation:"We now need to study the experience of these three co-operatives! 
and study it in detail, and carefully, with those involved so that we may 
I 
learn something from it."(l976,p7B). 
Opinion varied among researchers as to why the co-operatives proved so 
disappointing in practice, however some broed conclusions may be supported. 
Enveloping commercial pressures forced in upon the co-operatives immediately, 
• 
and were compounded by their serious under funding. This imposed the primacy 
of commercial considerations and curtailed co-operative experimentation 
completely. Few workers in the co-operatives had a detailed impression 
of what a workers co-operative should be, but they almost all had a clear 
sense of being subject to controls which they were largely powerless to 
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resist. They hoped that they had escaped the insecurity and irrationality 
of their recent past under private enterprise, but found they were still 
confronting similar problems: an unpredictable market; fierce competition; 
financial difficulties, particularly cash flow and insufficient capital 
for investment. The result was constant demands being made upon the workers 
for higher output, interspersed with abrupt lay-offs. In fact the central 
features of the co-operative work experience resembled thosein other 
factories under public and private ownership: the work organisation, 
'shift systems, payment systems, conditions, holidays, and supervision 
, were similar to those existing elsewhere. Meriden took the brave step of 
adopting a common wage and abandoning close supervision, together with 
intr6ducing more flexible conditions of work: however these conditions 
reflected more the high proportion of skilled men employed, and the controls 
gradually won by craft unions in the pas~ rather than any conscious adherence 
to co-operative principles. 
Most workers in the co-operatives were expected to playa~relatively passive 
role in the decision making process, and most decisions were made by the 
convenor-directors at KME, and an alliance of senior management and worker 
directors at Meriden and the SON. One reason for the passivity of the 
, co-ope18tive rank and file was that work tasks were generally as exhausting 
as in any conventional factory. The division of labour into fragmented 
and frequently stultifying repetitive and arduous work remained, particularly 
at KME where there was a high proportion of semi-skilled work. Beyond the 
• 
few members of the board of directors, the skills developed by the 
co-operative workers were little greater than in other factories. Workers 
nad greater access to information, but generally did not have the time, 
resources or opportunities to understand and discuss the information, or 
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to make decisions on the basis of it. On the rare occasions they did make 
their voices heard they were usually ignored, or persuaded that what they 
were suggesting was impossible. 
When the initial enthusiasm for the co-operative began to wear ofF, workers 
were left asking the pregnant question, "What has changed ?" Significant 
improvement in work experience under co-opertive production, is usually 
assumed rather than examined by co-operativ~ advocates, existing economic 
. and technological constraints are underestimated, and in particular, the 
capacity for market forces to impose unacceptable conditions of work is 
not appreciated. Even the most basic desires of the workers for secure 
employment and reasonable pay, remained unfulfilled. Pay in the co-operatives 
was lower than that of similar work in adjacent factories. Workers at 
KME fondly remembered when due to the effectiveness of -their trade union 
organization they had secured the top wages in the area under p~ivate 
ownership. Such factors caused workers to question the validity of the 
co-operative experiment, and idealism wore thin.- The conditions in the 
co-operative fostered the return of old attitudes towards work, which were 
a rational response since so litttle had changed. Work effort and enthusiasm 
fell from the euphoric heights it initially achieved: at KME workers 
completed their ~corel and downed tools. At Meriden it proved difficult 
to meet output targets when the order book was full. Defensive responses 
were also prompted by the persistent insecurity of employment the workers 
faced. At the SON the predictions of imminent closure began in the first 
week of production, at KME and Meri~en lay-offs were frequent, and large 
scale redundancies occurred. Whatever potential there was for improvements 
in workers control at the co-operatives, was to a considerable extent 
wasted because of the failure to develop an informed and participative 
rank and file. 
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In terms of the grander political goals of the co-operatives supporters 
the achievements were dismal. As hopes of co-operative purpose and control 
were crushed under the weight of the insistent antagonism of market 
forces, and as the vulnerabilities of the organizations were increasingly 
exposed, the political consciousness among the workers which had ignited 
in the original factory occupations in opposition to redundancy, evaporated 
and was replaced by a divisive defeatism which allowed the dismantling 
,-
of all the co-operatives, the closure of two of them, and the reduction 
. to a shell of Meriden.Though the co-operatives proved conclusively that 
trade union representatives could assume management roles, since in the 
process they also became immersed 'in market and managment priorities, 
not 'only was workers control a mere facade, but the possibility of effective 
trade union representation was eliminated. Finally, far from contrjbuting 
to an escalating class struggle provoking a crisis of dual power, the 
funding of the three co-operatives formed part of a successful~attempt 
on the part of the labour Government to divert the intense industrial 
militancy of 1974. As for the more practical achievements of the 
co-operatives: KME and Meriden each provided work for seven hundred people 
who may otherwise have remained unemployed. They did demonstrate, to the 
wider public at least, that large sc~le organizations structured as 
workers co-operatives were possible. However for the demoralised workers 
who experienced the disappointment of finding that their co-operatives 
offered no escape from the insecurity and exploitation of capitalism 
the chief lesson was a negative one: the severe limitations upon possible 
reforms attainable at the enterprise level within a market economy. 
The IWC has not yet appreciated the extent of the disaster of the co-operatives 
and has limited comment on their experiences largely to condemnations of 
the hostility displayed by government officials towards the co-operatives 
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survival. After a succession of published accounts concerning the 
democratic failings of the co-operatives, including reports from management 
consultants shocked at the KME bossdom, Coates could repeat verbatim his 
judgement that the co-operatives "enjoined the strictest participating 
democracy.II(1981,p140) Operating with such mistaken assumptions the problem 
for the IWC simply becomes that of electing a stronger labour Government 
and enthusiastically attempting more co-operative experiments without 
adequately appreciating the reasons for the failure of previous efforts. 
The focus of the IWC upon co-operatives and other forms of industrial 
democracy systematically distracts attention away from the dominance of 
national and international capital through the world market, and the importance 
of the industrial struggle to achieve public ownership and a planned 
economy. ( A debate recently crudely resurrected by Scargill and Kahn, 1980). 
Democratic central planning and decentralised implementation may be a 
distant and complex goal, but the support of industrial democra~y schemes 
which integrate workers representatives within existing control structures, 
or co-operatives submerged in a market economy, does little to bring it 
any closer. Attention should be directed primarily at how workers struggles 
in the large scale enterprises which dominate the economy can achieve a 
! 
system of accountable, democratic control within a framework of public 
ownership. To refer, as Coates does, to the unpopularity of nationalisation 
in the hope co-operatives may provide a more popular alternative is to 
evade the problem. To stress that nationalisation is synonymous with the 
rationalisation and elimination of jobs is to neglect the fact that the 
• 
same economic forces which determine mass redundancies in the nationalised 
sector will impose a similar fate upon co-operatives, probably more abruptly 
with-less chance of escape. (l981,ppI49-l57). Coates has now acknowledged 
that co-operatives are more suited to.sm~ll scale, local initiatives based 
on social planning for community needs. However the IWC remains committed 
to the view that redundancy struggles which lead to militant occupations 
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should found workers co-operatives. (Coates, 19BI,pI33). far from a 
succesful formula for socialist advance, this course has been shown to 
involve potentially disastrous consequences. 
The Socialist Environment and Resources Association (SERA) has put 
forward a more coherent strategy of the role of co-operatives in socialist 
change. SERA is committed to responding to the acute problems of unemployment 
in declining inner ci~y areas and depopulated rural areas by encouraging 
small scale co-operative initiatives to meet local needs, employing socially 
responsible technologies, and building skill 'back into the labour process, 
thus "bringing back local generation, ownership, social control and 
reinvestment of wealth by those who work to create it and encouraging the 
valuing of meeting social need over merely maximising the return on capital 
invested. This is essentially a political decision expressing the faith 
that given the right conditions people can begin to resolve their crisis. 
It is also unashamedly socialist in affirming the need for social planning 
and control. ."(SERA,n.d.l,p6). Co-operat.ive projects with which SERA is 
associated are funded largely by the local Athorities or state, in the 
Urban Aid, or t1SC programmes, and although SERA insists that control 
should remain with the co-operative, members, responsiveness to community 
needs shOuld clearly be an important factor in obtaining funds from these 
sources. Political and economic links between the co-operatives could 
begin to create a non-market sector co-ordinated by local Co-operative 
Development Agencies (CDAs), as Taylor has maintained: 
"The co-operative idea has a~ays been regarded as more than a method 
of establishing businesses. It is concerned with transforming society by 
changing the control of economic activity. It is a form of practical socialism • 
. local CDAs can link co-ops together so that they can support each other, 
• 
. 
, trade with each other, gain greater independence from the private market, 
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and develop a wider consciousness of the need for social and environmental 
responsibility."(n.d. p2) 
Among SERA activists there is an awareness of the political failure 
of commercially inclined co-operatives: "there are forms of co-op which 
aim to motivate members through the growth of their individual capital 
stake •• co-ops based on the urge to accumulate capital will not act as 
method of changing the private enterprise system."(Taylor,n.d. p9).Particular 
attention is devoted to devising appropriate alternative products and 
technologies which are both socially and environmentally responsible: 
alternative energy systems; longlife durables; small scale food and 
drink processing; waste recycling; nat4ral materials processing. SERA's 
links with the Centre for Alternative Technology have led to an active 
involvement in the possibilities of developing workers alternative plans 
for useful products, particularly that of the lucas Aerospace workers. 
Though little success is yet recorded in applying the more ambitious alternative 
products and technologies in the manufacturing sector, the philosophy of 
SERA is to some extent vindicated in the considerable growth in the service 
sector of wholefood stores, alternative bookshops, printing and pu~shing, 
and other craft work. Though the connotations of an underground sub-culture 
survive, every city is now served by several stores offering goods and 
I 
services which previously were almost unobtainable. Whether this movement 
. is capable of more extensive development, or whether it will continue to 
cater for minority needs, remains to be seen. 
Problems with the SERA approach involve the emphasis on direct democracy· 
thit restricts enterprises to the smallest scale. As with other small 
• 
businesses the failure rate is high, which would increase the tension between 
political ideals and the urge for survival. When engaged in conrnercial 
trading people dedicated to transforming society, often find it ~ they 
who are transformed, not society. More specific criticisms include the 
failure to relate closely to the trade union movement, co-operative 
enthusiasts often at"tempt to impose the concept, without proper regard for 
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the implications for trade union organisation, thus SERA proposed a plan 
of action involving, "Full d~scussions with the labour movement :Eading 
to a political decision to establish workers co-operatives."(n.d.,p8) 
And in the final analysis, however imaginative and stimulating, the 
futuristic idealism of the SERA programme often seems remote from the 
day to day struggles of ordinary workers. 
Under the influence of the Webbs pessimism, the labour Party itself 
has traditionally been cautious about the concept of workers co-operatives, 
and in repsonse to the growing interest in co-operatives the 1974-79 
labour Government·offered only nominal concessions. (P. Clarke,n.d.) 
However in a reply to a resolution passed at the 1979 Labour Party annual 
conference asking the National Executive Committee to present a report 
"outlining the ways in which future development of co-operatives can 
contribute to labour's goal for social control of a planned economy", an 
NEC working group produced proposals offering a "bolder approach" to the 
encouragemen~ of workers co-operatives. Realising that the conversion of 
failed private businesses is the worst possible legacy for a newly formed 
co-operative and that in many other circumstances,such as takeover or 
restructuring,workers are faced with redundancies which are difficult to 
resist by conventional means, the group suggested a dramatic alternative: 
"The key principle of our new approach is quite straightforward. 
It is that if the workers in a private firm decide that they 
wish to convert their enterprise into a workers co-operative, 
they should have the legislati~e right, subject to the 
consent of government and the conditions we outline below, 
~o acquire the assets of the firm and, if necessary to receive 
some financial assistance for the pU1Pose." (labour Party, 1980, p22) 
The report outlined a simple procedure by which workers could transform 
their company into a co-operative: a submission would be prepared for the 
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proposed Co-operative Development Advisory Board; an Official Trustee 
would take control of the as~ets of the company while the CDAB assessed 
the viaOlity of the project. If the CDAB recommended positively then financial 
assistance would be granted to the workforce and the firms assets would 
be purchased. A sum of £100 million per annum would be set aside for CDAB 
for this purpose, together with a further substantial annual public grant 
to a Co-operative Investment Bank, to compensate for the hostility of 
private financial institutions to co-operative ventures. On this basis 
an impressive expansion of the co-operative sector is envisaged: 
"At present workers co-operatives in this country represent a 
, 'negligible proportion of economic activity, even in the small 
firm sector. We hope that workers co-operatives could account 
for at least five per cent of total industrial and commercial 
'activity within a decade. If such a proportion were attained, 
the'British workers co-operative movement would be almost 
five times the relative size of of the Italian movement, by 
far the ~argest in Western Europe. A major expansion of 
co-operatives would therefore play an important part in 
the planned regeneration of British industry under a 
Labour Government."(l9BO,pJl} 
These proposals are extremely interesting. For the first time a 
Labour Government would be promting spontaneous extra-parliamentary industrial 
action by workers, whemasalways in the past Labour Governments have attempted 
sytematically to suppress and constrain such ~ction. (One might well ask 
if workers are to be allowed simila~y to demand nationalisation under 
workers control ?) However historical experience has a sobering effect: the 
COAB eroposals for the encouragement of co-operatives, resemble the plans 
for a National Enterprise Board designed ~o regenerate large sectors of 
British industry. The furious opposition of private industry, finance, 
management, and the civil service, at the implications of the CDAB-
for private businesses, would almost certainly lead to the retreat of 
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a Labour Government· faced with economic dislocation and sabotage, and the 
neutralizing of the CDAB, just as the NEB was reduced to the status of 
a small merchant bank. The fundamental problem with the CDAB, as with 
the general Alternative Economic Strategy of which it is part, is that 
it places too much confidence in the possiblity of parliamentary directed 
change and underestimates the constraints which national and international 
capital impose upon the political process and economic structure. Though 
potentially the CDAB proposals could contribute towards a rapidly expanding 
and integrated co-operative sector, "a coherent and politically conscious 
workers co-operative movement", in practice a more likely scenario is that 
only unwanted or loss-making businesses'would be converted into co-operatives. 
In this context workers would probably find that their enterprises were 
almost as isolated and vulnerable as the three co-operatives funded by Benn. 
Operating in a market economy they would find similar insistent pressures 
and experience sharp disappointments regarding wages, conditions, the 
division of labour, organisation and ~ontrol. The simplistic constitutional 
devices offered in the report, would actually provide no protection to 
withstand such powerful anti-democratic influences, and all that is left 
is wishful thinking: "Above all, because co-operatives are democratic and 
controlled on a one-member, one-vote basis, they afford the opportunity 
for the maximum participation by their membership." With reference to the 
difficult and complex role which trade unions have discovered when attempting 
to operate in co-operatives the report is equally simplistic: 
"~n fact, far from eliminating the need for trade unions, the 
spread of workers co-operatives would place equally important demands 
on·their·ser~ices, in terms of negotiations of wages, and conditions, 
the resolving of conflicts within the co-opertive, and the representation 
of the interests of worker members,. ensuri.ng internal democracy and 
protecting the interests of individual workers."(1980,p29) 
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In conclusion, however inspirational, the Labour Party report 
tends to underestimate or ignore the central political and economic 
problems of co-operative development in a market economy, if, as they insist, 
they envisage co-operatives as a component of socialist change. Indulging 
in naive co-operative rhetoric is no substitute for rigorous analysis of 
realistic possibilities, as in: 
"We believe that the co-operative form of organization offers a 
true socialist approach to economic planning and development •.• 
They enable us to practice socialism in our current mixed economy, 
and better still, give us an ever-widening circle of workers, 
experienced and trained in self-management and with the practical 
knowledge to help extend the frontiers of socialism. Not only 
will they know all too well the deficiencies of capitalism 
and private enterprise but can guide us more safely from their 
islands of socialism till we reach the shore of the socialist 
mainland. "(1980, p6) 
One suspects ~hat within the framework of a mixed economy,workers endeavouring 
to develop self-management will learn the deficiencies ofco-operativism 
too, and that there are no short-cuts to socialism. 
Utopian Socialist Political Economy: The Co-operative Commonwealth 
In contrast to socialists who regard co-operatives as part of the 
transition to a socialist economy, co-operative idealists, working within 
the conception of a co-operative commonwealth, are prone to value workers 
co-operatives as an end in ·themselves. The Industrial Common Ownership 
Movement (ICOM) is at the forefront of tn~s move~ent, and sees itself as 
overcoming the neglect of producer co-operatives by the established retail 
co-operative movement. IeaM originated in 1958 as the "Society for Democratic 
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Integration in Industry" (Demintry), and was formed on the initiative of 
Ernest Bader, the founder of the Scott Bader Commonwealth with the object 
of persuading other entrepreneurs to follow his example in handing their 
companies to their employees. ICOM has never shaken off this paternalistic, 
Christian, and somewhat eccentric origin, but more seriously, still operates 
with an essentially unitary coneption of authority in industry: 
"We believe: that the increasing tension of our industrial 
society will be resolved only by changing the basis of ownership 
in order to establish common interest instead of conflict, 
that, in order to achieve quality of life at work, enterprises 
must be owned and controlled democratically by all those 
working in them, bound together as a group with social as 
well as economic objectives; that labour should employ capital 
instead of capital employing labour." (ICOM leaflet) 
rCOM upholds a relatively pure form of producer co-operation: that all 
workers in co-operative may be members of it, that the general meeting 
should decide policy and control funds, and that any loans should be at 
a fixed rate of interest. Since 1978 there has been a rapid growth of 
co-operatives registered with ICOM from 27 to 224, though largely these 
are very small businesses. (Workers Control, 1980, 4, p23) ICOM has a 
diverse range of member organizations from radical newspaper co-operatives, 
through counter-culture whole food stores and craft shops, to the conservative 
Scott Bader chemical company. This diversity contributes to a confusing 
air of political schizophrenia with "anarchists, libertarians, christian 
socialists, Tribunites. Co-operative. or labour Party supporters, or 
non-aligned Socialists or Marxists."(Thornley, 1979, p9), engaging in a 
fair amount of political in-fighting despite the public image of a harmony 
of interest. The rival. orientations within ICOM are so distant, that it 
surprising that they can be contained within the same body, as illustrated 
in two contrasting contributions to the 1978 annual conference: 
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A: "I.COM may be either a radical advance vanguard moving towards a 
socialist society in which everyone will be able to maximise 
his/her potential to the full, or it may be seen as a means 
of rescui~g a capitalist system in dacadence. I am committed 
to ICOM because I believe it can be the former. This means 
that ICOM must be a united UK body composed of and controlled by 
an active mass membership." 
B: "When looking at the democratic and commercial aspects of 
co-operatives, the discussion has been solely of democracy. 
Surely the validation is to tap some sort of creative and 
co-operative way of working - then we should make a good 
living out of it as well. Clobber the competition and give 
value for money. Rather than a democratic phrase book 
and rock bottom prices we need professional organization 
and thrust, that is often forgotten." 
Thus while many of the younger, smaller co-operatives affiliated to ICOM 
have revolutionary inclinations, in the larger and older enterprises, 
especially the influential Scott Bader.co-operative, management have 
retained control despite the concession of democratic forms. Inequalities 
and differentials persist, and in essence many of the co-operatives 
are very paternalistic bodies. 
An enthusiastic advocate of common ownership, David Watkins introduced 
the Industrial Common Ownership Act 1976 as a private members bill in 
parliament, which provided funding for the work of leOM and similar bodies. 
Weaknesses in the argu ments he has presented for common ownership run 
• 
through much of the leOM literature and philosophy. (Watkins,1978) Firstly, 
the emphasis on 'ownership': the socialist commitment is to the abolition 
of private ownership of the means of production; 'common ownership' has 
connotations of , collectively owned private businesses'. Co-operatives 
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therefore, may not be as advanced as other forms of social ownership. 
Secondly the role of trade unions in co-operatives remains ambiguous: 
many small co-operatives are not organized in trade unions; other co-op-
eratives undermine established union wages and conditions - co-operatives 
may provide other benefits to members, but they may endanger conditions 
achieved elsewhere. Co-operative structures undermine the capacity of 
unions to to oppose management, yet may not provide any other adequate 
means of representation of workers interests. Thirdly Watkins exaggerates 
the extent of democratic participation and other benefits which common 
ownerships provide, for example in Scott Bader or the John Lewis Partnership, 
where thinly veiled paternalism and anti-trade unionism reigns. Watkins 
assumes, as do most ot~er proponents of co-operatives that a formal con-
stitution will provide a basis for democratic control, when it is clear 
that democratic constitutions may be reconciled with the most manipulatory 
practices as in the past. Finally Watkins underestimates the influence 
of market forces on co-operSives. If there was the considerable growth 
of the movem~nt he predicts, though this seems unlikely, then it could 
be anticipated that inter-eo-operative trade would eliminate some of the 
more damaging aspects of the market by providing a source of finance and 
more stable demand and supply. However at no stage does Watkins confront 
the influence of the market, indeed central to his thesis seems to be the 
free movement of interest bearing private capital. 
. The consumer co-operative movement has in the past regarded workers 
co-operatives as an illegitimate child. Assistance with the growth of 
contemporary work~rs co-operatives provided by the established co-operative 
movement will not be without conditions. The retail co-operative societies, 
Co-operative Wholesale Society, Co-operative Bank, and Co-operative Insurance 
Society, have responded to competitive pressures by pursuing the same strategy 
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of concentration and centralisation as their capitalist rivals. Thus co-
operative super-stores and hypermarkets are rapidly replacing the corner 
stores catering for local need, and products and pricing policies are 
geared closely to those of competitors. Automated technology at the point 
of sale is being introduced and will permit further centralisation of 
financial and stock control. Co-operative workers endure poor conditions 
and wages, typical of the retail trade. Negotiations between the shop 
workers union USDAW and the co-operative management are as difficult as 
with private management, as an inspection fo the USDAW annual reports reveals. 
"Recent figures have shown that average earnings for men in retail co-operative 
employment are approximately £10 per week less than, or 84% of the national 
average; for women in retail co-operative employment approximately £8 per 
week less than, or 73% of the national average." Workers control and co-
operative purpose are notable absent, and management-worker relations are 
similar to those that exist in conventional companies: " ••• all too often 
a gulf exists between the two sides. At present, decisions are being taken 
at top level .and are so far removed from ·the shop floor that they have 
little meaning or impact on the worker. In many cases communications are 
bad or non-existent, thereby giving rise to misunderstanding and 
distrust •• "(Whatley, 1976, ppl09-ll0) The elected bodies of the co-operative 
movement are heavily dominated by management, in a survey conducted in 
the 1950s at least 59% of elected employee directors of retail society 
boards were of management status. (Rose, 1976, p99) 
It is only to be expected that abady so conventional and integrated 
into existing society should be sus~cious and unhelpful towards workers 
co-operatives which have such radical images. If the Co-operative Union 
is to. become again a force for democratic change.in society, one would 
expect it to begin by restoring its own democratic structure. But the co-
operative movement has now been persuaded by activists to adopt a more 
positive approach to workers co-operatives. The Co-operative Union has 
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absorbed the functi.ons of the Co-npfJtative Productive Federation 
into a Co-operative Productive Committee to provide services to producer 
co-operative that become members or the Co-operative Union. The Co-operative 
banI< has an'nounced a scheme fOl' lending to industrial co-operatives, 
matching pound for pound the inveslment of members of co-operatives. 
Though such assistance may ease tho commercial difficulties of launching 
new co-operatives, it will be an influence towards political respectability. 
The roservations of Peter Clarke, n Co-operative Party research worker, 
concerning the labour Party's new proposals for workers co-opemtives 
are probably indicative of the attitude of the established co-operative 
movement: that the major opportunity for co-operative growth is in new 
ventures, and that state involvement in workers takeovers would drag 
co-operatives into political controversy and damage the movements 
reputation, with the likelihood of commercial failures in the face of 
a hostile private economy. (New Statesman, 17 April 1981) It is unlikely 
that the co-operative movement will do more than assist producer 
co-operatives to accomodate to the constraints of the market system. 
Utopian Capitalist Political Economy: Usus et Fructus 
Those who advocate producer co-operatives from within a liberal 
perspective seem to celieve that two hundred years of capitalist political 
and economic development involving the appropriation of the means of 
production, the exploitation of labo~, the accumulation of capital, and 
the monopolization of markets, with the resulting class conflict between 
capital and labour, can be dramatically reversed and replaced by a utopian 
capitalist system of de-centralized co-op~rative enterprises operating in 
. . 
a market economy in which workers would own the means of production and 
receive the full fruits of their labour. 
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Though thia view is becoming popular among a section of liberal 
economists, the only organized expression of it to emerge so far is Job 
Ownerhsip limited (JOL), a right wing breakaway from IeOM. JOl objects to 
leOM's emphasis on common ownership, and encourages substantial personal 
shareholding on the part of co-operative members "perhaps paid for by 
deductions from wages over two years." Moreover JOL favours the crediting 
of a substantial part of ploughed back earnings to me~bers share accounts 
which are only withdrawable on retirement. (Public Enterprise, April 1979, 
. pp8-l6) Suspicions that what is proposed is a system of job hire purchase, 
the industrial equivalent of shackling workers with house mortgages, are 
quickly confirmed: "Hire purchase terms ere in principle available to ease 
the problem of finding capital contributions." (JOl,1979,p2) It is not 
surprising that so far there have been no takers for this JOL offer! The 
. director of JOl, Robert Oakshott is infatuated with the experience of the 
Mondragon group of co-operatives in the Basque province of Spain: "There 
. 
can be no doubt that here is an enormous success story. In the space of 
a generation.~. the Mondragon co-operatives have developed from nothing 
into a many sided operation which in 1976 employed more than 15,000 people." 
(197S;pI65) For Oakeshott and other enthusiasts the problem is simply how 
to build Mondragons here: the structural constraints of capitalism are largely 
ignored, and the major impediments are deemed to be the existence of a 
developed welfare state and strong trade unions which it is alleged discourage 
initiative. Hence Oakeshott concludes, "For management and the shop floor, 
were they to join forces in the enterprise, could presumably say goodbye 
to both outside capitalists and outs1de unionism. Together management and 
the shopfloor could build a worker owned democratic economy on Mondragon 
lines,"(p260) This obsessive idealism is reminiscent of the views of the 
utopian socialists castigated by Marx: 
"Socialists of this kind •• consider themselves superior to all 
class antagonisms ••• Hence they reject all political, and especially 
all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful 
means, and endeavour by small experiments, necessarily doomed to 
failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new 
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social Gospel ••• They hold fast by the' original views of their masters, 
in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. 
They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class 
, struggle and reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental 
realisation of their social Utopias, of founding isolated "phalansteres" 
of establishing "Home Colonies", of sett~ng up a"little Icaria" - duodecimo 
editions of the New Jerusalem - and to realise all these castles in the 
air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the 
bourgeoisie. By degrees they sink into the category of the reactionary 
conservative Socialists depicted above, differing from these only by more 
systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in 
the miraculous effects of their social science."(1968,pp60-6l). 
It is at this point that increasing numbers of neo-classical 
economists have entered the ,debate: repelled by the brutality of monopoly 
capital and the creed of monetarism, yet remote from the class struggles 
I 
of workers who endure the effects of 'this system, they have retreated into 
'the comforting conception of autonomous self-managing producer co-operatives 
within a market system. Despite the claim that they are advocating a 
utopian new system, such economists carry with them the conceptual baggage 
of the old one beginning with the self-interested individual as the basic 
• 
element of economic activity: 
"Since the members of an industrial co-operative - whom we will 
assume are sel f- interested - are on the simplest intelptetation 
both the owners and the controllers of their enterprise, the benefits 
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of their work will accrue to them. This is supposeed to enhance their 
motivation and production compared to the 'employees' of a traditional 
capitalist firm. Now if the work leads to a collective return then an 
individual's ~ contribution will be diluted in proportion to the number 
of other members of the co-operative. We might expect that the motivation 
would attenuate with the number of members of the co-operative unless 
returns accrue on an individual basis as with piece rates. The 
rationally self-interested individual finds himself in a dilemma in 
relation to a collective return." (Abell,l979,p5) 
Abell seems to recommend what the Webbs condemned as the worst 
feature of associations of producers: self-interested acquisitiveness 
and enterprise consciousness. He unwittingly reveals the pernicious individualism 
which repels active socialists from this co-operaive form of organization. 
Abell continues, "perhaps the rationally self-interested individual will 
find the co-operative alternative rather unattractive "(p6), an~ concludes 
"the prevalence of self-interested motivation" is perhaps a major explanation 
for the lack of co-operatives. Clearly the co-operative concern for 
collective and community welfare in-the ideal, is antagonistic to 
such narrow orientations, but to argue this is am~or cause of the 
, 
lack of co-operatives is to ignore the structural constraints of capitalism 
which confine co-operative opportunities to narrow limits, and prevent 
the expression _of collective co-operative motivations. 
The economists conception of the market is also drawn from liberal 
ideology. Vanek has maintained that not only is self-management compatible 
• 
with a market system, but that they are mutually supportive: "The optimal 
form of the self-managed economy. or sector is one based on the market 
mechanism, in the sense that all firms act to the best advantage of their 
working collectives and whoever else they'~ay be 'concerned with, while 
using prices in all product and factor markets as objective signals in their 
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decision "making. n(l9=75,p36) The critique of the markfl:t and of comlllQility 
production has been the essence of the Harxist critique of capi t\llism, 
and only by contrasting 'market socialism' with a rigid and mechanieal 
model of a centralised command economy can market socialists claim U'8t 
they are constructing a democratic model. (Selucky, 1975,p57) They Offer 
an idealized market, which pays little attention to dynamic proces~.~3 such 
as accumulation, technical development, concentration and uneven dev~lopment, 
but more importantly, neglecis the exploitative impact of market comDetition 
on the division of labour, intensity of work, and structure of work organization. 
far from the liberation of man, self-management in a market system ~~ould 
provide the conditions for the more effective manipulation of worke~s. 
Thus ~he assessment of performance by the economists in terms of gr~wth, 
size, efficiency, and profitability tends to be according to t~~e most 
conventional criteria despite the anti-capitalist rhetoric; and lhe 
concession of a limited conception of constitutional democracy doe~ not 
provide the means to resist such priorities in favour of other inte~~sts. 
liberal economists and sociologists depend for p.mpirical st::lt'lport 
for their self-management theories upon·a rosy view of the Yugosla\(economic 
system, and more recently, the Mondragon co-operatives unique achie~~ment, 
which they have built into an academic mythology. But the belief i~a haven 
of purposeful work and meaningful participation is abruptly dispelt~d by 
the te~se observations of Jack Eaton in his critique of the experi~e of 
work at Mondragon: 
"Although the workers nominally own the co-operative enterpri~s, 
having paid out or mortgaged themsel~s to the tune of £2,000, they ~re 
really locked into the co-operative because they cannot leave withowt losing 
up to 20 per cent of this sum and forfeiting what has accrued to thaiir 
accounts from the annual profits of the enterprise. Their very wage$ are 
regarded as an anticipo or advance on future profits. This engende~$ 
tremendous commitment from the labour force in the early stages of m 
152 
co-operative since everybody realises how vital it is to make a good start 
and payoff the loan burden as soon as possible ••. However, here, as in 
conventional capitalist companies, ownership is separate from control and 
the democratic control structures devised by the Caja loboral Popular 
(the Mondragon co-operative bank) are ineffective. Every co-operative has 
a junta rectora or control board which is supposed to consult with and advise 
management on policy each month. To nobodyls great surprise, day-to-day 
decision making by the technocrats soon takes over ••• As one worker whom 
we interviewed put it, Ithe co-operative is a good idea but as time passes 
is falls into the hands of the chairman and the management who, by having 
more information and resources than the junta rectora, can always make their 
opinion or point of view prevail.IAll the usual mechanisms of managerial 
control of the workforce exist in the co-operative and there is little 
room for improving the quality of working life. Scientif~c management 
and work measurement are adopted with alacrity. There are clock cards, 
work study and work measurement, job evaluation and detailed per~onnel 
. records on absenteeism. The only exception to this are some limited 
experiments in job rotation and job en~ichment at the bigger co-operatives 
such as Ulgor and Copreci. T~e constraints upon concerted opposition, let 
alone strike action, are tight. However, some of the workers we spoke to 
, 
were believers in strong independent trade unionism rather than the joint 
consultative and works council type arrangements of their co-operatives. 
One said that there had been Ino strike action but only because the workers 
did not know how to unite against management. Significantly perhaps, much 
of t~sopinion was expressed by workers at one furniture co-operative 
• 
which had been created fiDm a failed capitalist enterprise. Conditions in 
it were Dickensian, overcrowded and squalid and with antiquated machines." 
(Eaton, n.d.,pp4-6) 
It is curious that the publicists of Modragon failed to notice, 
or mention, the many shortcomings which Eaton identifies; but it is more 
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than a little dison~erting that so many liberal commentators are so 
commercially 
keen to praise a sytem which is undoubtedly innovative and / . successful, 
but which developed within the longest surviving fascist state in Europe. 
Most liberals hastily skirt over the fact that Mondragon developed in 
. Fascist Spain,or attempt to portray it as a pocket of social resistance 
to a repressive regime, "Spain's Oasis of Democracy" in Oakeshott's 
terminology. But unfortunately, certain aspects of t~e Mondragon structure 
are related to the society within which it formed: the monolithic religious 
authority structure,"an alliance between the Catholic Church and technology" 
as one Mondragon manager put it; the abs ence of a tradition of free dissent, 
including basic civil liberties; the laok of free trade unions, and the 
resulting constrained wprkforce. For the authors of the Anglo-German study 
of Mondragon, the abs ence of free trade unions,at least,is no cause for 
concern: "The role that unions might play within a co-operative economy 
has not yet been given much attention. Historically, this posed no problem 
for the Mondragon group since there were no free trade unions in Franco's 
Spain."(Campbell,Keen,Norman and Oakeshott,l977,pJ). In fact, as Eaton 
graphically points out, at Mondragon, as in other producer co-operatives, 
there' is a need for trade union representation to resist the unacceptable 
decisions of management, and to fight for reasonable treatment in such basic 
areas as wages and health and safety. (Eaton,l980,pJ7) 
The attractions of co-operatives to utopian capitalists now 
become clear:' co-operatives operating in a market economy are a means 
to induce liberal capitalist orientations among working people, for whom 
such orientations have come to be r~garded as alien and exploitative. The 
object for Peter Jay is for workers 
"somehow to be 'disalienated' enough to become infected with 
the entrepreneurial realities which confront their present 
employers, so that they will accept anon-inflationary, 
market-determined' environment as setting the level of 
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rewards that can be afforded"(Jay,1976) 
For those who perceive workers co-operatives as a socialist advance, 
Jay's support becomes threatening since it is part of an affirmed anti-
unionism: thus his diagnosis of Britain's current economic problems revolves 
around the belief that they are caused by excessive trade union power,· and 
his prescription is the destruction of that power by whatever means are 
available. Jay therefore dreams of an economy of labour only sub-contracting 
by finance capital within a market discipline~ by strict monetarist 
orthodoxy, thus promoting the self-exploitation of workers and eliminating 
the burden of labour motivation for management.(Jay,197i) As Gregory has 
argued, conservatives view co-oper~tives as a route to worker capitalism, 
a means to sever working class consciousness and action, and Tories, 
including Sir Keith Joseph, the Industry Minister, have welcomed a limited 
number of co-operatives dependent upon private capital as a means of fostering 
private enterprise.(1979) Marx appreciated the significance of this 
insidious support for co-operatives in his own day: 
"The experience from 1848 to 1864 has proved beyond doubt that, 
however excellent in principle, and however useful in practice, 
co-operative labour, if kept within the narrow circle of the casual 
efforts of private workmen, wi~l never be able to arrest the growth 
in geometrical progression of monopoly, to free the masses, nor 
even to perceptibly lighten the burden of their miseries. It is 
perhaps for this very reason that plausible noblemen, philonthropic 
middle class spouters, and even keen political economists, have all 
at once turned nauseously complimentary to the very co-operative 
labour system they had vainly tried to nip in the bud by deriding it 
.as the utopia of the dreamer or stigmatizing it ·as the sacrilege of 
. 
the socialist. To save the industrious masses, co-operative labour 
• 
ought to be developed by nationai dimensions, and, consequently to 
155 
be fostered by national means. Yet the lords of capital will always 
use their political privileges for the defence and perpetuation of 
their economic monopolies. So far from promoting, they will continue to 
lay every possiole impediment in the way of the emancipation of labour." 
(l974,pBO) 
Contradictions of Workers Co-operatives in a Market System 
Individual co-operatives trading in a market can only achieve 
a restricted and contradictory form of co-operation, since the co-operatives 
are subject to competitive and exploitative relations of production. Attempting 
to practice co-operation and compete in a market leads to "impossible internal 
strains within an enterprise trying to adapt itself to two irreconcilable 
forms of economic activity."(Fletcher, 1976,pl79) The market is a form of 
social organization that reflects the collective class interests' of capital 
and fragments the working class, thus commercial co-operatives compete not 
only with capitalist firms but with themselves. The effects of this 
competition undermine any attempt to create alternative co-operative structures 
and conditions. Thus the co-operative societies have traditionally resented 
any claim from the union of co-operative workers for higher payor shorter 
hours than existed in capitalist companies, as Beatrice Webb noted: 
.. 
"So long as the co-operative society •• constitutes only one among 
other forms of production and distribution •• the co-operative society 
has to maintain itself in continual rivalry Mith capitalist enterprise, 
• 
against which it has perpetually to compete for raw materials, for 
the services of brain workers and skilled operatives, for customers 
and trade.Except in so far as it can effect a genuine impovement or 
, 
economy in management, every step by which it departs from the 
competitive standard set by its capitalist rivals results in 
lowering the margin between cost and price. ~ wide departure, 
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whether in the way of higher wages, shorter hours, more favourable 
conditions of employment, or failing to take advantage of the best terms 
of obtaining raw materials or of employing the most efficient processes, 
means failure to serve the customers on the same terms as the capitalist 
trader. Thus the co-operative society, if it is to continue to exist 
and make headway against capitalist enterprise, cannot go beyond the 
currently prevailing conditions of employment •• "(l92l,p29) 
The result of this competitive process, which Webb omitted to 
mention, is that it is difficult to distinguish any real 
improvements or advantages for workers employed in commercial co-operatives. 
The exploitative dynamic of produc~ion within capitalism is maintained 
remarkably intact with devastating consequences for workers: 
"The driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist 
production is the self-valorization of capital to the 
greatest possible extent, ie the greatest possible 
production of surplus value, hence the greatest possible 
exploitation of labour-power by the capitalist. It (Marx,l976,p449) 
The only solution for co-operatives is to try to escape from the market 
by attempting to produce for, social need, 'commercial co-operatives which 
attempt to trade normally, 'gradually lose any claim to be co-operative 
I 
organizations in practice. 
• 
, 
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De-industrialization, Recession and Co-operative Development 
Though the various political philosophies discussed have radically 
different interpretations of the significance of workers co-operatives, 
they share an optimistic assessment of the potential for co-operative 
growth. Co-operative development in Britain over the last ten years has 
occurred in the context of an accelerating de-industrialization and 
worsening recession. There has been a decline of industrial employment 
by 4 million jobs since 1966, a total reduction of 34%. In some important 
industrial sectors the decline has been more serious: 67% of jobs in 
textiles; 55% in clothing and footwear; 54% in shipbuilding and marine 
engineering; and 48% in metal manufacture over a similar period. (Thirlwall, 
1982) A protracted world recession has eliminat~d the hope of sufficient 
growth in other sectors of the economy to compensate for this job loss. 
Therefore, as in the past, the most important motivation behind 
the launch of most contemporary workers co-operatives is the escape from 
unemployment into more secure and meaningful work. The pessimism of the 
analysis concerning the prospects for co-operative initiatives must be 
balanced by the grim prospects of securing any other reasonable form of 
employment of the people concerned. Moreover there now exists a wide 
, 
range of support organizations to promote the setting up of co-operatives, 
including the Co-operative Development Agency, seventy local CDAs throughout 
Britain funded largely by the local Authorities, local Authority Industrial 
Development Units, Manpower Services Commission schemes, as well as 
ICOM, JOL, and other advisory agencies. (COA,l983) 
• 
Together these might have been expected to produce a major wave 
'of co-operatives, and many co-operative advocate~ referring to the 
, 
. cumulative growth of co-operative registrations, and in particular the 
rapid increase of affiliations to ICOM, have attempted to give this 
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impression. ·However since the failure rate of co-operatives, as of 
all small businesses. is also very high, a more accurate indication 
of the rate of co-operative growth than simply the number of new 
registrations is the total number of producer co-operatives currently 
. . 
in existence and the number of workers employed in them. Though over 
Table 2 Number of Co-operatives and Workers Employed 1982 
Co-operatives Workers Employed 
Industrial and Service Co-operatives 490 5,805 
Community Co-operative 21 359 
Neighbourhood Co-operatives 20 127 
Totals 531 6,291 
Source: COA, Directory of Industrial and Service Co-operatives, 1982. 
the last decade there has been a rapid increase in the number of producer 
co-operatives in Britain from the handful of old members of the cpr, 
inspection of Table 2 reveals that still the achievements of the producer 
co-operative movement are very modest. The creation of 531 co-operatives 
wmploying a total of 6,291 workers must be compared with the scale of 
the problem of over 3 million unemployed, and the drastic job losses 
sustained in repeated company closures: for example 5,000 jobe were 
lost by the closure of the Chrysler car plant in linwood, Glasgow in 
1981. 
• 
Almost all the recently formed co-operatives are extremely small 
. size as Table 3 
.1.n shows, and since they are concentrated largely in 
small scale production and services their' capacity for growth is very 
limited, though certainly there could be a further proliferation of 
small co-operatives. 
159 
Table 3 Size of Workforce Employed in Co-operatives 1982 
Workers Co-operatives 
Over 400 2 
200 - 399 2 
100 - 199 3 
50 - 99 11 
20 - 49 33 
10 - 19 82 
5 - 9 162 
Under 5 174 
Source: Derived from CDA,1982. 
Examination of the industries and services in which producer 
co-operatives are situated (Table 4 ) reveals that they are heavily 
concentrated in the retail and food trade,largely wholefoods; in.printing 
and publishing; in building; and in crafts. That is small scale, labour 
intensive activities serving the local community. 
Table 4 Trading Activites of Co-operatives 1982 
Number of Co-operatives 
Advisory;Consultative;Educational & Office Services 
Building;House Renovation and Decoration; Cleaning; 
Waste Recycling; Architecture; Gardening Services 
Crafts; Arts; Carpentry; furniture Making; Joinery 
Engineering;Electronics;Chemicals;Manufacturing 
footwear;Clothing and Textile Manufacture 
Printing and Publishing 
Provision and Hire of Transport;Bicycle and Motor Repairs 
Record; film and Music' Making; Theatre,; Theatrical Agencies 
Retail, Distributive,Catering and food Processing 
Umbrella Co-operatives; Workspaces 
Source: CDA,1982,p87. 
33 
69 
40 
41 
32 
75 
13 
46 
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Realistically, the achievements of the new producer co-operative 
movement remain highJy localised, restricted to specific activities, and 
diminutive in size. Yet the much greater extent of the producer co-operative 
sector in most other European countries, particularly France and Italy, 
( EEC, 1982); the severity of the present economic circumstances; and 
the lack of popular alternatives to economic decline and unemployment 
which can be readily implemented; necessitates a further theoretical 
consideration of the range of possibilities for producer co-operative 
development. 
• 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONTRASTING THEORIES OF CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTION 
Introduction 
In the context of an economy suffering the combined impact of 
de-industrialisation and recession, producer co-operatives have again 
become the focus of intense political interest and academic inquiry. 
However as with ideas on worker participation and industrial democracy, 
the broad consensus of political agreement in support of producer co-operatives 
is based on misunderstanding! There is a basic confusion on what kind of 
economy and society will be associated with the extensive operation of 
workers' co-operatives, what type of organization a worker co-operative 
is, and what is the resulting work situation for co-operators. Misunderstandings 
in industrial relations are often the basis for agr~ement. The confusion 
surrounding the concept of producer co-operatives is convenient because it 
helps co-operatives to elicit financial, practical and moral support from 
the state, banks, business, competing political parties, and the labour 
movement. Co-operatives have been known to present the image of lean, 
commercially oriented enterprises determined on competitive efficiency to 
banks when their overdrafts need extendingJ and the opposite face of a 
class conscious vanguard of the labour movement when trade union-support 
has proved necessary. 
To an extent though, this confusion rests upon real tensions that 
are found in every co-operative. Despite the image of peaceful harmony often 
implied by co-operatives, contradictions and tensions are central to their 
existence as hybrid organizations attempting to carve out a space between 
capitalism and state socialism. These tensions are inevitable: however pragmatic 
and profit oriented a co-operative, it usually will possess a formally democratic 
constitution and ideology, which will lead to a critical questioning by the 
co-operators that does not normally take place under private enterprise. 
Equally, however idealistic a co-operative, there will be the continual 
, 
reminder that it has to produce efficiently and balance the books to survive • 
• It could be argued that there is a need for greater conceptual clarity of 
the real choices that exist with producer co-operatives. Firstly, a more 
rigorous analysis of the comparative effectiveness of co-operatives in both 
commercial and democratic terms is necessary, which might ultimately assist 
in the growth of co-operatives, or provide a more satisfactory explanation 
of the reasons for co-operative failure. If there is to be the 
-democratisation of the social relations of production", (Thomas and Logan, 
1982,pl99), we need to have a clearer idea of what exactly this is. Secondly, 
it is important to be able to explain to potential co-operative workers 
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precisely what they are getting into, so that the explosion of idealism 
. that often' fuels the founding of co-operatives does not evaporate when 
people discover that what has been created is not what they expected, and 
, "that things are much as they were, with the consequent disillusionment 
and despondency that inhibits further efforts at co-operative experiment • 
. - ~ ..... " 
- ", . 
. ~. " 
Alternative Structures and Orientations of Workers Co-operatives 
What, follows is only an outline sketch of the different possibilities 
for co-operative production, but it does reveal some of the conceptual 
conflicts that occur, and are often glossed over in the academic literature, 
or by co-operative advocates, when they do frequently cause real problems 
\n practice. 0 .,", 0"' -.' 
,Many of the conflicts and tensions that surround the concept and 
practice of producer co-operation may be situated on a simplified continuum 
of opposing orientations: at one pole the pragmatic pursuit of commercial 
viabi~ity by the creation of co-operative enterprises that will integrate 
neatly into the existing competitive market economyJ at the other pole the 
idealistic attempt to build alternative democratic relations of production 
with enterprises that are intended to be fun~amentally different from 
,conven~ional capitalist companies. At the two extremes the organizations 
that emerge from these opposing orientations are so different, that it is 
imprecise to re"fer to both as 'producer co-operatives': perhaps worker 
ownership is a more accurate description of the first orientation,whilst 
the term worker co-operative should be reserved for the second. However 
many co-operatives attempt to stee~.a middle way between these two poles, 
and achieve some workable compromise that allows commercial survival with 
some element of democratic control. If co-operatives concentrate exclusively 
on commercial efficiency', survival may be ensured, but at the expense usually 
of any claim to being democratic organizations e"xcept in the most formal 
terms. Co-operative~ that concentrate on the pur,suit of , democracy internally,· 
and to contribute to the struggle' for democracy in wider socie~, will 
probably fail'commercially and be forced to close. 
Co-op,eratives must respond to the dynamic cOmplexity of their 
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ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES AND ORIENTATIONS OF WORKERS' CO-OPERATIVES 
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economic and social environment, which often leads to dramatic changes in 
organization and orientations. Such changes (as indeed the reasons for the 
setting up co-oper~tives in the first place) deserve critical scrutiny, and 
should not automatically be considered in the interests of the co-operative 
members bec~use the concern is self-managed. Often co-operatives are forced 
to adopt strategies which are very questionable, such as accepting the 
principle of workers control manipulatively as an inducement to make workers· 
'work harder to meet escalating market efficiency criteria; or investing 
executive power in trade union officials, not as a means to represent workers, 
'but as a means to disqipline them to maintain high productivity, as union 
officials become synonymous with managment. Whatever economic structure and 
organization a co-operative adopts will be subject to the insistent pressures 
of the wider political economy that may take a constant and determined 
effort to resist. 
a) Economic Structure 
At the level of the economy it has to be decided if what is desired 
is the reinvigoration of the competitive market economy by the introduction 
of worker capitalism; the creation of an authentic self-managed sector; or 
the groundwork of a component part of a pluralistic socialist economy. The 
economics literature of Vanek and others has explored these problems, and 
t~e rec~nt work of Henk Thomas and Chris Logan on Mondragon highlights some 
of the central issues involved (1982). Firstly with reference to the 
co-ordination of the economy: if worker.capitalism is the aim then free 
market forces will be the chosen constraint; but if the desire is to move 
towards a more consciously rational and socially responible system of 
co-ordination, then the que~tion ar~ses of how much planning is compatible 
with the assumed autono~ of co-operative enterprises? As far as the middle-
way of Mondragon' is concerned, according °to Thomas and Logan, planning is 
a significant but limited activity: 
• 
• ••• The co-operators have also adopted a pragmatic position in . , 
this respect. The support bloc has expressed a preference for 
long term planning; the associated co-operatives recognise the 
stimulating impact that is caused by market relationships. For instance 
~ ·0. policy by which stronger co-operatives might subsidise 
their weaker colleagues by purchasing their products at lower 
than market prices, has never been introduced. On the contrary 
there is strong determination to reach the efficiency standards 
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. 
determined by market pricing. One reason for this is undoubtedly 
the awareness of the difficulties involved in the planning 
process, particularly if undertaken in an innovative and self-
managed manner. At this stage of the analysis it is hardly necessary 
to repeat t~at self-managed planning is quite different from 
planning under sytems of centralised contro"l. The former entails 
'planning from below·,i.e. involvement of the institutions and 
people affected, optimal flows of information, and a system of 
monitoring that is democratically controlled. Plans are a 
'necessary instrument in the efficient allocation of resources 
and for the generation of information that otherwise may not 
be available. Given the smallness of Mondragon it is not 
realistic to carry the analysis fur·ther, plans' and markets 
typically belong to socio-economic decision making at the 
nat;ional level." (1982, pp 186-7) 
Under this sytem there would be tension between the centrally co-ordinated 
plan and the self-interested co-operative enterprises. However those 
oriented towards the creation of a socialist economy, even if wishing to 
avoid the authoritarian rigidities of centralised state planning as practiced 
in Eastern Europe, would wish for a mo~e thorough planning effort than this, 
with more responsive enterprises: responsive to·the needs of other enterprises 
and their workers, the community, and the collective democratic plan. Some 
.would argue that such a planning process would place unacceptable constraints 
upon co-operative autonomy, but in reality the market imposes sha~per and 
. more insistent pressures upon co-operative enterprises (Clarke,l98l). 
Theoretically there is no necessary incompatibility between 
se1f-ma~agement and planning, "though ~ritics would maintain that this view 
depends upon an idealised conception of the potentialities of democratic 
planning- On balance however, the self-management literature in an over-
reaction to the dramatic efficiency and democratic failures of centralised 
st~te planning in Eastern Europe, has tended to advocate different forms of 
. 'market socialism' that depend upon an idealised conception of the democratic 
.. 
. " " 
potentialities of th~ market and pricing me~hanisms (Vanek,l975). "The 
su~erior strategy would be to move towards 'anonymous capitalism': a system 
in which the yield of capital is determined at a'national level of policy 
maKing, in which investments are decid1!d upon centrally, and in which 
in each enterprise the workers bear all income and entrepreneurial risks ••• 
Self-management practice appears to have a preference for deltCCratic planning 
from below and' for market relationships rather than for centralised planning 
and price manipulation.- (Thomas and Logan;~982,pp199(200) An interesting 
discussion of ~e possibilities for self-management under plan and market 
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is provided by Lars Erik Kar1sonn (1982) who rejects the market based 
models of Vanek and other market socialists as inequitable, leading to 
uneven developme~t and'the imposition of unacceptable conditions of work. 
Karlssson is also sceptical concerning the prospects for co-operatives. 
Instead he proposes as preconditions for effective self~management the 
socialisation of the ownership of industry through wage and citizen funds; 
the development of agencies of democratic central planning, including an 
economic parliament to which unions, regions; and consumers would contribute; 
and the decentralised implementation of the plan through self-managed 
. enterprises in which ~nions have an-enhanced role. The ideas of G.D.H. 
Cole and the Guild Socialists thus assume a contemporary significance. 
Because it has never been achieved in practice, the assumption is often 
held that democratic centralised planning with workers' self-management is 
impossible, when in fact it largely depends upon the degree of worker 
participation which can be achieved in the planning process. 
Cloudy thinking about the impact of the market upon co-operative 
enterprises typifies the co-operative academic literature. Accepting the 
need to produce efficiently for the market to survive in western economies, 
researchers tend to accept the concomitant. economic and social constraints 
as a fact of life. Thus Thornley has criticised the 'utopian legacy' of the 
early idealist~ of the movement who sought to replace market relations with 
co-operative economic relations: "Often they have been blind to the need 
to integrate co-operatives closely in the market ••• carried away by their 
enthusiasm for principles, co-operators and their leaders in the first half 
of the 19th century persistently refused to reconcile themselves to the 
essential features of the capitalist market. They tried to carryon business 
in isolation from the market, setting their own prices for goods, raising 
capital where they could from sympathetic sources, and sometimes selling 
goods through co-operative outlets." (1981, pp168-9) 
• 
Socialist critics, on the contrary, would contend that the free 
market is essentially inequitable, irrational, unpredictable and undemocratic, 
represe~ting the collective class interests of cap~tal. Therefore it would 
be 'a vital prerequisite of any democratic innovation in industry of a , 
fundamental kind that enterprises firstly be removed and protected from 
the ~rket system, whether by being nationalised in the case of large 
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scale industry, or by setting up supportive networks and outlets for 
~o-operatives.' Some co-operatives do manage to survive in the market 
place without jett~soning every principle, because the market is not an 
undifferentiated entity but a complex of relations \vhich impose constraints 
of varying rigour and arbitrariness. But in most co-operatives competing 
in the market workers quickly learn as they did at KME and Triumph Neriden 
in Britain, that they are still subject to the controls that they thought 
-they had escaped: unpredictable demand, fierce competition, inadequate and 
unreliable investment, and unstable production; th~ result being constant 
demands made upon work~rs for higher output, interspersed with abrupt and 
protracted lay-offs. Even the most basic working conditions were dictated 
by the market rather than the co-operators, with a similar work intensity, 
shift system, payment system, hours and holidays, as existed under private 
competitors (or as existed in these organizations before they became 
co-operatives). (Clarke,l978) 
Questions may be asked about the purposes of co-operative 
ac~umulation and the principles of distribution of any surplus. At one 
extreme accumUlation may be simply to enhance the wealth and power. of the 
owners of the enterprise as in capitalist firms, at the other to satisfy a 
wide range of social needs in the community in which the co-operative is 
located. Mondragon again adopts a middle road, "capital resources are 
a~locat~ with two objectives: to gradually increase the capital intensity 
of production in order to integrate new technological developments, and 
to create the highest possible number of new jobs." (Thomas and Logan,l982 
p186) (Capital investment in new technology in industry today normally'leads 
to a reduction in direct employment rather than an increase, if introduced 
according to conventional competitive market criteria, but we will let 
. -
this pass !) ." ". 
The kinds of products or services offered by co-operatives are 
• • 
also of relevance. Commercial co-operatives will produce goods and services 
for the market, and will normally only be concerned with matters such as 
pric~ and quality to the extent that they effect sales and profitability. 
On the other hand idealistic co-operatives are often built around the 
aspiration to provide a product or service which the market economy has 
signally failed to do. Production of socially useful goods, for example in 
.. 
• 
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whole food stores or print-shops, must be tempered by the necessity to 
remain viable, though often co-operative workers in enterprises such 
as these are prepar.ed to engage in considerable self-sacrifice because 
of the importance they attach to the product or service they are providing. 
The Lucas Aerospace shop stewards proposals for an alternative workers' 
plan based on production of socially useful, environmentally beneficial 
goods instead of armaments, indicates that such concerns need not inevitably 
be confined to the political fringe. 
Finally ownership may be based on individual, marketable shares 
. 
at one pole, or on a collective conception of community ownership at the 
other. At Mondragon there are a variety of ownership forms: 
·It is recognised, on the one hand, that individual accounts 
represent evidence to members that they are stakeholders~ 
individual dlstdbution of ownership on a very large scale 
also prevents 'capital' owners from exercising that sort 
of control that normally is linked to the size of capital 
property. From the theoretical and operational perspective 
on the. other hand, it would be desirable to introduce a 
form of social ownership which is neither individualised 
nor liable to play into the hands of controlling groups, 
e.g. of bureaucrats. From the operational point of view, 
in fact, social ownership would have the advantage of 
avoiding the difficult problem of transferring ownership 
claims from one co-operative to another." (Thomas and 
Logan, 1982,pl84) 
. 
Individu~l stakes seem likely to induce economistic enterprise consciousness, 
whereas with collective or community ownership the question of control over 
.the co-operative organization still has to. be decided. 
The emphasis upon 'ownership' and property rights in the eo-operative 
~ 
and self-management literature is excessive: the impression ~ often created 
that the simple transfer of ownership from private hands to the workers 
themselves will almost magically transform job security and orientations 
to work. (In a curious parallel with Soviet ideology where state ownership 
of "industry is assumed to render any further concern about workers' job 
satisfaction irrelevant.l. Though co-operative workers will often comment 
"I feel that 1 own.the machine 1 work on now·, it is wrong of academics 
·to foster the illusory implications of such statements. Once the artisan 
mode of production is passed, worker ownersh.ip of machines is impractical. 
workers shares in the company may encourage a sense of job ownership, but in 
reality employment stability and accompanying job controls owe far more to 
169 
the caprices of the market or' the decisions made in the national 
planning process. In other words, although the transfer of ownership 
to the collective of wo~kers is a necessary condition for the transfer 
of control, it is' by no means a sufficient condition. In fact it presages 
more important, extensive and continuing struggles: fir~tly for the 
regulation of market forces and/or the achievement of efficient and 
democratic planning; and secondly for democratic management within 
., 
. the enterprise. In those co-operatives still.subject to the arbitrary 
impulses of the hidden hand of the market, or the directives of the 
·dead hand of the centralised authoritarian state plan, the improvements 
in job security or the meaning of work are minimal. 
b) organization and Control 
The kind of economic structure and process adopted by co-
operatives provides the constraints within which the possible forms of 
co-operative organization and' control will be determined. It is probable 
that a commercial market oriented co-operative will adopt some form of 
representative democracy as an efficient expedient. In contrast m?re 
ldealistically oriented co-operatives would insist upon policy formulation 
through an atte~pt at participatory democracy. Often co-operative 
constitutions ~h~t seem to enshrine participatory. democracy rapidly 
degener~te into either elitist forms'of representative democracy or are 
. . 
ignored' in practice, and this' is the most common and the most disturbing 
problem for both. old and new producer co-operatives. Most studies of 
worker participation in co-operatives h~ve evaded this problem by confini~g 
the focus to a formal examination of the operation of the managment boards, 
and have tended to be satisfied with the most superficial indications of 
worker involvement in decision making. It is as difficult·to discover the 
real distribution of power within co-operatives as it is in other complex 
organizations. Evidence required if assertions of sustained worker influence 
~d participation are to be verified at the level of the governing body 
again must include: ," . 
i. the composition of.the management board 
ii. who 'exerted greatest influence on the management board 
iii. what issues were considered or neglected by the management board 
iv. what external constraints limited internal choice (Lukes,l974) • 
. ... . 
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The elaborate questionnaires that have been employed in 
investigating workers influence are of limited usefulness and a~curacy. 
Firstly the relevaryce of what they discover tends to become lost in a 
wealth of statistical sophistication. Secondly 'they pay little ~'t.tention 
to dynamic processes of attitude formation and change (and how t~~e 
questionnaire itself may temporarily change or distort consciou:;;.~ .. ess). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the methodology and ideo!,'9Y of 
the questionnaires tends to be grounded in individualist assumptions: 
that .the right way to investigate (and exercise) control is, thrc;;lgh the 
individual worker. In fact as several distressed Yugoslav acade~ics pointed 
out when confronted with extensive questionnaire evidence of in~~easing 
worker. alienation in the Yugoslav system of self-management at t~e 1982 
International Sociological Association World Congress (Whitehor~~1982), 
the Yugoslav system is de~oted to collective ownership and contt:61 of 
economic resources and the stimulation of collective consciousn~~s: 
thus the same person who exerted little influence as an individ~~l, might 
exert considerable influence over the enterprise as a member of ~ work group. 
Whilst this explanation in relation to Yugoslavia might dwell mc~e in the 
realm of official ideology rather than demonstrable practice, s~ill it is 
true that collective control is the goal of most existing self-m~~a9ed 
systems, in which the role of the individual will not be primar::..'" as it 
. is, in the official ideology of the capitalist, West at least, in. "lrIarket 
systems •. 
Studies which have defended workers' co-operatives ag~~nst the 
cr~ticism that they display a tendency to degenerate, have tend~ to apply 
either incomplete or weak measures of democratic participation. ~~r instance, 
D.C.Jones, in a critique of the Webb~' pessimism concerning the ~~mocratic 
potentialities of pr9ducer co-operatives, emphasises the formal ~le~nts of 
co-operative constitutions and focuses upon nominal representat~~n upon 
management boards as proof of democratic control, whilst Martin ~kett 
. .. 
remains relatively sanguine about the survival of management hie~~rchies 
in co-operatives, to ~hich workers have to accomodate. (l976;l9~~) In fact, 
even.the celebrated Mondragon has suffered this dilemma:nThe mal~ity of 
the 100 co-operators interviewed reported that· they had never s~en in 
their factory's Assembly, some apparantly fOr reasons of 'shyne~", others 
because they agreed with the proposals made by the cha'ir. 'l'bere- Wl.tlS no 
active participation by co-operators, as evidenced in their few 
contacts with superiors, and relatively little familiarity with 
information that had been officially available. (Thomas and Wgan, 
1982,pl89) 
It is no excuse to suggest that workers are relatively 
satiGfied with their lack of participation, since this represents 
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simply a rationalization of the internalization of workers' sense of 
powerlessness, or lithe culture of silence of the dispossessed." (Spear, 
19B1,p2) Political participation in itself leads to the acquisition of 
political skills and a sense of poli~ica1 efficacy as Paternan (1970) and 
Blumberg (1968) have eloquently affirmed. It is sometimes argued that 
participatory democracy is an impossible goal or inherently inefficient. 
Usually this view is sup~rted by presenting a false dichotomy between 
the administrative efficiency and and political effectiveness assumed to 
be possible with forms of 'constitutional pluralism' in which participants 
are taken to have only a narrow instrumental approach to industrial democracy; 
and the disorder and dislocation assumed to be inevitable with 'prtmitive 
democracy' in which high levels of political invoivement are susta'ined. 
(Loveridge,1980; Eccles,l979) Indeed since ·the time of·the Webbs' classic 
study Industrial Democracy (1897) when the critique of 'primitive democracy 
was first elaborated, it has become an academic orthodoxy and political 
complacency to dismiss the possibility of worker democracy without considering 
why it is that workers are ill-equipped to participate, and what elements 
of existing organizational structure prevent meaningful participation. In 
essence this modern theory of democracy amounts to an acceptance of elite 
control of organizations .and relative m~mbership inactivity. It neglects 
the oligarchical tendencies of representative government, and the dislocation 
that occurs 'between the professional bureaucracy and the uninfomed membership. 
The active and informed involvement of ordinary people is defined out of 
existence: no active participation is expected of encouraged beyond a periodic 
. . 
demonstration of support or disagreement with the policies of those in power. 
As Macpherson insists" democracy involves making a continual contribution 
to the decision-making process, not being the passive recipient of political 
fate with occasional opportunities to ineffectually complain (1973). 
The form of technolQ9Y adopted by co-operatives will have an 
• 
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important bearing on organiza.tion and control. A commercial co-operative 
normally would install the same. least-cost technology as private competitors, 
almost regardless of the consequences for shopfloor workers. This ignore's 
the fact that indU'strial technology and production engineering were 
designed and introduced partly with the aim of restructuring the labour 
process under capital's control, with the intensification of labour, the 
imposition of a detailed division of labour, and the adoption of scientific 
management to discipline labour. (Braverman,1974, Marx,l976) A co-operative 
that adopts this form of mass production technology must accept that shop-
floor workers will exhibH similar levels of alienation as exist under the 
same technology in private industry. That the debilitating impact of modern 
production technology is not more widespread in'co-operatives is not a 
~esult of an enlightened attitude to the social implications of technology, 
.but simply due to the small size and capital starvation of most co-operatives 
that prevents them from investing in mass production machinery. In contrast 
those co-operatives that attempt to adopt socially responsible forms of 
technology often find that th~y are trapped within the confines of small-
scale craft production. However new electronic technology has opened up 
the possibility of professional service co-operatives utilising the most 
advanced technology in a meaningful way: companies involved in the rapidly 
expanding industry of mini and micro computers for example, are typically 
of small size with comparatively small capital requirements, both in 
production (where common electronic components are utilised) and in software. 
The Science Parks being established to foster joint college/company ventures 
in advanced technology are a context in which co-operatives could prove a 
, 
very appropriate form of organization. Sadly though, in california's Silicon 
Valley the multi-person partnerships of' scientists and engineers quickly 
resorted to hiring wage labour once large scale production began. 
Producer co-operatives that retain the detailed division of 
labour into fragmented, repetitive, and frequently stultifying work tasks 
s~ar~ely deserve the name 'co-operati~'. As Braverman maintains, -While 
the social division of labour subdivides society, the detailed division of 
labour subdivides humans, and while the subdivision of society may enhance 
the·ind~vidual and the species,. the subdivision o~ the individual, when 
carried on without regard to human capabili~ies and Deeds, is a crime' against 
• 
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th~ person and against humanity." (1974,p73) Some degree of rotation 
of offices and tasks ~'ould seem an elementary concession in the direction 
of co-operative id.eals •. It might seem unnecessary for this to be said, but 
both at l-londragon and at least one of the large scale co-operatives in 
Britain, (KHE), the retention of a detailed division of labour was a source 
of great disaffection among workers. (Eaton,l979; Clarke,l978) It is 
difficult for co-operative workers to maintain the feeling that they are 
. engaging in a great co-operative experiment ~hen their· sole co-operative 
duty is to make several thousand spot welds each day! The fact that co-op 
·researchers have ten~ed (with studies of industrial democracy in general) 
to have little to say about technology and the division of labour, reveals 
a lack of penetration to some of the central causes of worker alienation. 
(Eldridge,l982) 
Similarly in the Yugoslav system, following the Soviet emulation 
of the capitalist organization of production, little effort or attention 
was devoted to replacing standard .technology or restructuring the division 
~f labour in socially desirable ways. The perceived necessity for 
competitive efficiency subordinated the ideals of self-managemen~ to the 
imperatives of mass production technology and a detailed division of labour. 
In East and West conceptions of alternatives have been summarily foreclosed 
as utopian: "TPe similarity of Soviet and traditional capitalist practice 
,strongly encourages the conclusion that there is no other way in which 
modern industry can be organised. And this conclusion has already been 
sufficiently encouraged by the tendency of modern social science to accept 
all that is real as necessary, all that exists as inevitable, and thus the 
present mode of production as eternal." (Braverman,1974,pI6) Attempts at 
building different technologies and divisions of labour, or transforming 
existing ones, are normally sporadic, limited, temporary and isolated. The 
fate of efforts in China to engage in alternative forms of community 
production remains a difficult question. (Bettelheim,1974, Lockett,l980) 
. . . 
In this pessimistic context, endeavours such as·Vanek's attempt to develop 
a solar energy wate~ pump and generator around which agrarian and industrial. 
pr~uction c~n be organised in third world countries, ·may not prove as 
utopian a venture as his hard-nosed detractors (including myself) assume • 
. . 
Finally, and in some senses the thorniest issue of all, ·is the 
place of trade unions under· co-operative production. Many commercially 
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oriented cO-!Jperatives wouhl deny any role t;.o trade unions in organizations 
run by and for the membero. rrom a sympathetic position Thomas and Logan 
argue, "Trade union activities under a market economy clearly do not fit 
into a self-managed socio-~conomic system, but a representative organization 
of co-operators on an industrial or national scale could undertake a very 
constructive role: to enga~~ in education, to raise political issues, to 
guard against erosion of the system of self-management, are a few of its 
possible functions. In Yugt)ulavia for instance, trade unions have not been 
abolished but form part of the socio-economic system." (l982,pl88) 
This might seem reassuring if it was not almost ver~atim the role ·assigned to 
trade unions by Lenin at thQ Tenth Party Congress in 1921, which preceded 
their gradual undermining and assimilation into management and the Soviet 
state. (Deutscher,1950) Unions stripped of their collective bargaining, 
protective, and shop floor negotiating ~unctions gradually atrophy. In 
fact there is an indispensable task for trade unions in co-operatives: 
to defend workers against the arbitrary decisions of manag~ment and the 
dictates of the plan or marka~, and to link co-operative workers with the 
general struggles of other ~~rkers in society. Those co-operatives .which 
either sever, or have weak links with the organized labour movement may 
prosper commercially, but undermine any claim that they are making a 
significant contribution to social change. Indeed by voluntarily submitting 
to market determination of pay, conditions and 'productivity, non-unionised 
.. co-operatives could damage the efforts of the broader labour movement to 
'generally improve workers conditions. (~ill, 1981,p65) . ," 
• 
The ambivalence towards trade unionism often displayed in the 
self-management literature is its weakest and most suspect feature: the 
approach ranges from explicitly anti~crade union (Oakeshott,1978); through 
regarding trade unions as obstacles to co-operative development which must 
be overcome by transforming trade union attitudes and practices (Eccles, 
1981), to a justification for trade untons becoming integrated with 
management concerns in co-operatives, abandoning their traditional 
bargaining functions. Clegg's conception of collective bargaining by 
independent trade unions as the basis for industrial democracy is obviously 
limited, (Blumberg,1968), ~o~~ver he is right to stress the importance of 
maintaining independent tr~e union repr:sentation (even in supposedly 
self-managed enterprises) to pr~tect workers from unacceptable demands. 
(elegg,1960) Trade unions hav~ ~ the means of attaining a measure of 
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~ndustrial democracy in the past, achieving a degree ef job security, 
wage equity, health and. safety at work, and freedom from arbitrary 
management decisions. Rather than rejecting and s~eking to undermine 
trade union rights, self-management systems should embrace trade unions 
and attempt to transcend their achievements for workers: socialism 
should be a pluralist not a monist practice, we should now be aware of 
the dangers of unitary ideologies and unitary institutional struetures. 
Of course the question remains, will trade union~ embrace self-
management? National unions have often proved highly sceptical about the 
development of co-operatives and the impact that they may have upon 
nationally negotiated conditions and pay. At the plant level union officials 
.quickly learn of the dilernma.s posed by becoming involved in management 
decision-making processes: Art Hochner cites one example of union 
representation on the management board of an American co-operative (WSCDC) 
which sums up the arguments for and against: 
"The union bloc members add other considerations te the 
conventional balance sheet economics of entrepreneurial 
. decision making. Some board members feel the expression 
of union interests injects humanistic, democratic and 
: •. ~". socially just considerations into potentially cold-cash 
calculations. Others see the inclusion of these elements 
as delaying urgent decisions and contradicting WSCDC·s 
financial goals. Several union sympathizers, however, 
wonder whether the unions on the board are compromised 
by having to consider, participate in, and accept 
bottom-line, pro-management positions, thereby 
perpetuating the same kind of labour relations. they 
fight other employers about." (l~82,p24) 
A comprehensive analysis of workers gains and losses under co-operative 
production compared to what has been achieved by collective bargaining, 
similar to Herding·s (1972) definiti~e comparison of job centrol under 
co-determination and collective bargaining. has yet to ·be conducted. If 
trade uni~nists are to be persuaded of the virtues of self-management, 
then they will need to be shown ways in which they can enhance their 
., . 
influence, improve workers rewards and cond~ions, and retain their 
independence, under self-managed s~stems. If this sounds a difficult 
set .of demands~ it should be realised that the prospects of establishing 
and extensive co-operative or self-managed.~ector ~ithout union support 
in industrial countries with a mature labour movement are slender. If 
trade union support can be gained then they can offer considerable 
assistance in the development of co-operatives as Charles Rock has 
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indicated: as an initiator and co-ordinator of inter-co-operative 
relationships; as the guarantor of co-operative workers' rights; and 
. . 
as a force to take control of already collectively owned finance capital 
in the form of pension funds. (1982) 
c) Work Experience 
The economic and organizational structure adopted by co-operatives 
will influence whether the experience of working in a co-operative is 
fundamentally different from working in a conventional capitalist company. 
MOst co-operative research so far has been concerned with analysing·· 
contrasting co-operative structures and performances, often by interviewing 
the co-operative management and elected officials. Investigations of 
shopfloor workers ~ttitudes have tended to be satisfied with the platitudes 
that workers often feel are obligatory responses when they are asked if 
they are happy with their work and their company. In fact there is no ~ 
priori reason why working in a co-operative should be any more fulfilling 
than working in a capitalist enterprise. It is crucial to examine work 
organization and experience in greater depth, since typically workers are 
most concerned about the level of control and meaning at the job ievel, and 
a sophisticated co-operative constitution does not guarantee satisfaction 
: on this front. Efficiency-orie~ted co-operatives· normally retain the 
panoply of· bureaucratic controls upoQ labour including clock cards, first 
line supervision, and elaborate disciplinary procedures. Whilst workers 
are used to these types of control, they may reasonably ask "What has 
changed?" As part of building hi9her-t~ust relationships and developing 
the freedom, knowleegeand skills of workers, co-operatives at· the other 
. ext~eme may attempt to give workers control over their immediate work 
environment with some form of autonomous group production. Such workers 
will still of course be subject to the compulsion of the plan or market 
and the constraints of the scale of the enterprise and the technology 
employed. y .• .. -!. • 
In terms of day-to-day decision-making, many eo-operatives 
have been content to leave thi.s in the hanQs of professional management. 
. . 
Some commentators have rationalised this b~. maintaining that as long as 
policy formulation is the subject of democratic control then policy 
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execution should be left in the experienced hands of management to 
'implement as efficiently as possible. (Eccles,l979) This ignores the 
fact that for workers the first real test of democratic control is 
whether they have 'the capacity to influence the decisions which 
immediately effect them. Of course informed, flexible and adaptive 
decision-making is essential to the efficient operation of complex 
organizations, but there is no reaS0n why this should not be subject 
to joint regulation, or some form of collective participation. 
(Loveridge, 1980,p303) Finally, examining the meaning of ~~rk: if the 
conventional criteria of efficiency determine the organizational 
. 
structure of co-operatives, in the controls, technology, and division 
of labour applied, then workers in such co-operatives will be prone to 
similar levels of alienation and conflict as exist in capitalist firms 
'under such constraints. The result of having a formally co~operative 
constitution but conventional management and organizational structure, 
is that in the early, idealistic, stages of the life of the co-operative, 
workers are stimulated to a heightened involvement, but often are 
intensely frustrated at pursuing ideals which are continually obstructed 
by the existing commercial and organizational constraints. "In contrast 
if co-operatives attempt to create alternative social relations of 
production, then whatever efficiency they may lose by this, may be 
compensated for by the achievement of more purposeful work and the 
consequent improvements in effort and efficiency that this may bring. 
'.;'" .. " 
.-
- Aiternative Paths of Co-operative Consciousness 
There-are "alternative possible paths in the development of 
co-operative consciousness. The consciousneS!s of co-operative workers 
will develop in a dialectical relationship with the social and economic 
relations they experience. It would be wrong to imply that normally any 
great coherence of PQlitical consciousness exists among co-operative 
workers. The political sympathies of present-day co-operators ranges 
across the political kaleidoscope from petit bourgeois, christian democrat, 
social democrat, through socialist, anarchist, syndicalist, to communist, 
revolutionary, feminist,. ecologist and vegetarian. Normally, from the 
beginning there are significant degrees. of confusion and contradiction 
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among co-operators' different aspirations, as in the desire to build an 
alternative co-operative society while perf()~ming more efficiently in 
the competitive market economy. Whether a greater coherence and consistency 
does emerge with experience is an open question depending upon the kind 
of co-operative that is established. Jacques Defourny has put the present 
situation well, in which many co-operatives are being set up with little 
explicit thought to their ultimate aim, as "une pratique en re-quete de 
son utopie," ("a practice in search .of its ut.opia"). (1982) 
As the typol.ogy empl.oyed by the Open University Co-.operative 
Research Unit indicates, the c.onditi?ns and c.onsci.ousness present at the 
creati.on .of co-operatives can vary markedly. (C.ornforth,1982) Whether a 
co-operative is a traditional survival, endowed by a benefactor, a defence 
against ccmpany closure, a radical alternative, or part of a jcb creaticn 
scheme, will be associated with very different kinds of crientaticns and 
consci.ousness .on the part .of the c.o-operative members. Similarly the 
conditicns and conscicusness present at the creaticn of . self-managed 
systems can vary markedly. It is unlikely that a self-managed society 
could be constructed by piecemeal co-operative develcpment: a pol!tical 
movement to unite,systematise, and expand co-.operative eff.orts at least 
would be necessary. With such a political movement self-managed systems 
can develcp when government is neutral, or with government support, or 
by revo~utionary working class mobill"sation. (Espinosa,1982) The most 
th.or.ough attainment of self-management is by·revolutionary independent 
working class acti.on at the plant and c.ommunity level, th.ough clearly 
this cannct be sustained for any length of time withcut adequate wcrkers 
control of the state apparatus, as the ~ad examples of Allende's Chile 
.. (1970-73) and more recently Poland's Solidar ity (1980-81) indicate. 
(Espinosa and Zimbalist,1978) 
·A simplified model of the elements which constitute class 
consciousness provided by Mann helps tb identify the divergent possibilities 
in the devel.opment of c.o-.operative consciousness. (~973,p13) Those 
engaged in pragmatic commercially ·oriented co-operatives will tend to 
identify with their own enterprise and regard the greatest challenge as 
other competitors. The fundamental goal bet9mes survival in market 
competiti.on, and the belief is held that an alternative has already been 
created, the only problem being to maintain efficiency and viability. 
179 
2. ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF. CO-OPERATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
PRAGMATIC Political 
INDIVIDUALIST 
EFFICIENCY 
Enterpr ise ~( ____ _ 
Other Producer s co<"...---
Survival In ~~~ __ 
'Market Competition 
Co-operative c;<:~'---­
Alternative 
Already Achieved 
E.'!:per ience 
& 
Consciousness 
IDENTITY 
> 
OPPOSITION ___ -..,~ > 
" -.~ 
> 'lOTALITY 
ALTERNATIVE ___ ~ > 
IDEALISTIC 
COLLECTIVIST 
EQUITY 
Class 
Capitalist 
System 
Societal 
Struggle 
Co-operative 
Part of Pre-
Figurative Form 
'of Socialist 
~ Society 
Acute Aeu~ 
Democratic ~~~----------------~--~------------"---~~ Commercial 1:ontradictory Tensions in Co-operat1vesr P obI Problems r ems 
Paradoxically the doctrine of individual responsibility may be more 
firmly upheld by workers in this kind of c9-operative than in a private 
company where workers might be more distanced from the goals of the 
management. There is no desire to transform society, merely to succeed 
in business in this society. Acute democratic weaknesses are frequently 
found in this kind of co-operative, though the co-operators themselves 
, 
.may be adjusted to them. Often it is difficult to distinguish such 
enterprises from capitalist firms, and the workers in them are likely 
t~ exhibit a similar contradictory econornistic and alienated consciousness. 
However advocates would claim that'co-operatives are a unique means to 
achieve the pur~uit of commercial efficiency, social justice, and social 
integration simultaneously. 
• 
Oo-oper~tives dedicated to idealistic ends in the extreme will 
be class conscious organizations that are motivated primarily by the goal 
,of contr~buting to the class struggle to transform.capitalism. From this 
position co-operatives may be regarded as pre-figurative forms of , 
socialist society, making a contribution"to the struggle Against capitalism 
on a broad front, but also demonstrating some of the possibilities of a 
.. 
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pluralistic socialism of the future. Of course both pragmatic 
orientations and idealistic orientations are-.'ideological', and it 
is quite wrong to assert, ~s Bradley and Gelb frequently do in their 
analysis of the experiences of the Scottish Daily News, that pragmatic 
co-operators are more concerned !about their jobs than ideolog~' (1980) 
Pragmatic orientations involve an economistic consciousness which 
accepts the structural and organizational constraina; of contemporary 
capitalism, (which often will dictate the early demise of the co-operative 
and the unemployment of i~s members, on the grounds of efficiency or 
discrimination). Those·motivated by radical idealistic orientations 
reject these constraints and maintai~ that the ~st effective way to 
secure and meaningful employment is to overcome the instability and 
irrationality of market forces • 
. , .... " "." . .- . 
--. 
---~ 
, ...... 
Future Development of Workers Co-operatives 
It is the range of possibilities for future·~operative 
development that makes this such an interesting field of academic • 
inquiry. Different political philosophies conceive of widely divergent 
directions of deyelopment:. liberal economi$ts imagine a utopian worker 
capitalism; co-operative theorists have rekindled the dream of a utopian 
co-operative commonwealth; and socialist advocates perceive the illustrative 
. 
importance of productive prototypes of a socialist pluralism.· , .• ' .... 
Liberal economists see the rejuvenation of capitalism by making 
workers formally responsiple for their ~ enterprises and reintroducing 
them·to the direct impulses of the market. Worker c~italism for neo-
. 
. classical economists is a seductive idea at a time when western economies 
are increasingly dominated by the monopoly power of giant corporations, 
(at least it would rescue their models of competitive individualism from 
• total obsolescence)! The idea is to loCk workers into their enterprises 
with individual property shares, to promote enterprise consciousness in 
the competitive market, and thereby induce liberal capitalist orientations 
among working people for whom.sUch values have long "seemed alien and 
exploitative. (Jay,1976) It is unlikely ~at two huDdred years of 
~apitalist development with the appropriation of the .. ans of production, 
the extraction of surplus value, the monopolisation of markets, and the 
.' 
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concentration of economic power, can be reversed so easily to a system 
of de-centralised co-operatives operating in'· a market economy i.n which 
workers own the means of production and receive the full fruits of 
their' labour, with the almost magical disappearance of the structural 
antagonism between capital and labour, as Oakeshott supposes. (1978) 
In reality it is likely that though such a system would receive the 
full support of private industrialists and financiers because they 
legitimise the private enterprise system, they would inevitably remain 
at the periphery of market economies, and allow capitalists to maintain 
their monopolies as Marx predicted. ( 1974,pSO) Trade unionists are alert 
to·these implications of producer co~operatives and could be expected to 
be strongly antagonistic to such developments. . ',,, 
Co-operative theorists hope producer co-operatives can radicalise 
the wider co-operative movement and restore the original evangelical zeal 
to construct a co-operative commonwealth linking producers, retailers and 
consumers in a democratic harmony of interest, excluding (and ultimately 
eliminating) the capitalist. For many activists in the movement co-operatives 
are,an end in themselves, rather than simply one means to help reach an 
alternative society: motivated by a'few pure (some would say simple) 
principles - that labour should employ capital, and that all members should 
have the r~ght to share in ownership, and. in deciding policy - they uphold 
that workers have it in their power to resolve their fUndamental economic 
problems by adopting the co-operative form of industry. However the 
failure of succesive waves of the producer co-operative movement in the 
past has a sobering effect. (Pollard,l967) So too has the realisation that 
the.price of commercial success for the-vast retail co-operative 
movement ha~ been to adopt the same concentration and centralisation as 
capitalist rivals, with similar pricing policies, employment practices, 
and management controls. Unfortunately the practical help that the retail 
co-operative movement will give the infant producer co-operative movement 
• 
. is likely to be how to similarly accommodate to the constraints of the 
existing market system. 
Socialist advocates stress the demonstrative value of co-operative 
enterprises which show that organizations can be democratic and productive, 
. and reveal the variety of forms that socialism can eabrace. Worker co-ops 
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a~e seen as a means of securing badly needed employment in the most 
depressed areas, and of providing essential goods and services that 
the market will not co~sider. Yet there is a good deal of soundly based 
~cepticism on the'left concerning co-operatives: 
."Certainly the key problems with modern advocacy of co-operative 
production - as with the early rnilennialists - is'the lack of 
any strategy to confront the enveloping coercive po\'1ers of 
(increasingly mu1tinational)monopo1y capital, and the awesome 
sway of the modern state. Far less than at the time of O\'len 
. is it plausible to believe that a new society can be built 
outside the old. If co-operative production is not to 
become ever more marginal to the labour movement, its 
advocates will Qeed to relate their theory and practice 
to the experience and aspirations of the urban working 
class, and offer more than an escapist alternative to 
contemporary capitalism." (Hyman,l98l,ppl9-20) 
In fact co-operatives in themselves offer 'no solution to the problems of 
monopoly capital and stat~ power, ( though workers who determinedly reject 
their commodity status and launch co-operatives rather than accept 
unemployment have proved capable of unsettling ~,a ernbarassing the m0st 
pOwerful vested interests). Nevertheless those protagonists who have 
at times built the cause of co-operatives ,into a voluntaristic theory of 
socialist change, (such as the Institute for Workers Control in Britain 
that recommended the formation of workers' co-operatives to random 
workers~ takeovers of factor,ies), are destined' for disappointment as long 
,as privatecapiLal remains ascendant in -the ,market place and the state 
r;emains ~.antagonistic. (Coates ,,1976) .~ t ... • '.' 
Control of the commanding heights of western economies will 
have to be wrested from the hands of capital'by political means, and 
then subject to soci~lising strategies in which, althOugh democratic 
management should be a priority, co-operatives'will have little place 
due to the scale and public importance of the 'services and 'industries 
concerned. (Socialists who decry the unpopularity of national is at ion 
because it has become synonymous with rationalisation of employment, 
• 
control and pay, fail to appreciate that co-operatives ~perating in a 
free market would be ,even IOOre vulnerable to such rationalising pressures 
with.probably even' more dire results). (Coates,1981,pp149-lS7) But if 
co-operatives must 'inevitably assume secondary importance in any process 
of socialist transition, it would be wrong to underest~te their 
significance. The depth of the recessionJ the weaknesses of other 
• 
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socialist alternatives; the developing interest and experience in 
producer co-operatives in many countries; all invest in co-operatives 
a new relevance ~~ one·means to concretise a transitional strategy 
which contests the dominant political economy, whilst connecting \'1i th 
the immediate concerns of workers for jobs, decent wage~, and interesting 
work. It is important to move beyond the fragments of the socialist and 
labour movement and present a general, and multi-dimensional, challeuge 
to ~apitalism, in which co-operatives have a.minor, but significant 
role to play. (Rowbotham.et al,1979) The 'typical' member of the urban 
_ working class is no l?nger a skilled toolmaker in a car fact0ry waiting 
in anticipation. for the nationalisation of the .engineering.and vehicle 
industry (was he/she ever ?), the 'typical member of the urban working 
class is a young/old member of an ethnic minority, female, unemployed -
or in imminent danger of becoming unemployed, and for her co-operatives 
are a relevant alternative, holding out one hope of fulfilling work. 
The variety of philosophies of co-operative advocacy is only 
~xceeded by the range of potential forms of co-operative development. 
At the national level, despite the optimism of successive analyst:s of 
the yugoslavian system that market socialism and self-management could 
be readily transplanted into other western. economies, the prospect of 
thiS occurring. remain remote. It is only r i 9ht anyway that different 
ocieties should develop ,s . 
ideals and economies. In 
their own systems that relate to their own 
september 1982 the Social Democrats in Sweden 
fOUght a~d won a general election in which the central issue of contention 
was the establishment of wage earner funds supplemented by an excess profits 
that is democratically controlled investment funds which would tax, . 
ide the means to take over much of Swedish private industry within prov . 
ten years. This would enable worker ownership of industry, and could 
. ide the opPortunity for workers control of industry if the trade 
prov 
i b
ureaucrats can be restrained and the sabotage of private capital 
un on 
and ·traditional management prevented.-Alternatively the Swedish scheme 
cOUld be diluted'into a form of profit sharing for enterprise conscious 
(RoCk,l982) Mitterand's government in France is committed to a workers. 
• u·s progranrne of development of the 'social economy', includinn 
vigoro ~ 
~e fostering of co-operative developme~t ~hrou9h financial, legal, 
educational, and institutional supports in order: 
.. ---
.- ---
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socialist alternatives; the developing interest and experience in 
producer co-operatives in many countries; all invest in co-operatives 
a new relevance as one·means to concretise a transitional strategy 
which contests the dominant political economy, whil~connecting with 
the immediate concerns of workers for jobs, decent wage~, and interesting 
work. It is important to move beyond the fragments of the socialist and 
labour movement and present a general, and multi-dimensional, challeuge 
to ~apitalism, in which co-operatives have a.minor, but significant 
role to play. (Rowbotham et al,1979) The 'typical' member of the urban 
- working class is no ~onger a skilled toolmaker in a car factory waiting 
in anticipation for the nationalisation of the .engineering.and vehicle 
industry (was he/she ever ?), the 'typical member of the urban working 
class is a young/old member of an ethnic minority, female, unemployed -
or in imminent danger of becoming unemployed, and for her co-operatives 
are a relevant alternative, holding out one hope of fulfilling work. 
The variety of philosophies of co-operative advocacy is only 
exceeded by the range of potential forms of co-operative development. 
At the national level, despite the optimism of successive analyst;s of 
the Yugoslavian system that market socialism and self-management could 
be readily transplanted into other western. economies, the prospect of 
this occurring. remain remote. It is only right anyway that different 
,societies should develop their own systems that relate to their own 
ideals and economies. In September 1982 the Social Democrats in Sweden 
fought and won a general election in which the central issue of contention 
was the establishment of wage earner funds supplemented by an excess profits 
tax, that is democratically controlled investment funds which would 
provide the means to take over mu~ of Swedish private industry within 
ten years. This would enable worker ownership of industry, and could 
. provide the opportunity for workers control of industry if the trade 
union bureaucrats can be restrained and the sabotage of private capital 
and traditional management prevented.-Alternatively the Swedish scheme 
could be diluted'into a form of profit sharing for enterprise conscious 
wor~ers. (Rock,l982) Mitterand's government in France is committed to a 
vigorous programme of development of the 'social economy', including 
~e fostering of co-operative developme~t ~hrou9h financial, legal, 
educational, and institutional supports in order: 
.- ----
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3. THE MAIN FORMS OF PRODUCER CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Scale Examples 
NATIONAL 1. Self-managed Systems Yugoslavia 
REGIONAL 2. Co-operative Archipelagos Mondragon/Wales? 
CITY 
PLANT 
LOCAL 
3. Municipal Socialism Bologna/Santa Monica 
4. Worker Takeovers Triumph Meriden/ESOPs ? 
5. Radical Co-operatives Media/Wholefoods ? 
"to create spaces, becoming more numerous, where initiatives 
can expand not motivated by the pursuit of profit but by the 
spirit of service and an ideal of responsibility. For a long 
time co-operators and mutualists have been active propagators 
of this ideal, which harmonises completely with democratic, 
self-governing socialism." (Watkins,198l,plO) 
In Britain the Labour Party, which has shown little interest in ~ support 
for the producer co-operative movement in the post war period has now 
suggested in their discussion document a dramatic way in which co-operatives 
can contribute to the goal of social control of a planned economy: workers 
should have the legislative right to convert their enterprises into 
workers co-operatives and if necessary receive financial support to do 
this. Whether such a radical proposal could withstand the furious hotility 
of private capital and other established interests remains to be seen. 
Achieving a "coherent and politically conscious workers co-operative 
movement" (1980,p9) would involve securing the sympathy of a Labour 
Government to shopfloor demands never previously apparent. 
Another possibility is that of establishing at the regional level 
• 
'archipelagos of democratically organised enterprises,' as in the 
Mondragon model. Unemployment and structural decline has becoms so severe 
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. 
at the peripheries of many industrial countries that it is not 
'surprising that abandoned regions have been prepared to consider 
radical remedies to revive their economies, as in the Wales TOC 
proposals for substantial job creation through building a sector of 
inter-linked co-operatives drawing on common resource centres and 
investment funds. (1981) However, given decades of economic decay, 
the huge scale of the problems to be confronted means that at this 
. stage such initiatives remain largely at the level of inspirational 
guides rather than practical proposals. Though pump priming to the 
tune of £100,000 has been obtained from Thatcher's Government, and 
from the EEC, tens of millions are necessary if many co-operative 
initiatives are not to be throttled at birth. The capitalist market 
economy can only promise the intensification of the de-industrialisation 
of the regions, and indicative planning and limited regional assistance 
has failed to do anything but slow the. pace of decline. State initiatives 
through regional enterprise boards beyond anything so far attempted 
would seem the only solution, and encouraging a large co-operative 
sector is one way of ensuring grass-roots involvement in economic 
regeneration. 
• 
Inner cities faced with extreme social and economic deprivation 
are likely.to resort to co-operative development as one of the only 
effective means available to commence rebuilding communities. Two 
successful examples in rather pleasant contexts are Bologna in Italy, 
and Santa Monica in California, where local government has shown that 
it can intervene in the local economy to provide services and productive 
facilities on a co-operative basis from which the whole community 
benefits. (Jaggi et'al, 1917, Carnoyand Shearer, 1980) The small 
co-operative agencies being set up 1n Britain and other countries 
similarly could form part of a municipai ·s~ialism that would permit 
working class urban communities to achieve more control over their 
own lives, assuming that this was nott. an effort on the part of the 
local state to impose on working people the responsibility for the 
structural economic and social problems that blight their communities. 
In an exciting illustration of what is possible, ~ group of South 
Y~rkshire engineers who had been made redundant by the multinatianal 
• 
GEe -formed a Traffic Systems co--opera~lve and bid for the traffic 
signals maintenance contracts in the area, monopolised by their . 
• 
former employers and by Ples~ey. GEe were forced to slash their 
prices by 56% and Plessey by 70% in their effort to retain the 
contracts when confronted for the first time by this unorthodox 
competition, but the County Council awarded the Sheffield city 
contract to the co-operative instead of GEC. Other councils are now 
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ke'en to follow South Yorkshire's example, breaking the hold of giant 
monopolies, promoting local co-operative employment, and saving money 
in the process. (Sunday Times, 23 January 1983) ",In another significant 
example, the Labour Group of the Greater London Council (GLC) has a 
strong policy commitment to revive London's local economy \.,.hich has 
lost half a million jobs in the last decade and has 33 million square 
feet of empty factory and warehouse space. The GLC has formed a Greater 
~ndon Enterprise Board as a means to intervene to save jobs in companies 
faced with bankruptcy, to support trade union proposals to prevent 
redundancies, and to create new jobs with co-ops or municipal enterprises. 
(GLC,l983) Now there are 9 Co-operative Development Agencies operating 
in London, funded through Borough Councils. Among the most successful 
is Brent CDA which has been associated with the launch of'25 co-operatives 
in the last three years, including Third Sector, a large electrical 
engineering co-operative established when GEC attempted to close • 
Associated Automation, saving the jobs of 180 largely Asian and West 
Indian women workers.(Sadly, amid considerable confusion, Third Sector 
collapsed in the middle of 1983). 
WOrker takeovers of collapsed businesses are bound to continue 
as the world recession deepens and more businesses fail. If they meet 
with more financial and practical assistance than they have in the past, 
then survival for these desperate organizations may not be so precarious 
as it was in the case of the celebrated Benn co-operatives. Co-operative 
purists may claim that this is the worst basis on which to establish a 
co-operative, b~t it involves more idealism and effort than when.some ~ 
rich eccentric decides to give his company away t~ the workers : To be 
realistiC the growing interest in workers' co-operatives is largely a 
• 
result of the sev~rity of the present recession, and the accelerating 
collapse of private companies that it has caused. If the new worker 
co-operative movement is not to fade away as economic recovery is 
achieved, like the waves of co-operatives in the past, then the financial, 
organizational, and political support has to be developed which is 
necessary to provide strength and continuity to this movement. Minimally 
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this would consist of a number of vital.co-operative services: 
" banking and investment: management !Onsultancy; research and development; 
technical resources; and marketing services. Also essential is the 
. 
commitment of socialist political parties to sustain and expand 
. ? 
co-operative enterprises. Moreover if internal democratic degen~ration 
is not to occur, as it, did at K~ffi and the Scottish Daily News in 
Britain, under the weight of external pressures and ·internal contradictions, 
then efforts at promoting worker involvement will have to be relentless. 
In this context , whether the spate of worker takeovers in the United 
States with the adoption of ESOPs (employee stock ownership plans) is 
simply a temporary outbre·ak of enforced worker 'capitalism, cutt.ing 
workers in these plants off from the broader struggle against capital, 
or whether they have the capacity to survive as'clues to a socialist 
future in the heartland of multi-national capital remains to be seen. 
(Woodworth,198l) 
Finally the creation of radical alternative co-operatives, 
perhaps employing more advanced technologies, and engaging in more 
sophisticated industries than is involved in the retailing of brown· 
rice (however essential this may be !) seems an area of unlimited 
potential growth. Indeed the producer co-operative form seems uniquely 
suited for small-scale, service-based, labour-in'. ~r .. sive industries such 
..as agriculture, crafts, retailing, printing', construction, media and 
the arts. Wallace Tuck has delineated a typology of the industries and 
services most suitable for co-operative development that accurately 
reveals the immense scope but real limitations of the growth of 
co-operatives. (1981) It has to be realised that large scale, capital 
intensive industries are not really appropriate for transformation into 
.co-operatives (for example the comparatively few workers in a large 
,.cbemical pr:ocessing plant would each have to be millionaires to collectively 
own the plant). Ambitions for the break-up of the existing public sector 
and replacement with competing producer co-operatives seem even more 
hopelessly misconceived, since unpred\ctable and uneven production and 
provision of these vital goods and services would be publicly unacceptable. 
However as the typology shows this still leaves a vast range of activities 
in wbic~co-operatives could freely proliferate. ~ elaborate the potential 
of 'just one area, that of the media: already in the campaign for more 
participatory communications and culture" there have been widespread 
" developments of community newspapers; co-operatlve national ~ewspapers 
'. 
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4. WALLl\CE TUCK TYPOLOGY OF INDUSTRIES, SERVICES AND ACTIVITIES 
SUITABLE FOR CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPHENT (1981) 
Not Seen As possible For 
Co-operative Development 
Large Scale Production 
Capital Intensive Technology 
Non-Divisible Production 
(Seen as ripe for radical 
socialising strategies) 
Nationalised Industries 
Public Sector 
(Seen as ready for c?mplete 
overhaul in the direction of 
more democratic management) 
• J: • 
" Possible Areas For 
.' ': Co-operative Development 
, .Agr icu 1 tur e 
, -Fishing 
. Construction 
, Furniture 
-Food Processing 
Clothing 
. :.::--: lJ'ransport 
-wnolesale/Retail 
Distr ibution 
Private 'Service Sector 
Community Based Savings 
Small Scale l-lanufactur ing 
'Light Engineering 
llicro Computers 
Professional Services 
Arts/Crafts 
Recreation 
sports (Including 
'Professional Football 
" Clubs !) 
and magazines; co-operative local radio and televisLonl co-operative 
cable television; co-operative publishing houses;' independent co-operative 
film-making; and co-operative theatre. (Henhy,l982, .i99 and Wade,l980) 
Thus in many co-operative experiments in different countries it has been 
successfully shown that the stranglehold of commercia1 domination of the 
media can be broken, without necessarily the media falling into the 
bearhug of the state. 
This ~ange of co-operative philosophies, fOrms and activities, 
may continue to be advocated and att·empted. However it is important to 
.' realise that they ar'e in 'some important respects rrutllally contradictory, 
and that there will be conflicts between co-operatives as well as within 
them over the direction of future co-operative development. We have to 
decide if we are attempting to rescue capitalism fraa its own failings, 
to create an independent self-managed sector, or to engage in the struggle 
for ,socialist transformation. If we know where we are going. there is 
slightly more chance that we may end up the~e ! 
Abell, P. 1979 
Accountancy 1978 
Accountants 
Journal 1950 
Ackland,J. 1897 
Acland,A.H.D. 1886 
Adams,R.J. & 
Rummel,C.H. 1977 
Adams ,V. 1949 
Adsett,W.H. 1921 
Alexander,K.J. 1970 
& Jenkins,C.L. 
Alexander ,K.O. 1975 
Allan,J. 1887 
Anderson,S.S. 1967 
Antoni ,A. 1968 
Arena 1907 
Arena 1908 
Ashley,W.J. 1889 
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E P I lOG U E 
" The rhinoceros, a formidable looking 
beast ••• starts to charge with 
devastating intent but instead of 
reaching its target tends to stop 
dead, run straight past or disappear 
at a tangent having forgotten 
what it was trying to do in the 
first place ••• " 
Mathew Engel, Guardian, 1~ July 1982 • 
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